Locke and Grice on 'self'

One might suggest that there is an alternative interpretation of ―genuinely remember‖ which avoids the issues of circularity and inconsistency that apparently generate the Memory Dilemma. For example, Mackie50 mentions an ―ancestral link‖ theory of personal identity proposed by Grice as an amendment to avoid the Memory Dilemma; Parfit develops this theory into the ―chain of memory‖ theory; and Garrett argues that this ―chain of memory‖ theory is not an amendment but Locke‘s own view. If Locke‘s theory of personal identity is interpreted this way, the transitivity principle will indeed be an advantage of Locke‘s theory. According to the ancestral link theory51: LPI2‘: a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if there is an ―ancestral link‖ that connects b‘s memory at t2 and any of a‘s actions and thoughts at t1. If a person a at t1 and b at t2 and c at t3 all belong to the same of consciousness, the same unified mental history unified by the relevant ancestral links, then they are the same person. In particular, if c at t3 seemingly remembers any of b‘s actions and thoughts at t2, and b at t2 seemingly remembers any of a‘s actions and thoughts at t1, c is the same person as b, and b is the same person as a, and c is the same person as a (for c genuinely remembers any of a‘s actions and thoughts at t1, though c might not seemingly remember it). The ancestral link theory easily explains away Reid‘s brave officer example; however, it is hard to see how the ancestral link theory explains away the amnesia example. For during the amnesia, the person has no consciousness at all, and thus nothing to be linked with its ancestor‘s memory. But Parfit suggests how the amnesia example might be explained by the ―chain of memory‖ theory, allowing us to say, that even on a Memory theory, that ―a person continues to exist even if he suffers from complete amnesia.‖52 For example, Parfit suggests that we suppose that I am knocked unconscious by a climbing accident. My fellow climber tells me years later what he shouted at me just before I fell. Years later I seem to remember what my fellow climber shouted at me. It seems impossible, however, for me to actually remember what he shouted since it is a well-established fact that we cannot remember our last few experiences before we are knocked unconscious.53 Parfit proposes a way of dealing with this problem with the word ―memory‖ in a sense wide enough that its continuity allows any cause. Thus, in the above example, even though my ―memory‖ that my fellow climber yelled at me before I fell was caused by his testimony rather than my actual memory, I still ―genuinely remember‖ that he yelled at me. This ―chain of memory‖ theory is, thus, a very liberal version of a psychological criterion for personal identity: a person a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if (1) there is between them continuity of memory in the sense of ―the holding of overlapping chains of strong connections,‖ where (2) this continuity can have any sort of cause, and so long as (3) ―there does not exist a different person who is also psychologically continuous with b‖.54 However, Parfit‘s ―chain of memory‖ theory is still too narrow for a plausible theory of personal identity; for what if, in the above example, I do not even ―seem to remember‖ what my fellow-climber shouted at me? Observers might be convinced by other evidence that I continued to exist when my fellow-climber shouted at me; but what if I do not remember what my fellow-climber shouted at me even in the widest sense of ―memory‖? Society and Politics Vol. 10, No. 2(20)/November 2016 27 Garrett has further developed the ―chain of memory‖ theory. Garrett55 argues that ―the extension by consciousness of a present person into the past‖ is not limited to what the person now remembers or can now remember; rather, to be conscious of a person‘s experiences or thoughts is to ―find‖ oneself to be the same person, to be prepared to represent any of this person‘s experiences or thoughts as performed by oneself. Thus, even though in the above example I do not remember what my fellowclimber shouted at me, as long as I once remembered, or external evidence convinced me, I may well honestly represent what my fellow-climber shouted at me as heard by myself, even if with less force and conviction than is present in actual memory. And according to Garrett this type of ―memory‖ is arguably allowed by Locke as constitutive of a ―chain‖ that constitutes personal identity. Garrett‘s diagnosis of Locke‘s theory of personal identity conflicts with the diagnosis of Grice, Mackie and Parfit. For example, Grice56 says: ―The theory which I am going to suggest is, I think, mainly a modification of Locke's theory of Personal Identity.‖ And Mackie57:―However, this is a revision, not an interpretation, of Locke‘s account.‖ And Parfit 58 : ―Locke suggested that experience-memory provides the criterion for personal identity. Though this is not, on its own, a plausible view, I believe that it can be part of such a view.‖ According to their interpretations, Locke indeed holds the view that a person a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if b at t2 now remembers (or can now remember) any of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1. This is why they call their theory of personal identity, an amendment of Locke‘s theory of personal identity. The textual evidence from Locke seems to support this view. Locke says: Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them? (II.xxvii.20:342) In response to the question, he answers: ―we must here take notice what the Word I is applied to, which in this case is the Man only‖ (II.xxvii.20:342). Mackie interprets this passage in this way: ―that is, the person who did those forgotten actions is not the same person as I now am, though no doubt a series of memory bridges will have connected them.‖ If Mackie is right, Locke would not hold the ancestral link theory or any form of the chain of memory theory. The ―ancestral link‖ theory or the ―chain of memory‖ theory might be a theory of identity of man, but not a theory of personal identity. However, Garrett insists that Locke holds the ―chain of memory‖ theory: For to become conscious of an action of Nestor‘s is, on Locke‘s account, to become convinced that one is the same self as Nestor and ipso facto to become prepared to represent any of the actions of Nestor’s self—properly incorporated into Nestor‘s self at whatever time and by whatever means—as actions performed by one’s own self; and this must include even actions that Nestor once remembered but that one cannot now specifically remember.59 Xinghua Wang – A Skeptical View on Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity 28 I think that it is hard to see why Locke would endorse the view that Garrett attributes to him. Though Locke claims: ―as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought…it is the same self now it was then‖ (II.xxvii.9:335), he never asserts that the extension by consciousness of the present person to the past goes beyond what one now remembers or can now remember. Locke says: ―But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person as Nestor‖ (II.xxvii.14:340). This seems to support Garrett‘s view that if a person once remembered any of the actions or thoughts of someone, he is that same person. But I think that the quoted passage actually supports the view that if a person b once at t2 remembered any of the actions or thoughts of a at t1, a at t1 is the same person as b at t2. 60 Note that this is quite different from the view Garrett attributes to Locke: if a person b once at t2 remembered any of the actions or thoughts of a at t1, a at t1 is the same person as b at any time. Earlier in the same passage, Locke raises the question: ―But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same person as either of them‖ (II.xxvii.14:339)? He responds: So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of either of those Men, he is no more one self with either of them, than if the Soul or immaterial Spirit, that now informs him, had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present Body. (II.xxvii.14:339) Thus, it should be clear that Locke thinks that if one now has no consciousness of any of the actions of Nestor, he cannot conceive himself the same person as him. It thus follows that if a person b at t2 (say, now) is the same person as a (say, Nestor) at t1, b at t2 has consciousness of some of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1. Garrett is thus wrong to say that Locke holds the ―chain of memory‖ theory. And the second approach in response to the Memory Dilemma also fails. Even though the first two approaches fail, there might be a third approach that explains away the dilemma. One might want to find a new understanding of Locke‘s concept of consciousness to avoid the dilemma61: LPI3: a person a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if b at t2 is ―conscious‖ of a‘s experiences or thoughts at t1. We might say that Garrett has already done this. However, I think that Garrett‘s interpretation is better regarded as an alternative interpretation of ―genuine remembering,‖ than as comparable to the suggested to be in this section. For he never says that consciousness (of the past) is not memory, and indeed his understanding of consciousness is as a type of ―memory‖. Weinberg argues that the traditional interpretations of Locke‘s theory have been taking consciousness as a state of a person providing a psychological criterion for personal identity, but textual evidence also seems to support the view that, as a certain enduring ―thing‖ in its own right, consciousness provides a metaphysical criterion for personal identity. Weinberg62 says: Society and Politics Vol. 10, No. 2(20)/November 2016 29 But Locke also seems to see consciousness as (2) the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states. The second sense is the objective fact of an ongoing consciousness, something that is epistemically available from a third personal (maybe only God‘s) point of view. Thus, according to her interpretation ―consciousness‖ has two senses for Locke: (1) consciousness as a psychological criterion for personal identity is a state of awareness of myself as thinking and acting (or willing); (2) consciousness as a metaphysical criterion for personal identity is the ongoing self I am aware of in such states of awareness. The former is epistemically accessible to us; the latter is (maybe) only epistemically accessible to God. Since Locke‘s psychological interpretation of personal identity either ends up with counterexamples or with problems of circularity or inconsistency, the only way around this, Weinberg argues, is just to allow a metaphysical interpretation of Locke‘s theory of personal identity. If Locke‘s theory of personal identity can be interpreted in a metaphysical way, Weinberg argues, there will be an objective fact of the matter about the truth or falsity of what is given in the first-personal way, accessible from God‘s point of view. From the latter point of view, it would be truly known whether I am a self with a particular past (even if I do not remember my past). Weinberg‘s interpretation of Lockean personal identity has two advantages compared to the standard view and the ancestral link or chain of memory theory. First, since she argues that memory is not sufficient for personal identity, she does not need to deal with the paramnesia, fission and fusion examples. Secondly, the metaphysical criterion for personal identity can compensate for the deficiencies of the psychological criterion for personal identity and explains away Reid‘s brave officer and amnesia examples. However, apart from the fact that Weinberg‘s interpretation leaves Locke vulnerable to the inconsistency criticism, 63 Weinberg‘s interpretation itself is inconsistent with Locke‘s text. Weinberg says: There are two ways, Locke suggests, that we can think about consciousness as having a continuing existence. We can try to explain it insofar as it can be seen to fit with the traditional ontology of substances, modes and relations, or we can try to explain it insofar as it continues to exist as the object I, self, or person we experience when we are conscious we are perceiving ideas.64 But (as this even seems to grant) Weinberg‘s new understanding of consciousness cannot fit into the traditional ontology of substances, modes and relations. Is this ―ongoing self‖ a substance? Since ―this self has existed in a continued Duration more than one instant‖ (II.xxvii.25:345), it surely looks like a substance; but Locke continues to say: ―In all which account of self, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making the same self: but the same continued consciousness‖ (II.xxvii.25:346). Is this ―ongoing self‖ not a substance, but something that looks like a substance? But how is it possible that something that is not a substance can have ―reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing‖ (II.xxvii.9:335)? In any case, Weinberg does not make clear what this ―ongoing self‖ is, and certainly not in a way that is consistent with Locke‘s text. Weinberg‘s approach, therefore, also fails to explain away the Memory Dilemma. Xinghua Wang – A Skeptical View on Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity 30 Yaffe provides an alternative reading of consciousness that supposedly also explains away the brave officer example and the amnesia example. According to Yaffe, consciousness is ―both a smooth and halting awareness of one‘s mental states‖, and it always ―involves two ideas, a halting idea of the mental states of the previous instant, and a smooth idea of a particular mental state enjoyed during that instant‖ which provides one with ―a conception of oneself as continuously existing, as having duration‖. 65 To illustrate this point, Yaffe invites us to imagine looking at a photograph of a streak of flying cannonball with a spotlight moving from left to right across the streak.66 Putting the photograph (the halting idea) and the spotlight (the smooth idea) together, Yaffe argues, we are able to get the idea of succession. Once we have gotten the idea of succession, we are able to acquire the idea of continuous existence. Thus, even though one is not actually conscious during an instant, he still has the (fictitious) idea of continuous existence throughout a sequence of instants. Therefore, Yaffe concludes that the idea of continuous existence is applicable even across gaps in conscious experience, and then applying the point to Locke‘s personal identity: Perhaps person-stage A and C can be thought of as stages of the same person if there‘s some other person-stage B such that the succession of ideas from A to B allows B to derive the idea of continuous existence while the succession from B to C allows C to do so.67 Therefore, even though there is no succession of ideas from A to C, as long as there is a certain sort of succession of ideas from A to B and from B to C (a sort allowing for the derivation of the idea of succession), person-stage A and C can still be the stages of the same person. For example, in Reid‘s brave officer example, even though there is no succession of ideas from the boy to the general, as long as there is the right sort of succession of ideas from the boy to the officer and from the officer to the general, the boy and the general can still be the same person. Similarly, a person might have continued existence during amnesia. Note that Yaffe‘s understanding of consciousness is different from Weinberg‘s. Nowhere does Yaffe suggest that there is a metaphysical criterion for personal identity in Locke‘s theory, or some sort of enduring object that is consciousness even though we may fail to be conscious of it. Like Weinberg, he aims to explore what more can be said about consciousness besides that it is a form of awareness and directed inward.68 For him, however, the enduring ―self‖ in question seems to be a ―real object‖ only in the sense that it is really the object of an idea. In particular, he doesn‘t seem to see Locke as thinking that such an ―object‖ is something that, over and above one’s own present consciousness of it, might also be the object of some other (e.g. God‘s) consciousness. But Yaffe, in any case, agrees that Locke speaks of an ongoing ―self‖ or ―mind‖ that we can represent as enduring through time up to the present, encompassing successive ideas, and even as having existed at times when the ideas it contained are not at present objects of recollection. However, on the one hand, Yaffe‘s ―enduring self,‖ which is a sort of fictional construction,3 only provides a false continued existence that crosses gaps in conscious experience. The ―enduring self‖ at most makes us believe that there is a succession of ideas from A to C; it cannot demonstrate objectively that there is indeed Society and Politics Vol. 10, No. 2(20)/November 2016 31 a succession of ideas from A to C. Thus, Yaffe‘s interpretation at most explains why we believe that the boy is the general; it cannot explain why the boy is the general. On the other hand, the ―enduring self‖ is not enough on which to base reward and punishment on the Day of Judgment. Locke says that person is ―a Forensic Term, appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness, and Misery‖ (II.xxvii.26:346). But if the idea of continued existence is only a fictional construction, it might not be able to give us something ―objective‖ enough to be the basis for a perception of objective desert, above and beyond the mere subjective fact that we seem to be able or unable to remember certain things at certain points in our lives. Therefore, Yaffe‘s approach also fails to explain away the Memory Dilemma. Strawson69 provides the other alternative interpretation of consciousness, i.e., consciousness as concerned consciousness, to explain away the Memory Dilemma. He argues that if we understand Person as a forensic term, Consciousness entails Concernment. If b at t2 is Concerned in a‘s actions and thoughts at t1, b at t2 is Conscious of a‘s actions and thoughts at t1. Also, if b at t2 is not Conscious of a‘s actions and thoughts at t1, b at t2 is not Concerned in a‘s actions and thoughts at t1. And it follows that a at t1 is not the same (forensic) Person as b at t2. In Reid‘s brave officer case, since the general is not Conscious of the boy‘s being flogged, the general is not Concerned in the boy‘s being flogged. It follows that the general is not the same (forensic) Person as the boy. Now it seems that if the general is not the same Person as the boy, the general is the same Person as the young officer, and the young officer is the the same Person as the boy, Locke violates the principle of the transitivity of identity. But Strawson argues that this is not an objection to Locke, but an illustration of the point that human beings won‘t be responsible for all the things they have done in their lives, but only those they are still Conscious of or Concerned in on the Day of Judgment.70 He argues: As a subject of experience you have a life time of actions and experiences behind you – most of which you‘ve completely forgotten. The ones that are part of your Personal identity, i.e., the ones that constitute your forensic identity, i.e., the ones that constitute the Person you are, considered as a moral being, a forensic entity, are simply those which you are still Conscious of, and hence still Concerned in: those that you still experience as your own in the crucial moral-affective way.71 If Strawson‘s interpretation is correct, Locke is simply insightful to point out that human beings are not always accountable for everything he did or thought. The so called ―counterexamples‖ are not really counterexamples at all. But though I think that Strawson is right that Locke has a forensic notion of personal identity in mind, personal identity is not at its core a forensic term.72 Locke says: ―to find wherein personal Identity consists, we must consider what Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection‖ (II.xxvii.9:335). Thus, there are at least two senses of personal identity, a forensic sense, and a metaphysical sense. Nowhere does Locke say that the forensic conception of person is prior to the metaphysical conception of person. And we can easily understand why Locke would not say so. If b at t2 is not conscious of any of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1, b is not Xinghua Wang – A Skeptical View on Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity 32 accountable for any of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1. Consciousness is, therefore, prior to accountability. The metaphysical conception of person is prior to the forensic conception of person. All in all, there is no textual evidence supporting the view that personal identity is at its core a forensic term. Strawson‘s interpretation also fails to explain away the Memory Dilemma. 4. A Skeptical Conclusion To conclude, Locke‘s theory of personal identity is correctly interpreted by the traditional or standard view: (LPI) a person a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if b at t2 remembers any of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1. LPI can be interpreted in two ways: (LPI1) a person a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if b at t2 seemingly remembers any of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1; and (LPI2) a person a at t1 is the same person as b at t2 if and only if b at t2 genuinely remembers any of a‘s actions or thoughts at t1. But this standard view faces a dilemma: either Locke‘s theory of personal identity is counterintuitive, if LPI is interpreted as LPI1; or his theory is circular or inconsistent, if LPI is interpreted as LPI2. There seems to be three types of approaches by Lockean scholars to respond the Memory Dilemma: 1) one might argue that our intuitions in those counterexamples are illusory, because of the uncritical assumption that the principle of the transitivity of identity applies to the case of diachronic identity; or 2) one might grant the principle of transitivity in application to the case but argue that there is an interpretation of ―genuinely remember‖ (LPI2‘) through ancestral links or chains of memory that explains the distinction between the two kinds of memory without begging the question or being inconsistent; 3) one might suggest a third way out of the dilemma by arguing for a completely new understanding of the role of the idea of ―same consciousness‖ (LPI3) in Locke‘s theory of personal identity. I have argued that these three approaches fail to explain away the Memory Dilemma that challenges Locke‘s account in the first place. The first approach fails to explain why the principle of transitivity is not applicable or compatible with Locke‘s theory of personal identity; the second approach is an amendment but is not an interpretation of Locke‘s theory of personal identity; the third approach indeed explains away the counterexamples in question, but Weinberg‘s approach leads to inconsistency with Locke‘s more general ontology, Yaffe‘s interpretation, which reduces the role of enduring consciousness in Locke‘s theory to the role of the idea of an enduring consciousness, seems incapable of fully explaining away the brave officer example and it is not ‗objective‘ enough for the basis Locke requires for the distribution of reward and punishment to the ‗same person‘ who deserves it on the Judgment Day, and Strawson‘s interpretation is based on the uncritical assumption that Locke‘s conception of person is at it core a forensic term. Therefore, we still need to take a skeptical stance towards Locke‘s theory of personal identity on the grounds that the Memory Dilemma still seems to be a major objection to it. Society and Politics Vol. 10, No. 2(20)/November 2016 33 References 1All references to Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), will appear by book number, chapter number, section number and page number. 2 Butler, J., The Analogy of Religion: Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. to Which Are Added Two Brief Dissertations: I. of Personal Identity. Ii. of the Nature of Virtue. by Joseph Butler, L.l.d. Rector of Stanhope, in the Bishoprick of Durham, (London: James, John and Paul Knapton, at the Crown in Ludgate Street, 1736), 301-8. 3 Grice, H. P., ―Personal Identity.‖ Mind 50 (October) (1941): 330-350. 4 Flew, A., ―Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity‖, Philosophy 26/96 (1951): 53-68. 5 Reid, T., ―Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity‖, in Personal Identity, ed. J. Perry (University of California Press, 1975). 6 Mackie, J. L., Problems from Locke, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 7 Perry, J., ―Can the Self Divide?‖ Journal of Philosophy 64/7 (1972): 463-88. 8Allison, H., ―Locke‘s Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-examination‖, In Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays, ed. I.C. Tipton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 105-122. 9 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 10 Jolley, N., Locke: His Philosophical Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 11 Garrett, D., ―Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and ‗Fatal Errors‘‖, Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2) (2003): 95-125. 12 Lowe, E. J., Locke, (London: Routledge, 2005). 13 Ichinose, M., ―Strawson on Locke's Theory of Personal Identity‖, Philosophical Studies 32 (2014): 1-9. 14 Winkler, K., ―Locke on Personal Identity.‖ Journal of the History of Philosophy 29/2 (1991): 201-226. 15 Weinberg, S, ―Locke on Personal Identity.‖ Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 398-407. 16 Weinberg, S, ―The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.‖ Journal of the History of Philosophy 50/3 (2012): 387-415. 17 Yaffe, G., ―Locke on Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Idea of Duration.‖ Noûs, 45/3 (2011): 387-408. 18 Helm, P., ―Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.‖ Philosophy 54 (208) (1979): 173-185. 19 Gustafsson, J. E., ―Did Locke Defend the Memory Continuity Criterion for personal identity?‖, Locke Studies 10 (2010): 113–129. 20 Rickless, S. C., Locke, (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2014). 21 Behan, D. P., ―Locke on Persons and Personal Identity‖, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9.1 (1979): 53–75. 22 McCann, E., ―Locke on Identity: Matter, Life, and Consciousness.‖ In Essays on Early Modern Philosophers, ed. V. Chappell (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992), 54-77. 23 Noonan, H.W., ―Locke on Personal Identity.‖ In John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in Focus, ed. G. Fuller, R. Stecker, and J. P. Wright (New York: Routledge, 2000), 210-235. 24 Forstrom, J. K., John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17thcentury Philosophy, (London: Continuum, 2010). 25 Strawson, G., Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011). 26 Strawson, G., ―‗The Secrets of All Hearts‘: Locke on Personal Identity‖, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 (2015): 111-141. Xinghua Wang – A Skeptical View on Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity 34 27 Boeker, R., ―The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity‖, History of Philosophy Quarterly 31/3 (2014):229-247. 28 Jolley, N., (1999), 120-1; Garrett, D., (2003), 17; Weinberg, S., (2011), 400-1. 29 This chapter was added to the second edition of the Essay in response to William Molyneux‘s comments to the first edition. 30 Some scholars argue that Locke is also concerned about synchronic identity when he talks about personal identity and since memory is consciousness of the past, it cannot explain synchronic personal identity. I think that Locke has made clear that he is only concerned about diachronic identity here. 31 Not all of the three principles are on the same level or independent. The first two principles are in the same breath, for Locke says: ―for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places‖ (II.xxvii.1:328). The third principle follows from the second principle, for if an object can only exist in one place, it can only come into existence in one place. See Conn, C.H., Locke On Essence and Identity, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2003), 68-9. 32 Conn, C. H., (2003), 65-68. 33 Broad, C. D., ―Locke‘s Doctrine of Substantial Identity & Diversity‖, Theoria 17 (1951), 16. 34 The inconsistency between Locke‘s principles of individuation and the relative identity thesis is pointed out by Conn, C. H., (2003), 91. Based on this reason, Conn argues that Locke does not hold the relative identity thesis. But if Locke does not hold the relative identity thesis, he seems to commit to essentialism which he explicitly rejects. 35 See Rickless, S. C., (2014), 115, Lowe, E. J., (2005), and Noonan, H. W., (2000), 221. 36 See Behan (1979), Strawson (2015) and Boeker (2014). 37 Reid, T., (1975), 347. 38 Flew, A., (1951), 57. 39 Perry, J., (1972). 40 One might argue that the examples of fission and fusion might be explained away by Locke‘s exclusion principle, i.e., two things of the same kind cannot locate at the same place at the same time. But as it is argued, two things of the same kind can locate at the same place at the same time at least when the things are thinking substances. 41 According to Flew, genuine remembering necessarily involves the truth of the proposition said to be remembered, and honest memory claims do not necessarily do so. See Flew, (1951), 56. 42 Mackie, J. L., (1976), 179-80. 43 Butler, J., (1736), 301-8. 44 Rickless, S. C., (2014), 126. 45 Lowe, E. J., (2005), 96. 46 Jolley, N., (1999), 121. 47 Garrett, D., (2003), 20. 48 Perry, J., (1972). 49 McIntyre, J. L., ―The Role of Temporal Adverbs in Statements about Persons.‖ Noûs 12/4 (1978): 443-461. 50 Mackie, J. L., (1976), 180-1. 51 Mackie, J. L., (1976), 180; Grice, H. P., (1941), 341-2. 52 Parfit, D., (1984), 208. 53 Parfit, D., (1984), 207. 54 Parfit, D., (1984), 205-6. 55 Garrett, D., (2003), 20-1. Society and Politics Vol. 10, No. 2(20)/November 2016 35 56 Grice, H. P., (1941), 341. 57 Mackie, J. L., (1976), 181. 58 Parfit, D., (1984), 205. 59 Garrett, D., (2003), 20-1. 60 Gustafsson argues that it is obvious that the Nestor example supports that memory is a sufficient condition for personal identity. See Gustafsson, J. E., (2010), 116. 61 Weinberg, S., (2011); Yaffe, G., (2011); Strawson, G., (2015). 62 Weinberg, S., (2011), 405. 63 If there is a third person perspective, say God, that determines whether a at t1 is conscious of any of b‘s actions or thoughts at t2, as Weinberg seems to suggest, the sameness of consciousness alone cannot determine personal identity, contrary to Locke‘s view. 64 Weinberg, S., (2012), 392. 65 Yaffe, G., (2011), 406. 66 Yaffe, G., (2011), 400. 67 Yaffe, G., (2011), 406 (Italics added). 68 Yaffe, G., (2011), 387-8. 69 Strawson, G., (2015). 70 For similar views, see Behan (1979) and Boeker (2014). 71 Strawson, G., (2015), 124. 72 Ichinose (2013) also agrees that S