W. H. F. Barnes and H. P. Grice

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W. H. F Barnes studied for the Litera e Humaniores degree a t Oxford Universit y between 1930-32. Whilst seeking regular academic employment he was invite d t o address a meeting of the Jowett Society a t Oxford on November 8th , 1933. The paper which he gave, entitle d 'Is there a Realm of Values?', raised considerable interes t because i t expressed an emotivis t view of the nature of evaluative judgements. Amongst those present a t the meeting was Duncan-Jones who, i n hi s capacity as coedito r of the newly founded journa l Analysis, asked fa r a copy of the paper fo r the purposes of publication . The published extrac t was renamed 'A Suggestion about Value', and appeared i n the March 1934 volume. Although the extrac t was only 150 words long, i t nonetheless constitute d one of the firs t publicl y accessible statements of the emotivis t analysi s of ethics . Barnes explains tha t a t the time of writin g the paper he was engaged i n reading Nicolas Hartmann's Ethics, and was concerned t o rejec t Hartmann's notion tha t values exis t i n some sphere other than tha t of the natura l world. He was also convinced by Moore's refutatio n of any naturalis t explanation of value, but fel t sure tha t Moore's notio n of goodness as a non-natural qualit y fared no better. However i t was, Barnes says, only as the day of the meeting neared tha t he struc k upon a plausibl e alternativ e t o both Hartmann's and Moore's theories, and made the suggestion tha t 'to say something i s good i s not t o predicate a characteristi c but t o express approval'. (1) I t i s therefore worthwhile t o examine i n detai l the arguments presented i n t he unti l recentl y missing Jowett Society paper, and draw upon Barnes' recollectio n of the historica l context withi n which he made the emotivis t suggestion. Barnes introduces the paper by summarising Hartmann's thesi s i n Ethic s as an attempt t o prove the objectivit y and absoluteness of ethica l principles . He indicate s that , fo r Hartmann, these principle s are tru e because they relat e t o a pluralit y of values the concrete existence of which i s manifest i n thei r 'ideal essences'. (2) In showing - 118 - this , Barnes states tha t Hartmann's thesi s rest s upon a procedure of analysi s which i s t o be characterisise d thus: The objectivit y of moral principle s consists... i n this , tha t they derive thei r authorit y always from a value. I f i t can be shown tha t values are genuine existen t entities , then i t wil l be shown tha t moral principle s are objective, i n the sense tha t thei r relativit y rest s upon the discernment of values tha t are absolute, n ot upon the relativit y of values. (3) For Hartmann, as Barnes explains, values are 'genuine existen t entities ' because they are essences, where 'Essences form a realm of entities.. . which i s not less real , and i n a way more real , than the world of existin g things'. (4) For Barnes, however, thi s conception of value as t he essence or common idea l property of a thin g i s false . This i s because, he argues, our knowledge of the essence of a thin g relate s simply t o our necessarily imperfect and contingent observations of 'what i t is' , and how i t resembles simila r existin g objects. I t therefore follow s tha t thi s knowledge does not relat e t o some alleged property t he form of which i s perfec t and eternal . As Barnes puts it , t o know t he essence of a table , fo r example, 'is simply t o know what a tabl e is : i t i s an imperfect knowledge of thing s not a perfec t knowledge of an idea l entity' . (5) As such, he claims tha t Hartmann's notio n tha t moral principle s are objective and absolute i s groundless because i t i s based upon a conception of ideal value essences which i s mistaken. Having dismissed Hartmann's thesis , Barnes focusses hi s attentio n upon the ethica l theory of G.E. Moore. He offer s a critica l summary of Moore's positio n when he write s tha t Professor Moore maintains tha t goodness i s a qualit y intuitivel y perceived. I t i s unanalysable and indefinable. He furthe r adds tha t i t i s a nan-natural qualit y . Reflection seems t o show tha t i t i s a very puzzling quality . I f a thin g i s t o be good i t seems i t must be good i n virtu e of what i t is . That i s t o say, i t must firs t have it s own completely determinate nature: then, and then only, wil l i t be good. (6> - 119 - Barnes' poin t i s tha t i f Hoore i s correc t i n saying tha t goodness i s a quality , then he must assume tha t an object i s good i n virtu e of al l i t s propertie s or it s whole nature. For Barnes, however, thi s cannot be so. He asserts tha t 'i f goodness i s a qualit y i t must be a par t of the thing's nature. The thin g cannot be good i n virtu e of it s whole nature, f o r it s whole nature includes it s goodness'. <7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes suggests tha t thi s doubt accentuates a more general deficiency i n the arguments of both Hoore and Hartmann. He write s that : The defect of... the theories so fa r considered... i s tha t the goodness or value of anything i s not considered t o be i n any way relativ e t o the desires and interest s of appraising subjects. And thi s seems difficul t t o maintain. I t would involve maintaining that , however radicall y men's desires change, stil l what has been good would remain good. (10) Barnes assumes tha t the goodness or value of something must relat e i n some way t o the materia l and practica l contingencies of human moral experience, as fel t i n desires, interests , and the like . I t i s thi s relationshi p which i s not considered by theorist s who conceive of values as being revealed t o us a priori , and quite independently of our materia l circumstances as subjects. However, Barnes insist s tha t the acknowledgement tha t goodness i s relativ e t o the desires and interest s of men does not imply tha t 'naturalist ' definition s of good are correct , where 'A i s good' i s taken t o mean 'A i s the object of my approval', or ' I take an interes t i n A'. (11) I f thi s were so, then two people who maintain respectivel y tha t 'A i s good' and tha t 'A i s bad' would not be contradictin g each other at all . This account, he says, i s incapable of explainin g al l arguments about value. We therefore need t o explain - 120 - arguments about value i n terms which are not naturalis t i n character. Barnes proceeds t o do so by making the emotivis t 'suggestion1 , which was published i n Analysis, and shal l be quoted here i n full . He write s that : Value judgements i n thei r origi n are not strictl y judgements a t all . They are exclamations expressive of approval. This i s t o be distinguishe d from the theory tha t the value judgement 'A i s good' state s tha t ' I approve A.' The theory tha t 1 am now puttin g forward maintains tha t 'A i s good' i s a form of words expressive of my approval. To take an illustration: - when I say ' I have a pain' tha t sentence state s the occurrence of a certai n feelin g i n me: when I shout 'Oh!' i n a certai n way tha t i s expressive of the occurrence i n me of a certai n feeling . We must seek then fo r the origi n of value judgements i n the expressions of approval, deligh t and affection , which childre n utte r when confronted wit h certai n experiences,.. I f al l so-called value judgements are, i n principle , expressions of approval, then they wil l only possess meaning i n so fa r as the society i n which they are used i s agreed on what thing s i t approves. And then 'good' and value wil l be terms which have meaning only by referrin g t o the actual nature of the thing , not t o any non-natural qualit y i t possesses. Meanwhile i t i s worthwhile mentioning tha t many controversies arisin g out of value judgements are settle d by saying ' I lik e i t and you don't, and that s the end of the matter1 . We are content t o adopt thi s solutio n of the difficult y on matters such as food and drink , though even here we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs. Why are we not content t o accept the same solutio n on al l matters where value i s concerned? The reason we are not so content seems t o li e i n the fac t tha t t he actio n of one man dictate d by hi s approval of something i s frequently incompatible wit h the actio n of another man dictate d by h i s approval of something. Lif e i n a societ y leads us continuall y t o transfe r our approval t o differen t objects. Reflection upon tha t lif e leads t o stil l furthe r modifications . I t i s thi s - 121 - opposition between the approval of one man and tha t of others which lie s a t the bottom of controversies about value. I f I maintain 'A i s good' against the contention "A i s bad' my attempt t o prove the trut h of my statement i s not reall y what i t pretends t o be. I point out detail s i n A which are the object of my approval. By so doing I hope tha t my opponent, when he becomes aware of these, wil l approve A: and so be ready t o say 'A i s good'. But what I have done i s not reall y t o gain hi s assent t o a propositio n but t o change hi s attitud e from one of disapproval t o one of approval towards A. Al l attempts t o persuade others of the trut h of value judgements are thus reall y attempts t o make others approve the thing s we approve. (12) We can see tha t thi s published passage expresses most lucidl y the centra l characteristi c features of a distinct y emotivis t view. Most importantly , i t contains the notion tha t value judgements are expressions of approval rathe r than proposition s of fact , and the idea tha t disagreements about value are primaril y reconcilable through attitudina l persuasion rathe r than factua l demonstration. I t i s worthwhile notin g tha t Barnes extends thi s analysi s int o a discussion of the standards of our socia l morality . He continues that : I f al l values are relativ e i n thi s way (ie . i f al l values relat e t o expressions of approval) how then can we be justifie d i n speaking of a moral standard? There seems t o be an objectivit y about moral values which distinguishe s them from other values. Taken a t thei r narrowest they are those ways of actin g which everybody must approve of i f organised society i s t o be possible. In so fa r as every man, i n virtu e of hi s membership of society, approves of whatever i s necessary t o maintain society, these values, though relativ e t o the members of a society, are relativ e not t o thi s or tha t man but t o a standard man... There i s no standard by which we can judge him. He may condemn himself fo r fallin g shor t of his own ideals of conduct but hi s ideal s of conduct are no idea l essences: they are merely the interna l signs tha t he himself i s i n process of transferrin g hi s approval from one set of thing s t o - 122 - another. As he changes the standard changes because he i s the standard. (13) Barnes' relativis t account of socia l moralit y i s familia r enough t o us. I t i s t o claim tha t the ethica l standards which a societ y adopts res t upon a collectiv e choice of it s members, who undertake t o follo w rule s of conduct which they individuall y approve. Thus, according t o thi s view, the moral standards of a particula r society always relat e t o t he exhibitio n of shared individua l preferences, as set withi n a specifi c context. I t follow s tha t moral standards or general socia l rule s of conduct are invented and mutable, not absolute and merely awaitin g discovery. Having given thi s account of socia l morality , Barnes turn s t o the issue of whether any philosophica l theory which purports t o indicat e t he objectivit y of moralit y i s plausible. Taking Hartmann as hi s prime example, he makes the poin t tha t any philosophica l examination which generates prescriptiv e recommendations about moral lif e i s not an authentic analysi s of ethic s a t all , but i s instead an example of moralising . In other words, he insist s tha t any objectivis t account of ethic s does not constitut e a pure descriptio n of moral experience but rathe r makes a prescriptiv e contributio n t o tha t moral experience which invite s agents t o approve of the same thing s approved of by the prescriber. Thus, Barnes claims tha t what the objectivis t i s reall y doing i s 'simply analysing the situations , emotions, ways of actin g etc. which he approves, His purpose i n so doing i s t o induce i n us the same feeling s of approval as he has.' (14) Barnes' contention, then, i s tha t philosophers such as Hartmann fai l t o recognise tha t a theoretica l account of the ethica l world, and t he making of prescriptiv e recommendations about the 'good life' , are two logicall y distinc t activities . As such, he says, you can do one or t he other, never both, a t the same time: or you can only do both i f you recognise the difference. But i t i s a differenc e which, he claims, ethica l theorist s of the past have tended t o overlook. This i s because, he states: - 123 - I t i s a characteristi c of the great moral philosophers from Plato onwards, tha t they were inten t on so presenting the nature of thing s as t o win the approval of thei r hearers fo r what they themselves approved. Al l men are drive n by a deep and inescapable desire t o make others approve what they approve. (15) However, he says, thi s desire t o gain approval fo r what you value i s inappropriate fo r the moral philosopher t o seek. Barnes furthe r asserts tha t the objectivis t ethica l theoris t i s n ot only guilt y of overlooking the distinctio n between analysis and prescription . He i s also committed t o an inappropriat e monism. For, as he explains: I f we were t o speak of a Realm of Values we could only mean the expositio n of a man's preferences i n thei r systematic interrelation , includin g specificatio n of the particula r emotional qualit y tha t accompanies each act of preference. There wil l thus be not one, but many, Realms of Value. (16) Barnes' poin t i s tha t an objectivis t cannot claim tha t the values he approves of are singularl y valid . At best, they express one among many personal preferences. Therefore, although both objectivist s and ordinary moral agents assume tha t thei r standards are absolutely true , i t i s the task of the moral philosopher t o inform them tha t ethica l understanding i s i n fac t relativ e and plural . As such, he concludes that : moralit y i s simply i n the long run tha t set of ideas and approving attitude s which has triumphed i n any particula r society. And difficul t as thi s view may seem, i t i s nevertheless implied every time we speak of the moralit y of the East, the moralit y of t he 14th century, or the moralit y of Germany. Each i s a morality , believin g itsel f t o be absolute, yet seen on examination t o be relative . Ernest Barker has said: 'I t i s the essence of nationalism tha t a natio n considers it s civilisatio n t o be Civilisation' . I n a world where nationalism threatens t o destroy civilisatio n a sound convictio n of the relativit y of al l moralit y - 124 - i s likel y t o be not so much a solvent of moralit y as a salutar y check on it s onesidedness. (17) Barnes has recentl y given hi s own assessment of the historica l context withi n which hi s emotivis t suggestion was made. He has no doubt tha t G.E Moore's Principi a Ethica was the major tex t which the earl y emotivis t thinker s were responding to , The reason why DuncanJones, Stevenson and himself were al l moving towards a simila r positio n a t the same time was because, he suggests, 'Moore had convinced us tha t there was no analysi s of 'good' i n empirical , or as he would say, naturalisti c terms, and we could not accept hi s alternativ e of a nonnaturalisti c characteristic , goodness' (18) Likewise, Barnes di d not accept the version of ethica l intuitionis m which was advanced by Professor Prichard, who was hi s tuto r a t Oxford i n hi s undergraduate years. He explains tha t although hi s earlies t views on ethic s were shaped by Prichard's lectures and classes, and although he respected Prichard's rejectio n of al l empirico-utilitaria n analyses, he was convinced tha t Prichard's own account of good as an indefinable su i generis concept fared no better than Moore's. (19) In other words, Barnes found Prichard's and Moore's rejectio n of t he naturalis t account of ethic s convincing, but he rejected thei r own metaphysical views, and sought an alternativ e theory which was consisten t wit h hi s empiricis t viewpoint, He write s that : At the time, I held... tha t al l knowledge and rationa l belie f must relat e t o what the senses disclose or what goes on i n my mind: but I was not incline d t o blackbal l ethic s and theology fo r membership of the empirica l club, simply because they had nD direc t and singl e relationshi p t o the evidence of the senses. Rather I hankered afte r showing tha t they had a looser, but stil l a justifyin g relationshi p t o the world of the senses. (20) Barnes' hankering i n thi s respect was satisfie d by making the suggestion tha t our ethica l and theologica l understandings constitut e t he expression of desires which are disclosed through the senses. I t was, he says, a notio n which linke d up wit h 'the attractiv e idea that... - 125 - a thing's being good i s relate d t o what we desire i n same way', although not i n a way which was describable i n the naturalis t manner. (21) In concluding this , Barnes acknowledges the possible influence of Ogden and Richards, He recall s tha t he had read The Meaning of Meaning during the period of making the suggestion, and he admits t o the likel y probabilit y tha t i t was hi s familiarit y wit h thei r account of the emotive use of language i n general which contributed t o the emergence of hi s distinctl y emotivis t view. As he puts it , 'while I cannot be sure tha t thi s volume was the midwife which delivered me from the labour of producing the suggestion, I thin k i t probably was'. (22)