Grice on individuum and beyond

Grice introduces 'individual' in terms of 'izzing' and 'hazzing': 

x is an
individual, individuum, atomon, iff nothing other than x izz x. 

x is a primary individual, primum individuum, proton atomon,
iff x is an individual, individuum, atomon, and nothing hazz x.

There is a stark contrast between 'individual' (individuum, atomon) from a _particular_ (kath'ekaston, particulare) proper.

Ax). x is individual ("atomon," individuum)
  <->  Nec. (y) (y is x) -> (x is y).

Ax) x is particular ('kath'ekaston,' particulare) <->
  Nec. (y). x is predicable of y -> x is y & y is x.
*

x is "tode ti" ("a this somewhat") ->
  x is individual, atomon, individuum.

Ax)(x is particular (kath'ekaston, particulare, singulare)  -> x is individual, atomon, individuum).

But the converse is not a theorem. Not every individuum is a "kath'ekaston."

It is important, at Oxford, never to confuse 'individual' with 'particular.'

An _individual_ is an item that cannot be truly "i[zz]"-predicated of another item. 

individual (e.g. an individual white ("to ti leukon", Cat. 2.1a27)) may be "hazz"-predicable of another thing. 

A _particular_ ('kath'ekaston') on the other hand, cannot be neither "izz"-predicated nor "hazz-"predicated of any other item. 

While every particular is an individual, the converse implication does not hold. 

A particular cannot receive a property unless the particular is something essentially. 

A particular must be _something_ or other definable in order to _have_ a property. 

A particular must be _tode ti_, a 'this some_what_', where the 'ti' is the something definable that _tode_ is.

"Tode ti" is sometimes used so that "ti" is the 'something' that "tode" picks out.

It may also involve quantification over an
essence (essential property) of the
 _tode_. 

_Tode_ may pick out the essence, and the _ti_ range over this or that singular or particular endowed with that essence.

'Socrates is tode ti' may thus generalise either
 'Socrates is _this_ man' or 'Socrates is _a_
 man'. 

In Aristotle's Categoriae, a "primary substance"  (_prote ousia_, substantia prima) is an individual "_tode ti_" (Cat. 1b6-9 3b10-15). 

The 'substantia prima' -- indeed, the _tode ti_ -- is the particular or singular (e.g. a particular or singular man), which is _not_ predicable of anything further. 

Only a 'substantia prima' is a 'this', i.e. a, a singular, a singleton, a particular. 

A particular man is a 'this.'

No 'this' is predicable of this 'this'.

For Aristotle, however, matter (hyle, materia) is _not_ "tode ti", and hence matter is _not_ a primary substance (substantia prima). 

The matter of which a particular is made is not a 'this'.
 

Grice knew of M. Cohen through Code.

Grice was obsessed with this or that. 

Consider, Grice notes, an utterance, out of the blue, of such a sentence as, 'The philosopher in the conference is intelligent'.

As there are, obviously, _many_ philosophers on [many] conferences
    in the world, if the addressee is to treat such a sentence
    as being of the form "the A is G" and
    as being, on that account, ripe for Russellian
    expansion, the utterer might do well to treat it as
    exemplifying a more _specific_ form, 'The A'
    _which is Phi_ is not G', where 'phi' represents
    an epithet to be identified in a _particular_
    context of utterance ("phi" being a sort of
    quasi-demonstrative). 

Standardly, to identify
    the reference of "phi" for a particular utterance
    of 'The philosopher in the conference is sarcastic', the addressee
    would proceed via the identification of a particular
    philosopher as being a good _candidate_ for being the
    philosopher meant, and would identify the candidate
    of "phi" by finding in the candidate a feature,
    for example, that of _being in *this* city, Oxford, which
    could be used to yield a composite epithet ("philosopher at the conference at Oxford"), which would
    in turn fill the bill of being the epithet which
    the utterer has in mind as being uniquely satisfied
    by the philosopher selected as candidate. Determining
    the reference of "phi" would, standardly, involve
    determining what feature the utterer might have in
    mind as being _uniquely instantiated_ by an _actual
    object_, or philosopher, and this in turn would standardly involve
    satisfying oneself that some particular feature
    actually is uniquely satisfied by a particular
    actual object (e.g. a particular philosopher)."
          

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