Grice introduces 'individual' in terms of 'izzing' and 'hazzing': "x is an
_individual_ iff nothing other than x izz x. x is a _primary individual_
iff x is an individual and nothing hazz x (Grice, 'Aristotle on the
multiplicity of being, p. 182). Code, in those same terms, further
contrasts an 'individual' from a _particular_ proper:
_individual_ iff nothing other than x izz x. x is a _primary individual_
iff x is an individual and nothing hazz x (Grice, 'Aristotle on the
multiplicity of being, p. 182). Code, in those same terms, further
contrasts an 'individual' from a _particular_ proper:
* (x). x is individual ("_atomon_")
<-> Nec. (y) (y is x) -> (x is y).
* (x) x is particular ("_kath'ekaston_") <->
Nec. (y). x is predicable of y -> x is y & y is x.
* x is _tode ti_ (a this somewhat) ->
x is individual.
* (x)(x is particular -> x is individual).
(The converse is not a theorem).
A. Code, in _PGRICE_ (Grandy/Warner,
in refs, below), p. 414.
<-> Nec. (y) (y is x) -> (x is y).
* (x) x is particular ("_kath'ekaston_") <->
Nec. (y). x is predicable of y -> x is y & y is x.
* x is _tode ti_ (a this somewhat) ->
x is individual.
* (x)(x is particular -> x is individual).
(The converse is not a theorem).
A. Code, in _PGRICE_ (Grandy/Warner,
in refs, below), p. 414.
Code writes:
"It is important not to confuse 'individual'
with 'particular': an _individual_ is an item
that cannot be truly "i[zz]"-predicated
of another item. An individual (e.g. an
individual white ("to ti leukon", Cat. 2.1a27))
may be "h"-predicable of another thing. A
_particular_, on the other hand, cannot be neither
"i"-predicated nor "h-"predicated of any other
item. While every particular is an individual,
the converse implication does not hold. A particular
cannot receive a property unless the particular
is something essentially. A particular must be
_something_ or other definable in order to _have_
a property. A particular must be _tode ti_,
a 'this some_what_', where the 'ti' is the
something definable that _tode_ is (v. Owen, p.
24). "Tode ti" is sometimes used so that "ti"
is the 'something' that "tode" picks out.
It may also involve quantification over an
the essence (essential property) of the
_tode_. _Tode_ may pick out the essence,
and the _ti_ range over the particulars
endowed with that essence: 'Socrates is
tode ti' may thus generalise either
'Socrates is _this_ man' or 'Socrates is _a_
man'. In the Categories, a "primary substance"
(_prote ousia_) is an individual "_tode ti_"
(Cat. 1b6-9 3b10-15). The primary substance
-- indeed, the _tode ti_ -- is the particular
(e.g. a particular man), which is _not_
predicable of anything further. Only
a primary substance is a 'this', i.e. a
particular. A particular man is a 'this',
and no 'this' is predicable of this 'this'.
For Aristotle, however, matter is _not_
"tode ti", and hence matter is _not_ a primary
substance. The matter of which a particular is
made is not a 'this'.
(Code, op. cit., p. 439).
with 'particular': an _individual_ is an item
that cannot be truly "i[zz]"-predicated
of another item. An individual (e.g. an
individual white ("to ti leukon", Cat. 2.1a27))
may be "h"-predicable of another thing. A
_particular_, on the other hand, cannot be neither
"i"-predicated nor "h-"predicated of any other
item. While every particular is an individual,
the converse implication does not hold. A particular
cannot receive a property unless the particular
is something essentially. A particular must be
_something_ or other definable in order to _have_
a property. A particular must be _tode ti_,
a 'this some_what_', where the 'ti' is the
something definable that _tode_ is (v. Owen, p.
24). "Tode ti" is sometimes used so that "ti"
is the 'something' that "tode" picks out.
It may also involve quantification over an
the essence (essential property) of the
_tode_. _Tode_ may pick out the essence,
and the _ti_ range over the particulars
endowed with that essence: 'Socrates is
tode ti' may thus generalise either
'Socrates is _this_ man' or 'Socrates is _a_
man'. In the Categories, a "primary substance"
(_prote ousia_) is an individual "_tode ti_"
(Cat. 1b6-9 3b10-15). The primary substance
-- indeed, the _tode ti_ -- is the particular
(e.g. a particular man), which is _not_
predicable of anything further. Only
a primary substance is a 'this', i.e. a
particular. A particular man is a 'this',
and no 'this' is predicable of this 'this'.
For Aristotle, however, matter is _not_
"tode ti", and hence matter is _not_ a primary
substance. The matter of which a particular is
made is not a 'this'.
(Code, op. cit., p. 439).
Code makes on p. 439 an acknowledgment to M. Cohen whose refs. on these
concerns I've made avail of in the list below. As for the _linguistic_ side
to this (and "this"), may I append Grice's brief consideration on
'[quasi-]demonstrat[ion] in _Studies in the Way of Words_:
concerns I've made avail of in the list below. As for the _linguistic_ side
to this (and "this"), may I append Grice's brief consideration on
'[quasi-]demonstrat[ion] in _Studies in the Way of Words_:
"Consider utterances of such a sentence as,
'The book on the table is not open'. As there
are, obviously, _many_ books on [many] tables
in the world, if we are to treat such a sentence
as being of the form "the A is not G" and
as being, on that account, ripe for Russellian
expansion, we might do well to treat it as
exemplifying a more _specific_ form, 'The A'
_which is Phi_ is not G', where 'phi' represents
an epithet to be identified in a _particular_
context of utterance ("phi" being a sort of
quasi-demonstrative). Standardly, to identify
the reference of "phi" for a particular utterance
of 'The book on the table is open', the addressee
would proceed via the identification of a particular
book as being a good _candidate_ for being the
book meant, and would identify the candidate
of "phi" by finding in the candidate a feature,
for example, that of _being in *this* room_, which
could be used to yield a composite epithet ("book
on the table in _this_ room"), which would
in turn fill the bill of being the epithet which
the speaker had in mind as being uniquely satisfied
by the book selected as candidate. Determining
the reference of "phi" would, standardly, involve
determining what feature the utterer might have in
mind as being _uniquely instantiated_ by an _actual
object_, and this in turn would standardly involve
satisfying oneself that some particular feature
actually is uniquely satisfied by a particular
actual object (e.g. a particular book)."
Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, WOW, p. 277.
& cf. Schiffer in _Synthese_.
Cheers,
'The book on the table is not open'. As there
are, obviously, _many_ books on [many] tables
in the world, if we are to treat such a sentence
as being of the form "the A is not G" and
as being, on that account, ripe for Russellian
expansion, we might do well to treat it as
exemplifying a more _specific_ form, 'The A'
_which is Phi_ is not G', where 'phi' represents
an epithet to be identified in a _particular_
context of utterance ("phi" being a sort of
quasi-demonstrative). Standardly, to identify
the reference of "phi" for a particular utterance
of 'The book on the table is open', the addressee
would proceed via the identification of a particular
book as being a good _candidate_ for being the
book meant, and would identify the candidate
of "phi" by finding in the candidate a feature,
for example, that of _being in *this* room_, which
could be used to yield a composite epithet ("book
on the table in _this_ room"), which would
in turn fill the bill of being the epithet which
the speaker had in mind as being uniquely satisfied
by the book selected as candidate. Determining
the reference of "phi" would, standardly, involve
determining what feature the utterer might have in
mind as being _uniquely instantiated_ by an _actual
object_, and this in turn would standardly involve
satisfying oneself that some particular feature
actually is uniquely satisfied by a particular
actual object (e.g. a particular book)."
Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, WOW, p. 277.
& cf. Schiffer in _Synthese_.
Cheers,
JL
===
Refs.
Ackrill J. Aristotle's _Categories_. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Addis L. Aristotle and the independence of substances.
Philosophy & Phenomenological research. 54
Albritton R. Forms of particular substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Journal of Philosophy 54.
Allen R. Individual properties in Aristotle's Categories.
Phronesis 14.
Annas J. Individuals in Aristotle's Categories. Phronesis 19
Aristotle, Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Anscombe, G. The Principle of Individuation.
Aristotelian Society 27. Reprinted in J. Barnes,
M. Schofield, and R. R. K. Sorabji (eds.),
Articles on Aristotle, Vol 3. Metaphysics.
London: Duckworth
Block, I. Substance in Aristotle. In G. C. Simmons (ed.),
Paideia: Special Aristotle Issue. Brockport, NY.
Bolton, R. Science and the Science of Substance
in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76
Bostock, D. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Burnyeat, M. Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Oxford: Sub-faculty of Philosophy.
Chappell, V. Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation.
Phronesis 17
Chen C. Aristotle's primary substance. Phronesis 2
Code A. Aristotle’s Response to Quine's objections to modal logic.
Journal of Philosophical Logic 5
The persistence of Aristotelian matter.
Philosophical Studies 29
No universal is a substance:
an interpretation of Aristotle's _Metaphysics_ Z 13 1038b 8-15
Paideia.
What is it to be an individual?
Journal of Philosophy 75
Metaphysics & Logic, in Matthen,
Aristotle Today. Edmonton: Academic Printing.
On the origins of some Aristotelian theses about predication'
In J. Bogen & J. Mcguire,
How things are: studies in predication and the
history of philosophy. Reidel.
Aristotle: essence & accident," in
PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends, eds. R. Grandy and R. Warner.
The aporematic approach to primary being in Aristotle's
_Metaphysics_ Z.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10
Repr. in T. Irwin, _Aristotle: substance, form, & matter_,
Garland.
Potentiality in Aristotle's science & metaphysics
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76
Repr. in F. Lewis/R Bolton, _Form, matter, and
mixture in Aristotle_, Blackwell.
Aristotle’s metaphysics as a science of principles
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51
Some remarks on Aristotle's _Metaphysics_ L5.
in D. Charles & M. Frede, Aristotle Metaphysics Bk L:
Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford.
Monty Furth's Aristotle: 10 Years Later
Philosophical Studies 94
Philosophical method in Aristotle's On Ideas
Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie 2
The priority of final cause over efficient
cause in Aristotle.
Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden,
Ergebnisse, ed. W Kullmann and S Foellinger.
Stuttgart: Steiner.
Aristotle: logic & metaphysics,
Routledge History of Philosophy 2
eds. S.G. Shanker and G.H.R. Parkinson;
Aristotle," Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy,
ed. D Zeyl. Greenwood.
Dictionary articles (on David Hume, Francis
Hutcheson, and Lord Kames), The
Dictionary of Art, ed. Jane Shoaf Turner (Macmillan).
Owen on the Development of Aristotle's Metaphysics,
Aristotle's philosophical development, ed. Wians,
William (Rowman & Littlefield)
Cohen SM. Individual & essence in Aristotle's _Metaphysics_.
Paideia
Aristotle & individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10
Aristotle's metaphysics.
Online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Cresswell M. Existence in Aristotle. Theoria 37.
Dancy J. Aristotle on substance. Phil Rev. 84.
Devereux D. Primary substance in Aristotle. Ancient Philosophy 12
Durrant M. Essence and accident. Mind 84.
Frede M. Individuals in Aristotle. In Frede] 49-71.
Gill M. Aristotle on substance. Princeton UP.
Aristotle on substance. Ancient Philosophy 15
Grice HP. Aristotle on the multiplicity of being.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69
Harter E. Aristotle on primary ousia. Geschichte der Philosophie 57.
Irwin T. Aristotle's First Principles. Clarendon
Jones B. Individuals in Aristotle. Phronesis 17
Kapitan T. Substance
http://www.soci.niu.edu/~
Kirwan C. Aristotle. Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kosman, L. Substance and being. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 2
Kung J. Aristotle on "this" and "such". Phronesis 26.
Aristotle on 'being is said in many ways'
History of Philosophy Quarterly 3
Lacey A. Ousia in Aristotle. Phronesis 10
Lesher J. Aristotle on substance. Phronesis 17
Lewis F. Predication in Aristotle.
In Bogen/Mcguire. Cfr. Code.
Substance and predication in Aristotle. CUP
Lloyd A. Aristotle's principle of individuation. Mind 79
Loux M. Primary ousia: an essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Cornell University Press.
Mackinnon D. Aristotle on substance. In R. Bambrough,
On Aristotle. Routledge.
Matthen M. Individual substance as a hylomorphic complex.
In Matthen, On Aristotle.
Mckinnon D. Aristotle on substance.
Modrak D. Type and token in Aristotle.
Journal History of Philosophy 17
Moravcsik, J. Aristotle on predication.
Journal of Philosophy 76
Owen G. Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology.
Repr. in Bambrough] 95.
Inherence," Phronesis 10
Particular & general. PAS 79
The Platonism of Aristotle.
Proceedings of the British Academy 50.
Repr. in [Barnes et al., v. 1] 14-34.
Owens, J. The doctrine of being in Aristotle.
Institute of Medieval studies.
Matter and Predication in Aristotle," in [McMullin].
and in [Moravcsik]
Peirce C S. Works. Cited by S. Sharpless. On 'haecceity'
as ultimate.
Regis, E. Aristotle's principle of individuation. Phronesis 21
Whiting J. Form & individuation in Aristotle. HPQ 3
Scaltsas, T. Substance in Aristotle.
Cornell University Press.
Schiffer S. Demonstratives. In _Synthese_
Sellars W. Substance in Aristotle. Journal of Philosophy 54.
Shannon T. Duns Scotus and bio-ethics
http://www.lexisnexis.com/
Smith J. Tode ti in Aristotle. Classical Review 35
Smith R. A. Predication. Grice on izzing and hazzing.
http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~
Stough C. Language & ontology in Aristotle.
Journal History of Philosophy 10
Regis E. Aristotle's principle of individuation. Phronesis 21
Wedin M. PARTisanship in Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Ancient Philosophy 11.
Whiting J. Form and individuation in Aristotle.
Histor of Philosophy Quarterly 3.
Witt C. Substance and Essence in Aristotle
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Woods, M. Substance and Essence in Aristotle.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75
Refs.
Ackrill J. Aristotle's _Categories_. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Addis L. Aristotle and the independence of substances.
Philosophy & Phenomenological research. 54
Albritton R. Forms of particular substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Journal of Philosophy 54.
Allen R. Individual properties in Aristotle's Categories.
Phronesis 14.
Annas J. Individuals in Aristotle's Categories. Phronesis 19
Aristotle, Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Anscombe, G. The Principle of Individuation.
Aristotelian Society 27. Reprinted in J. Barnes,
M. Schofield, and R. R. K. Sorabji (eds.),
Articles on Aristotle, Vol 3. Metaphysics.
London: Duckworth
Block, I. Substance in Aristotle. In G. C. Simmons (ed.),
Paideia: Special Aristotle Issue. Brockport, NY.
Bolton, R. Science and the Science of Substance
in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76
Bostock, D. Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Burnyeat, M. Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Oxford: Sub-faculty of Philosophy.
Chappell, V. Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation.
Phronesis 17
Chen C. Aristotle's primary substance. Phronesis 2
Code A. Aristotle’s Response to Quine's objections to modal logic.
Journal of Philosophical Logic 5
The persistence of Aristotelian matter.
Philosophical Studies 29
No universal is a substance:
an interpretation of Aristotle's _Metaphysics_ Z 13 1038b 8-15
Paideia.
What is it to be an individual?
Journal of Philosophy 75
Metaphysics & Logic, in Matthen,
Aristotle Today. Edmonton: Academic Printing.
On the origins of some Aristotelian theses about predication'
In J. Bogen & J. Mcguire,
How things are: studies in predication and the
history of philosophy. Reidel.
Aristotle: essence & accident," in
PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends, eds. R. Grandy and R. Warner.
The aporematic approach to primary being in Aristotle's
_Metaphysics_ Z.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10
Repr. in T. Irwin, _Aristotle: substance, form, & matter_,
Garland.
Potentiality in Aristotle's science & metaphysics
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76
Repr. in F. Lewis/R Bolton, _Form, matter, and
mixture in Aristotle_, Blackwell.
Aristotle’s metaphysics as a science of principles
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51
Some remarks on Aristotle's _Metaphysics_ L5.
in D. Charles & M. Frede, Aristotle Metaphysics Bk L:
Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford.
Monty Furth's Aristotle: 10 Years Later
Philosophical Studies 94
Philosophical method in Aristotle's On Ideas
Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie 2
The priority of final cause over efficient
cause in Aristotle.
Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden,
Ergebnisse, ed. W Kullmann and S Foellinger.
Stuttgart: Steiner.
Aristotle: logic & metaphysics,
Routledge History of Philosophy 2
eds. S.G. Shanker and G.H.R. Parkinson;
Aristotle," Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy,
ed. D Zeyl. Greenwood.
Dictionary articles (on David Hume, Francis
Hutcheson, and Lord Kames), The
Dictionary of Art, ed. Jane Shoaf Turner (Macmillan).
Owen on the Development of Aristotle's Metaphysics,
Aristotle's philosophical development, ed. Wians,
William (Rowman & Littlefield)
Cohen SM. Individual & essence in Aristotle's _Metaphysics_.
Paideia
Aristotle & individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10
Aristotle's metaphysics.
Online Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Cresswell M. Existence in Aristotle. Theoria 37.
Dancy J. Aristotle on substance. Phil Rev. 84.
Devereux D. Primary substance in Aristotle. Ancient Philosophy 12
Durrant M. Essence and accident. Mind 84.
Frede M. Individuals in Aristotle. In Frede] 49-71.
Gill M. Aristotle on substance. Princeton UP.
Aristotle on substance. Ancient Philosophy 15
Grice HP. Aristotle on the multiplicity of being.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69
Harter E. Aristotle on primary ousia. Geschichte der Philosophie 57.
Irwin T. Aristotle's First Principles. Clarendon
Jones B. Individuals in Aristotle. Phronesis 17
Kapitan T. Substance
http://www.soci.niu.edu/~
Kirwan C. Aristotle. Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kosman, L. Substance and being. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 2
Kung J. Aristotle on "this" and "such". Phronesis 26.
Aristotle on 'being is said in many ways'
History of Philosophy Quarterly 3
Lacey A. Ousia in Aristotle. Phronesis 10
Lesher J. Aristotle on substance. Phronesis 17
Lewis F. Predication in Aristotle.
In Bogen/Mcguire. Cfr. Code.
Substance and predication in Aristotle. CUP
Lloyd A. Aristotle's principle of individuation. Mind 79
Loux M. Primary ousia: an essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Cornell University Press.
Mackinnon D. Aristotle on substance. In R. Bambrough,
On Aristotle. Routledge.
Matthen M. Individual substance as a hylomorphic complex.
In Matthen, On Aristotle.
Mckinnon D. Aristotle on substance.
Modrak D. Type and token in Aristotle.
Journal History of Philosophy 17
Moravcsik, J. Aristotle on predication.
Journal of Philosophy 76
Owen G. Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology.
Repr. in Bambrough] 95.
Inherence," Phronesis 10
Particular & general. PAS 79
The Platonism of Aristotle.
Proceedings of the British Academy 50.
Repr. in [Barnes et al., v. 1] 14-34.
Owens, J. The doctrine of being in Aristotle.
Institute of Medieval studies.
Matter and Predication in Aristotle," in [McMullin].
and in [Moravcsik]
Peirce C S. Works. Cited by S. Sharpless. On 'haecceity'
as ultimate.
Regis, E. Aristotle's principle of individuation. Phronesis 21
Whiting J. Form & individuation in Aristotle. HPQ 3
Scaltsas, T. Substance in Aristotle.
Cornell University Press.
Schiffer S. Demonstratives. In _Synthese_
Sellars W. Substance in Aristotle. Journal of Philosophy 54.
Shannon T. Duns Scotus and bio-ethics
http://www.lexisnexis.com/
Smith J. Tode ti in Aristotle. Classical Review 35
Smith R. A. Predication. Grice on izzing and hazzing.
http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~
Stough C. Language & ontology in Aristotle.
Journal History of Philosophy 10
Regis E. Aristotle's principle of individuation. Phronesis 21
Wedin M. PARTisanship in Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Ancient Philosophy 11.
Whiting J. Form and individuation in Aristotle.
Histor of Philosophy Quarterly 3.
Witt C. Substance and Essence in Aristotle
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Woods, M. Substance and Essence in Aristotle.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75
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