H. P. Grice agrees with S. N. Hampshire's critique to Ryle's dispositional analysis of intention

According to Hampshire, Ryle's distinction between categorical and hypothetical is confusing. His general thesis is that there is no mental happeninq, i.e. to speak to of a person's mind is speak of certain ways in which some of the incidents of his " life are ordered. This hinges largely on the distinction between occurrence and disposition. He indicates that in all cases, reduction of the categorical into hypotheticals is not possible. Not only in the case of emotion, thrills, pangs but also in other various places the translation of perceptible behaviour is,as a matter of logic,a pure mistake. The double distinction between categorical and hypothetical breaks down and produces confusion. He hrts no logical criterion for such translation. Hampshire remarks in this regard : ''But if this distinction is shown to be unworkable, and cannot be clearly formulated, the whole account of the relation between mind and body - overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of mind, they are those workings - collapses with it. It must be reformulated' •. 16 Thus Professor Ryle's distinction between occurrence and disposition is pseudo-logical distinction. In fact, they have separate loqical status. We cann~t explain mental occurrences in the light of overt behaviours completely. Ryle thinks that typical mental concepts are dispositions and the statements in which they occur are law-like propositions 16. Stuart Hampshire, 'Critical Review of the Concept of Mind'. In Wood and Pitcher Ed. Ryle, Macmillan. London,l97l,p.28. - 197 - which have to be supported by observation of overt behaviours. His analysis reveals that statements about mental occurrences are confirmed or rejected by interpretation of overt behaviours. But this analysis is incomplete in the sense that it misleadingly denies the status of categorical propositions. Hampshire observes that he suspects that one of the main confusions of the book comes from the use of distinction such as the hypothetical and categorical distinctions which are borrowed from logic in the strict sense 17 in order to make distinction which cannot be strictly logical. D.Carr also observes: ''According to this criticism psychological reports instead of being merely short hand version of hypothetical conditional statements about possible behaviours have a proper place in the antecedent positions of conditionals about human conduct'•. 18 .) Ryle's idea of multi-track disposition is another intance I, where we come accross a fresh difficulty. We find him drawing a distinction between single-track dispositions which are uniform and many-track dispositions thE~ actualisations of which are infinitely heteroqeneous. 'CigarE~tte smoker' is a single-track disposition word, because it refers to only one type of activity, i.e., the activity of smoking. But the word 'vain' or 'qreedy' is a many-track disposition word, as it signifies not one but many diverse activities 17. Stuart Hampshire, 'Critical Review of the Concept of Mind', pp. 29-30. 18. David Carr, 'The Logic of Knowing How and Ability', Mind, Vol. LXXXVLLL, No.351, July, 1979, p.395. - 198 - in different situations. Ryle illustrates it with the example of gracing which stands for different activities p like selling sugar, weighing tea, wraping up butter and so ,..._ on. In a similar way the term'vanity' or 'greedy' behaves in many ways. The many track disposition-words are highly generic or determinable, but the single-track words are highly specific or determinate. Real difficulty begins in case of multi-track disposition-words. Such words are highly generic. It serves as genus having heterogeneous episodes as its species. But the question is : How can a series of episodes which are different in character be all subsumed unde! a common genus ? How can in the absence of a relationship among these episodes they can all be taken to refer to a generic term ? What is the rule of construction by which the different hypotheticals can be grouped together ? Is it possible to have a definite meaning of a highly generic term 7 It is in this connection that Spilsbury holds, ''I do not understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context. In any ordinary language it would be absurd to say that hardness is a genus of which the properties of causino pains, resisting deformation and giving out a sharp 19 sound were species''. W.Lyons makes the observation that Rylesdistinctions of determinable and determinate are not correct. He thinks that there are not two types of disposition, 19. R.J.Spilsbury, 'Disposition and Phenomenology', Mind, July, 1953, pp.342-43. - 199 - there is only one and this is determinate disposition. We have nothing to do with determinable disposition. He argues "All dispositions are determinate dispositions which are parasitic on similar occurrences or episodes of certain type''. 20 According to W.Lyons, Ryle's account of disposition is ambiguous and it is the initial difficulty of his philosophy. The term 'disposition' may have two senses or rather it has two kinds of implications (a) semantic (use) implication and (b) genetic (ontoloqical) implication. If the former is taken it means how it is used and then Ryle's account is correct. But if the latter sense is taken, Ryle's account is inadequate. It seems that Ryle accepts also the latter sense of genetic explanation. He accuses the Cartesian dualist of thinking mind as a sort of ontological categorysubstance. He analysed what the Cartesians thought to be substances and their activities as proneness to activities of cartain type in certain circumstances. He was accusing the Cartesians of elevating pronen~ss or potentialities into actualities. But W.Lyons thinks that he suspects what Ryle's account was not merely an account of how we use the term disposition, because he argued from his account of disposition to ontological conclusions, not merely semantic 21 conclusions. A true account of generic disposition shows 20. William Lyons, 'Ryle and Disposition', Philosophical Studies, Vol.24, No.5, 1973, p.326. 21. William Lyons, Op,cit., pp,49-SO. - 200 - that dispositions are not just potentialities. They are potentialities based on the existence of real facts. The causal factor which is dominant in persons or things to which a disposition is attributed is called the structural or categorical basis of the disposition. To refer to an actual property is to refer categorically rather than hypothetically. Besides behaviour or circumstances, a third thing namely the structural basis is to be accounted for. If this be done in a dispositional analysis, this will not eradicate the inner aspect. Thus we can say that both in the semantic and genetic accounts of dispositions there are causal factors hidden or inwardly. But to admit this is not necessarily to reinstate Cartesian dualism .. That is why,the categorical or the structural basis of human disposition may not turn out to be mental accurrences. In the final analysis we find that Ryle's plea to reject the causal theory of purposive activity that involves the fallacy of infinite regress cannot be maintained. Armstrong tries to show that there will be no regress if we disting u i s h be t we en the a c t s o f w i 11 and opera t i on s of w i ll. An act is something that we do as opposed to something that merely happens. An act springs from our will. Operations of will are mere happenings. They have causes, but these causes do not lie in the will. Both acts of will and operations of will are purposive, but not in the same sense. Actions are purposive in the sense that they are caused by will. Operations of will are purposive in the sense that - 201 - they cause actions. Only acts of will are purposive in both senses. So, according to Armstrong, there will be no regress when we say that actions a~e caused by operations of will. Armstrong criticises Ryle's account of disposition also. He terms Ryle's account of disposition as the phenomenalist or the operationalist account and opposes this with what he calls the realist account. He identifies dispositions with their categorical basis. He explains that to speak of an object having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has 22 some property (There exists a categorical basis). The realist account is taken as t~e genetic account of disposition, where as the phenomenCUist account is the semantic account. But we may say that both accounts are speaking with crossed purposes. Thus it may be said that Ryle and Armstrong are not clear in their analysis of disposition. Indeed the whole debate on ~isposition has been bedevilled by the unfortunate confusion. This is the reason why Alston really suqqests that Ryle's account of disposition may well be the result of confusinq meaninq and reference. It may be correct to say that the meaning of a disposition-term 'brittleness' can be explicated in terms of typical reactions and circumstances. But the reference of the dispositional t0rm will 22. D.M.Armstronq, A Materialist Theory of Mind, Routlerlqe and Keqan Paul, London, 1968, p. 86. - 202 - be some internal eccurrence - its categorical base. Alston says : ''In otherwords, the entity referred to by a linguistic expression may have many properties not reflected in the meaning of that expression, and such that an account of the meaning of that expression will afford no basis for anticipating them' •. 23 If we deny disposition as something actual or categorical we face an absurd situation. Ryle thinks that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do that because of a property present in the one which is absent in another. This can be done only with the help of certain hypotheticals. But if this be the case how is it possible to distinguish one person from another ? What will be the point of difference between two things or persons if no categorical statements or actual characters are not explained 7 Besides, infinite series of conditionals do not give a difinite meaning of expression~oThe denial of the actuality of expressions - statements seems to be incompatible with the learning of skills or abilities. It is known that skills are learned gradually by practice. But if every practice does not leave a positive impression how can it be carried forward in the next or how can we improve an acquired skill 7 If there is nothing positive due to pr~ctice which can be sustained ana carried forward, every attempt in learning a skill will be a new attempt about the 23. W.J.Alston, 'Dispositions and Occurrences', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1971, p.l51. - 203 - learning of that skill. Again, the rejection of disposition as something actual leads to queer consequences. It has led Ryle to believe that vain behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent. It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger, talking tall talks etc. But to say so is to explain vanity more in terms of the stranger than in the terms of the agent himself. If we examine reflexes we find that the actuality of disposition cannot be denied. Reflexes are the actualisation of disposition of an organism to react to different stimuli in more definite ways. Such an actualisation presupposes a stable nervous system in the organism. It is in the interaction between the stimulus and the system which gives rise to manifestation of behaviour. So we find that an enduring system is necessary for the actualisation of disposition, some stable property or properties within the human organisation should be required for the actualisation of disposition. G.D.Jha in his book, A Study of Ryle's Theory of Mind. published by Visva-Bharati, West Benqal, 1961, p.8l, states that stimulus acts on the nervous system to produce reflex-behaviour. Circumstances shoulrl also act on the inner qualities to produce dispositional behaviours. Ryle ignores the categorical basis of disposition and that is why his analysis of disposition is incomplete. - 204 - According to Ryle, disposition means a regular sequence of behaviour under appropriate conditions. If it is said the X has a disposition, it is to say that X has regularly behaved in a particular manner Y and is likely to behave in this way in future. Disposition-words do not stand for drives, force or powers existing in the agent. He reminds us that the concept of an occult process has been rejected by the physical sciences. Why should it then at all continue in the theories of mind ? But it may be pointed out that physical sciences have given up the idea of an existing force. Ordinary language which is the basis of Ryle's anait lysis has not yet given up. ~ The phrase 'force of habit' ~ is very much in use to rlay as any other phrases. Habit is our disposition. Can we not treat disposition as force on the basis of this usage ? Dispositions may be accepted to exist within us as a force which we experience when we want to do something against what we are disposed to do so. In a situation like this we are not able to do easily what we want to do. We feel as if something is preventing us. We have tn develop a counter force against the resistance. The resistance which we feel and the force which we apply to meet it clearly suggests that there is a force or drive in us to do thing in a certain manner which we want to break in the present case. This is found in the case of a habitual smoker who wants to give up smoking. He will require a strong will force to overcome the preexistinq force of the tempta- ~ tion for cigarette. In view of all these consideration it is - 205 - defficult to believe with Ryle that a disposition is not an existino drive or force. Thus we findAaron at the time of explaining the nature of disposition observes that it does not signify only a regular behaviour sequence. On the otherhand he thinks ''When ordinary men and scientists and philosophers speak of disposition they clearly mean 24 more; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces or powers''. In a semilar manner W.Lynos explains that Ryle gives us a more or less adequate account of what the term 'disposition' may be taken to mean but he does not give us a satisfactory account of what dispositions are and how they give rise to behaviour. His account is somewhat different from the account of psychologists. That is why, a psychologist deals with the nature of disposition and the causal processes that give rise to them but not about how the word 'disposition' is used. Lyons remarks in this context : ''So the psychologist, rightly, looks for internal factors to explain the workings of dispositions and ••..• looks first for clearly isolatable physico-logical factors to explain dispositional 25 behaviour patterns''. It is argued th~t Ryle's theory of disposition has a role in deciding about the character of mind, but not about the workings of mind. This can be explained with the help of one or two illustrations given by Ryle. When he gives 24. R. A a ron, The Theory of Universal, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962, p. 174. 25. W.Lyons, Op,cit., p. 56. - 206 - us a criterion of intelligent activity he remarks that it is one which is the result of skill or disposition. The shooting of a bull's eye by a marksman is an example of an intelligent activity, because the marksman has the ability or skill or disposition to do it under different circumstances. The corollary which can be drawn from this view is that some acts of successful shooting by a novice is not an intelligent activity as he is not able or disposed to do it again and again. But in this case what the ability or disposition helps us to decide is that the mind of the marksman is superior to the mind of the novice. It is on the account of superiority of the mind of the marksman that we call his action intelligent. So when the question of knowing the quality of one's mind and comparing it with that of another arises, dispositions may help us. But when the question of workings is about the working of one's mind, disposition can be almost of no help. Whether the novice had pressed the trigger mindfully or not cannot be decided with the help of his disposition. In a situation like this it is not through his disposition but through his avowals that we can know whether he had or had not directed his action at the moment. Again, the word 'intellLwnt' as predicated of an action may mean, according to G.D.Jha, directed action as opposed to a mechanical action, or it may mean well directed and careful action as apposed to the action of an idiot. Ryle's disposition is helpful in accounting for well directed and careful action. It however fails in case of simply directed or conscious - 207 - action. The same explanation will also apply to heeding or minding. But dispositions sometimes appear to be a good substitude for mind. Even then it is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human and non-human disposition. Inanimate objects also have their disposition to behave in particular ways. What is it then when we classify some disposition as physical and others as mental? Ryle does not give any suitable answer to this question. That is the reason why Russell argues that a plain man would say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of bodies and 'intelligent' denotes a disposition of mind - infact, the two adjectives apply to different kinds of stuff. But it is not open to Professor Ryle to say 26 this and I do not quite know what he would say. Though Ryle does not distinguish human disposition from non-human disposition he makes a certain distinction in mental dispositions. About the distinction of 'know' and 'believe' one refers to capacity and the other to tendency. To know means to be able to get things right anrl to believe means to tend to act or react in certain ways. Neither the capacity verb 'know' nor the tendency verb 'believe' refers in Ryle's opinion to any act or process conducted on the private stage of mind. Dispositional concepts are different from the activity or process concepts. There are no cognitive acts or processes whatsoever. The cognitive acts lead to infinite regress. It is really absurd to ask how many 26. B.Russell, My Philosophical Development~ George Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 247. - 208 - cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast ? Here we may say that the answer cannot be easily given. It is not because there are no cognitive acts but because the question is more or less illegitimate. In case of knowing,the cognitive acts are to be accounted for. This means that they cannot be ignored. The only difficulty is that we cannot know them by making them objects of our consciousness. They are always subjects of consciousness or awareness. They are known in relation to their objects, as knowing and believing cannot be abstracted from the known and believed. The verb 'know' and 'believe' the·refore, do report mental acts in a certain way. When vve say that 'the sleeper knows French' we mean his ability or disposition to act in a certain way. But when we say that we have just come to know how the incident occurs, we do not here mean any ability or disposition, but narrate the consequences. That is why, Jane Roland argues, ''In ordinary language the phrase 'knowing how' is often used when performances are not involved' •. 27 Ryle himself has noticed that a concept of heed, noticing, concentrating, caring, attending etc. are not fully explicable in dispositional line. In the case of these concepts comprised under the head of 'minding' Ryle has to take recourse to the lanquage of 'mongrel-categorical' or 'semi-dispositional' concepts. They are half-dispositional 27. Jane Roland, 'On Knowing How and Knowing That', Philosophical Review, July, 1958, p. 380. - 209 - and half-categorical or episodic which have both dispositio~~nd episodic references. The proposition 'X' is reading r, carefully contains the heed concept 'carefully'. But introducing the concept of mongrel-categorical for elucidating the meaning of heed concept Ryle,in fact, goes against his own theory. He maintains firmly that mental concepts or inner happenings are occult ghostly processes which do not exist. The so-called inner mental concepts are dispositional and not episodic. The categorical statements about mental events are to be reduced to the conditional statements about possible behaviours. The logic of disposition-word is different from the logic of episodic words. But when we have to explain the logic of heed verbs, the occurrence-disposition dichotemy creates a great problem. Ryle had to maintain then that the logic of occurrence and disposition words both meet in the heed concepts. This obviously makes his original thesis weak. T.D.Weldon point out, ''It is essential to Ryle's argument to maintain that disposition and e~isodic words are 28 of different logical types''. Ryle wants to maintain that when a man is said to be minding what he is doing, his minding is not over and above his overt activities. It is not that the man is minding something at the ghostly level and working at the physical level. But the point is that minding cannot go by itself. lt is a conscious direction which requires some objects on 28. T.D.Weldon, 'The Concept of Mind' (Discussion), Philosophy, July, 1950, p. 269. - 210 - which it 1s to be applied. When a man is'walking ' and 'humming' it is always possible to do the one without the other. But minding cannot be continued without the activity of doing or reading. Thus there is an important point of difference between walking and humming on the one hand and reading and minding on the other hand. Ryle seems to overlook this point. The complex activity of doing mindfully is not open to an outside observer. He does not have an access to the mind of others to see directly the minding aspect of the complex activity. He can see only the overt or the public part of the activity,i.e. the act of reading. He can know that it is mindful indirectly only through certain tests. Thus when I have to decide whether somebody's action is heedful or not I have to depend on these tests. But I do not need them in order to know whether my action is mindful or not. So minding, noticing, caring, etc. in my own case is known directly through the fact of my consciousness.Rvle while talking about minding, heeding, etc.talks about minding of others. He seems to confuse the question. 'How do I know that I am minding my activity'? With the question 'How do you know that some one else is minding his activity'? If we state that minding in our own case is known from consciousness then kyle will bring the charge of infinite regress against this. He will argue that if minding is known from consciousness, the consicousness of minding must be known by another consciousness and so on. He thus uses his - 211 - favourite argument of infinite regress against the traditional concept of heed by stating : ''Doing something with heed does not consist in coupling an executive performance with a piece of theorising, investigating, serutinising, cognising or else doing something with heed would involve~ ' doing an infinite number of things with heeds' •. 29 But we find that it is not difficult to see that behind this infinite regress argument there is a mistaken notion of consciousness. Ryle seems to understand that if there is consciousness it must be instantaneous or fragmentary. It is only with such a notion of consciousness that it is possible to speak of going back from one consciousness to another and so on adinfinitum . But mind is not a series of different bits of consciousness like walking which is a mere series of different steps. If the regress is accepted as true, it does not mean that the activity of consciousness is thereby refuted. The The argument has its destructive force when it defeats a purpose. If to draw money from the bank the signature of the drawee is to be attested and the attested signature is again to be attested and so on adinfinitum the drawee cannot withdraw his money. Infinite regress is harmful here and in cases like this. But no such harm is done to consciousness even if regress is true there. U.T. Place in his paper 'The Concept of Heed' published in Gustafson's Essays in Philosophical Psychol~, Macmillan, 1964, p.220, states that when Ryle uses 'a heed concept' we 29. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 131. - 212 - ~ mean by that we are not merly refering to the disposition "' in a manner appropriate to the presence of the thing in question and specifying how the disposition is actualised. f r. But we are also re er1ng to an internal state of the indiviA dual. This is a necessary and sufficuent condition of such a disposition. He maintains also that there are not two things sensation and my consciousness of it in the way that there are two things a penny and my consciousness of the penny. According to Place, the occurrence of a sensation entails someone's consciousness of that sensation. The major problem of Ryle's theory of knowledge seems to be his failure to distinguish between task-verbs and achievement-verbs, between achievements and disposition. This ultimately leads to some epistemological problemS•Special co9nitive acts are postulated by Ryle to explain achievementwords. He considers knowledge as an achievement. It is also dispositional. The trouble is that these characteristics exclude each other and so their joint attribution is selfcontradictory. Ryle explicitly introduces the episodic character of achievement-words. They signify occurrences. He stresses also equally that dispositional statements do not narrate any incidents; by holding that to clarify a word as dispositional is to say atleast that it does not indicate any episode. He does not even suggest that 'know' is a hybrid word which is both episodic and dispositional. Thus we see that Ryle is not at all clear about his own theory - 213 - of knowledge. It knowledge is interpreted as dispositional how can it be achievement at the same time ? Scheffler criticises Ryle by stating that Ryle is perfectly clear and explicit in classifying 'know' as a dispositional word with- ~ out any qualification. He is also perfectly straight forward ~ in calling achievement words 'genuine episodic words'. It follows that 'know' cannot be both an achie!vement-word and dispositional word. Ryle's total account is thus literally . . t t 30 1ncons1s en • In discussing the various ways in which we use the word 'know' Austin unlike Ryle puts forward the theory that knowing is a performative word. The statement '1 know that S is P' is usually understood to assert that I am in a mental state in relation to'S is P'. This doc~rine Austin argues rests on the discriptive fallacy which supposes that words are used only to describe. To claim to know is not to describe my mental state. It is to take a plunge that is to give others my authority, my word. In his article •other ~ our Mind~'Austin seems to bring~an analogy between 'know statements' and 'promise-statements'. ~terences like 'I pronise' are performatives in that the saying of 'I promise' is the performances of a promise itself. It actually does what is seems to say, what the speaker is doing. Austin points out that 'I know' is not just reporting a fact about myself, 30. Israel Scheffler, 'On Ryle's Theory of Propositional Knowledge', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.LXV, No.22, 1968, p.728. - 214 - it is giving one's warrant to something. He says : ''But now when 'I say, I promise' a new plunge is taken : I have not merely announced my intention, but by using this formula (performing this rituals), I have bound myself to others, and asked my reputation, in a new way. Similarly~saying 'I know' is taking a new plunge'•. 31 Finally, we find that the official myth- 'the cogito' of the Cartesian Philosophy cannot be replaced by Ryle's knowledge how or disposition. R.King's observation is very apt when he says : ''We cannot reduce 'my mind' to simply my ability or proneness to do certain sorts of thing. Indeed ability or proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed to di • • d' I 32 . snu ss-my m1n • A.J.Ayer remarks that what Ryle has succeeded in doing is to reduce the empire of the mind over a considerable area. This is an important achievement and one that is brilliantly effected, but it does not fulfil Hyle's proposed intention of entirely exorcising the ghost in the machine. The movements of the ghost have been curtailed but it still walks and some of us are still haunted by it. 33 Hecently Rickman arguing against Ryle maintains that it is not at all possible to exercise Descartes' ghost in ........._ the body machine and to for sake the dualism thereby. The ..J 31. J.L.Austin, Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, 1961, London, p. 67. 32. R.H.King, 'Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind', ~n.aLof Philosog__l"}y...._,Vol.XLVII, 1951, p.293. 3 3. A. J. Ayer, 'An Honest Ghost' , ln Wood and Pitcher ed. Ryle, Macmillan and Co., 1971, p. 74. - 215 - privileged access - the official legend cannot be explained away by Ryle's theory of knowledge which abolished all references to inner activities of mind in the case of knowing. Moreover, minds or souls cannot be compared with the ghost. Ghosts are superstitions, minds or souls are not. So while Ryle is interested to expel Descarte's ghost in the body machine Professor Rickman is rather anxious to exorcise 'Ryle's ghost in the machine'. He states : n 'As I turn to my preferred alternative, dualism, it is still necessary to exercise a particular ghost- Ryle's ghost in the machine'•. 34 In a word we want to conclude by saying that Ryle in his attempt to do away with all links to mechanical and para-mechanical explanations of knowledge fails to give us ~ satisfactory account of his own dispositional analysis of the same. 34. H.P.Rickman, 'Exorcising the Ghost in the Machine', Philosophy, October, 1988, Vol.63, No.246, p. 489.