GRICEIANA

Speranza

The primary contribution of H.P. Grice (1913-1988) to the philosophy of communication can be found in his theory of conversation which focuses on the analysis of language in everyday contexts of interaction and the implications that arise in its usage. He was the first who directed attention towards the value of inference in communication, a view that was adopted by later pragmatists. The kinds of inferences Grice was interested in were those that cannot be deduced from the actual content of an utterance but belong to the complete process that enables comprehension between participants to take place. Grice can be situated within the debate in the philosophy of language on whether meaning should be understood in terms of formal linguistic rules or formal semantics 325 (Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, Chomsky) or in terms of context of use and participants (the later Wittgenstein, Austin). The debate between the two approaches to linguistic meaning can be understood in the difference between what people say and what they mean since it frequently happens that these two do not coincide. This disjunction between what is said and what is intended poses the problem of how to study language. The first group of philosophers think that since everyday language can lead to such difficulties, it would be best to study it at a formal level: it is therefore the logical meaning and not the everyday meaning that should be emphasised. Using deductive inferences, logic studies the transition from premises to conclusions that are automatically generated. This view of what constitutes the study of language is associated with Russell who dismisses ordinary, everyday language as such a ‗messy‘ affair that it cannot be considered a proper field of study. On the other hand, philosophers such as the later Wittgenstein did not consider everyday language as flawed in any way, but rather, argued that the question of meaning should be grounded in the way language is used in the contexts of everyday life; to focus on the logical meaning of language is to abstract it from such contexts. Grice‘s position in the debate is singular in that while he rejects the idea of language as dependent upon truth-conditions, i.e., the formal semantic view, he was not wholly persuaded by the idea that the use of language in everyday life was the best way to understand meanings. Although a member of the ordinary language philosophy movement, Grice still thought that logic could help with explaining conversational meaning. 326 Throughout his career Grice wrote a number of essays that have been collected into a volume entitled ‗Studies in the Way of Words‘ (1989) and it is this volume that I shall be referring to when I examine his writings. In the first section (a) I focus on the relationship between intention and meaning and follow this (b) with an analysis of conversational interactions concerning perceptual statements that reveal the way these could be true, but misleading. The next section examines (c) Grice‘s theory of conversation followed by (d) the relationship between the tools of logic and implicatures that can be raised within conversational settings. The final section (d) describes a number of areas within which Grice‘s work has been fruitfully applied. 1.0. Meaning and Intention Although Grice was clearly influenced by the work of J.L. Austin there are a number of differences between them: (a) Grice agreed with Austin on the value of ordinary language, but he considered Austin‘s approach, with its reliance on particular linguistic examples, as failing to differentiate between what is philosophically important from what is philosophically trivial. Grice himself attempted Austin‘s method of going through the dictionary to analyse the language of emotions but gave up at the end of the letter B when he realised that the verb ‗to feel‘ could also be used with ‗Byzantine‘; (b) while Austin favoured remaining at the level of describing linguistic uses Grice wanted to put together these descriptions to formulate a general theoretical account; (c) Grice also retained the 327 distinction between the meaning of words and the way words are used, while Austin emphasised use at the expense of sentence meaning. In ‗Meaning‘ (1989: 213-224), Grice‘s central thesis is that an account of meaning must be offered within the explanatory framework of the speaker‘s intention to mean something when he/she is communicating ‗...the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions...‘ (1989: 217) The analysis of meaning is seconded to the use of language for communicating intentions. Grice applies the method of ordinary language philosophy to analyse the concept of meaning to see the different ways it is used. He concludes by grouping the different uses into two sets. The first set is that of natural meaning where we find sentences such as ‗those spots mean measles‘ and ‗the recent budget means that we shall have a hard year‘. Natural meaning explains events that are symptomatic so that it is natural that the spots on a patient mean that he/she has measles and that the slashes in the budget mean that we will not have much money spend next year. The second set is that of non-natural meaning (or meaningNN) where we find sentences such as ‗[t]hose three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that ‗the bus is full‘ and ‗[t]hat remark, ‗Smith couldn‘t get on without his trouble and strife‘ meant that Smith found his wife indispensable‘. (1989: 214) In this case non-natural meaning is linguistic meaning where something is meant by being uttered; the speaker means something with the utterance so that when he/she utters ‗the patient has measles‘ there is no natural relation between the patient and the measles. 328 When the expressions ―means,‖ ―means something,‖ ―means that‖ are used in the kind of way in which they are used in the first set of sentences, I shall speak of the sense, or senses, in which they are used, as the natural sense, or senses, of the expression in question. When the expressions are used in the kind of way in which they are used in the second set of sentences, I shall speak of the sense, or senses, in which they are used, as the nonnatural sense, or senses, of the expressions in question. I shall use the abbreviation ―means nn‖ to distinguish the nonnatural sense or senses. (1989: 214) The differences between these two sets are specified as follows: (a) in the first set, the sentence entails the truth of what is said. This, however, is not the case with the second set for while it does not make sense to say ‗[t]hose spots mean measles but he hasn‘t got measles‘, (the first set) it is perfectly possible to say ‗[t]hose three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full‘…. ‗[b]ut the bus isn‘t in fact full ---the conductor has made a mistake.‘(1989: 213-214) (b) it would seem strange to say that the speaker who uttered ‗those spots mean measles‘ intended to communicate something more by the spots. There is no question of trying to further understand the intentions of the speaker. On the other hand, with the second class of examples it would not be strange to say that the speakers intended to mean something more by their utterance: the ‗rings on the bell‘ mean or communicate that there is no more place on the bus; likewise, the speaker – remarking about Smith – intended to communicate Smith‘s dependence on his wife. (c) finally, it is only with the second set of examples that we can add ‗mean‘ followed by quotation marks: ‗those three rings on the bell ‗mean‘ the bus is full‘ but we cannot say ‗those spots ‗mean‘ measles‘. 329 It should be pointed out that although the difference between these two classes is characterised by Grice as a difference between natural and non-natural meaning or meaningNN‘ the latter it is not restricted to linguistic meaning. Grice uses ‗utterance‘ in a broad sense such that it includes non-linguist meaning: human behaviour which is used to communicate something to someone on a particular occasion is also an utteranceiv. In the later ‗Utterer‘s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning‘ (1989: 117-137) this view is specified: ‗I use the term ―utter‖ (together with ―utterance‖) in an artificially wide sense, to cover any case of doing x or producing x by the performance of which U meant that so-and-so.‘ (1989: 118) In his analysis of meaningNN, Grice considers causal explanations of meaning as similar to behaviourist accounts of meaning, an account that he firmly rejects. The causal explanation of meaning was suggested by C.L. Stevenson, and although Stevenson did not favour a strict behaviourist account of meaning on the ground that it was too simplistic, he did assume a causal model when explaining linguistic meaning. Stevenson had argued in Ethics and Language (1944) that a sentence such as, ‗John is a remarkable athlete‘ causes in the listener the effect of associating ‗athlete‘ with ‗tallness‘. This is obviously not a linguistic rule but an association that the sentence suggests: ‗we should not ordinarily say that it ‗meant‘ anything about tallness, even though it ‗suggested it‘ (in Chapman 2005: 65). Grice‘s reply is that it is possible to talk about ‗non-tall athletes‘ without contradicting oneself. The trouble with Strawson‘s account, as Grice shows, is that given the notion of suggestion, all forms of behaviour might be considered as 330 communication, including those forms of behaviour that we would not normally consider as communication. For example, putting on a tailcoat might lead to the belief that one is about to go dancing because we conventionally associate tailcoats with dancing. But just because we conventionally associate wearing tailcoats with dancing, it does not meanNN that this is what is being communicated. ....the causal theory ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions; and so the latter notion, which is unexplained by the causal theory, in fact the fundamental one. (1989: 217) This explains why the concept of intention is crucial to the Gricean account of meaning. Intentionality provides the framework for understanding communication by shifting the emphasis away from conventional behaviour. It is the intention to mean rather than the convention that explains what is meant through the act of communication. It seems that another major influence upon Grice‘s paper is that of Peirce (Chapman, 2005: 71-72). The starting point of Grice‘s analysis concerns Peirce‘s use of the term ‗sign‘ that he equates with ‗means‘: by using ‗means‘ Grice is able to bring out the similarities as well as differences with Peirce‘s concepts of ‗index‘ and ‗symbol‘. Using the following sentence, ‗the position of the weathercock meant that the wind was North East‘ to analyse the category of index, Grice brings out two important points: (a) that it truly was a north east wind; and (b) that there was a causal connection between the wind and the weathercock. 331 However, if instead of ‗means‘ one says ‗the position of the weathercock was an indication that the wind was North East, but it was actually South East‘, it is clear that ‗was an indication‘ cannot be used interchangeably with ‗means‘: ‗indication‘ does not entail the truth of what is said. Likewise, the word ‗mean‘ does not necessarily imply a causal relation: if one says ‗the position of the weathercock meant that the wind was North East‘ then, in this case, there is a causal relation between the weathercock and the North East wind. But if during a conversation at a bus stop one says, ‗those three rings of the bell meant that the bus was full‘, there is no causal connection since one might ask ‗was it full?‘ By applying the method of ordinary language philosophy, Grice concludes that the way Peirce uses the term ‗sign‘ is not consistent with everyday usage. Grice introduces a distinction between the ‗timeless meaning of an utterance‘ and what speakers mean to communicate with these utterances i.e., the ‗utterer‘s occasion meaning‘. Although Grice seems undecided on whether meaning is something stable (or ‗timeless‘) or whether it depends upon the speaker, he eventually places greater emphasis on different levels of intentionality and communication. This account of intentionality is further developed since it is realized that it is not only the speaker‘s intention that is important, but equally important is the hearer‘s recognition of that intention. When a speaker wants to produce a certain effect or a belief in a hearer the speaker both intends to communicate meaningNN and he/she intends that his/her intention be recognised by the hearer as the communication of certain information. It is 332 the recognition of this intention that causes the speaker to accept or change his/her beliefs. His analysis here concerns descriptive sentences: ―A meantNN something by x‖ is (roughly) equivalent to ―A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of that intention‖; and we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect...(1989: 220) Grice‘s main contribution to understanding what is entailed by the concept of communication is the recognition of the speaker‘s intentions by the hearer. He introduces a number of examples that highlight the pivotal role of intentionality and its recognition in communication: the difference between ‗I show Mr X a photograph of Mr Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs X‘ and ‗I draw a picture of Mr Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr X,‘ is that in the former, the effect upon Mr Y (surprise, anger) would still take place irrespective of the intention to communicate the meaningNN: seeing the photo is enough. In the case of the latter, it is the intention to communicate that characterises the example: the art of drawing is my way of communicating my intentions to reveal or expose Mr Y‘s behaviour, and it is this that would normally be considered as communication. Likewise, intentionality plays an important role in the types of communication that influence the actions of others. Take Grice‘s example of the policeman who stops the car by standing in front of it: the action of stopping the car will take place whether the motorist recognises the policeman‘s intention or not. On the other hand, when the policeman waves the car to stop, an act of communication has taken place because this depends upon the motorists‘ recognition of the wave as an act intended to communicate 333 the message of stopping. Grice identifies two levels of meaningNN: first, and primarily, in the relation between the speaker, the listener and the context where intentions are communicated and recognised; second, and derived from the first, is the meaningNN of words and phrases. However, despite conventional meaning being secondary to intentional meaning, Grice adds that the way some intentions are recognised cannot be included as part of the meaningNN: ‗if (say) I intend to get as man to do something by giving him some information, it cannot be regarded as relevant to the meaningNN of my utterance to describe what I intend him to do.‘ (1989: 221) As Grice points out, the actual explicit formulation of the intention is ‗comparatively rare‘ but, should there be any doubt about the intention, the context serves as a useful way of understanding it: Again, in case where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternative would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit in with some purpose he obviously has (e.g. a man who calls for a ―pump‖ at a fire would not want a bicycle pump). (1989: 222) 2.0 Conversational statements: ‘true but misleading.’ A clue to the development of Grice‘s theory of language can be seen in his paper ‗The Causal Theory of Perception‘ (1989: 224-247) where he offers a defence of the causal nature of perception. Traditional empirical theory maintains that if our knowledge is derived from our senses, then it is this sense-data that we are immediately aware of. While it has been presumed that the material world is the cause of the sense data, there is 334 no way of proving with certainty the existence of the material world since all we have access to is the sense-data and not the material world. Grice defends this scepticism of the material world arguing that it is a challenge that should not be dismissed out of hand, but listened to. However, the value of the discussion on sense data is that of offering insights on language-use: when one utters the sentence ‗so and so‘ looks Q [red] to me‘ one is assuming that the notion of sense data is relevant otherwise there is no way of explaining the subjectivity of the experience. Grice calls such statements ‗L-statements‘, and his general argument is that if I perceive a red object, then this objects causes me to ‗seem to see something red‘: he claims that L-statements are ‗true whenever a perceptual statement is true‘ (989: 227) since the perceptual statement entails the L-statement. When someone makes such a remark as ―It looks red to me,‖ a certain implication is carried, an implication which is disjunctive in form. It is implied either that the object referred to is known or believed by the speaker not to be red, or that it has been denied by someone else to be red, or that the speaker is doubtful whether it is red, or that someone else has expressed doubt whether it is red, or that the situation is such that though no doubt has actually been expressed and no denial has actually been made, some person or other might feel inclined toward denial or doubt if he were to address himself to the question whether the object is actually red. (1989:227) L-statements make sense only if one is doubting or denying the sense-data: when a speaker says ‗it looks red to me‘ this utterance can only be construed as an answer to a query on the colour and Grice points out to the strangeness of the speaker ‗saying ―that looks red to me‖ (not as a joke) when I am confronted by a British pillar box in normal daylight at a range of a few feet.‘ (1989: 227) The speaker would only say ‗it looks red to me‘ if someone else was doubting or denying the colour. 335 But, the conditions of doubt and denial are not part of the meaning of L-statements and this is why the implication of L-statements is ‗canceallable‘. This point can illustrated with another of Grice‘s examples from a non-perceptual angleiv: when a tutor is asked to write a report on the standard of philosophy of his student and his response only mentions the student‘s excellent use of English and regular attendance at tutorials, it is evident that he is implying that the standard of the student‘s philosophical ability is not worthy of note. However, if the tutor goes on to say, ‗I do not of course mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy‘, then clearly the implication is cancelled with the qualification. In the case of L-statements, and the aforementioned example, Grice shows the way a statement might be true, even if misleading. To explain this use of language, Grice offers both a weaker and a stronger account: in the weaker case, if there is no doubting or denial involved, then the sentence demonstrates a plain misuse of language. In the stronger case, if there is no doubt or denial and Q has the relevant property (red) this use is misleading even if true. Grice resolves the question in favour of the second case as it seems more applicable to language in general. He formulates a general principle of language-use as the ‗preference to the making of a stronger rather than a weaker statement in the absence of a reason for not doing so.‘ (1989: 236) The difference between perceptual statements and L-statements is that perceptual statements are stronger since they entail L-statements while L-statements do not entail perceptual statements. To utter an L-statement when one could utter the stronger perceptual statement is misleading even though, as such, the L-statement is not untrue. On the causal theory of perception, L-statements are always true, even though 336 using them in everyday contexts of communication is misleading. In his later writings on the maxims of conversation, Grice replaces the principle of the stronger and the weaker with the maxim of relevancy. Chapman (2005: 96) describes the benefit of the principle of the ‗stronger‘ as twofold (a) it is prescriptive in that it recommends the way language should be used and (b) it allows for reasonable exceptions since in terms of Grice‘s overall project the principle would provide an explanatory account of language rather than merely provide a list of linguistic rules. Grice‘s conclusion regarding the use of the language of sense data is that it is legitimate to use such statements because they are true irrespective of whether one is in a condition of doubt or denial, and, although true, people tend to avoid using them because they are misleading. 3.0. The Theory of Conversation In the 1960s Grice‘s research focused on the difference between speaker and sentence meaning paying special attention to the context of speaker meaning: Philosophers often say that context is very important. Let us take this remark seriously. Surely, if we do, we shall want to consider this remark not merely in its relation to this or that problem, i.e., in context, but also in itself, i.e., out of context. If we are to take this seriously, we must be systematic, that is thorough and orderly. If we are to be orderly we must start with what is relatively simple. Here, though not of course everywhere, to be simple is to be as abstract as possible; by this I mean merely that we want, to being with, to have as few cards on the table as we can. Orderliness will then consist in seeing first what we can do with the cards we have; and when we think that we have exhausted this investigation, we put another card on the table, and see what that enables us to do. (in Chapman, 2005: 96) 337 From the aforementioned passage Grice emphasises the values of systematicity and order as a counterweight to the tendency of some ordinary language philosophers – Austin, being a case in point - to produce open-ended lists without some form of generalization. Grice‘s operating strategy for the analysis of context consisted in narrowing it to linguistic contexts i.e., to conversational situations with two persons in the changing roles of speakers and hearers. The model of conversation adopted by Grice is one whereby meaning is communicated by one speaker to one listener with the aim of producing some effect on that listener. It seems that on Grice‘s account the goal of communication can be defined in terms of the values of success and effectiveness. (Cosenza, 2001: 20) However, while Grice acknowledges the position of the hearer in the process of conversation, his account is structured in terms of the contributions of the speaker‘s intention to communicate a meaning to a hearer. In this respect, the hearer‘s contribution to the conversation is limited to the recognition of the speaker‘s intentionsiv: A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows: ―He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless the thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q‖. (1989: 31) Although Grice restricts the concept of context to conversational exchanges, he does use some ideas from non-linguistic situations: in the situation of two persons passing through a gate it is expected of the first person to hold or leave it open for the second. Should the first person shut the door without any good reason then this would be considered rude. Just as helpfulness is a normal expectation in human behaviour, so too, helpfulness is part 338 of our conversational behaviour, especially since conversations are joint, collaborative ventures between partners: both partners share a mutual goal and therefore help each other in achieving this goal. Grice later changes the terminology of ‗helpful‘ to that of ‗co-operative‘: in trying to understand the nature of this co-operative activity, Grice uses the terms ‗object‘ and ‗desiderata‘ to describe the principles that regulate the behaviour within a conversation. There are two desiderata (a) of candour where speakers should, as a rule, make the strongest possible statements with the qualification that they do not attempt to mislead; (b) of clarity where speakers should contribute to the conversation by speaking clearly and by providing relevant information to the conversation. Other principles that formed part of the conversational setting are (i) the principle of Conversational Benevolence where contributions to a conversation are geared towards the agreed principle of conversation and (ii) the principle of self-love where the participants will not go to unnecessary trouble towards their contribution. These principles will later be renamed Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner where this loose assemblage of principles are united into a generalised schema. Grice‘s theory of conversation mapped out a new area of study in the philosophy of language. As such, he preferred using the term ‗conversation‘ rather than that of ‗communication‘ and it was only subsequent critics who labelled his work as a attempt at elaborating a theory of communication (Cosenza, 2001: 20). Although studies in the philosophy of language were divided into a concern with either the formal analysis of 339 language or towards speaker meaning and intention, Grice argued that both could be subsumed under a broad principle that explained all human behaviour (linguistic and nonlinguistic behaviour) as directed towards a goal. In ‗Logic and Conversation‘ he develops this theme and introduces the Cooperative Principle: ‗Make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.‘ (1989: 26). When people communicate they expect to achieve certain purposes and in order to achieve them they follow a number of principles or maxims. For Grice, conversation implies co-operation between participants and he lists four maxims that they should follow in the pursuit of understanding: The category of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims: 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more informative that is required. …. Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim---―try to make your contribution one that is true‖--- and two more specific maxims: 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Under the category of Relation I place a single maxim, namely, ―Be relevant.‖ Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. …under the category of Manner, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said, but rather, to how what is said is to be said, I include the supermaxim---―Be perspicuous‖---and various maxims such as: 1. Avoid ambiguity of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4. Be orderly. And one might need others. (1989: 26-27): 340 Grice offers some examples of the aforementioned maxims: 1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less that is required. If, for example, at a particular state I need four screws, i expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six. 2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt; if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber. 3. Relation. I expect a partner‘s contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at each stage of the transaction. If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later stage). 4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch. (1989: 28) The difference between what is said (the literal meaning) and what is meant (or as Grice says ‗implicated‘) can both be explained and resolved by an appeal to the principle of cooperation: listeners can and do re-interpret literal sentences to achieve the goal of successful communication. It is by integrating these principles of language use that Grice hoped to create a broad philosophical theory of language. While Grice favours the analysis of language in a particular context, he is critical of the notion that sentence or conventional meaning has one ‗meaning‘. The concept of sentence meaning is analysed as a) the ‗what is said‘, where the speaker is committed to the truth of what is said. b) the conventional implicature where it is not the speaker intention but the words that generate the implicature. If we compare the following sets of examples: (i) Set A: ‗she was poor but honest‘ and ‗he is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave‘ with (ii) 341 Set B: ‗she is poor and honest‘, and ‗he is an Englishman and brave‘. The meaning of the Set A is not the same as the meaning of Set B since it is only in Set A that the idea of contrast and consequence are introduced. As a result we would not say the sentences in the Set A are false, though we would consider them to be misleading. With conventional implicatures Grice shows how it is the conventional meanings of words that can implicate. c) conversational implicatures are those implicatures that result from the fact that something is being said. With conversational implicatures participants in a conversation ‗add‘ to the actual utterance so as to achieve understanding. One can say the participants go beyond the ‗surface‘ of the utterance to fill in what has been implicated. For example, ‗A says ‗Smith doesn‘t seem to have a girlfriend these days‘ and B replies, ‗He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately‘. B‘s reply does not seem relevant to A‘s remark but the relevant connection can be made because B is conversationally implicating that A has a girlfriend in New York. The opposition between ‗conventional implicature‘ and ‗conversational implicature‘ is fundamental. In the case of conventional implicature, it is the meaning of the words that determines the implicature, but in the case of the conversational implicature, the meaning is inferred from the context and the observation of the principle of co-operation. With conversational implicatures, it is not what is said that is the goal of the conversation but what is meant and conversational implicatures are generated when a maxim is not 342 fulfilled. There is therefore a close connection between the principle of co-operation, maxims and conversational implicature. Grice lists the different ways in which a maxim can fail to be fulfilled: a) a maxim can be ‗violated‘ deliberately: this is the situation of people who don‘t say what they mean but pretend to be open and transparent. The list includes liars, conartists, grifters, tricksters. Although they violate the maxims uncooperatively they still have reasons for their behaviour. b) a participant can ‗opt out‘ by not following the relevant maxim, ‗He may say, for example, I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.‘ (1983: 30). Again, the participant has reasons for not saying what he/she means and therefore opts out of cooperating in the conversation. c) a participant might be faced with a ‗clash‘ of maxims so that to fulfil one maxim entails a clash with another one. So the maxim of quantity (be informative) is in conflict with the maxim of quality (have adequate evidence for what you say). d) a participant may ‗flout‘ a maxim where he/she blatantly fails to fulfil it without however trying to deceive, opt out or resolve a clash of maxims. In this case, the participant does not say what he/she means but hints at it in such a way that the hearer understands what the speaker means. It is these ‗floutings‘ of the maxim that are 343 typical of conversational implicatures and it is these that Grice focuses on by offering a number of examples that demonstrate that ‗though some maxim is violated at the level of what is said, the hearer is entitled to assume that that maxim, or at least the overall Cooperative Principle, is observed at the level of what is implicated.‘ (1989: 33) In these conversations the speaker is un-cooperative at the level of what is said. Again the example of the Professor‘s reference for the student who has applied for a job in philosophy: ‗Dear Sir, Mr X‘s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.‘ (1989:33) This example shows that that co-operation is not taking place at the level of what is said, but at the level of what is implicated: the maxim of quantity is flouted by not giving enough information and therefore producing the implicature in which the professor is indirectly saying or implying that the student is not good at philosophy For the hearer to figure out the conversational implicature a number of features must be taken into account. These include: the conventional meanings of the words; the principle of co-operation and its maxims; the linguistic and non-linguistic context; any background information; and that the participants are aware of the aforementioned features (a-d). 4.0. Logic and Conversational Implicatures. In ‗Indicative Conditionals‘ (1989: 58-85) Grice discusses the relationship between logic and natural language arguing that no ‗such divergence exists‘ while focussing primarily on conditionals (although he does discuss other logical constants to a lesser degree). 344 Chapman suggests (2005: 106-107) that the target of Grice‘s paper is P. Strawson who in Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) states that the logical implication ‗p>q‘, is very different from the way it is used in ordinary everyday language. The use of ‗if, then‘ in ordinary language suggests a causal connection between the antecedent and the consequent: when we say ‗if it rains, then the party will be a failure‘ the suggestion seems to be that one is causally connected to the other. There is the further possibility, according to Strawson, that when the ‗if, then‘ formula is used in everyday life the speaker is expressing some doubt about the ‗if…‘ or he/she knows that it is false. As a result Strawson concludes that while the ordinary language use of ‗if, then‘ entails its logical counterpart, the contrary is not the case: there is more to ordinary language usage than can be accounted for by the logical form. Grice disagrees with Strawson and he introduces the ‗Indirectness Condition‘ to describe the causal connection between p and q. For Grice, (Chapman, 2005: 107) the literal meaning of ‗if p then q‘, of the ‗what is said‘ on any particular occasion of utterance, is simply equivalent to the logical meaning of ‗p>q‘. He argues that the casual connection is a conversational implicature and can therefore be cancelled out by the context or by denial. To say ―If Smith is in the library, he is working‖ would normally carry the implication of the Indirectness Condition; but I might say (opting out) ―I know just where Smith is and what he is doing, but all I will tell you is that if he is in the library he is working.‖ No one would be surprised if it turned out that my basis for saying this was that I had just looked in the library and found him working. The implication is also contextually concealable, that is, I can find contexts which, if known to participants in a talk-exchange, would make an explicit cancellation unnecessary.‘ (1989: 59) 345 The question Grice tackles concerns how implicatures produce the indirect condition. His first answer refers to the maxim of Quantity which enjoins us to use the stronger or more informative statement in our conversations. In this case, the more informative statement would be ‗p and q‘ rather than ‗if p then q‘. In the weaker case, there is no definite information about the truth values of p and q the use of ‗if p then q‘ leads (unless cancelled by the context) to conversational implicature. The same argument apples to other logical forms: (for example) ‗p or q‘ has common features with the logical form ‗p v q‘ but the ordinary language-use leads to conversational implicatures. The conversational implicature arises because it seems strange to use ‗p or q‘ if both p and q are known to be true. While the truth conditional meaning of the logical form ‗p v q‘ states that at least one of the propositions should be true, in the conversational use of ‗p or q‘ it is implied that not both are true. If both were true it would, within a conversational setting, be better to offer ‗p and q‘ since this would be providing more information. Grice‘s second answer to the question of how conversational implicatures are produced is the way they contribute to everyday human interaction. The use of conditionals enables people to understand the choices available to them, though these uses depend upon the context: it does not make sense to say on a hot sunny day, ‗if it is hot and sunny, I shall go to the beach‘? Likewise, the use of disjunctions helps people in everyday life to think about alternatives: this or this other possibility. it would not ( for example)make sense to say at 4.30 pm, ‗which show shall we go to? The 3.00 pm or the 6.00 pm show?‘ 346 In ‗Presupposition and Conversational Implicature‘ (1989: 269-282), Grice returns to the question of expressions that refer to non-existing things picking up the debate between Russell and Strawson. Here, Grice applies once again his theory of conversation to traditional philosophical problems retaining the overlap between logic and language-use rather than their opposition. Chapman (2005) points out that when this paper is read within the larger context of Grice‘s writings it can be seen as part of a study of the way language refers to the world with the question of reference as pivotal to the philosophy of language. In the theory of descriptions Russell had argued that in (a) ‗the King of France is bald‘, the sentence entails that there is one unique person (the king of France) and this unique person is bald. (b) ‗the King of France is not bald‘, it is possible to deny that there is one unique person (i.e., there is no King of France) and that this unique person (who does not exist) is not bald. According to Russell, this sentence is ambiguous. Strawson challenges the supposed ‗ambiguity‘ that Russell claims, on the grounds that in everyday language-use, ‗the King of France is not bald‘ means that there is a King of France who is not bald: speakers are committing themselves to the existence of the King of France while denying his baldness. The ambiguity of the kind Russell claims rarely crops up in everyday conversation, 347 when one is asked such a question as whether the king of France is, or is not, bald, one does not feel inclined to give an answer; one does not feel very much inclined to say either that it is true that he is bald or that it is false that he is bald, but rather to say things like The question does not arise or He neither is nor is not bald, etc.‘ (1989: 269) Grice‘s response and defence of Russell focuses on the different types of commitment by speakers to ‗the existence of the King of France‘ and to his ‗baldness‘. These, Grice argues, do not necessarily involve the same kind of commitment. Grice‘s defence involves pointing out the distinction between (a) the use of negation when applied to the whole sentence (it is not the case that the King of France is bald): in this sentence there is no commitment to the King of France or to the baldness; and (b) the use of negation when applied to the latter part of the sentence (‗the king of France is not bald‘): in this sentence, there is no commitment to the baldness. Russell‘s theory of descriptions allows for two sentences that entail a commitment to the existence of the King of France: (a) the positive assertion (the king of France is bald) and (b) the sentence that denies only his baldness (the king of France is not bald). But, Grice points out, ‗without waiting for disambiguation, people understand an utterance of ―The king of France is not bald‖ as implying (in some fashion) the unique existence of the king of France (1989: 272)‘. The denial of the commitment to the existence of the King of France only occurs in the denial of the whole sentence. Such a denial, Grice argues, is not the result of logical entailment, but rather the result of conversational interaction. The implicature arises on account of the form or way that the speaker formulates his/her utterance: it belongs therefore to the category of Manner. However, Grice adds a new element when he says, ‗―Frame whatever you say in the form 348 most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate‘; or, ―Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply.‖‘ (1989: 273) The point here is that participation in conversation should take into account the range of possible responses. This further reinforces Grice‘s defence of Russell against Strawson since it can be argued that the speaker did not frame the utterance in such a way that allows for a possible reply. Strawson had argued that upon hearing ‗the King of France is bald,‘ the hearer would not say false but be nonplussed as to what you were talking about. But when the speaker utters ‗the King of France is bald‘ one of the possible replies does not include denying the existence of the King of France because information or knowledge that is commonly shared is not usually denied. This leads Grice to distinguish between common knowledge and controversial information: [f]or instance, it is quite natural to say to somebody, when we are discussing some concert, My aunt‟s cousin went to that concert, when we know perfectly well that the person we are talking to is very likely not even to know that we have an aunt, let alone know that our aunt has a cousin. So the supposition must be not that it is common knowledge but rather that it is noncontroversial, in the sense that it is something that we would expect the hearer to take from us (if he does not already know). That is to say, I do not expect, when I tell someone that my aunt‘s cousin went to a concert, to be questioned whether I have an aunt and, if so, whether my aunt has a cousin. This is the sort of thing that I would expect him to take from me, that is, to take my word for. (1989:274) In both the positive and negative sentences, it is not the existence of the King of France that is being challenged or considered controversial but the baldness. 5.0. Applied Grice 349 One area in which Grice‘s analysis seems especially amenable to is that of popular culture and what makes plays, TV shows, films interesting to watch occurs as a result of the violating, infringing and opting out of the maxims of conversation. While the ideal of clarity in the everyday use of language is important for mutual understanding, within popular culture the use of language with the ideal of clarity would lead to boredom. It is not difficult to recall situations in films where the protagonist needs to convince the addressee to reveal what they know so as to save (for example) someone else or the environment. The participant fails because the addressee refuses to cooperate by saying nothing i.e. by opting out; or the addressee misleads the protagonist by shifting attention to something else (rather than communicating the information he/she knows): this is a violation of the maxim of quantity. In Logic, Laughter and Laughter-Provocation (2006) Cassar examines, among other issues, the way laughter is generated. She suggests that although one way of explaining laughter-provocation could be that of examining what Grice calls ‗utterer-meaning‘, this might not be a fruitful approach, as the question of meaning itself is broader than the way Grice conceptualised it. As a result, It follows that the first imperative task that has to be carried out in order to determine the meaning of laughter-provocation is to establish what laughter is, since only then can the investigation of the mechanisms, logical or otherwise, which connect provocation and response be undertaken, taking into account the diversities of both ends of the operation. (2006: 13) In other words, it is not enough to examine Grice‘s codes or maxims and argue that laughter-provocation is the result of inverting these codes because these codes are framed as ways of achieving effective communication. Merely inverting them would only result 350 in restricting our understanding of the way laughter can be provoked without any guarantee that this would be successful: (for example) by breaking Grice‘s maxim ‗Be relevant‘ one does not necessarily produce laughter. Cassar concludes by pointing out that an account of laughter provocation is limited if it focuses on Gricean codes as such an account fails to take into consideration the temporal process underlying the generation of laughter. Critical Remarks Although Grice is remembered mostly for his theory of conversation it should be added that his contributions to philosophy were wide ranging, offering solutions to problems in the fields of epistemology, perception, and ethics. However, while he applied his theory of conversation to these fields, he never used actual conversations in his analysis of language-use. Over time Grice realised that rationality plays in important part in his theory of conversation: by following the Co-operative Principle a person was behaving rationally by pursuing the goals of a conversation. It was this rational activity that constituted the very essence of human life that Grice tried to explain. And this is why the criticism that Grice‘s theory of conversation - as failing to take into account the conflictual nature of actual conversations - might be misplaced: as a rationalist, he was attempting to outline the conditions that allow for the production of meaning and effective communication, rather than an empirical description of actual conversations. Hanfling (2000: 186-8) argues that although Grice champions the cause of ordinary language in the analysis of philosophical problems, as it turns out, the analysis 351 undermines ordinary language. In his account of perception and L-statements, he supports his arguments with a number of ingenious examples but the result is that he employs a very non-ordinary use of everyday language. In this case, the meanings that are attributed to certain words such as ‗seem‘ or ‗see‘ deviate from their everyday ordinary use. So too, the principle that the stronger statement should be adopted over the weaker one is challenged: according to the theory, one should not say that ‗Grice is in England‘ if I knew ‗Grice is in Oxford‘ but if both contribute equally to the conversational exchange then – unless one had a point for doing so – there is no inherent reason for choosing the stronger statement and not the weaker one. Grice also argues in favour of thesis that to understand the meaning of an utterance one must understand what the speaker intended by that utterance and in so doing eliminating the class of locutionary acts; in other words, he reduces the sense of the utterance to the force or the way that it is used. Again, Friggieri points out (1991: 199-204) that understanding the way the speaker intends to use the sentence, presupposes an understanding of what the sentence means so that to understand the utterance ‗You‘re standing on my foot‘ as a request to get off my foot, you must first understand the meaning of the sentence. Chapman (2005: 191) points to a number of criticisms with Grice‘s account of language: (i) his failure to define conversation, taking it to mean language used in a context i.e. a number of sentences following each other without any empirical data; (ii) the theory of conversation was supposed to explain a number of traditional philosophical problems but 352 the casual conversations used seem to develop a life of their own with the point of their original introduction forgotten; (iii) on the one hand, Grice generalises from particular conversations, a generalization that is the result of describing what participants bring to the conversation, but on the other hand, he considers his maxims as rules that prescribe the way language should be used; (iv) Grice‘s conversations are between persons of equal social status and mutually interested in the exchange of information. However, not all conversations are of this kind and within different context (for example a university) participants resort to different maxims. The influence of Grice‘s writings has been chiefly achieved through the papers on ‗Meaning‘ and ‗Logic and Conversation‘ and this success has been recognised by philosophers of language and linguistics. It is not uncommon to come across the term Gricean pragmatics even though he never used the term himself. It could be said that Grice‘s contribution to the debate between formal semanticists and pragmatists on the issue of literal meaning and speaker meaning is that of bridging the two through the Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims. In addition, the concept of conversational implicatures – a concept that includes the possibility of alluding, implying or insinuating something – highlights the difference between what speakers literally say and what they mean i.e., implicate. One way of evaluating Grice‘s place within the philosophy of language is by contrasting his views on language with those of Chomsky: Chomsky had argued that to understand linguistic meaning there was no need to take into consideration the use of language to communicate, arguing that it was not even necessary 353 to consider communication as the primary function of language. For Grice the opposite is the case: the only way to explain language is from the point of view of communication. In this chapter I have outlined (a) the concepts of intention and meaning in Grice‘s philosophy of communication, followed by (b) his analysis of statements that are true but misleading within conversational settings. The next sections discuss (c) his theory of conversation and (d) the relation between the procedures of logic and conversational implicatures and (e) ending with a brief look at the way his ideas have been applied.