J. A. Fodor is one of the world’s foremost philosophers of mind, who brought the workings of computer technology to bear on ancient questions about the structure of human cognition.
His home is in Manhattan.
A faculty member of Rutgers University, Fodor is the State of New Jersey professor of philosophy there.
Fodor's oeuvre, dovetailing with logic, semiotics, psychology, anthropology, computer science, artificial intelligence and other fields, is widely credited with having helped seed the emerging discipline of cognitive science.
Fodor's oeuvre, dovetailing with logic, semiotics, psychology, anthropology, computer science, artificial intelligence and other fields, is widely credited with having helped seed the emerging discipline of cognitive science.
“Fodor basically created the field of philosophy of psychology,” E. Lepore, of Rutgers and a frequent collaborator, said.
“If the study of the mind has been dominant in the last years of philosophy, it is really a function of Fodor’s influence.”
“If the study of the mind has been dominant in the last years of philosophy, it is really a function of Fodor’s influence.”
Known for his buoyant, puckish, at times pugnacious style, Fodor is the author of more than a dozen essays, several intended for what Grice would call the 'lay man.' (Vide Grice, "The learned and the vulgar.")
Among the best known of these is “The Modularity of Mind."
Among the best known of these is “The Modularity of Mind."
In it, Fodor argues that the 'soul,' rather than being a unitary system as was often supposed, comprises a set of inborn, compartmentalized, purpose-built subsystems: a faculty for language, another for musical ability, still another for mathematics, and so on.
These faculties -- there is a Kantian ring to 'faculty' that both Fodor and Grice adore -- Fodor explains, operate by means of abstract algorithms, much as computers do.
These faculties -- there is a Kantian ring to 'faculty' that both Fodor and Grice adore -- Fodor explains, operate by means of abstract algorithms, much as computers do.
In setting forth this model, Fodor marries developments from the midcentury revolution in linguistics ushered in by A. N. Chomsky to the computer science of the mathematician and cryptanalyst AlanTuring.
While the brain, a physical entity, is amenable to study, the 'soul' or to use Grice's term of art, 'personal identity' — an abstract, elusive quarry — is far less so, and questions about its architecture have occupied philosophers at intervals since classical antiquity.
Plato and Aristotle -- never mind Kantotle -- had much to say on the subject.
So, more than two millenniums later, did philosophers like the 17th-century rationalist René Descartes and the 17th-century empiricist John Locke. (Interestingly, while Grice wrote on "Descartes" in his WoW (Way of Words) he merely delivered the John Locke lectures -- with a charming proemium, though!)
So, more than two millenniums later, did philosophers like the 17th-century rationalist René Descartes and the 17th-century empiricist John Locke. (Interestingly, while Grice wrote on "Descartes" in his WoW (Way of Words) he merely delivered the John Locke lectures -- with a charming proemium, though!)
Such questions — in particular whether cognitive abilities are innate or must be learned — were taken up again in the first half of the 20th century by behavioral psychologists, notably B. F. Skinner, whose work, by Fodor’s lights, was a reprehensible thing indeed.
(Oddly, A. N. Chomsky found Grice too behaviourist to his taste -- but the Grice Chomsky is concerned with is the bit reprinted by Searle in "The philosophy of language," Oxford readings in philosophy -- For a defence of Grice as an 'intentionalist' rather than a behaviourist, vide Suppes, in P. G. R. I. C. E., ed. by Grandy and Warner).
(Oddly, A. N. Chomsky found Grice too behaviourist to his taste -- but the Grice Chomsky is concerned with is the bit reprinted by Searle in "The philosophy of language," Oxford readings in philosophy -- For a defence of Grice as an 'intentionalist' rather than a behaviourist, vide Suppes, in P. G. R. I. C. E., ed. by Grandy and Warner).
An ardent empiricist, Skinner maintains that a child is born with its mind a blank slate.
As it matures, a spate of mental abilities — language, reason, problem-solving and much else — is learned through external experience.
As it matures, a spate of mental abilities — language, reason, problem-solving and much else — is learned through external experience.
Chomsky, a philosopher (who quotes "H. P. Grice" as "A. P. Grice" in "Aspects of a theory of syntax") and ardent rationalist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, demonstrates that language was not learned behaviour, as Skinner believes.
Instead, Chomsky aims to show, it is the product of a dedicated mental faculty that is inborn — in today’s parlance, hard-wired in.
A. N. Chomsky's work, scholars now seem to agree, vanquished behaviourism, especially as far as the study of language was concerned.
(Oddly, Grice never understood why, of all people, his two mentors had to be Chomsky and Quine -- "whom I never saw agree on ANYTHING!")
Instead, Chomsky aims to show, it is the product of a dedicated mental faculty that is inborn — in today’s parlance, hard-wired in.
A. N. Chomsky's work, scholars now seem to agree, vanquished behaviourism, especially as far as the study of language was concerned.
(Oddly, Grice never understood why, of all people, his two mentors had to be Chomsky and Quine -- "whom I never saw agree on ANYTHING!")
Fodor, like Grice, an equally ardent rationalist who taught at M.I.T. for years, expands Chomsky’s ideas about linguistic innateness to include aspects of mind beyond language.
(Vide D. E. Cooper for a conceptual analysis of 'innateness' as sometimes misused by Chomsky).
(Vide D. E. Cooper for a conceptual analysis of 'innateness' as sometimes misused by Chomsky).
Drawing on the work of Turing, who develops mathematical models of computation, Fodor proposes a model of the 'soul' that entails separate faculties — Fodor, a bit out of nowhere, calls them “modules” — each governing a separate function.
“Faculty psychology,” Fodor notes, “is impressed by such prima facie differences as between, say, sensation and perception, volition and cognition, learning and remembering, or language and thought.”
As Lepore points out: “It’s a very old idea, but for some reason it got lost in the history of philosophy. And it got resuscitated by Fodor." Of all people. (Grice loved the implicatures of 'of all people').
The idea had fallen into disfavour partly as a result of phrenology, the pseudoscience, popular in the 19th century, that sought to divine people’s prowess in given areas — and by extension their characters — by feeling the bumps on their heads to find the prominent spots.
But if one pared away the bumps and their touchy-feely characterological connotations, Fodor argues, phrenology’s underlying premise — that the 'soul' consists of discrete, dedicated faculties — was worth revisiting.
One problem that such a model appears to solve had long bedeviled psychologists: the question of why one part of the 'soul' seems disinclined to talk to another. (Although Grice thought the 'executive' side to his soul often disagreed with the 'legislative' side to it. Granted, Grice is only toying with Davidson on Davidson's too simplistic idea of 'deciding' and 'intending').
“There are different aspects of the 'souul' — reasoning, language, perception, thought — and they don’t communicate very well, and that’s a bit of a shock,” Lepore says.
Interestingly, Lepore can also be spelt (or spelled) "Le Pore."
Interestingly, Lepore can also be spelt (or spelled) "Le Pore."
Consider, for example, a familiar optical illusion, in which lines of equal length are flanked by inward- or outward-facing arrowheads:
Even contemplating it now — though you have known for years that it is an illusion — you cannot help seeing the lines as different in length.
“That is an example of the perceptual part of the mind not communicating with the reasoning part of the soul,” Lepore explains.
A model of the organization the soul in which the faculties are in essence walled off from one another can account for this, Fodor argues.
“Faculty psychology is getting to be respectable again after centuries of hanging around with phrenologists and other dubious types,” Fodor notes in “The Modularity of Mind.”
(Grice speaks of the 'faculty of reason,' but only because he is a Kantotelian -- vide J. F. Bennett, "In the tradition of Kantotle).
(Grice speaks of the 'faculty of reason,' but only because he is a Kantotelian -- vide J. F. Bennett, "In the tradition of Kantotle).
Fodor revised his position, arguing that some functions of the 'soul,' including language and perception, are modular, while others, like belief, decision-making and logical inference, operate more broadly.
But his words resonate:
But his words resonate:
“A proposed inventory of psychological faculties,” he wrote, “is tantamount to a theory of the structure of the soul.”
The son of A. Fodor, a research bacteriologist, and Kay Rubens, Jerome Alan Fodor was born in Manhattan and reared (of all places) in Queens. (Grice loved the implicatures of 'of all places').
After graduating from Forest Hills High, Fodor received a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Columbia, where he studied with the philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser -- of 'double negative' fame.
Fodor earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton, where he was a disciple of the philosopher and mathematician Hilary Putnam (of all people). Actually, Grice uses 'of all people' of Putnam. "I tended to be very formal, until Putnam, of all people, reprimanded me by implicating that I was TOO formal."
Fodor earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton, where he was a disciple of the philosopher and mathematician Hilary Putnam (of all people). Actually, Grice uses 'of all people' of Putnam. "I tended to be very formal, until Putnam, of all people, reprimanded me by implicating that I was TOO formal."
Fodor taught at M.I.T.
He was at the City University of New York Graduate Center, before joining Rutgers.
Throughout his Rutgers years, Fodor maintains his residence on the Upper West Side of Manhattan for its proximity to the Metropolitan Opera, an abiding passion. (The Metropolitan Opera was originally on Broadway!)
He was at the City University of New York Graduate Center, before joining Rutgers.
Throughout his Rutgers years, Fodor maintains his residence on the Upper West Side of Manhattan for its proximity to the Metropolitan Opera, an abiding passion. (The Metropolitan Opera was originally on Broadway!)
Fodor’s first marriage, to Iris Goldstein, a professor of applied psychology at New York University, ends in divorce.
Besides his spouse, Janet Dean Fodor, a professor of linguistics at the CUNY Graduate Center, his survivors include a son, Anthony, from his first marriage; a daughter, Katherine Fodor, from his second marriage; and three grandchildren.
Besides his spouse, Janet Dean Fodor, a professor of linguistics at the CUNY Graduate Center, his survivors include a son, Anthony, from his first marriage; a daughter, Katherine Fodor, from his second marriage; and three grandchildren.
Fodor's other essays include “The Structure of Language," with Jerrold J. Katz; “The Language of Thought;" Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Goes Wrong," and “The Soul Doesn’t Work That Way."
Fodor is a regular contributor to The London Review of Books and The Times Literary Supplement, the London periodical.
His laurels include Fulbright and Guggenheim fellowships.
His laurels include Fulbright and Guggenheim fellowships.
Like much in philosophy, a field whose marrow is argument, Fodor’s oeuvre is not without controversy.
No essay of his engendered more of it than the provocatively titled volume “What Darwin Gets Wrong," written with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, a University of Arizona cognitive scientist, originally from somewhere in Italy. (Grice loved the implicatures of 'somewhere in...').
No essay of his engendered more of it than the provocatively titled volume “What Darwin Gets Wrong," written with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, a University of Arizona cognitive scientist, originally from somewhere in Italy. (Grice loved the implicatures of 'somewhere in...').
In it, Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini take on one of evolutionary biology’s sacred cows: natural selection.
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini argue that the process, with its slow incremental changes, may have little bearing on the development of cognition, or, for that matter, other features of Homo sapiens, aka Man.
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini argue that the process, with its slow incremental changes, may have little bearing on the development of cognition, or, for that matter, other features of Homo sapiens, aka Man.
“We think that what is needed,” Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini note, “is to cut the tree at its roots: to show that Darwin’s theory of natural selection is fatally flawed.”
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini continue, in one of the most damning indictments a rationalist can make:
"We claim that Skinner’s account of learning and Darwin’s account of evolution are identical in all but name.”
"We claim that Skinner’s account of learning and Darwin’s account of evolution are identical in all but name.”
The essay loosed an uproar among scientists.
Its review in the magazine Science appeared under the headline “Two Critics Without a Clue.”
Its review in the magazine Science appeared under the headline “Two Critics Without a Clue.”
“Fodor and Chomsky have a modus operandi which was ‘Bury your opponents as early as possible,’ ” Lepore says, speaking of Fodor.
“And when Fodor goes up against the scientific community, I do not think Fodor is ready for that."
"Fodor basically tells these guys that natural selection is bogus."
"The arguments are interesting, but Fodor doesn't win a lot of converts, if I may use innuendo."
“And when Fodor goes up against the scientific community, I do not think Fodor is ready for that."
"Fodor basically tells these guys that natural selection is bogus."
"The arguments are interesting, but Fodor doesn't win a lot of converts, if I may use innuendo."
In the end, despite a half-century of work by Fodor and his colleagues, the 'soul' remains a slippery thing.
Fodor brought the point forcibly home in “The Soul Does Not Work That Way.”
Fodor brought the point forcibly home in “The Soul Does Not Work That Way.”
“We’ve got lots to do,” Fodor notes.
"In fact, what our cognitive science has done so far is mostly to throw some light on how much dark there is.”
"In fact, what our cognitive science has done so far is mostly to throw some light on how much dark there is.”
ALTERNATIVE ACCESSION: FODOR, whose studies seek to map the soul's depths.
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