H. P. Grice finds W. H. F. Barnes 'congenial' -- "We are Corpus"

Like H. P. Grice, W. H. F Barnes studied for the Literae Humaniores degree at Oxford -- and at Corpus, too!

Barnes was invited to address a meeting of the Jowett Society at Oxford. 

The essay he presented was entitled 'Is there a Realm of Values?'

The essay raises considerable interest -- Grice well knew -- because it expresses an emotivist or 'emotional' view of the nature of the axiological or evaluative judgement. 

Amongst those present at the meeting is A. E. Duncan-Jones who, in hi s capacity as co-edito r of the newly founded journal Analysis, asked fa r a copy of the paper fo r the purposes of publication . 

The published extrac t was renamed 'A Suggestion about Value', and appeared i n the March 1934 volume. 

Although the extrac t was only 150 words long, i t nonetheless constitute d one of the firs t publicl y accessible statements of the emotivis t analysi s of ethics . 

Barnes explains that at the time of writing the paper he was engaged in reading Nicolas Hartmann's "Ethik," and was concerned to reject Hartmann's notion that values exist in some sphere other than that of the natural (or physical or phenomenal) world. 

Grice loved Hartmann's idea of emergence, because Grice is a naturalist at heart. 

Barnes is also convinced by Moore's refutatio n of any naturalis t explanation of value, but fel t sure tha t Moore's notio n of goodness as a non-natural qualit y fared no better. 

However it is, Barnes says, only as the day of the meeting neared that he struck upon a plausible alternative to both Hartmann's and Moore's theories, and made the suggestion that 

'to say something is good is not t o predicate a characteristic but to express approval'.

which is exactly the paragraph that H. P. Grice cites in "Prolegomena" to "Logic and Conversation" at Harvard!



 (1) 

I t i s therefore worthwhile t o examine i n detai l the arguments presented i n the Jowett Society essay and draw upon Barnes' recollectio n of the historical context withi n which he made the emotivist suggestion. 

Barnes introduces the essay by summarising Hartmann's thesis in Ethik as an attempt to prove the objectivity and absoluteness of ethical principles . 

Barnes indicates that, for Hartmann, these principle s are true because they relat e t o a pluralit y of values the concrete existence of which is manifest in their 'ideal essences'. (2) 

In showing this , Barnes states that Hartmann's thesi s rest s upon a procedure of analysi s which i s t o be characterisise d thus.

The objectivit y of moral principle s consists... i n this , that they derive thei r authorit y always from a value. 

If i t can be shown tha t values are genuine existent entities , i t wil l be shown tha t moral principle s are objective, i n the sense tha t thei r relativit y rest s upon the discernment of values tha t are absolute, n ot upon the relativit y of values. 

For Hartmann, as Barnes explains, values are 'genuine existen t entities ' because they are essences, where 'Essences form a realm of entities.. . which i s not less real , and i n a way more real , than the world of existin g things'.  

For Barnes, however, thi s conception of value as the essence or common idea l property of a thin g i s false . 

This i s because, he argues, our knowledge of the essence of a thin g relate s simply t o our necessarily imperfect and contingent observations of 'what i t is' , and how i t resembles simila r existin g objects. I t therefore follow s tha t thi s knowledge does not relat e t o some alleged property t he form of which i s perfec t and eternal 

As Barnes puts it , t o know t he essence of a table , fo r example, 'is simply t o know what a tabl e is : i t i s an imperfect knowledge of thing s not a perfec t knowledge of an idea l entity' . (5) As such, he claims tha t Hartmann's notio n tha t moral principle s are objective and absolute i s groundless because i t i s based upon a conception of ideal value essences which i s mistaken. 

Having dismissed Hartmann's thesis , Barnes focusses hi s attentio n upon the ethica l theory of G. E. Moore. 

He offer s a critica l summary of Moore's positio n when he write s tha t Professor Moore maintains tha t goodness i s a qualit y intuitivel y perceived. I t i s unanalysable and indefinable. He furthe r adds tha t i t i s a nan-natural qualit y . Reflection seems t o show tha t i t i s a very puzzling quality . I f a thin g i s t o be good i t seems i t must be good i n virtu e of what i t is . That i s t o say, i t must firs t have it s own completely determinate nature: then, and then only, wil l i t be good. (6> - 119 - Barnes' poin t i s tha t i f Hoore i s correc t i n saying tha t goodness i s a quality , then he must assume tha t an object i s good i n virtu e of al l i t s propertie s or it s whole nature. 

For Barnes, however, thi s cannot be so. 

He asserts tha t 'i f goodness i s a qualit y i t must be a par t of the thing's nature. The thin g cannot be good i n virtu e of it s whole nature, f o r it s whole nature includes it s goodness'. <7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes suggests tha t thi s doubt accentuates a more general deficiency i n the arguments of both Hoore and Hartmann. He write s that : The defect of... the theories so fa r considered... i s tha t the goodness or value of anything i s not considered t o be i n any way relativ e t o the desires and interest s of appraising subjects. And thi s seems difficul t t o maintain. I t would involve maintaining that , however radicall y men's desires change, stil l what has been good would remain good. (10) 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes assumes tha t the goodness or value of something must relat e i n some way t o the materia l and practica l contingencies of human moral experience, as fel t i n desires, interests , and the like . I t i s thi s relationshi p which i s not considered by theorist s who conceive of values as being revealed t o us a priori , and quite independently of our materia l circumstances as subjects. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">However, Barnes insist s tha t the acknowledgement tha t goodness i s relativ e t o the desires and interest s of men does not imply tha t 'naturalist ' definition s of good are correct , where 'A i s good' i s taken t o mean 'A i s the object of my approval', or ' I take an interes t i n A'. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">If thi s were so, two people who maintain respectivel y tha t 'A i s good' and tha t 'A i s bad' would not be contradictin g each other at all . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">This account, he says, i s incapable of explainin g al l arguments about value. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">We therefore need t o explain arguments about value i n terms which are not naturalis t i n character. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes proceeds t o do so by making the emotivis t 'suggestion1 , which was published i n Analysis, and shall be quoted here i n full . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">He write s that : 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Value judgements in their origin are not strictly judgements at all. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">They are exclamations expressive of approval. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">This is to be DISTINGUISHED from the theory that the value judgement 'A i s good' *states* that ' I approve A.' 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">---- AN EXCELLENT GRICEIAN POINT, THAT!
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">The theory that I am now puttin g forward maintains that 'A i s good' is a form of words EXPRESSIVE of my approval. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">To take an illustration: 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">When I say 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">'I have a pain' 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">that sentence states the occurrence of a certain feeling in me.
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
When I shout 'Oh!' in a certai n way that is expressive of the occurrence in me of a certain feeling.
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">We must seek then for the origi n of value judgements in the expressions of approval, delight and affection, which children utte r when confronted with certai n experiences,.. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">If all so-called value judgements are, in principle , expressions of approval, they will only possess 'meaning' i n so far as the society in which they are used is agreed on what thing s it approves. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">--- FIRST USE OF 'MEAN' THAT GRICE WILL CALL meta-bolic. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">And then 'good' and value will be terms which have 'MEANING' only by referring to the actual nature of the thing, not to any NON-natural (as Moore wants) quality it possesses. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Meanwhile it i s worthwhile mentioning that many controversies arising out of value judgements are settled by saying 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">'I like it and you don't, and that s the end of the matter.' 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">1
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">We are content to adopt this solution of the difficult y on matters such as food and drink , though even here we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Why are we not content to accept the same solution on al l matters where value is concerned? 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">The reason we are not so content seems to lie in the fact that the action of one man dictated by hi s approval of something is frequently incompatible wit h the actio n of another man dictate d by h i s approval of something. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Lif e i n a societ y leads us continuall y t o transfe r our approval t o differen t objects. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Reflection upon tha t lif e leads t o stil l furthe r modifications . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I t i s thi s opposition between the approval of one man and tha t of others which lie s a t the bottom of controversies about value. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">f I maintain 'A i s good' against the contention "A i s bad' my attempt to prove the TRUTH of my statement is not reall y what i t pretends t o be. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I point out details in A which are the object of my approval. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">By so doing I hope that my opponent, when he becomes aware of these, will approve A: and so be ready to say 'A is good'. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">But what I have done is not really to gain his assent to a proposition but to change his attitude from one of disapproval to one of approval towards A. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Al l attempts t o persuade others of the TRUTH of value judgements are thus really attempts t o make others approve the thing s we approve. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">We can see tha t thi s published passage expresses most lucidl y the centra l characteristi c features of a distinct y emotivis t view. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Most importantly , i t contains the notion tha t value judgements are expressions of approval rathe r than proposition s of fact , and the idea tha t disagreements about value are primaril y reconcilable through attitudinal persuasion rathe r than factua l demonstration. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I t i s worthwhile notin g tha t Barnes extends thi s analysi s int o a discussion of the standards of our socia l morality . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">He continues that : 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I f al l values are relativ e i n thi s way (ie . i f al l values relat e t o expressions of approval) how then can we be justifie d i n speaking of a moral standard? 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">There seems t o be an objectivit y about moral values which distinguishe s them from other values. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Taken a t thei r narrowest they are those ways of actin g which everybody must approve of i f organised society i s t o be possible. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">In so fa r as every man, i n virtu e of hi s membership of society, approves of whatever i s necessary t o maintain society, these values, though relativ e t o the members of a society, are relativ e not t o thi s or tha t man but t o a standard man... 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">There i s no standard by which we can judge him.
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y=""> He may condemn himself fo r fallin g shor t of his own ideals of conduct but hi s ideal s of conduct are no idea l essences: they are merely the interna l signs tha t he himself i s i n process of transferrin g hi s approval from one set of thing s to another. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">As he changes the standard changes because he i s the standard. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes' relativis t account of socia l moralit y i s familia r enough t o us.
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y=""> I t i s t o claim tha t the ethica l standards which a societ y adopts res t upon a collectiv e choice of it s members, who undertake t o follo w rule s of conduct which they individuall y approve. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Thus, according t o thi s view, the moral standards of a particula r society always relat e t o t he exhibitio n of shared individua l preferences, as set withi n a specifi c context. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I t follow s tha t moral standards or general socia l rule s of conduct are invented and mutable, not absolute and merely awaitin g discovery. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Having given thi s account of socia l morality , Barnes turn s t o the issue of whether any philosophica l theory which purports t o indicat e t he objectivit y of moralit y i s plausible. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Taking Hartmann as hi s prime example, he makes the poin t tha t any philosophica l examination which generates prescriptiv e recommendations about moral lif e i s not an authentic analysi s of ethic s a t all , but i s instead an example of moralising . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">In other words, he insist s tha t any objectivis t account of ethic s does not constitut e a pure descriptio n of moral experience but rathe r makes a prescriptiv e contributio n t o tha t moral experience which invite s agents t o approve of the same thing s approved of by the prescriber. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Thus, Barnes claims tha t what the objectivis t i s reall y doing i s 'simply analysing the situations , emotions, ways of actin g etc. which he approves, His purpose i n so doing i s t o induce i n us the same feeling s of approval as he has.' 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes' contention, then, i s tha t philosophers such as Hartmann fai l t o recognise tha t a theoretica l account of the ethica l world, and t he making of prescriptiv e recommendations about the 'good life' , are two logicall y distinc t activities . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">As such, he says, you can do one or t he other, never both, a t the same time: or you can only do both i f you recognise the difference. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">But i t i s a differenc e which, he claims, ethica l theorist s of the past have tended t o overlook. This i s because, he states: 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I t i s a characteristi c of the great moral philosophers from Plato onwards, tha t they were inten t on so presenting the nature of thing s as t o win the approval of thei r hearers fo r what they themselves approved. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Al l men are drive n by a deep and inescapable desire t o make others approve what they approve. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">However, he says, thi s desire t o gain approval fo r what you value i s inappropriate fo r the moral philosopher t o seek. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Barnes furthe r asserts tha t the objectivis t ethica l theoris t i s n ot only guilt y of overlooking the distinctio n between analysis and prescription . He i s also committed t o an inappropriat e monism. For, as he explains: 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I f we were t o speak of a Realm of Values we could only mean the expositio n of a man's preferences i n thei r systematic interrelation , includin g specificatio n of the particula r emotional qualit y tha t accompanies each act of preference. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">There wil l thus be not one, but many, Realms of Value. (16) Barnes' poin t i s tha t an objectivis t cannot claim tha t the values he approves of are singularl y valid . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">At best, they express one among many personal preferences. Therefore, although both objectivist s and ordinary moral agents assume tha t thei r standards are absolutely true , i t i s the task of the moral philosopher t o inform them tha t ethica l understanding i s i n fac t relativ e and plural . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">As such, he concludes that : moralit y i s simply i n the long run tha t set of ideas and approving attitude s which has triumphed i n any particula r society. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">And difficul t as thi s view may seem, i t i s nevertheless implied every time we speak of the moralit y of the East, the moralit y of t he 14th century, or the morality of Germany. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Each is a morality, believing itself t o be absolute, yet seen on examination t o be relative . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">Ernest Barker has said: 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">'I t i s the essence of nationalism tha t a nation considers it s civilisatio n t o be Civilisation' . 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">I n a world where nationalism threatens t o destroy civilisatio n a sound convictio n of the relativit y of al l moralit y i s likel y t o be not so much a solvent of moralit y as a salutar y check on it s onesidedness.
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y=""> Barnes has recentl y given hi s own assessment of the historica l context withi n which hi s emotivis t suggestion was made. 
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">He has no doubt that G.E Moore's Principi a Ethica was the major text which the earl y emotivist thinkers were responding to.
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">
<7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" style="font-size: xx-large;" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y="">The reason why A. E. Duncan-Jones and C. L. Stevenson mostly at Cambridge and himself at Oxford (with A. E. Duncan-Jones present) were al l moving towards a simila r positio n a t the same time was because, Barnes suggests, 'Moore had convinced us tha tthere was no analysi s of 'good' i n empirical , or as he would say, naturalisti c terms, and we could not accept hi s alternativ e of a nonnaturalisti c characteristic , goodness.'

Likewise, Barnes di d not accept the version of ethica l intuitionis m which was advanced by Prichard, who was hi s tuto r a t Oxford i n hi s undergraduate years.



 He explains tha t although hi s earlies t views on ethic s were shaped by Prichard's lectures and classes, and although he respected Prichard's rejectio n of al l empirico-utilitaria n analyses, he was convinced tha t Prichard's own account of good as an indefinable su i generis concept fared no better than Moore's. (19) In other words, Barnes found Prichard's and Moore's rejectio n of t he naturalis t account of ethic s convincing, but he rejected thei r own metaphysical views, and sought an alternativ e theory which was consisten t wit h hi s empiricis t viewpoint, He write s that : At the time, I held... tha t al l knowledge and rationa l belie f must relat e t o what the senses disclose or what goes on i n my mind: but I was not incline d t o blackbal l ethic s and theology fo r membership of the empirica l club, simply because they had nD direc t and singl e relationshi p t o the evidence of the senses. Rather I hankered afte r showing tha t they had a looser, but stil l a justifyin g relationshi p t o the world of the senses. (20) Barnes' hankering i n thi s respect was satisfie d by making the suggestion tha t our ethica l and theologica l understandings constitut e t he expression of desires which are disclosed through the senses. I t was, he says, a notio n which linke d up wit h 'the attractiv e idea that... - 125 - a thing's being good i s relate d t o what we desire i n same way', although not i n a way which was describable i n the naturalis t manner. (21) In concluding this , Barnes acknowledges the possible influence of Ogden and Richards, He recall s tha t he had read The Meaning of Meaning during the period of making the suggestion, and he admits t o the likel y probabilit y tha t i t was hi s familiarit y wit h thei r account of the emotive use of language i n general which contributed t o the emergence of hi s distinctl y emotivis t view. As he puts it , 'while I cannot be sure tha t thi s volume was the midwife which delivered me from the labour of producing the suggestion, I thin k i t probably was'. (22)  




****

W. H. F Barnes studied for the Litera e Humaniores degree a t Oxford Universit y between 1930-32. Whilst seeking regular academic employment he was invite d t o address a meeting of the Jowett Society a t Oxford on November 8th , 1933. The paper which he gave, entitle d 'Is there a Realm of Values?', raised considerable interes t because i t expressed an emotivis t view of the nature of evaluative judgements. Amongst those present a t the meeting was Duncan-Jones who, i n hi s capacity as coedito r of the newly founded journa l Analysis, asked fa r a copy of the paper fo r the purposes of publication . The published extrac t was renamed 'A Suggestion about Value', and appeared i n the March 1934 volume. Although the extrac t was only 150 words long, i t nonetheless constitute d one of the firs t publicl y accessible statements of the emotivis t analysi s of ethics . Barnes explains tha t a t the time of writin g the paper he was engaged i n reading Nicolas Hartmann's Ethics, and was concerned t o rejec t Hartmann's notion tha t values exis t i n some sphere other than tha t of the natura l world. He was also convinced by Moore's refutatio n of any naturalis t explanation of value, but fel t sure tha t Moore's notio n of goodness as a non-natural qualit y fared no better. However i t was, Barnes says, only as the day of the meeting neared tha t he struc k upon a plausibl e alternativ e t o both Hartmann's and Moore's theories, and made the suggestion tha t 'to say something i s good i s not t o predicate a characteristi c but t o express approval'. (1) I t i s therefore worthwhile t o examine i n detai l the arguments presented i n t he unti l recentl y missing Jowett Society paper, and draw upon Barnes' recollectio n of the historica l context withi n which he made the emotivis t suggestion. Barnes introduces the paper by summarising Hartmann's thesi s i n Ethic s as an attempt t o prove the objectivit y and absoluteness of ethica l principles . He indicate s that , fo r Hartmann, these principle s are tru e because they relat e t o a pluralit y of values the concrete existence of which i s manifest i n thei r 'ideal essences'. (2) In showing - 118 - this , Barnes states tha t Hartmann's thesi s rest s upon a procedure of analysi s which i s t o be characterisise d thus: The objectivit y of moral principle s consists... i n this , tha t they derive thei r authorit y always from a value. I f i t can be shown tha t values are genuine existen t entities , then i t wil l be shown tha t moral principle s are objective, i n the sense tha t thei r relativit y rest s upon the discernment of values tha t are absolute, n ot upon the relativit y of values. (3) For Hartmann, as Barnes explains, values are 'genuine existen t entities ' because they are essences, where 'Essences form a realm of entities.. . which i s not less real , and i n a way more real , than the world of existin g things'. (4) For Barnes, however, thi s conception of value as t he essence or common idea l property of a thin g i s false . This i s because, he argues, our knowledge of the essence of a thin g relate s simply t o our necessarily imperfect and contingent observations of 'what i t is' , and how i t resembles simila r existin g objects. I t therefore follow s tha t thi s knowledge does not relat e t o some alleged property t he form of which i s perfec t and eternal . As Barnes puts it , t o know t he essence of a table , fo r example, 'is simply t o know what a tabl e is : i t i s an imperfect knowledge of thing s not a perfec t knowledge of an idea l entity' . (5) As such, he claims tha t Hartmann's notio n tha t moral principle s are objective and absolute i s groundless because i t i s based upon a conception of ideal value essences which i s mistaken. Having dismissed Hartmann's thesis , Barnes focusses hi s attentio n upon the ethica l theory of G.E. Moore. He offer s a critica l summary of Moore's positio n when he write s tha t Professor Moore maintains tha t goodness i s a qualit y intuitivel y perceived. I t i s unanalysable and indefinable. He furthe r adds tha t i t i s a nan-natural qualit y . Reflection seems t o show tha t i t i s a very puzzling quality . I f a thin g i s t o be good i t seems i t must be good i n virtu e of what i t is . That i s t o say, i t must firs t have it s own completely determinate nature: then, and then only, wil l i t be good. (6> - 119 - Barnes' poin t i s tha t i f Hoore i s correc t i n saying tha t goodness i s a quality , then he must assume tha t an object i s good i n virtu e of al l i t s propertie s or it s whole nature. For Barnes, however, thi s cannot be so. He asserts tha t 'i f goodness i s a qualit y i t must be a par t of the thing's nature. The thin g cannot be good i n virtu e of it s whole nature, f o r it s whole nature includes it s goodness'. <7 a="" an="" are="" bad="" barnes="" be="" but="" cast="" completely="" coupled="" descriptio="" doubt="" exhaustive="" f="" fac="" firs="" fo="" g="" give="" good="" goodness="" h="" hoore="" i="" idea="" importantly="" is="" itsel="" judged="" make="" mentioning="" more="" must="" n="" nature="" notion.="" o="" object.="" of="" on="" or="" poin="" point="" possible="" problems="" qualit="" qualitie="" r="" raise="" s="" says="" seems="" t="" tha="" the="" thin="" thing="" this="" what="" whereas="" whether="" whole="" wit="" without="" y=""> Barnes suggests tha t thi s doubt accentuates a more general deficiency i n the arguments of both Hoore and Hartmann. He write s that : The defect of... the theories so fa r considered... i s tha t the goodness or value of anything i s not considered t o be i n any way relativ e t o the desires and interest s of appraising subjects. And thi s seems difficul t t o maintain. I t would involve maintaining that , however radicall y men's desires change, stil l what has been good would remain good. (10) Barnes assumes tha t the goodness or value of something must relat e i n some way t o the materia l and practica l contingencies of human moral experience, as fel t i n desires, interests , and the like . I t i s thi s relationshi p which i s not considered by theorist s who conceive of values as being revealed t o us a priori , and quite independently of our materia l circumstances as subjects. However, Barnes insist s tha t the acknowledgement tha t goodness i s relativ e t o the desires and interest s of men does not imply tha t 'naturalist ' definition s of good are correct , where 'A i s good' i s taken t o mean 'A i s the object of my approval', or ' I take an interes t i n A'. (11) I f thi s were so, then two people who maintain respectivel y tha t 'A i s good' and tha t 'A i s bad' would not be contradictin g each other at all . This account, he says, i s incapable of explainin g al l arguments about value. We therefore need t o explain - 120 - arguments about value i n terms which are not naturalis t i n character. Barnes proceeds t o do so by making the emotivis t 'suggestion1 , which was published i n Analysis, and shal l be quoted here i n full . He write s that : Value judgements i n thei r origi n are not strictl y judgements a t all . They are exclamations expressive of approval. This i s t o be distinguishe d from the theory tha t the value judgement 'A i s good' state s tha t ' I approve A.' The theory tha t 1 am now puttin g forward maintains tha t 'A i s good' i s a form of words expressive of my approval. To take an illustration: - when I say ' I have a pain' tha t sentence state s the occurrence of a certai n feelin g i n me: when I shout 'Oh!' i n a certai n way tha t i s expressive of the occurrence i n me of a certai n feeling . We must seek then fo r the origi n of value judgements i n the expressions of approval, deligh t and affection , which childre n utte r when confronted wit h certai n experiences,.. I f al l so-called value judgements are, i n principle , expressions of approval, then they wil l only possess meaning i n so fa r as the society i n which they are used i s agreed on what thing s i t approves. And then 'good' and value wil l be terms which have meaning only by referrin g t o the actual nature of the thing , not t o any non-natural qualit y i t possesses. Meanwhile i t i s worthwhile mentioning tha t many controversies arisin g out of value judgements are settle d by saying ' I lik e i t and you don't, and that s the end of the matter1 . We are content t o adopt thi s solutio n of the difficult y on matters such as food and drink , though even here we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs. Why are we not content t o accept the same solutio n on al l matters where value i s concerned? The reason we are not so content seems t o li e i n the fac t tha t t he actio n of one man dictate d by hi s approval of something i s frequently incompatible wit h the actio n of another man dictate d by h i s approval of something. Lif e i n a societ y leads us continuall y t o transfe r our approval t o differen t objects. Reflection upon tha t lif e leads t o stil l furthe r modifications . I t i s thi s - 121 - opposition between the approval of one man and tha t of others which lie s a t the bottom of controversies about value. I f I maintain 'A i s good' against the contention "A i s bad' my attempt t o prove the trut h of my statement i s not reall y what i t pretends t o be. I point out detail s i n A which are the object of my approval. By so doing I hope tha t my opponent, when he becomes aware of these, wil l approve A: and so be ready t o say 'A i s good'. But what I have done i s not reall y t o gain hi s assent t o a propositio n but t o change hi s attitud e from one of disapproval t o one of approval towards A. Al l attempts t o persuade others of the trut h of value judgements are thus reall y attempts t o make others approve the thing s we approve. (12) We can see tha t thi s published passage expresses most lucidl y the centra l characteristi c features of a distinct y emotivis t view. Most importantly , i t contains the notion tha t value judgements are expressions of approval rathe r than proposition s of fact , and the idea tha t disagreements about value are primaril y reconcilable through attitudina l persuasion rathe r than factua l demonstration. I t i s worthwhile notin g tha t Barnes extends thi s analysi s int o a discussion of the standards of our socia l morality . He continues that : I f al l values are relativ e i n thi s way (ie . i f al l values relat e t o expressions of approval) how then can we be justifie d i n speaking of a moral standard? There seems t o be an objectivit y about moral values which distinguishe s them from other values. Taken a t thei r narrowest they are those ways of actin g which everybody must approve of i f organised society i s t o be possible. In so fa r as every man, i n virtu e of hi s membership of society, approves of whatever i s necessary t o maintain society, these values, though relativ e t o the members of a society, are relativ e not t o thi s or tha t man but t o a standard man... There i s no standard by which we can judge him. He may condemn himself fo r fallin g shor t of his own ideals of conduct but hi s ideal s of conduct are no idea l essences: they are merely the interna l signs tha t he himself i s i n process of transferrin g hi s approval from one set of thing s t o - 122 - another. As he changes the standard changes because he i s the standard. (13) Barnes' relativis t account of socia l moralit y i s familia r enough t o us. I t i s t o claim tha t the ethica l standards which a societ y adopts res t upon a collectiv e choice of it s members, who undertake t o follo w rule s of conduct which they individuall y approve. Thus, according t o thi s view, the moral standards of a particula r society always relat e t o t he exhibitio n of shared individua l preferences, as set withi n a specifi c context. I t follow s tha t moral standards or general socia l rule s of conduct are invented and mutable, not absolute and merely awaitin g discovery. Having given thi s account of socia l morality , Barnes turn s t o the issue of whether any philosophica l theory which purports t o indicat e t he objectivit y of moralit y i s plausible. Taking Hartmann as hi s prime example, he makes the poin t tha t any philosophica l examination which generates prescriptiv e recommendations about moral lif e i s not an authentic analysi s of ethic s a t all , but i s instead an example of moralising . In other words, he insist s tha t any objectivis t account of ethic s does not constitut e a pure descriptio n of moral experience but rathe r makes a prescriptiv e contributio n t o tha t moral experience which invite s agents t o approve of the same thing s approved of by the prescriber. Thus, Barnes claims tha t what the objectivis t i s reall y doing i s 'simply analysing the situations , emotions, ways of actin g etc. which he approves, His purpose i n so doing i s t o induce i n us the same feeling s of approval as he has.' (14) Barnes' contention, then, i s tha t philosophers such as Hartmann fai l t o recognise tha t a theoretica l account of the ethica l world, and t he making of prescriptiv e recommendations about the 'good life' , are two logicall y distinc t activities . As such, he says, you can do one or t he other, never both, a t the same time: or you can only do both i f you recognise the difference. But i t i s a differenc e which, he claims, ethica l theorist s of the past have tended t o overlook. This i s because, he states: - 123 - I t i s a characteristi c of the great moral philosophers from Plato onwards, tha t they were inten t on so presenting the nature of thing s as t o win the approval of thei r hearers fo r what they themselves approved. Al l men are drive n by a deep and inescapable desire t o make others approve what they approve. (15) However, he says, thi s desire t o gain approval fo r what you value i s inappropriate fo r the moral philosopher t o seek. Barnes furthe r asserts tha t the objectivis t ethica l theoris t i s n ot only guilt y of overlooking the distinctio n between analysis and prescription . He i s also committed t o an inappropriat e monism. For, as he explains: I f we were t o speak of a Realm of Values we could only mean the expositio n of a man's preferences i n thei r systematic interrelation , includin g specificatio n of the particula r emotional qualit y tha t accompanies each act of preference. There wil l thus be not one, but many, Realms of Value. (16) Barnes' poin t i s tha t an objectivis t cannot claim tha t the values he approves of are singularl y valid . At best, they express one among many personal preferences. Therefore, although both objectivist s and ordinary moral agents assume tha t thei r standards are absolutely true , i t i s the task of the moral philosopher t o inform them tha t ethica l understanding i s i n fac t relativ e and plural . As such, he concludes that : moralit y i s simply i n the long run tha t set of ideas and approving attitude s which has triumphed i n any particula r society. And difficul t as thi s view may seem, i t i s nevertheless implied every time we speak of the moralit y of the East, the moralit y of t he 14th century, or the moralit y of Germany. Each i s a morality , believin g itsel f t o be absolute, yet seen on examination t o be relative . Ernest Barker has said: 'I t i s the essence of nationalism tha t a natio n considers it s civilisatio n t o be Civilisation' . I n a world where nationalism threatens t o destroy civilisatio n a sound convictio n of the relativit y of al l moralit y - 124 - i s likel y t o be not so much a solvent of moralit y as a salutar y check on it s onesidedness. (17) Barnes has recentl y given hi s own assessment of the historica l context withi n which hi s emotivis t suggestion was made. He has no doubt tha t G.E Moore's Principi a Ethica was the major tex t which the earl y emotivis t thinker s were responding to , The reason why DuncanJones, Stevenson and himself were al l moving towards a simila r positio n a t the same time was because, he suggests, 'Moore had convinced us tha t there was no analysi s of 'good' i n empirical , or as he would say, naturalisti c terms, and we could not accept hi s alternativ e of a nonnaturalisti c characteristic , goodness' (18) Likewise, Barnes di d not accept the version of ethica l intuitionis m which was advanced by Professor Prichard, who was hi s tuto r a t Oxford i n hi s undergraduate years. He explains tha t although hi s earlies t views on ethic s were shaped by Prichard's lectures and classes, and although he respected Prichard's rejectio n of al l empirico-utilitaria n analyses, he was convinced tha t Prichard's own account of good as an indefinable su i generis concept fared no better than Moore's. (19) In other words, Barnes found Prichard's and Moore's rejectio n of t he naturalis t account of ethic s convincing, but he rejected thei r own metaphysical views, and sought an alternativ e theory which was consisten t wit h hi s empiricis t viewpoint, He write s that : At the time, I held... tha t al l knowledge and rationa l belie f must relat e t o what the senses disclose or what goes on i n my mind: but I was not incline d t o blackbal l ethic s and theology fo r membership of the empirica l club, simply because they had nD direc t and singl e relationshi p t o the evidence of the senses. Rather I hankered afte r showing tha t they had a looser, but stil l a justifyin g relationshi p t o the world of the senses. (20) Barnes' hankering i n thi s respect was satisfie d by making the suggestion tha t our ethica l and theologica l understandings constitut e t he expression of desires which are disclosed through the senses. I t was, he says, a notio n which linke d up wit h 'the attractiv e idea that... - 125 - a thing's being good i s relate d t o what we desire i n same way', although not i n a way which was describable i n the naturalis t manner. (21) In concluding this , Barnes acknowledges the possible influence of Ogden and Richards, He recall s tha t he had read The Meaning of Meaning during the period of making the suggestion, and he admits t o the likel y probabilit y tha t i t was hi s familiarit y wit h thei r account of the emotive use of language i n general which contributed t o the emergence of hi s distinctl y emotivis t view. As he puts it , 'while I cannot be sure tha t thi s volume was the midwife which delivered me from the labour of producing the suggestion, I thin k i t probably was'. (22)