Ruth Barcan Marcus and Grice

Speranza


Ruth Barcan Marcus (b. 1921, d. February 19, 2012) was a philosopher and logician who developed the "Barcan formula".

Barcan Marcus was a pioneering figure in the quantification of modal logic and the theory of direct reference.

She wrote seminal essays on

identity,

essentialism,

possibilia,

belief,

moral conflict as well as some critical historical studies.

Education: B.A., New York University (1941), M.A., Yale University (1942), Ph.D., Yale University (1946). Posts: Professor of philosophy and founding department chair, University of Illinois at Chicago (1962–1970), Professor of philosophy, Northwestern University (1970–1973), Halleck professor of philosophy, Yale University (1973–1991), Professor emerita and senior research scholar, Yale University 1992-2012); Visiting distinguished professor, University of California, Irvine (one quarter each year, 1992–97), Chair of the Board of Officers, American Philosophical Association (1976–83), President, Association for Symbolic Logic (1983–86), President, International Institut de Philosophie (1989–92) and Presidente Honoraire (continuing), Served on various visoring committees for programs and departments, Serves on various editorial boards

Ruth Barcan Marcus' earliest published work was the publication of the first axiomatic study of modal logic with quantifiers.

These three ground-breaking articles were

"A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication", Journal of Symbolic Logic (JSL, 1946),

"The Deduction Theorem in a Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication" (JSL, 1946),

"The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order", (JSL, 1947).

The three articles are published under Marcus' maiden name:

Ruth C. Barcan.

The widely discussed Barcan Formula is introduced as an axiom in QML.

The papers of 1946 and 1947, were the first systems of quantified modal logic, which extended some propositional modal systems of C. I. Lewis to first and second order.

A major accomplishment in the development of 20th century logic.

Lewis gives Marcus special recognition in his

"Notes on the Logic of Intension",

originally printed in Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer (New York, 1951).

Here, Lewis recognizes Barcan Marcus as the first logician to extend propositional logic as a higher order intensional logic.

Barcan Marcus proposed the view in the philosophy of language according to which proper names are what Marcus termed mere

"tags".

("Modalities and Intentional Languages" (Synthese, 1961)(and elsewhere).

These "tags" are used to refer to an object (the bearer of the name).


The meaning of the name is regarded as exhausted by this referential function.

This view contrasts for example with late B. A. W. Russell description theory of proper names as well as J. R. Searle's cluster description theory of names which prevailed at the time.

This view of proper names (presented in 1962 with Quine as commentator) has been identified by Quentin Smith with the theory of reference given in Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity.

However, in a recent laudatio to Ruth Barcan Marcus, T. Williamson writes:

"One of the ideas in them that resonates most with current philosophy of language is that of proper names as mere tags, without descriptive content."

"This is not Kripke's idea of names as rigid designators, designating the same object with respect to all relevant worlds, for ‘rigidified’ definite descriptions are rigid designators but still have descriptive content."

"Rather, it is the idea, later developed by David Kaplan and others, that proper names are directly referential, in the sense that they contribute only their bearer to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur."

Marcus formally proved the necessity of identity in 1946 and informally argued for it in 1961 and thereafter thus rejecting the possibility of contingent identity.

See Journal of Symbolic Logic, (1947) 12: pp 12–15

Marcus prefers an interpretation where the domain of the interpretation comprises individual entities in the actual world.

She also suggests that for some uses an alternative substitutional semantics is warranted.

She provides arguments against possibilia. See "Dispensing with Possibilia" (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1975–76);

"Possibilia and Possible Worlds" (Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1985–86). T

Marcus defines a consistent set of moral principles as one in which there is some "possible world " in which they are all obeyable.

That they may conflict in the actual world is not a mark of inconsistency.

As in the case of necessity of identity, there was a resistance to this interpretation of moral conflict.

Her argument counts against a widely received view that systems of moral rules are inevitably inconsistent.

It is proposed that believing is a relationship of an agent to a possible state of affairs under specified internal and external circumstances. Assenting to a quoted sentence (the disquotation account of belief) is only one behavioral marker of believing.

Betting behavior is another.

The wholly language-centered account of belief (e.g. Davidson) is rejected.

Where an agent behaves as if an impossibility obtained Marcus proposes that under those circumstances the agent, on the disclosure of the impossibility should say that she only claimed to believe an impossibility.

In much the same way, when a mathematician discovers that one of his conjectures is false, and since if it is mathematically false it is impossible, he would say he only claimed to believe it. Odd as this proposal is, it is analogous to the widely accepted principle about knowing: if we claim to know P, and P turns out false, we do not say we used to know it, we say we were mistaken in so claiming.

The GRICE-MYRO theory of relative identity pertains to Barcan's metaphysics.

Aristotelian Essentialism is concerned with properties which Marcus defines in the context of a modal framework.

One proposal is that a property is essential if something has it, not everything has it, if something has it then it has it necessarily, and it is not wholly individuating e.g. a natural kind property.

It is otherwise claimed by Quine and others that modal logic or semantics is committed to essentialist truths.

Marcus argues informally that there are interpretations of some modal systems in which all essentialist claims are false.

Terence Parsons later formally proved this result.

An alternative to Tarskian (model theoretic) semantics is proposed for some uses where "the truth conditions for quantified formuli are given purely in terms of truth with no appeal to domains of interpretation".

(Later called by others "truth value semantics".)

She shows that the claim that such a semantics leads to contradictions is false. Such a semantics may be of interest for mathematics e.g. Hartry Field, or for fictional discourse.

Objectual quantification is required for interpretation of identity and other metaphysical categories.

Awards: -- Guggenheim Fellow (1952), National Science Foundation Fellow (1963)
Rockefeller Foundation Residency (Bellagio, 1973 and 1990)
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1979)
University of Edinburgh Fellow, Humanities Institute (1983)
Wolfson College of Oxford University, Visiting Fellow (1985 and 1986)
Clare Hall of Cambridge University, Visiting Fellow (1988)
National Humanities Center, Mellon Fellow (1992–93)
Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences(1977--)
Medal of the Collège de France (1986)
Doctor of Humane Letters, honoris causa, University of Illinois at Chicago (1995)
Wilbur Cross Medal, Yale University (2000)
Lauener Prize in Analytic Philosophy, Lauener Foundation, 2007-08.
Permanent Member of the Common Room, Clare Hall (1986-)
Phi Beta Kappa (1941)
Membre, Institut International de Philosophie, Presidente 1989-92, President Honoraire 1992-
Quinn Prize, American Philosophical Association 2007, for service to the profession
Dewey Lecture, APA, Dec 2009

---

Work:

The Logical Enterprise, ed. with A. Anderson, R. Martin, Yale, 1995

Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, VII, eds. R. Barcan Marcus et al., North Holland, 1986

"Modalities: Philosophical Essays".
Oxford University Press, 1993.
Paperback; 1995
(contains many of Marcus's important papers)

[edit] See also

American philosophy
List of American philosophers
[edit] References and notes

1.^ Timothy Williamson's Tribute to Ruth Barcan Marcus on the Occasion of Her Receipt of the Lauener Prize, Leiter Reports: A Philosophical Blog, October 14, 2008.

2.^ See "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency" (Journal of Philosophy, 1980)(and frequently published elsewhere)

3.^ See "A Proposed Solution to The Puzzle About Belief" (Foundations of Analytic Philosophy in Midwest Studies, 1981) and "Rationality and Believing the Impossible" (The Journal of Philosophy, 1983 and elsewhere).

4.^ Philosophical Review, 78 (1969).

[edit] External linksYale University philosophy department biography: Ruth Barcan Marcus

Encyclopedia of Jewish Women: Ruth Barcan Marcus

Persondata
Name Marcus, Ruth Barcan
Alternative names
Short description
Date of birth 1921
Place of birth
Date of death
Place of death

Categories: 1921 births2012 deaths20th-century philosophers21st-century philosophersAmerican educatorsAmerican philosophersAmerican philosophy academicsWomen philosophersPhilosophers of languageAmerican JewsJewish philosophersAnalytic philosophersAmerican logiciansNew York University alumniYale University alumniYale University facultyUniversity of Illinois at Chicago facultyFellows of Clare Hall, CambridgeFellows of Wolfson College, Oxford

Some google hits for Popper/metaphysic, as we consider Grice's and Carnap's contributions to a city of eternal truth...

Speranza

--- for the record, as we consider Donal McEvoy's arguments, elsewhere.

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13 Nov 1997 – Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University ... Karl Popper is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the ...
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Metaphysical Cosmology is the branch of metaphysics that deals with the world as the ..... However, Karl Popper argued that metaphysical statements are not ...
Karl Popper: Metaphysics and epistemology - Google Books Resultbooks.google.com/books?isbn=0754653765...

Ian Charles Jarvie, Karl Milford, David W. Miller - 2006 - Philosophy - 296 pages

The first concerns the value of metaphysics as a general view of the world or as a world ... As Popper refused then to partake in any metaphysical controversy, ...
The Categorical Structure of Popper's Metaphysicswww.jstor.org/stable/2106516
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by DA Kelly - 1977 - Cited by 2 - Related articles

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of how he defines the logic of
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by H Krips - 1984 - Cited by 7 - Related articles

embracing of metaphysics -- which strikes one as the most significant change from the Popper of The Logic of Scientific Discovery:

But if my dream is metaphysical, what is the use of it?

Philosophy of Metaphysics: Quotes by Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Popper ...www.spaceandmotion.com/Metaphysics-Hume-Kant-Popper-Kuhn.htmCached - Similar
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the impossibility of metaphysics became almost an ...

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Popper's conception of “metaphysics” is different from the original conception of the term.

In spite of the importance of regarding metaphysical statements ...

Evolution and Metaphysics
www.talkorigins.org/faqs/chance/metaphysics.htmlCached - Similar
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22 Aug 1996 –

he claim that evolution is a metaphysic equivalent to a religion is related to .... Popper developed his view of science in reaction to the extreme ...

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In other words, Popper and the Austrians are metaphysical fellow travellers. ... conventions and metaphysics in shaping and directing research programs.

Karl Popper on Metaphysical Realism and Bi-valence | Notes from ...notesfrommylibrary.wordpress.com/.../karl-popper-on-metaphysical-...Cached
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4 Jul 2011 –

The positivists dismissed the “way of truth” (metaphysics) as dogmatic illusion.

Popper couldn't give up his metaphysical commitment to realism.

And so on...

A Griceian Type of Metaphysic

Speranza

From wiki, metaphysics:

"Popper argued that metaphysical statements are NOT meaningless statements, but rather not fallible, testable or provable statements -- Howard Richards (2004). Understanding the Global Economy. Peace Education Books. p. 293. -- i.e.

neither empirical observations

nor

logical arguments

could falsify metaphysical statements to show them to be true or false.

Hence, a metaphysical statement usually implies an idea about the world or about the universe, which may be reasonable but is ultimately not empirically testable.

---

On the other hand (or is it the same?), Carnap, in his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax, used the concept of verifiability to reject metaphysics.

"Metaphysicians cannot avoid making their statements non-verifiable, because if they made them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the region of empirical science."

"This consequence metaphysicians wish to avoid, because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level than that of empirical science."

"Thus metaphysicians are compelled to cut all connection between their statements and experience; and precisely by this procedure they deprive them of any sense."

Simplistic overview, but worth examining!

It all started, recently, when Pinker and Fodor were considering Darwinianism, and we were revising Popper's idea that there may be a 'metaphysical research programme' at the core of it... or not!

Grice, Popper and Carnap -- on the metaphysical. Something to consider

Speranza.

Cfr.

R. B. Jones on Carnap -- his "Carnap Corner" and "City of Eternal Truth."

Donal McEvoy on the metaphysic in Popper, Lit-ideas, etc.

---

The Grice Point

Speranza

I was nicely surprised to read that Peter Winch, the revered London philosopher (hisself a reverer of Witters) quotes Grice -- in a Royal Philosophical Society thing.

Winch makes a distinction, which he credits to Grice between

the _meaning_ of a remark

and the

_point_ of the remark.

It is TOO easy to go the whole hog and identify this _point_ with the relevance, but we know that Grice minimised relevance, which he only saw as one of the four categories in his amusing attempt to echo Kant: qualitas, quantitas, relatio, modus.

Consider,

"It looks to me as a red pillar box".

The _meaning_ may be something like:

_That pillar box seems red to me_.

compared to:

That pillar box is red to me.

The _point_ of the remark is what Grice calls the D-or-D implicature: "the red pillar box is NOT red, or I doubt it is."

And so on.

Grice will go on to apply the

meaning/point

distinction when, years later,

he considers:

"He likes it because he likes it."

In symbols:

p
---
therefore, p.

Grice wants to argue that that is a piece of reasoning. "Trivial, if you mustn't".

In

"He reasoned from p to p", again, we seem to have a clear meaning, since

p
---
therefore p

is valid in ALL logical accounts.

Yet, the _point_ of such a triviality is more difficult to grasp. But other than Winch, who cares?

The Grice Cycle

Speranza

A Grice Cycle shop existed on Harborne High Street, next to Lloyds bank, about 1910.

Hell and Conversation

Speranza

"In the course of our conversations Russell would often exclaim: "Logic's hell!"--And this fully expresses what we were thinking about the problems of logic; namely their immense difficulty. Their hardness--their hard & slippery texture. The primary ground of this experience, I think, was this fact: that each phenomenon of language that we might retrospectively think of could show our earlier explanation to be. But that is the difficulty Socrates gets caught up in when he tries to give the definition of a concept. Again and again an application of the word emerges that seems not to be compatible with the concept to which other applications have led us. We say: but that isn't how it is!--it is like that though!--& all we can do is keep repeating these antitheses." (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 35; ]MS 119 59: 1.10.1937])

---

Cfr.

Grice,

"Logic and conversation".

For Grice, Logic's paradise.

I'm never sure if Witters was transcribing a Russell quote that needs requoted. It seems rude.

---- But the point is nicely illustrated by Grice.

Grice always regarded himself (or hisself, as he hisself would prefer) as an 'anti-Wittersian'. His first output, in the 1940s, was directed against "Wittgensteinian" comments in the theory of sense data.

Grice wants to show that while logic may seem hell, it is purgatory and paradise, rather.

Take the connectives.

In "Logic and conversation" he shows how each of the connectives: from the one-place one like "not" (that does not really connect) to functors like "and", "or" and "if" -- and to which he adds "all", "some", and "the" for good measure, there is a way to show that

LANGUAGE is actually very clever.

If for Witters's Russell, "Logic's hell", for Grice, "How clever language is."

In reality,

"how clever language is"

is a trick of a phrase (c) Grice (-- as transmitted by Warnock). It may mean:

Language is clever.
Language is VERY clever.

This is an Austinian thing to say, but still.

The point is then that by way of some Kantotelian transcendental justification we can arrive at 'rules' of logic (and pragmatics) that explain any apparent divergence between, say "not" and "~".

Those 'maxims' or pragmatic dimensions are defeasible in the sense that indeed, the slippery texture may be brought in.

At this point, Grice speaks of DISIMPLICATURE.

Implicature allows us to explain how we may mean more than we say.
Disimplicature is the way to explain how we may actually mean LESS (than we say).

And so on.

Cheers.

Primacy of Substantials

Speranza

-----

In "Notes for categories with Strawson", The Grice Papers, Grice suggests that our use of language very often presupposes the existence of substantial objects.

Furthermore, substances are in a sense the basic, or primary objects of reference.

Cfr. Strawson on 'individual' qua spatio-temporal continuant, and Strawson, "Subject and Predicate in logic and grammar" (Irvine lectures, with Grice).

Grice and Strawson admit that they have no conclusive proof of this latter claim (that substantials are baisc) but they offer their own intuitions in support, presumably drawn from their experiments with substantial subjects ("Socrates", "Grice") and non-substantial subjects ("Mercy").

Further, substances (like Grice) are, in general, what we are most interested in talking about, asking about, issuing orders about.

"Indeed the primacy of substance
is deeply embedded in our
language", Grice and Strawson write,
in a note as if to provoke Hume.

----

Grice will later suggest that the closes echoes of this joint work ("Notes for categories with Strawson", the Grice Papers) in published writing were in Strawson's "Individuals".

But there are also resonances of the joint project with Strawson in various aspects of Grice's own work.

Two points from the end of the manuscript fragment, one a non-linguistic parallel, and one a consequence of their position, indicate these.


----

The non-linguistic parallel comes from a consideration
of the basic needs for survival and the attainment of
satisfaction people experience as living creatures.

Processes such as 'eating', 'drinking', 'being hurt by', 'using', 'finding', are ENTIRELY dependent on transactions with substances.

Cfr.

"I found a sense datum."

"I was hurt by red".

"I drank mercy".

----

Grice and Strawson suggest that it is not entirely fanciful to consider that the structure of language has developed to reflect the structure of these most basic interactions with the world.

As Palmer said it: one caveman to another: "Remember when all we had to care about was nouns and verbs?"

---

The relevant consequence of Grice's and Strawson's position relates to a familar target for ordinary language philosophers: the theory of sense data, as practiced by verificationists like Berlin, and Ayer.

Grice's and Strawson's argument is in essence a PCA.

If substances are a primary focus of interest, and if this fact is reflected in the language, then this offers good evidence that the world must indeed be substantial in character.

If the proponents of sense data were correct, if al we can accurately discuss are the individual sensations we receive though our sense, then

"SUBSTANTIAL TERMINOLOGY
WOULD HAVE NO APPLICATION".

----

And so on.

Oxonian dialectic, Athenian dialectic

Speranza

We see that in "Notes for categories with Strawson" (the Grice Papers), Grice plays with words, alla Aristotle/Austin/Kant.

Grice notes that

'healthy'

can be applied to, or predicated of, 'person'.

Grice is experimenting to see which lexical items (terms) can successfully combine with others, trying out combinations of possible subjects and predicates.

----

Grice notes that

'healthy' -- nomen adjectivum

can be applied to, or predicated of

common nouns such as

'person'
'place'
'occupation'
or 'institution'.

He also notes that

"medical" (another nomen adjectivum)

can be applied to common nouns such as

'lecture'
'man'
'treatise'
'problem',
'apparatus'
'prescription'
and 'advice'.

-----

----

Grice notes that the neutral term, 'employment' can cover the importantly different terms 'use', 'sense' and 'meaning', and that here it is perhaps most appropriate to say that the predicate has a particular range of 'uses'.

-----

The notions of 'sense', 'meaning', and 'use' need to be distinguished not just from each other but between discussions of sentences and of speakers.

"Need to distinguish all these
from cases where _speaker_ [utterer. Speranza]
might mean so-and-or or such-and-such, but
wouldn't say that of the sentence."

""Jones is between Williams and Brown" either SPATIAL order or ORDER OF MERIT, but doubtful this renders it an ambiguous sentence."

-----

--------

For Griceness Sake

Speranza

We see that in "Notes for Categories with Strawson" (The H P Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, University of California, Berkeley), Grice plays with language.

He uses the examples of

"Socrates" as a proper name so-called, "nomen proprium"

and

"mercy" as an abstract name, so called.

The notes explore the difference in grammatical distribution, shall we say, between substantial nouns (like "Socrates") and non-substantial nouns (like "mercy"). The idioms suggest that 'mercy' can be both referred to and predicated, whereas 'Socrates' can only be referred to.

In Latin, the distribution is subtler.

In Greek, we need the article, say, "to agathon", bonum, the good.

The house is clean.
Domus pulchrum.
Cleanliness is good. Pulchrum bonum est.

-----

It would seem that, although both substantials and non-substantials can occupy subject position, substantials must be seen as the primary occupiers of the subject slot because they CANNOT occur as predicates.

But cfr. Snydd, "predicating proper names".

"He is no Socrates".

-----

-----

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul.

Paul ---> Paulness
Peter ---> Peterness
Grice ---- Griceanity.

---

To demonstrante this point, Grice goes on to distinguish between establishing existence by referring to, and by predicating expressions. (Recall that Searle's DPhil Oxon, under Strawson, was on "Reference and predication").

The distinction between establishing existence by referring to and by predicating expressions is established by means of a comparison between two short dialogues.

CONVERSATION I.

Conversation I is perfectly acceptable. Evidence is successfully offered for the EXISTENCE OF A UNIVERSAL ("Disinterestedness") by predicating it of a particular ("Banbury"):

A: Banbury is really disinterested.
B: Disinterested people do not exist; real disinterestedness does not exist.
A: Yes, they do. Yes, it does. Bunbury is really didisinterested.

In second-order predicate calculus:

(F)GF

----

CONVERSATION II.

In contrast, descriptive statements do not guarantee the existence of their subjects, but rather stand in a "special relation" (expression Grice's) to statements of existence.

This "special relation" is, Grice and Strawson note, elsewhere called 'presupposition'. It seems that at this stage, at least, Grice is prepared to endorse Strawson's response to Russell. The following conversation is thus 'NOT LINGUISTICALLY IN ORDER' (expression Grice's):

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is really disinterested.

Producing a sentence in which something ('disinterested') is predicated of a substantial subject ('Bunbury') is NOT enough to guarantee the existence of that subject.

Grice and Strawson note at this point that the situation would be quite different if 'in the next room' were substituted into A's response.

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is in the next room.

Here, A's choice of predicate ("in the next room") does MORE than just offer a description of Bunbury. The choice of the predicate points to a way of verifying Bunbury's existence.

----

And so on.

Grice on the 'existence of a universal' and Metaphysics 1003a7

Speranza

Jones was mentiong that Grice was mentioning in the "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" paper that Grice reads a certain passage in Aristotle's Metaphysics -- 1002a7-- as asserting that (in Grice's words):

"the existence of a universal requires not just the
possibility but the actuality of an item which
instantiates that universal ..."

Jones comments:

"if this were the case, and if the
variables in the propositional forms were taken as varying
over universals, then we would be talking only of "non-
empty" terms, perhaps supporting the Robin Smith line [in the entry for Aristotle in SEP]."

I will elaborate from some notes in the Grice papers -- (c) Grice/Strawson.

The reference is

Grice, "Notes for Categories with Strawson", H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Grice and Strawson taught together, covering the topic of categories.

----

Grice's and Strawson's topic of categories dated, of course, back to Aristotle, and Kant.

Grice's and Strawson's is a type of DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS, in that it involves the analysis of the ontology embodied in ordinary language.

Grice valued his joint work with Strawson very highly, and commented late in his life that he had always kept the manuscripts with him.

These manuscripts are accompanied by rough notes indicating something of their working method.

Grice and Strawson apply a distinctively Austinian approach to Aristotle's metaphysics, experimenting together to see which itemscan successfully combine with others, trying out combinations of

POSSIBLE SUBJECTS AND POSSIBLE PREDICATES.

Notes in Grice's hand record that

"healthy"

can be applied to, or predicated of:

--- person
--- place
--- occupation
--- institution

while

"medical"

can be applied to

--- lecture
--- man
--- treatise
--- problem
--- apparatus
--- prescription
--- advice.

Grice notes that the neutral term,

"employment"

can cover the importantly different terms 'use', 'sense', and 'meaning', and that here it is perhaps most appropriate to say that the

predicate

has a particular range of 'uses'.

---

The notions of 'sense', 'meaning' and 'use' need to be distinguished not just from each other, but betweeen discussions of sentences and of speakers.

---

'Need to distinguish all these from cases
where SPEAKER [or utterer] might mean so-and-so
or such-and-such but wouldn't
say that of the sentence', he notes.

----

"Jones is between Williams and Brown"

""Jones is between Williams and Brown" either SPATIAL ORDER or ORDER OF MERIT, but _doubtful_ this renders it an ambiguous sentence".

Cfr. later on 'French' and 'contextual ambiguity', in "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being".

depends on what you mean by 'between'.

---

The notes also explore the difference in grammatical distribution between
substantial and non-substantial nouns.

"Mercy"

can be both referred to and predicated, whereas

"Socrates"

can only be referred to.

In other words, it seems that although both substantials and non-substantials can occupy SUBJECT position, substantials must be seen as the PRIMARY OCCUPIERS of this slot because they cannot occur as predicates.

To demonstrate this point, Grice distinguishes between

ESTABLISHING EXISTENCE

by referring to, and by predicating expressions.

The distinction is established by means of comparison between two short dialogues. The following is perfectly acceptable; evidence is successfully offered for

THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIVERSAL [tota] by predicating it of a particular:

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.

B: (a) Disinterested persons do not exist.
---(b) Real disinterestedness does not exist.

A - (a) Yes, they do: Bunbury is really disinterested.
--- (b) Yes, it does: Bunbury is really disinterested.

----

In contrast, descriptive statements DO NOT guarantee THE EXISTENCE
OF THEIR SUBJECTS, but rather stand in 'a special relation'
to statements of existence. This special relation is, Grice and
Strawson note, elsewhere called 'presupposition'.

It seems at this stage at least, Grice was prepared to endorse Strawson's response to Russell. The following is 'not linguistically in order':

A: (a) Bunbury is really disinterested.
---(b) Bunbury is in the next room.

B: There is no such person as Bunbury.

A: (a) Yes, there is, he is really disinterested.
---(b) Yes, there is, he is really in the next room.

----

Producing a sentence in which something IS PREDICATED of a substantial subject is NOT enough guarantee the EXISTENCE of that subject.

Grice and Strawson note that the situation would be quite different if 'in the next room' were substituted into A's response.

Here, A's choice of predicate does more than just offer a description of Bunbury: it points to a way of verifying his existence.

Our use of language, then, very often presupposes the existence of substantial subjects.

Furthermore, substances are in a sense the basic, or primary objects of reference.

Grice and Strawson admit that they have no conclusive proof of this latter claim, but they offer their own intuitions in support, presumably drawn from their experiments with substantial and non-substantial subjects.

Further, substances are, in general, what we are most interested in talking about, asking about, issuing orders about; 'indeed the primacy of substance is deeply embedded in our language'.

----

Grice will indeed later suggest taht the closest echoes of this joint work were in Strawson's "Individuals", subtitled 'an essay in descriptive metaphysics', as opposed to revisionary.

But there are also resonances of the joint project in various aspects of Grice's own later work. Two points from the end of "Categories", one a non-linguistic parallel and one a consequence of their position indicate this.

The parallel comes from a consideration of the basic needs for survival and the attainment of satisfaction people experience as living creatures. Processes such as 'eating', 'drinking', 'being hurt by', 'using', 'finding', are entirely dependent on transactions with substances. Grice and Strawson suggest that it is not entirely fanciful to consider that the structure of language has developed to reflect the structure of those most basic interactions with the world.

The relevant consequence of their position relates to a familiar target for ordinary language philosophers: the theory of sense data. If substances are a primary focus of interest, and if the fact is reflected in the language, then this offers good evidence that the world must indeed be substantial in character. If the proponents of sense data were correct, if all we can accurately discuss are the individual sensations we receive through our sense, then 'substantial terminology would have no application'.

And so on.

"the existence of a universal requires ... the actuality of the item" (Grice on Met. 1003a7)

Speranza

In some online discussion in Phil-Logic, Jones has brought up an interesting issue.

Jones writes:

"Grice mentions in ['Aristotle on the multiplicity of being'] that he reads a certain passage in the metaphysics [Met. 1003a7] as asserting that (in Grice's words):

"the existence of a universal requires not just the
possibility but the actuality of an item which
instantiates that universal ..."

Jones comments:

"if this were the case, and if the variables in the propositional forms were taken as varying over universals, then we would be talking only of "non-empty" terms, perhaps supporting the Robin Smith line."

---- I append the main body of Jones's commentary below.

---


Jones:

"[DOB] disputes that something I took from Maritain was (as I
said) "something like" what Maritain actually said.
I don't care to enter into a debate about what is or is not
"something like" another thing, but I am happy to point out
the points in Maritain that provoked my concern.
There are two separate issues for me which arise from the
passage in question.
The first is that, contrary to my previous opinion obtained
by considering Aristotelian texts to which I was referred by
Drake, Maritain denies that all affirmative propositions have
"existential import" (i.e. entail the existence of something
which satisfies the subject predicate).
The second point is that he says that in the case that the
affirmation of existence is absent (i.e. in propositions in
necessary matter), the proposition nevertheless "bears upon"
(which possibly means asserts) "possible or ideal
existence".
In paraphrasing this I used the concept of consistency of
predicates, which Drake does not understand.
Possibly this idea does not appear in Aristotle (though it
would be rather surprising).
It is an elementary idea in modern logic.
To say that a predicate is consistent has two distinct
meanings according as we are speaking of a language in which
one speaks of the world or a more purely logical language.
In the latter to say that a predicate is consistent is
simply to say that is it true of something.
However in the former to say that a predicate is consistent
is to say that it is possible that it might be true of
something.
I used the term in the latter sense. and in that sense it
corresponds directly to Maritain's observation which I
understood as asserting that a universal proposition in
essential matter asserts the "possible existence" of its
subject, i.e. that the subject term is "consistent" in the
second of the two above usages.

D. O'B.:

"No, he doesn't say that an essential predication of the
> form "Some A are B" may be true even if there is no A,
> provided only that there is some possible A. That's a
> pidgin version providing a much too vague approximation.
> He says:
> "From the point of view of matter we must distinguish
> between propositions in necessary matter, that is, those
> in which the Pr. Is essential to the S. (in which case
> we say that the S. has supposition naturalis) and
> propositions in contingent matter, that is, those
> wherein the Pr. Is accidental to the S. (the S. has a
> supposition accidentalis). In the first case the
> proposition expresses an eternal truth and affirms only
> the relation (of identification) between the object of
> thought signified by the Pr. and the object of thought
> signified by the S. (habitudinem praedicati ad
> subjectum)."

Jones: This part of your quote corresponds to my first issue:

D.O.B.:

"> Thus it does not require the actual
> existence of the subject to be true (non requiritur
> existential subjecti ut preaedicatum verificetur de
> subject) and not necessarily and itself an "existential"
> sense.""

Jones: "You do not quote the part in which he talks about "possible
existence" though you do discuss it.
Both of these matter cause difficulties for someone who wishes
to assess the syllogistic as a formal system, since in doing
so an important consideration is validity of the syllogisms
which cannot be determined without a grasp of the truth
conditions of the relevant propositional forms.
What Maritain tells us is that the truth conditions are not
determined solely by the form of the proposition, since the
question of whether a proposition is in essential or
accidental matter also enters into the conditions.
This seems to make the validity of syllogisms not a purely
formal matter, questions of interpretation enter into it.
The second point is also of concern because it seems to
bring modal considerations into the question even for non-
modal syllogisms.
Perhaps in the literature all these matters are
satisfactorlly resolved, but I am nevertheless now in a
state of not having any understanding of the syllogism on
the basis of which I could agree that the supposedly valid
syllogisms really are valid."

It is at this point that Jones brings in the extra point by Grice.

"A further point in connection with the

disagreement among contemporary scholars on

whether Aristotle assumes that
terms are non-empty (the article on SEP

by Robin Smith still
gives that interpretation) arises in the paper by Grice in
connection with which this issue about Maritain arose."

"Grice mentions in that paper that he reads a certain passage
in the metaphysics as asserting that (in Grice's words):
"... the existence of a universal requires not just the
possibility but the actuality of an item which
instantiates that universal ..."
Which he takes to be enunciated in Metaphysics IV, ii,
1003a7.
I don't see it myself, but if this were the case, and if the
variables in the propositional forms were taken as varying
over universals, then we would be talking only of "non-
empty" terms, perhaps supporting the Robin Smith line."

Cheers.

Re: Grice on Aristotle

Speranza

Jones writes:

"Though I first began to consider the Grice/Code material on multiplicity of being in Aristotle back in 2009, I worked then primarily from the semi-formal assertions posted by Speranza, and later from the Code version which could be seen on Google books. At that time I did not have access to either the paper by Grice on multiplicity of being or that paper of Code's (which I think is in PGRICE) and so my activity in the first instance was mainly a formal exercise in seeing whether the collection of propositions represented a coherent semi-formal model (of whatever)."

Good. It would be good to trace all the Code references. I do think his main exercise is indeed in the

Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.

---

--- (Code happens to be a literary executor to Grice, and I wish he could lead a student or former student of his to do research on Kantoteliana as found in the Grice Papers -- mabbe sometime in the future).

Alan Dodds Code is the name, and he was himself a former PhD student with Grice at UC/Berkeley. PhD dissertation on 'philosophical logic'. Code's interest in ancient philosophy and Aristotle in particular seems to have been a later development.

Jones continues:

"Soon, I decided to try to analyse the matter in conjunction with Aristotle's syllogistic, since it seemed that if formal logical tools were to be brought to bear, then they should involve those of Aristotle, and in this enterprise for lack of access to the detail the project assumed a life of its own and began to be directed by my own interests (to which the difference between "izz" and "hazz" did seem relevant).

----

As I see, Jones connects the 'izz' with the essence, and the 'hazz' with the contingency, and rightly he does so. I was suggesting that we could also consider Grice's thoughts on relative identity, since it seems we may need three predicates:

izz-p
izz-o
izz-f

i.e. izz in the past
izz in the present (o)
and izz in the future.

Also hazz-p, hazz-o, and hazz-f.

The point is that, to use Myro's example (in PGRICE, "Time and Identity"), drawn from Hobbes:

this ship gets dismantled, so it's no longer a ship (Hobbes's discussion of essence and identity in "Leviathan").

Aristotle's example: bronze becomes a sculpture. And so on.

--- In any case, Grice allows to deal with Leibniz's law without recourse to the [] Nec Operator of standard modal logic:

a = a --> [ ] a = a

i.e. if a=a, then it is necessary that a=a.

This may bear on discussions of _essence_. As Code notes, the standard way to approach those issues (The essentialism of Aristotle, say, or the contingentialism of Plato) was via first-order predicate logic, with necessity.

---

Jones:

"My interest in Aristotle is primarily twofold.
The first part is to understand what contribution Aristotle made towards the later establishment (not to speak of the even later disestablishment) of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the two closely related distinctions between necessary and contingent, and between the a priori and the a posteriori (passing over the slip into Latin).
Aristotle has much to say about all these, the question is how, close was he to the distinctions as they might now be appreciated (or deprecated)."

Good. An examination of Aristotle's modal logic should help. Noel Burton-Roberts, himself a linguist rather than a logician, or philosopher, has dealt with a funny implicature, in terms of the scale:



i.e.

S must be P.

Therefore S may be P.

---- This little inference above can be understood in terms of the modal square of opposition. It tells that what is necessary is possible.

--

Jones:

"Secondly, and of course closely related, to what extent can we find anything like semantics in Aristotle.
Quite recently I have begun occasionally to go to the British Library and this has improved my access to the literature generally and in particular enabled me to scan both the Grice and the Code papers (though it took me longer to find the Grice because some of his writings, or were they just speakings, were at conferences whose proceedings I never did find.
Still I don't spend a lot of time on this, and I didn't at first get on well with the Grice paper.
I am beginning now to get an idea of what he was about, and find that the distance between his motivations and mine is a lot smaller than I had imagined.
Firstly it is interesting to note that his conclusions connect his analysis with the analytic/synthetic distinction in the following way.
He argues that anyone who accepts his account of unity of meaning (in connection with multiplicity of being) is "not free" to combine it with rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction."

WHAT AN EXCELLENT POINT.

His account of 'unity of meaning' is an excellent thing. It turns out that the multiplicity of being was 'alleged'. The essay should have been title,

Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or something). Grice is all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or something.

Jones:

"Secondly both his conclusions and his observations about larger issues show that he is very much concerned with meaning (perhaps not quite the same thing as semantics, but closely related) and metaphysics (about which my own brand of positivism is also curious).
So my interest in this work is reinforced as I now become acquainted belatedly with its sources, and it won't be abandoned any time soon (though it will continue to spend most of its time on a back burner)."

Good to learn.

------ Indeed, Grice was into 'semantics', rather than 'pragmatics'. And he liked to play with 'metaphysics', because he saw the connections.

As he left Oxford, but found himself in charge of seminars on Aristotle at UC/Berkeley, it is only natural that he played with a critical commentary on the Aristotle classics.

I tend to think that Grice went deeper in these areas in association with his former student at Oxford, P. F. Strawson.

There are PILES of unpublications in the Grice Papers, (c) Grice/Strawson. They were formal material presented to seminars on the "Categories" of Aristotle.

At the time, Grice was not into presenting a formal system, but his notes retain a charm as he engages in linguistic botany.

By the time he was invited to contribute to the Quine festschrift, Grice had developed a System -- what he called System Q, but Myro relabelled System G. Within System G, the nuances and implicatures regarding categorial (intracategorial) predication receive a formalisation.

While Grice loved Aristotle, he saw himself as a follower of Kantotle.

Kantotle was used by J. F. Bennett, in his review of PGRICE: "In the tradition of Kantotle", he entitled it.

The connections between Aristotle and Kant, even at the level of categories, are interesting. Kant kept an Aristotelian logic of sorts, and of course, reconsidered all that needed to be reconsidered about the analytic-synthetic, apriori-aposteriori distinction.

By calling himself a Kantotelian, Grice wants to separate himself from the narrowest fields of linguistic botany proper. He feels that behind the analysis of the nuances of linguistic forms lies an interest in the broader issues of metaphysics, and what Grice irritatingly (somewhat) calls "philosophical eschatology".

---

Consider his example of metaphor (WoW:34):

You are the cream in my coffee.

Grice writes:

"Examples like "You are the cream in my coffee" [oddly, the title of the song is "You're the cream in my coffee," rather] INVOLVE

***** CATEGORIAL FALSITY *****"

This is a critical notion here, as it pertains to Kantotelian categories as studied by Grice/Strawson.

Grice goes on:

""You're the cream in my coffee" ... involve[s] CATEGORIAL falsity"

This is different form:

"Virtue is square".

The issue is relevant to the study of negation. If Virtue is square is a categorial falsity, "Virtue is not square" comes out as true.

Also,

"You are NOT the cream in my coffee".

Grice goes on:

"Examples like "You are the cream in my coffee
characteristically involve categorial falsity."

One cannot think what Grice is thinking. I once studied the lyrics to that song: "My only necessity is you". Examples like Cole Porter's "You're the tops: you're the Coliseum", may also apply.

----

"characteristically involve CATEGORIAL
FALSITY"

intracategorial falsity.

The idea is that a human co-conversationalist cannot be an organic liquid (as cream is).

"involve categorial falsity"

Recall that in WOW:Philosophical Eschatology, he considers Metaphor, Parable, and Simile, and Analogy as modes for eschatological study.

"involve categorial falsity"

and yet they are things we say. "So the contradictory
of what th speaker has made it as if to say will, strictly
speaking, be a truism."

IT IS NOT the case that you are the cream in my coffee.

He is considering this just after his account of irony, where 'p' becomes '-p'.

So this is a different rhetoric animal, yet involving,

"Say the truth" qua conversational maxim.

---

"So, it cannot be THAT that such a speaker
is trying to get across."

It is not the case that you are the cream in my coffee.

Since, being a truism, it needn't be communicated, unlike:

"That car has all the windows intact" (by uttering, "One of the windows is broken", WoW:iii -- irony).

"The most likely supposition" is that

S IZZ P

is

S IZZ-LIKE P.

"the most likely supposition is that the
speaker is attributing to his [HUMAN] audience
some feature or features in respect of which
the audience resembles (more or less fancifully)
the mentioned substance."

----

Analysis by Aristotle, Kant, or Kantotle, of metaphor, should also help. Or not!

Grice on Aristotle

Roger Bishop Jones

Though I first began to consider the Grice/Code material on multiplicity of being in Aristotle back in 2009, I worked then primarily from the semi-formal assertions posted by Speranza, and later from the Code version which could be seen on Google books.  At that time I did not have access to either the paper by Grice on multiplicity of being or that paper of Code's (which I think is in PGRICE) and so my activity in the first instance was mainly a formal exercise in seeing whether the collection of propositions represented a coherent semi-formal model (of whatever).

Soon, I decided to try to analyse the matter in conjunction with Aristotle's syllogistic, since it seemed that if formal logical tools were to be brought to bear, then they should involve those of Aristotle, and in this enterprise for lack of access to the detail the project assumed a life of its own and began to be directed by my own interests (to which the difference between izz  and hazz did seem relevant).

My interest in  Aristotle is primarily twofold.
The first part is to understand what contribution Aristotle made towards the later establishment (not to speak of the even later disestablishment) of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the two closely related distinctions between necessary and contingent, and between the a priori and the a posteriori (passing over the slip into latin).
Aristotle has much to say about all these, the question is how, close was he to the distinctions as they might now be appreciated (or deprecated).

Secondly, and of course closely related, to what extent can we find anything like semantics in Aristotle.

Quite recently I have begun occasionally to go to the British Library and this has improved my access to the literature generally and in particular enabled me to scan both the Grice and the Code papers (though it took me longer to find the Grice because some of his writings, or were they just speakings, were at conferences whose proceedings I never did find.
Still I don't spend a lot of time on this, and I didn't at first get on well with the Grice paper.

I am beginning now to get an idea of what he was about, and find that the distance between his motivations and mine is a lot smaller than I had imagined.


Firstly it is interesting to note that his conclusions connect his analysis with the analytic/synthetic distinction in the following way.
He argues that anyone who accepts his account of unity of meaning (in connection with multiplicity of being) is "not free" to combine it with rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Secondly both his conclusions and his observations about larger issues show that he is very much concerned with meaning (perhaps not quite the same thing as semantics, but closely related) and metaphysics (about which my own brand of positivism is also curious).

So my interest in this work is reinforced as I now become acquainted belatedly with its sources, and it won't be abandoned any time soon (though it will continue to spend most of its time on a back burner).

RBJ

The Izz and the Hazz: Kantotelian Foundations

Speranza

---

R. B. Jones is engaged in some online discussion on Grice, etc, at phil-logic. Some excerpts as they pertain to Grice.

Jones notes, properly:

"I should have mentioned, when speaking of Grice on semantic
multiplicity, that Grice is again inventing new words to
speak of old things.
By semantic multiplicity Grice means what Aristotle called
"homonymy", and by "unified semantic multiplicity" he means
what Aristotle called "paronymy"."

This is an excellent paraphrase, to consider:

homonymy ----> semantic multiplicity.
paronymy ----> unified semantic multiplicity.

D. O'Brien:

"Aristotle set out a system of logic, a complete analysis
including a system of valid schematic formulae, and if
> one wishes to understand his work both his formal and
> material logic should be studied and restudied as given.
> One isn't in a position to critique or "examine" it
> using whatever tool set, of whatever pedigree, until it
> is already well-known, unless one is willing to examine
> it for what it is in itself. For this reason I'm happy
> to hear that you've made some connection with Terence
> Parsons' work, because he does seem to understand this."

In fact, Terence Parsons, for the record,is quoted by Grice in "Vacuous Names"

Jones

"Thank[s] [DOB] for that advice.
I myself find that the construction of formal models is a
valuable aid in coming to an understanding, it is my way of
coming to grips with a topic."

Drake O'Brien:


"The point I was making is simply that being qua being is
> a different thing than being qua predicated term in a
> proposition. The sense of the term 'being' is modified
> accordingly. There's a purely *syntactical* difference
> to examine, as a difference between simple terms which
> have significance but are neither true nor false, per
> se, and propositions which express some kind of
> combination or separation and so can be judged true or
> false. Aristotle discusses the difference several
> times, in several ways, giving it a thorough airing."

Jones replies:

"I am familiar with all these points, though I don't
understand why you describe the difference between terms and
propositions as "purely syntactic" particularly since you
describe the difference in semantic terms.
I agree that prima facie there are obvious differences in
sense, but I am still groping for a good understanding of
Grice's enterprise.
It is certainly clear that Grice is familiar with the
difference between being qua being and being in predication."

---

"In fact, Grice lists *four* different _notions_ of being and then
shows that two are derivative and settles down on the
remaining two, which are predication and affirming existence."

"However, this difference in _sense_, if that's what it is, is
_not_ the one Grice is interested in, or at least _not the only
one_."

"Grice is in fact digging deeper, into the
"semantic multiplicity" of predication."

----- So, out of the four 'usages' of 'being', Grice wants to dig into being-qua-predication.

"In relation to essential predication this semantic
multiplicity [homonymy] is said to arise from categorial
considerations."

"Being as _essential_ predication is said to have _mutiple
senses_ because essential predication is *intra-categorial*, the
subject and predicate must belong to the same category."

"So, it looks like there may be a different _sense_ of 'being' for
each category."

"However, this is "unified" semantic multiplicity."

----> paronymy.

"In computer science parlance, if we think of the categories
as providing a kind of type system, then saying that "izz"
exhibits unified semantic multiplicity [homonymy] is rather like saying
it is a polymorphic function and the polymorphism is the
kind which was badly named (perhaps by Cardelli), parametric
polymorphism."

Good to learn. Incidentally, J. O. Urmson, who knew Grice so well (and was, Urmson was, described as 'the greatest living philosopher in the English language), wrote a little essay on "Polymorphous" concepts in a little book ed. by Oxonian O. Wood in a tribute to Ryle. I treasure that essay (when I find it) because it shows that AT SOME POINT the older generation of Ryle and the younger one of Austin, Grice, and Urmson, met (Grice, b. 1913; Urmson, b. 1914).

D. O'Brien:

"> I understand that usage for "izz" and "hazz" is intended
> to correspond according as Aristotle puts it:
> " Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of
> something else, i.e. of something either predicable of
> or present in some other thing." On Interpretation part
> 3. What Aristotle mentions here, in On Interpretation,
> is covered more extensively in Categories, Section 1.
> When Aristotle spoke of "something said of something
> else", what do you make of his distinction between
> "something either predicable of or present in some other
> thing"?"

Jones comments:

"This is a puzzle for me.
Cohen has commented on the Grice neologisms (if they can
still be called that after a few decades) here:
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/433/GriceCode.pdf."

----

"In Cohen's note he tells is that 'izz' and 'hazz', which I talk
of as essential and accidental predication respectively,
correspond in Aristotle to "said of" and "in", i.e."

---> "a izz b" is Griceian for Aristotle's "b is said of a"

[It may do to reconsider the Greek forms for "B is said of A" -- Speranza]

and

----> "a hazz b" for "b is in a".

[It may do to reconsider the forms of "B is in A" -- Speranza].

Jones goes on:

"but the passage you cite suggests that Aristotle uses "said
of" for predication in general, not just for essential
predication."

"Furthermore "either predicable or present in" suggests that
"present in" is not a predication, which conflicts with my
present understanding.
Perphaps this makes more sense in context."

---

D. O'Brien:

"> Those who made it their lifework
> to study and translate Aristotle's texts, and make those
> texts more accessible, aren't somehow less than
> "Aristotelian" for pointing this kind of material out."

Jones:

"Nothing I said should be understood as suggesting that.
Are you suggesting than none of them made an original
contribution to logic?"

Jones:


> > Maritain is represented by SEP as an original
> > philosopher, not merely an Aristotelian scholar, and
> > we must therefore in reading what he says not assume
> > that he is confining himself to opinions which can be
> > shown to have been held by Aristotle.

O'Brien:

> Maritain was a theologian.

Jones:

"SEP describes him as a philosopher.
It is as a philosopher that he is of interest to us here."

----- This amusing exchange reminds me of Grice!

Grice is described as a 'logician' ("British logician", to boot) in an online dictionary. Books were written on him as Grice, "philosopher and linguist", which by separation would have that Grice is a "linguist" (OED3). He was of course, a philosopher simpliciter rather. Platts amused me when in reviewing PGRICE for Mind called Grice, 'a philosopher's philosopher'. As if philosophers came in varieties to cater for this or that profession ("a gardener's philosopher" -- cfr. "a philosopher's gardener").

D. O'Brien:

"> Most certainly his theology
> wasn't confined to opinions held by Aristotle. In fact,
> his theological opinions mostly stem from more or less
> established religious dogma. ho hum. But Maritain
> doesn't confuse religious dogma with "logic", however
> the term 'logic' might be construed. When he discusses
> Aristotle's texts, he's discussing exactly those texts
> and those sentences that his footnotes refer to. The
> same holds when he discusses a commentator on
> Aristotle's texts. If you disagree, I'd like you to
> show me some (or any) specific examples."

Jones:

"I did not venture an opinion on the matter.
I simple asked the question.
You should not infer from my asking a question that I have
an opinion on what the answer is.
In this case I did not."

D. O'Brien:

"> An example
> where he butchers Aristotle's text, or Ockham's text, or
> the text of any of his exemplars. Otherwise I conclude
> that you're dealing with innuendo."

Jones:

"Even if I thought he was going beyond Aristotle (on which I
had no opinion) that would not entail that I had any
criticism to offer or that I had a bad opinion of his work.
Going beyond Aristotle, i.e. venturing an opinion which
cannot be found in Aristotle, is not the same as
misrepresenting Aristotle, so long as the opinion is not
represented as being Aristotle's."

O'Brien:


"> > > To say that he was a "Thomist" is really no more than
> > > to say that he wrote his texts specifically for use
> > > in seminaries of the Catholic church, where there's
> > > a Thomist tradition, but little more than that.

Jones:

"> > I would be very surprised if that was what the author
> > of the SEP article intended to say.

O'Brien:

"> Nevertheless, it is true in context of Maritain's
> presentation of Aristotelian logic, which is the context
> at issue here."

Jones:

"I don't think so.
The issue at stake here is what the SEP author meant by
describing Maritain as a Thomist.
I shall leave off here, and return in another post to discuss
the issue which arises from the passage in Maritain to which
you referred me."

----

I THINK THOMISM IS OVERRATED. Aquino is a lovely part of Italy, and Thomas of Aquino (never a 'saint', in philosophical parlance) was pretty clever. I like to distinguish him from Duns.
It is bad enough when a philosopher becomes an -ism.
Thomas or Tomasso d'Aquino, if you must, was a pleasure to read.
To call Maritain Thomistic is like calling Grice Kantian or Aristotelian ("Kantotelian" or "Ariskantian", at most). O. T. O. H., one could distinguish between,

"What Tomasso said"

and

"What those who read Tomasso said".

--- Cheers.
Speranza

Below some extracts from wiki's entry for "Tomasso di Roccasecca" if you must.

"Tommaso d'Aquino O.P. (Roccasecca, 1225 – Fossanova, 7 marzo 1274) fu un frate domenicano, del tempo della scolastica e della scuola domenicana, definito Doctor Angelicus dai suoi contemporanei."

"È venerato come santo dalla Chiesa cattolica che dal 1567 lo considera anche dottore della Chiesa."

"Tommaso rappresenta uno dei principali pilastri teologici e FILOSOFICI della Chiesa cattolica."

"Egli è anche il punto di raccordo fra la cristianità e la FILOSOFIA CLASSICA, che ha i suoi fondamenti e maestri in
Socrate,
Platone e
Aristotele,

e poi passati attraverso il periodo ellenistico, specialmente in autori come Plotino.

Tommaso dei conti d'Aquino nacque a Roccasecca, nel castello paterno situato nel feudo dei conti d'Aquino (Frosinone), nel 1225, e morì nel convento di Fossanova il 7 marzo 1274.

La sua tomba si trova presso il convento domenicano des Jacobins a Tolosa, in Francia.

Fu allievo di sant'Alberto Magno, che lo difese quando i compagni lo chiamavano "il bue muto" dicendo: «Ah! Voi lo chiamate il bue muto! Io vi dico, quando questo bue muggirà, i suoi muggiti si udranno da un'estremità all'altra della terra!»

Il piccolo Tommaso, tenuto a battesimo da papa Onorio III, a soli cinque anni, fu inviato come oblato nella vicina Abbazia di Monte Cassino, di cui suo zio era abate, per ricevere l'educazione religiosa e per, così come nelle intenzioni dei genitori, iniziare una prestigiosa carriera ecclesiastica nell'Ordine dei benedettini.

A quattordici anni si trasferì a Napoli, dove si dedicò allo studio delle arti all'Università, presso il convento di San Domenico Maggiore. È così che, pur fortemente ostacolato dalla famiglia, fece richiesta nel 1244 di essere ammesso all'Ordine domenicano.

I suoi superiori, avendone intuito il precoce talento, per consentirgli il completamento degli studi lo inviarono a Parigi, ma il giovane, prima che potesse giungervi, fu ripreso dai suoi familiari e ricondotto al castello paterno di Monte San Giovanni Campano. Il periodo di prigionia, che durò un anno, fu caratterizzato dalle pressioni della famiglia, che voleva fargli rinunciare all'abito domenicano, e si concluse, per intercessione di papa Innocenzo IV, con la liberazione (o, secondo alcuni biografi, con la fuga) di Tommaso.

Dopo brevi soggiorni, prima a Napoli e poi a Roma, nel 1245 giunse a Parigi, e nel 1248 partì alla volta di Colonia con Alberto Magno, filosofo e teologo tedesco che cercò di conciliare il Cristianesimo con l'Aristotelismo, al nuovo Studium Generale di Colonia, del quale Alberto era stato nominato Rettore, mentre Tommaso divenne secondo professore e Magister Studentium.

In seguito, Tommaso volle essere l'esecutore del progetto del suo maestro. È dibattuto il rapporto che Tommaso ebbe con Aristotele, ma, a questo proposito, dice Marcello Landi: «Si può ridurre Tommaso ad un aristotelico tardo? In effetti, per motivi storici e teoretici è meglio fare l'operazione contraria: cercare, cioè, di cogliere la peculiarità e l'originalità del tomismo rispetto all'aristotelismo, se si vuole capire il modo di pensare dell'Aquinate, il cui punto di vista tiene conto di quanto è intervenuto, nel frattempo, in Occidente: l'arrivo del Cristianesimo e del pensiero da esso suscitato. Tommaso, insomma, ha assimilato Aristotele al Cristianesimo, non ha fatto l'operazione contraria»[4].

Dal 1252 insegnò all'Università di Parigi, iniziando come baccalarius biblis, e dopo 4 anni poté tenere la sua prima lezione in cattedra.

Nel frattempo Tommaso combatté contro gli averroisti (seguaci del filosofo arabo Averroè, secondo cui l'anima umana singolarmente presa è mortale), che ritenevano la fede inconciliabile con la ragione: "La fede è per le anime semplici, la filosofia per le persone colte".

Tommaso si batté anche contro gli agostiniani, filosoficamente platonici o neoplatonici, che ritenevano inconciliabile l'Aristotelismo con la fede.

Per Tommaso l'anima è creata "a immagine e somiglianza di Dio" (come dice la Genesi), unica, immateriale (priva di volume, peso ed estensione) non localizzata in un punto particolare del corpo, trascendente come Dio e come Lui in una dimensione al di fuori dello spazio e del tempo in cui sono il corpo e gli altri enti. L'anima è tota in toto corpore, contenuta interamente in ogni parte del corpo, e in questo senso legata ad esso indissolubilmente.

Secondo Tommaso:

« fede e ragione si possono conciliare, anzi, la ragione serve agli esseri umani per interrogarsi anche su alcuni enigmi di fede. Lo scopo della fede e della ragione è lo stesso, se poi la ragione si trova in contrasto con la fede deve cedere a questa. »


Le cinque vie per dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio.

La certezza inoppugnabile che Dio esista ci è data dalla fede, ma la ragione ha il suo percorso che prepara l'adesione libera dell'intelletto e della volontà dell'intera persona umana rendendo plausibile, credibile l'adesione al Dio che si rivela. Ma tra i grandi pensatori cristiani si sono elaborati diversi percorsi razionali: mentre Anselmo d'Aosta, sulla scia neoplatonica di Agostino d'Ippona procedeva sia a simultaneo, cioè dal concetto stesso di Dio, da lui ritenuto id quo maius cogitari nequit (nel Proslogion, cap.2.3), sia a posteriori (nel Monologion) per dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio, l'unico modo per arrivarci, secondo Tommaso, consiste nel procedere a posteriori: partendo cioè dagli effetti, dall'esperienza sensibile, che è la prima a cadere sotto i nostri sensi, per dedurne razionalmente la sua Causa prima. Si tratta di quella che chiama demonstratio quia[5], cioè, appunto dagli effetti, il cui risultato è ammettere necessariamente che esista il punto d'arrivo della dimostrazione, anche se non è pienamente intelligibile, come in questo caso, ed in altri, il perché (demonstratio quid, es. i sillogismi: le premesse esprimono proprietà che sono cause della conclusione: "Ogni uomo è mortale; ogni ateniese è uomo; ogni ateniese è mortale": essere uomo e mortale è necessaria causa della mortalità di ogni ateniese)

Sulla base di questo sfondo di pensiero Tommaso espone le sue prove dell'esistenza di Dio, non a caso chiamate in latino 'viae', cioè 'percorsi', 'cammini' presi come esempi di largo respiro [6]. Tutte e cinque, con piccole variazioni, seguono questa struttura: 1) constatazione di un fatto in rerum natura, nell' esperienza sensibile ordinaria (movimento inteso come trasformazione; causalità efficiente subordinata; inizio e fine dell'esistenza degli esseri generabili e corruttibili, perciò materiali, contingenti nel suo vocabolario, che quindi possono essere e non essere; gradualità degli esseri nelle perfezioni trascendentali, come bontà, verità, nobiltà ed essere stesso; finalità nei processi degli esseri non intelligenti); 2) analisi metafisica di quel dato iniziale esperienziale alla luce del principio metafisisco di causalità, enunciato in varie formulazioni ("Tutto ciò che si muove è mosso da un altro"; "E' impossibile che una cosa sia causa efficiente di sé stessa"; "Ora, é impossibile che tutte di tal natura siano state sempre, perché ciò che può non essere un tempo non esisteva"; "Ma il grado maggiore o minore si attribuiscono alle diverse cose secondo che si accostano di più o di meno a qualcosa di sommo o di assoluto"; "Ora, ciò che è privo di intelligenza non tende al fine se non perché é diretto da un essere conoscitivo e intelligente"); 3) impossibilità di un regressus in infinitum inteso in senso metafisico, non quantitativo, perché ciò renderebbe inintelligibile, inspiegabile pienamente il dato di fatto di partenza esistente ("Ora, non si può in tal modo procedere all' infinito, perché altrimenti non vi sarebbe un primo motore, e di conseguenza nessun altro motore..."; "Ma procedere all' infinito nelle cause efficienti equivale ad eliminare la prima causa efficiente; e così non avremmo neppure l' effetto ultimo, né le cause intermedie..."; "Dunque non tutti gli esseri sono contingenti, ma bisogna che nella realtà ci sia qualcosa di necessario. Ora, tutto ciò che è necessario, o ha la causa della sua necessità in un altro essere oppure no. D' altra parte [in questo genere di esseri] non si può procedere all'infinito..."; questo passaggio manca, per la sua evidenza agli occhi dell' Aquinate manca nella quarta via e nella quinta via, si passa direttamente alla conclusione; 4) conclusione deduttiva strettamente razionale (senza nessuna cogenza di fede) che identifica il 'conosciuto' sotto quel determinato aspetto con quello "che tutti chiamano Dio", o espressioni simili ("Dunque è necessario arrivare ad un primo motore che non sia mosso da altri; e tutti riconoscono che esso è Dio"; "Dunque bisogna ammettere una prima causa efficiente, che tutti chiamano Dio"; "Dunque bisogna concludere all'esistenza di un essere che sia di per sé necessario e non tragga da altri la propria necessità, ma sia causa di necessità agli altri. E questo tutti dicono Dio"; "Ora ciò che è massimo in un dato genere è causa di tutti gli appartenenti a quel genere, come il fuoco, caldo al massimo, è causa di ogni calore, come dice lo stesso Aristotele. Dunque vi è qualcosa che per tutti gli enti è causa dell' essere, della bontà e di qualsiasi perfezione. E questo chiamiamo Dio"; "Vi è dunque un qualche essere intelligente, dal quale tutte le cose naturali sono ordinate ad un fine: e quest'essere chiamiamo Dio". I cinque percorsi indicati da San Tommaso sono:

Ex motu et mutatione rerum (tutto ciò che si muove esige un movente primo perché, come insegna Aristotele nella Metafisica: "Non si può andare all'infinito nella ricerca di un primo motore");
Ex ordine causarum efficientium (cioè "dalla causa efficiente", intesa in senso subordinato, non in senso coordinato nel tempo. Tommaso non è, per sola ragione, in grado di escludere la durata indefinita nel tempo di un mondo creato da Dio, la cosiddetta creatio ab aeterno: ogni essere finito, partecipato, dipende nell' essere da un altro detto causa; necessità di una causa prima incausata);
Ex rerum contingentia (cioè ""dalla contingenza". Nella terminologia di Tommaso la generabilità e corruttibilità sono prese come segno evidente della possibilità di essere e non essere legata alla materialità, sinonimo, nel suo vocabolario di "contingenza", ben diverso dall' uso più comune, legato ad una terminologia avicenniana, dove "contingente" è qualsiasi realtà che non sia Dio. Tommaso, in questa argomentazione della Summa Theologiae distingue attentamente il necessario dipendente da altro (anima umana e angeli) e necessario assoluto (Dio).L' esistenza di esseri generabili e corruttibili è in sè insufficiente metafisicamente, rimanda ad esseri necessari, dapprima dipendenti da altro, quindi ad un essere assolutamente necessario);
Ex variis gradibus perfectionis (le cose hanno diversi gradi di perfezioni, intese in senso trascendentale, come verità, bontà, nobiltà ed essere, sebbene sia usato un 'banale' esempio fisico legato al fuoco ed al calore; ma solo un grado massimo di perfezione rende possibile, in quanto causa, i gradi intermedi);
Ex rerum gubernatione (cioè "dal governo delle cose": le azioni di realtà non intelligenti nell'universo sono ordinate secondo uno scopo, quindi, non essendo in loro quest'intelligenza, ci deve essere un'intelligenza ultima che le ordina così).
Processo conoscitivo [modifica]Tommaso, che riteneva la conoscenza acquisibile solo attraverso la sensibilità, rifiuta la visione della conoscenza di Agostino, che pensava che questa avvenisse tramite l'illuminazione divina.

La conoscenza degli universali però appartiene solo alle intelligenze angeliche; noi, invece, conosciamo gli universali post-rem, ossia li ricaviamo dalla realtà sensibile. Soltanto Dio conosce ante rem.

La conoscenza è, quindi, un processo di adeguamento dell'anima o dell'intelletto e della cosa, secondo una formula che dà ragione del sofisticato platonismo di Tommaso:

(LA)
« Veritas: Adaequatio intellectus ad rem. Adaequatio rei ad intellectum. Adaequatio intellectus et rei.[7] » (IT)
« Verità: Adeguamento dell'intelletto alla cosa. Adeguamento della cosa all'intelletto. Adeguamento dell'intelletto e della cosa. »


La Creazione secondo Tommaso [modifica]Tommaso spiega che l'uomo non può stabilire se il mondo è infinito o se è stato creato dal nulla, poiché queste tesi riguardano l'ambito della fede e non è possibile arrivarci razionalmente, l'uomo può solo rifarsi alle verità rivelate che dicono che l'universo ha effettivamente un punto zero dal quale è nato. Nelle opere di Tommaso l'universo (o cosmo) ha una struttura rigorosamente gerarchica: posto al vertice da Dio che viene posto come al di là della fisicità, governa da solo il mondo al di sopra di tutte le cose e gli enti; al di sotto di Dio troviamo gli angeli (forme pure e immateriali) ai quali Tommaso attribuisce la definizione di intelligenze motrici dei cieli anche esse ordinate gerarchicamente tra di loro; poi un gradino più in basso troviamo l'uomo, posto al confine tra il mondo delle sostanze spirituali e il regno della corporeità, in ogni uomo infatti si ha l'unione del corpo (elemento materiale) con l'anima intellettiva (ovvero la forma, che secondo Tommaso costituisce l'ultimo grado delle intelligenze angeliche), l'uomo è l'unico ente in contatto sia con il mondo fisico, sia con il mondo spirituale. Tommaso crede che la conoscenza umana cominci con i sensi, l'uomo non avendo il grado di intelligenza degli angeli non è in grado di apprendere direttamente gli intelligibili, ma può apprendere solamente attribuendo alle cose una forma e quindi solamente grazie all'esperienza sensibile. Un'altra facoltà necessaria che caratterizza l'uomo è la sua tendenza a realizzare pienamente la propria natura ovvero compiere ciò per cui è stato creato. Ciascun uomo infatti corrisponde all'idea divina su cui è modellato di cui l'uomo è consapevole e razionale, conscio delle proprie finalità, alle quali si dirige volontariamente avvalendosi dell'uso dell' intelletto (l'uomo prende le proprie decisioni sulla base di un ragionamento pratico con cui tra due beni sceglie sempre quello più consono al raggiungimento del suo fine). Al di sotto dell'uomo troviamo le piante e le varie molteplicità degli elementi.

Rientro in Italia [modifica] « Sono altre quattro le città preminenti, Parigi nelle scienze, Salerno nelle medicine, Bologna nella legge, Orleans nelle arti attoriali. »


Nel 1259 tornò in Italia: strinse amicizia con Guglielmo di Moerbeke (grande traduttore di Aristotele e di Proclo) e collaborò ad alcuni scritti con papa Urbano IV, presso il convento di Orvieto, dove il pontefice si era temporaneamente stabilito.

Su incarico di Urbano IV compose l'ufficio e gli inni per la festa del Corpus Domini appena istituita (8 settembre 1264), tra i quali spicca l'inno Pange Lingua, con le celeberrime ultime due strofe del Tantum Ergo che la liturgia cattolica ancor oggi eleva durante la benedizione con il Santissimo Sacramento.

Successivamente si recò a Roma per organizzare i corsi dello Studio di santa Sabina e, nel 1267, papa Clemente IV lo chiamò con sé a Viterbo, dove predicò spesso dal pulpito della chiesa di Santa Maria Nuova.

È proprio durante gli anni trascorsi in Italia che compose numerose opere come la Summa contra gentiles, il De regimine principium, il De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas e buona parte del suo capolavoro, la Summa Theologiae, fonte d'ispirazione della teologia cattolica fino ai nostri giorni.

Nel 1269 fu richiamato a Parigi dai suoi superiori ed iniziò, attraverso una strenua difesa teologica degli Ordini mendicanti, la sua opera di confutazione del Neoplatonismo agostiniano (in contrapposizione al suo Aristotelismo) ed agli errori dottrinari averroisti.

Nel 1272, chiamato da Carlo I d'Angiò, fu nuovamente a Napoli e si occupò della riorganizzazione degli studi teologici presso il convento di San Domenico, presso il quale era annessa la locale Università. In questo periodo San Tommaso fu a Salerno dove tenne una serie di lezioni di teologia, ricordate da una lapide nel duomo cittadino, nelle sedi della celebre scuola medica salernitana. [8]

Il 6 dicembre 1273, nella chiesa di San Domenico a Napoli, cadde in estasi e da quel giorno smise di scrivere, confidando a fra' Reginaldo da Piperno, suo aiutante e confessore: «Tutto quello che ho scritto mi sembra un pugno di paglia a paragone di quello che ho visto e mi è stato rivelato. È venuta la fine della mia scrittura e spero che sia vicina la fine della mia vita.»[9]

Fu in questo periodo che Tommaso fece sì che la sua Summa Theologiae restasse incompiuta (l'ultimo trattato è il De Poenitentia).

La fine [modifica]Il 6 dicembre del 1273, durante una messa, fu colpito da qualcosa che lo sconvolse profondamente. Da quel momento in poi non scrisse più nulla. Confessò al suo segretario, Reginaldo da Piperno, le seguenti parole: "Promettimi, in nome del Dio vivo e onnipotente e della tua fedeltà al nostro ordine, e dell'amore che nutri per me, che non rivelerai mai, finché sarò vivo, ciò che ti dirò. Tutto ciò che ho scritto è come paglia per me in confronto a ciò che ora mi è stato rivelato [...]. L'unica cosa che ora desidero è che Dio dopo aver posto fine alla mia opera di scrittore possa presto porre termine anche alla mia vita".

Nel gennaio del 1274 papa Gregorio X gli ordinò di presenziare al Concilio di Lione II, per verificare in che cosa consistessero le divergenze tra la Chiesa latina e quella greca e se fosse possibile appianarle; Tommaso, anche se non in buone condizioni di salute, si mise in viaggio.

Durante il tragitto si fermò presso il castello di Maenza, da sua nipote Francesca, maritata con il conte Annibaldo de Ceccano, signore di Maenza, ma il suo male si aggravò. Pur ammalato, era ancora in grado di celebrare messa - cosa che, secondo i testimoni, faceva con grande devozione e versando lacrime copiose.

Dal momento che desiderava finire i suoi giorni in un monastero ("se il Signore vorrà prendermi è meglio che mi trovi in una casa di religiosi che non in un castello", disse), e non essendo in condizione di raggiungere una casa dei domenicani, fu portato all'abbazia cistercense di Fossa Nuova (oggi Fossanova), a poca distanza da Priverno (in provincia di Latina), dove, al termine di una malattia durata qualche settimana, morì il 7 marzo 1274.

Il racconto biografico di Guglielmo di Tocco narra che Tommaso, ormai prossimo alla morte, dettò ai monaci dell'abbazia un breve commento al Cantico dei cantici.

Le spoglie di Tommaso d'Aquino sono conservate nel convento dei Giacobini a Tolosa. La reliquia della mano destra, invece, si trova a Salerno nella chiesa di San Domenico, assieme alle spoglie di due sorelle del santo, mentre l'insigne reliquia del suo teschio si trova custodita e venerata nella Basilica Cattedrale di Priverno (Latina). È patrono della città e della diocesi privernate.

Ipotesi sulla morte di Tommaso [modifica]Dante Alighieri, nella sua Commedia,[10] sostiene che il teologo sia stato avvelenato per ordine di Carlo d'Angiò; Giovanni Villani (Cronache IX, 218) conferma questa versione e l'Anonimo Fiorentino descrive il crimine e ne spiega le motivazioni. Il Muratori, al contrario, riproducendo il resoconto di uno degli amici del teologo, non fa accenni ad eventuali congiure. Anche il semplice sospetto, comunque, ci comunica la convinzione dei contemporanei di Tommaso che la sua opera fosse pericolosa per il partito guelfo, rappresentato dai d'Angiò.

Importanza ed eredità [modifica] Per approfondire, vedi la voce Tomismo.


San Tommaso d'Aquino, ritratto di Carlo CrivelliSan Tommaso fu uno dei pensatori più eminenti della filosofia Scolastica, che verso la metà del XIII secolo aveva raggiunto il suo apogeo. Egli indirizzò diversi aspetti della filosofia del tempo: la questione del rapporto tra fede e ragione, le tesi sull'anima (in contrapposizione ad Averroè), le questioni sull'autorità della religione e della teologia, che subordina ogni campo della conoscenza. Tali punti fermi del suo pensiero furono difesi da diversi suoi seguaci successivi, tra i quali Reginaldo di Piperno, Tolomeo da Lucca, Giovanni di Napoli, il domenicano francese Giovanni Capreolus e Antonino di Firenze. Infine però, con la lenta dissoluzione della Scolastica, si ebbe parallelamente anche la dissoluzione del Tomismo.

Oggigiorno il pensiero di Tommaso d'Aquino trova ampio consenso anche in ambienti non cattolici (studiosi protestanti statunitensi, ad esempio) e perfino non cristiani, grazie al suo metodo di lavoro, fortemente razionale ed aperto a fonti e contributi di ogni genere: la sua indagine intellettuale procede dalla Bibbia agli autori pagani, dagli ebrei ai musulmani, senza alcun pregiudizio, ma tenendo sempre il suo centro nella Rivelazione cristiana, alla quale ogni cultura, dottrina o autore antico faceva capo.

Il suo operato culmina nella Summa Theologiae (cioè "Il complesso di teologia"), in cui tratta in maniera sistematica il rapporto fede-ragione ed altre grandi questioni teologiche.

Agostino vedeva il rapporto fede-ragione come un circolo ermeneutico (dal greco ermeneuo, cioè "interpreto") in cui credo ut intelligam et intelligo ut credam (ossia "credo per comprendere e comprendo per credere"). Tommaso porta la fede su un piano superiore alla ragione, affermando che dove la ragione e la filosofia non possono proseguire inizia il campo della fede ed il lavoro della teologia. Dunque, fede e ragione sono certamente in circolo ermeneutico e crescono insieme sia in filosofia che in teologia. Mentre però la filosofia parte da dati dell'esperienza sensibile o razionale, la teologia inizia il circolo con i dati della fede, su cui ragiona per credere con maggiore consapevolezza ai misteri rivelati. La ragione, ammettendo di non poterli dimostrare, riconosce che essi, pur essendo al di sopra di sé, non sono mai assurdi o contro la ragione stessa: fede e ragione, sono entrambe dono di Dio e non possono contraddirsi. Questa posizione esalta ovviamente la ricerca umana: ogni verità che io posso scoprire non minaccerà mai la Rivelazione anzi, rafforzerà la mia conoscenza complessiva dell'opera di Dio e della Parola di Cristo. Si vede qui un esempio tipico della fiducia che nel Medioevo si riponeva nella ragione umana. Nel XIV secolo queste certezze andranno in crisi, coinvolgendo l'intero impianto culturale del periodo precedente.

La teologia, in ambito puramente speculativo, rispetto alla tradizione classica, è considerata una forma inferiore di sapere, poiché usa le armi della filosofia senza partire da qualcosa che abbia la forza della necessità filosofica, ma Tommaso fa notare, citando Aristotele, che non si può mai dimostrare tutto (sarebbe necessario un processo all'infinito), ed anche che si possono distinguere due tipi di scienze: quelle che esaminano i propri principi e quelle che ricevono i principi da altre scienze, costruendo sopra di essi come su dati validi. La teologia, rivalutata, si costruisce le basi della sua substantia. L'ideale, per uno spirito concreto come Tommaso, sarebbe superare la fede e raggiungere la conoscenza ma, sui misteri fondamentali della Rivelazione, questo non è possibile nella vita terrena del corpo. Avverrà nella vita eterna dello spirito.

Il sapere teologico è più elevato per l'importanza assoluta e fondamentale delle sue "ipotesi", da cui parte poi a ragionare e sulle quali cresce il suo essere; esso è un moto a spirale della conoscenza che muove da un'ipotesi, cioè un atto di fede, guardando Dio e l'eternità. Per l'uomo è più importante dei ragionamenti necessari che un filosofo è riuscito a dimostrare. La filosofia è dunque ancilla theologiae e regina scientiarum, primo fra i saperi delle scienze. Il primato del sapere teologico non è nel metodo, ma nei contenuti divini che affronta, per i quali è sacrificabile anche la necessità filosofica.

Il punto di discrimine fra filosofia e teologia è la dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio; dei due misteri fondamentali della Fede (Trinitario e Cristologico), la ragione può dimostrare solamente l'esistenza di Dio e che questo Dio non può che essere Trinitario, il paradosso razionale, che la ragione non può spiegare: un Dio Uno e Trino. Il maggior servizio che la ragione può fare alla fede è che dimostrare l'esistenza di un Dio non Trinitario è altrettanto irrazionale quanto la sua affermazione, perché i motivi per non credere al Dio che emerge dal Nuovo Testamento non sono maggiori di quelli che si hanno per credere ad un'altra divinità o per essere atei. La ragione fornisce un secondo aiuto alla fede: mostrare che da questo mistero scaturiscono conseguenze non contraddittorie fra loro (il mistero stesso è l'ipotesi-premessa razionale). La ragione non può entrare nella parte storica dei misteri religiosi, può mostrare solo prove storiche che tal "profeta" è esistito, ma non che era Dio, e il senso della Sua missione, che è appunto un dato, un fatto a cui si può credere o meno.

Il primato della teologia verrà fortemente discusso nei secoli successivi, ma sarà anche lo studio praticato da tutti i filosofi cristiani nel Medioevo e oltre, tant'è che Pascal fece la sua famosa "scommessa" ancora nel XVII secolo. La teologia era questione sentita dal popolo nelle sacre rappresentazioni, era il mondo dei medioevali e degli zelanti studenti che attraversavano a piedi le paludi di Francia per ascoltare le lectiones dell'Aquinate nella prestigiosa Università della Sorbonne di Parigi, incontrandosi da tutta Europa .

Gli storici della filosofia richiamano l'attenzione anche sulla prevalenza dell'intelletto rispetto ad una prevalenza della volontà nella vita intellettuale/spirituale dell'uomo. La prima è seguita da San Tommaso e dalla sua scuola, mentre l'altra è propria di San Bonaventura e della scuola franscecana. Per Tommaso il fine supremo è "vedere Dio", mentre per Bonaventura fine ultimo dell'uomo è "amare Dio". Quindi per Tommaso la categoria più alta è "il vero", mentre per Bonaventura è "il bene". Per ambedue però, "il vero" è anche "il bene", e "il bene" è anche "il vero".

Il pensiero di Tommaso ebbe influenza anche su autori non cristiani, a cominciare dal famoso pensatore ebreo Hillel da Verona.

A partire dal secondo Novecento poi il suo pensiero viene ripreso nel dibattito etico da autori cattolici e non, quali Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Ruth Foot.

Culto [modifica]San Tommaso d'Aquino è patrono dei teologi, degli accademici, dei librai e degli studenti. Fu canonizzato nel 1323 da papa Giovanni XXII. La sua memoria viene celebrata dalla Chiesa cattolica il 28 gennaio, la luterana invece lo ricorda invece l'8 marzo.

L'11 aprile 1567 papa Pio V lo dichiarò dottore della Chiesa con la bolla Mirabilis Deus.

Il 29 giugno 1923, nel VI centenario della canonizzazione, papa Pio XI gli dedicò l'enciclica Studiorum Ducem.

Opere [modifica]
Una pagina della Summa theologiaeAd Bernardum (A Bernardo)
Aurora Consurgens (Il sorgere dell'aurora)
Compendium theologiae (Compendio di teologia)
Contra errores Graecorum (Contro gli errori dei Greci)
Contra impugnantes Dei cultum (Contro coloro che avversano il culto di Dio)
Contra retrahentes (Contro coloro che distolgono)
Contra Saracenos (Contro i Saraceni, cioè i Musulmani)
De aeternitate mundi (L'eternità del mondo)
De alchemia (L'alchimia)
De anima (L'anima; dalle Quaestiones disputatae)
De articulis Fidei (Gli articoli della Fede)
De ente et essentia (L'ente e l'essenza)
De forme absolutionis (La forma dell'assoluzione)
De lapide philosophico (La pietra filosofale)
De malo (Il male; dalle Quaestiones disputatae)
De motu cordis (Il moto del cuore)
De operationibus occultis (Le operazioni nascoste)
De perfectione (La perfezione)
De potentia (La potenza"; dalle Quaestiones disputatae)
De principiis naturae (I principi della natura)
De rationibus Fidei (Le ragioni della Fede)
De regimine principum (Il governo dei principi; scritto politico incompiuto)
De spiritualibus creaturis (Le creature spirituali)
De substantiis separatis (Le sostanze separate)
De unione Verbi Incarnati (L'unione del Verbo Incarnato)
De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (L'unità dell'intelletto contro gli Averroisti)
De veritate (La verità; dalle Quaestiones disputatae)
De virtutibus, (Le virtù; dalle Quaestiones disputatae)
Summa contra Gentiles (Il complesso contro i Gentili; rivolta contro i Gentili, cioè i Musulmani ed i pagani, per sostenere la superiorità della religione cristiana)
Summa theologiae (Il complesso della teologia; incompiuta)
Preghiere [modifica]San Tommaso d'Aquino ha scritto preghiere tra cui vari inni per il Corpus Domini: il Pange Lingua, le cui ultime due strofe (Tantum Ergo Sacramentum), sono utilizzate durante la benedizione eucaristica e la sequenza del Corpus Domini, il Sacris solemniis, le cui ultime due strofe costituiscono il Panis Angelicus, il Lauda Sion Salvatorem e l'inno Adoro te devote per l'adorazione eucaristica.

Note [modifica]1.^ a b Mario Sgarbossa, I Santi e i Beati della Chiesa d'Occidente e d'Oriente, II edizione, Edizioni Paoline, Milano, 2000, ISBN 88-315-1585-3, pag. 63
2.^ È venerato come santo anche dalla Chiesa luterana
3.^ Secondo alcune tesi, minoritarie, datate e di stampo localistico, san Tommaso sarebbe nato a Belcastro. Fra queste, si segnalano quelle di fra' Giovanni Fiore da Cropani, storico calabrese del XVII secolo, che lo scriveva nella sua opera Della Calabria illustrata, di Gabriele Barrio nella sua opera De antiquitate et situ Calabriae e di padre Girolamo Marafioti, teologo dell'ordine dei Minori Osservanti, nella sua opera Croniche ed antichità di Calabria.
4.^ Recensione di M. Landi a S. Muscolino, Il problema della legge naturale in san Tommaso e Rosmini, in «Bollettino telematico di filosofia politica» (online)
5.^ cfr. S. Th. I, q.2, a.2, c. e luoghi paralleli nei commenti aristotelici
6.^ Cf. Summa Theologiae, Iª q. 2 a. 3
7.^ Cf. Quaestio disputata de anima, a. 3 ad 1; Summa Theologiae, Iª q. 16 aa. 1-2.
8.^ San Tommaso a Salerno
9.^ Antonio Livi, Dal senso comune alla dialettica. Una storia della filosofia, Casa editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Roma, 2004-2005
10.^ « Carlo venne in Italia e, per vicenda,
vittima fé di Curradino; e poi
respinse al ciel Tommaso, per ammenda. »
(Dante Alighieri, Commedia, Purgatorio, canto XX, vv. 67-69)

Bibliografia [modifica]AA. VV., Le Ragioni del Tomismo, Ares, Milano, 1979
Maria Cristina Bartolomei, Tomismo e Principio di non contraddizione, Cedam, Padova, 1973
Inos Biffi, La teologia e un teologo. San Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni Piemme, Casale Monferrato (AL), [1984
Marie-Dominique Chenu, Introduzione allo studio di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze, 1953
Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Tommaso d'Aquino, Guida Editori, Napoli, 1992
Marco D'Avenia, La Conoscenza per Connaturalità, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1992
Cornelio Fabro, Introduzione a San Tommaso. La metafisica tomista e il pensiero moderno, Ares, Milano, 1997
Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, S.E.I., Torino, 1939
Marco Forlivesi, Conoscenza e Affettività. L'Incontro con l'essere secondo Giovanni di San Tommaso, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1993
Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, La Sintesi Tomistica, Queriniana, Brescia, 1953
Alessandro Ghisalberti, Tommaso d' Aquino, in Enciclopedia Filosofica (diretta da V. Melchiorre), vol. XII, 11655-11691, Bompiani, Milano, 2006
(FR) Étienne Gilson, Saint Thomas Moraliste, J. Vrin, Parigi, 1974
(FR) Étienne Gilson, Realisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance, J. Vrin, Parigi, 1947
(FR) Étienne Gilson, Le Thomisme. Introduction a la Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, J. Vrin, Parigi, 1986
Marcello Landi, Un contributo allo studio della scienza nel Medio Evo. Il trattato Il cielo e il mondo di Giovanni Buridano e un confronto con alcune posizioni di Tommaso d'Aquino, in Divus Thomas 110/2 (2007) 151-185
Dietrich Lorenz, I Fondamenti dell'Ontologia Tomista, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1992
Amato Masnovo, San Agostino e S. Tomaso, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 1950
Ralph Mcinerny, L'analogia in Tommaso d'Aquino, Armando, Roma, 1999
Battista Mondin, Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di San Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 2002
Battista Mondin, Il Sistema Filosofico di Tommaso d'Aquino, Massimo, Milano, 1985
Vittorio Possenti, Filosofia e rivelazione, Città Nuova Editrice, Roma, 1999
Giacomo Samek Lodovici, La felicità del bene. Una rilettura di Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2002
Giacomo Samek Lodovici, L'esistenza di Dio, Quaderni del Timone, 2005 ISBN 88-7879-009-5
(ES) Ramón Saiz-Pardo Hurtado, Intelecto-razón en Tomás de Aquino. Aproximación noética a la metafísica, EDUSC, Roma, 2005
Juan José Sanguineti, La Filosofia del Cosmo in Tommaso d'Aquino, Ares, Milano, 1986
Fausto Sbaffoni, San Tommaso d'Aquino e l'Influsso degli Angeli, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1993
(EN)Robert Schimdt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, NL, 1966
Rolf Schönberger, Tommaso d'Aquino, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002
Raimondo Spiazzi, O.P. San Tommaso d'Aquino: biografia documentata, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1997
Alfonso Tisi, San Tommaso d'Aquino e Salerno, Grafica Jannone-Salerno, Salerno, 1974
Jean-Pierre Torrell, Tommaso d' Aquino. Maestro spirituale, Città Nuova, Roma, 1998
Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Introduzione a Tommaso d'Aquino, Laterza, Bari, 2002
James Weisheipl, Tommaso d'Aquino. Vita, pensiero, opere, Jaca Book, Milano, 2003
Louis De Wohl, La Liberazione del Gigante
Michela Pereira, La filosofia nel Medioevo, Carocci, Roma, 2008.
Tommaso d'Aquino, De Magistro, a cura di Edda Ducci, Anicia, Roma, 1995
Jean-Pierre Torrell, Amico della verità. Vita e opere di Tommaso d' Aquino, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 2006.
Giuseppe Barzaghi, La Somma Teologica di San Tommaso d'Aquino, in Compendio. Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 2009
Voci correlate [modifica]Quaestio disputata de malo
Cristianesimo
Domingo Bañez
Filosofia medioevale
Hillel ben Samuel da Verona
San Bernardo di Chiaravalle
San Bonaventura da Bagnoregio
Santi
Summa Theologiae
Timeo hominem unius libri
Tomismo
Altri progetti [modifica] Wikisource contiene opere originali di o su Tommaso d'Aquino
Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Tommaso d'Aquino
Wikimedia Commons contiene file multimediali su Tommaso d'Aquino
Collegamenti esterni [modifica] Biografia [modifica]Scheda su San Tommaso d'Aquino, da Santi, beati e testimoni - Enciclopedia dei Santi, SantieBeati.it
Biografia dall'Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani
(EN) La voce "St. Thomas Aquinas" dal sito della Catholic Encyclopedia
(EN) Tommaso d'Aquino dall'Enciclopedia inglese di Filosofia in Internet
Le Sue Opere [modifica](LA) Opera omnia di san Tommaso d'Aquino
(EN) Aquinas in Inglese
(LA, IT, EN, FR, ES, DE, PT) Opera omnia di san Tommaso d'Aquino
Opere di Tommaso d'Aquino: testo con concordanze e lista di frequenza
Traduzione italiana del trattato De Ente et Essentia
Traduzione parziale della Lettera alla Duchessa di Brabante, sui rapporti con gli Ebrei
Amici di San Tommaso d'Aquino - Catechesi facili basate sulle opere di san Tommaso d'Aquino
Summa Theologiae [modifica](IT) La Somma Teologica
(EN) La Summa theologiae di Tommaso
Su Tomismo [modifica](EN) Tommaso nella Stanford Enciclopedia di Filosofia
(PT) Instituto Teológico São Tomás de Aquino - Brasile
Presentazione globale del pensiero filosofico di Tommaso
Scheda su san Tommaso a cura di Marcello Landi.
Le cinque vie di Tommaso
Il pensiero e le opere di Tommaso in breve (archiviato dall'url originale)
[mostra]v · d · mPadri e Dottori della Chiesa cattolica
Nozioni e testi di patristica Didaché · A Diogneto · Letteratura sub-apostolica · Omelia Pasquale di San Melitone di Sardi · Padri alessandrini · Padri apostolici · Padri cappadoci · Padri controversisti · Padri polemisti · Pastore di Erma · Patristica · Patrologia · Scrittore ecclesiastico
Lista dei Padri della Chiesa
e degli scrittori ecclesiastici
(ordine cronologico) San Clemente I Papa · Sant'Ignazio di Antiochia · San Policarpo di Smirne · San Papia di Ierapoli · Erma · Sant'Aristide Marciano · San Giustino Martire · Atenagora di Atene · Taziano il Siro · Melitone di Sardi · San Teofilo di Antiochia · Sant'Ireneo di Lione · Sant'Ippolito di Roma · Origene Adamantio · Clemente Alessandrino · San Dionisio di Alessandria · San Pietro di Alessandria · San Metodio di Olimpo · Quinto Settimio Fiorente Tertulliano · Minucio Felice · San Cipriano di Cartagine · Lucio Cecilio Firmiano Lattanzio · Sant'Eustazio di Antiochia · Eusebio di Cesarea · San Cirillo di Gerusalemme · Sant'Alessandro di Alessandria · Sant'Atanasio di Alessandria · Didimo il Cieco · Sant'Ilario di Poitiers · Gaio Mario Vittorino · San Basilio Magno · San Gregorio Nazianzeno · San Gregorio di Nissa · San Giovanni Crisostomo · Sant'Ambrogio · Diodoro di Tarso · Teodoro di Mopsuestia · Teodoreto di Cirro · San Cirillo di Alessandria · Rufino di Aquileia · San Girolamo · Sant'Agostino d'Ippona · Paolo Orosio · San Giovanni Cassiano · San Sulpizio Severo · San Leone I Papa · Pseudo-Dionigi l'Areopagita · San Massimo il Confessore · San Giovanni Damasceno · Sant'Efrem il Siro · Sant'Eucherio di Lione · Anicio Manlio Torquato Severino Boezio · San Gregorio I Papa · Sant'Isidoro di Siviglia · Giovanni Scoto Eriugena · San Bernardo di Chiaravalle
Lista dei Dottori della Chiesa
(ordine di elezione) San Gregorio I Papa · Sant'Ambrogio · Sant'Agostino d'Ippona · San Girolamo · San Giovanni Crisostomo · San Basilio Magno · San Gregorio Nazianzeno · Sant'Atanasio di Alessandria · San Tommaso d'Aquino · San Bonaventura da Bagnoregio · Sant'Anselmo d'Aosta · Sant'Isidoro di Siviglia · San Pietro Crisologo · San Leone I Papa · San Pier Damiani · San Bernardo di Chiaravalle · Sant'Ilario di Poitiers · Sant'Alfonso Maria de' Liguori · San Francesco di Sales · San Cirillo di Alessandria · San Cirillo di Gerusalemme · San Giovanni Damasceno · San Beda il Venerabile · Sant'Efrem il Siro · San Pietro Canisio · San Giovanni della Croce · San Roberto Bellarmino · Sant'Alberto Magno · Sant'Antonio di Padova · San Lorenzo da Brindisi · Santa Teresa d'Avila · Santa Caterina da Siena · Santa Teresa di Lisieux
[mostra]v · d · mFamiglia domenicana
Origini Domenico di Guzmán · papa Innocenzo III · Catarismo
Santi San Tommaso d'Aquino · Santa Caterina da Siena · Beato Angelico
Teologi Sant'Alberto Magno · San Raimondo di Peñafort · Meister Eckhart · Edward Schillebeeckx · Yves Congar · Marie-Dominique Chenu · Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange ·
Opere, Istituzioni ed edifici Maestro Generale dell'ordine dei predicatori · Pontificia Università San Tommaso d'Aquino · Istituto Superiore di Scienze Religiose San Tommaso d'Aquino · Monache domenicane
Tutte le voci sulla Famiglia Domenicana
Portale Biografie Portale Cattolicesimo
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Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XIII secoloTeologi italianiSanti italianiNati nel 1225Morti nel 1274Morti il 7 marzoPersonalità legate a RoccaseccaSanti per nomeDomenicani italianiDottori della Chiesa cattolicaFilosofi della politicaFilosofi cattoliciPersonaggi citati nella Divina Commedia (Paradiso)Santi del XIII secoloSanti canonizzati da Giovanni XXIISanti domenicaniScolastici| [altre]