Retrospective Epilogue: Precise and Strand on Central Meaning

As we've seen with Jones, Grice identifies some 'strands', for which he gives a precis, and Strand No. 5 is indeed 'central meaning'. For the precis, on p.140 Grice writes:

"The fifth strand is the contention"

---- those strands have identified Grice FOR YEARS. He is doing an intellectual autobiography. So he is talking of things he always found important.

"that in considering the notion of meaning we should
pay attention to two related distinctions."

"The first is a distinction" that trades on

"what [an utterer] ASSERTS" (p. 341). What he calls 'assertive meaning'.

----

Note his use of 'commit' here which may relate to our discussion with Jones with 'entailment':

He is referring to what U asserts

as different from

"those elements of meaning which rather
form part of what THE WORDS (or their users)
IMPLY OR otherwise convey OR ARE COMMITTED TO."

Since there is a disjunction here ("OR their users") the claim involves that

WORDS are committed to. This may be entailment.

---- But it is dubious to see how words can just entail (without an user to back them?)

---

So far for a precis! This in turn is connected with the TWO Main topics in the WJames lectures that he identified in the Foreword and the Introduction to the Retrospective Epilogue, first few paragraphs: assertion vs. meaning vs. etc.

----

So, now for Strand 5 specifically. Note that we are doing this to shed light on Grice's motivation for focusing on some type of 'central' meaning and whether he saw the alethic as essentially forming part of it. (Along with perhaps the 'practical' or deontic -- as one may prefer).

In Strand 5 Grice writes:

of a "REGION OF SIGNIFICATION" (he has become grand in style) with "a special claim to CENTRALITY".

Versus the rather more modest claims of 'adverbial' modification in WoW:VI, "By uttering x, U centrally meant that..."

----

Grice goes on:

In this strand, he proposes

"primary" as synonym for 'central':

"the existence of such a CENTRAL OR PRIMARY
range of cases of signification."

------

While in the retrospective epilogue Grice balances between formality and dictiveness (as candidates for 'centrality') I think that, as a matter of history, the Grice of 1967 was more into the 'dictiveness': the implicatum/dictum distinction: what is said (or stated, or asserted) versus what is just implied. No real reference to 'formality' THEN.

---

Note that when in the retrospective epilogue he introduces 'dictiveness' he brings in some problem:

what U says, etc." "as distinct from what he implies, suggests, hints, or in some other less than fully direct manner conveys."

But here we have IRONY.

He said that he was a fine friend.

And we have metaphor:

He said that I was the cream in his coffee.

THESE cases, while 'dictive', cannot be CENTRAL!

---- And note that the account of 'implicature' does NOT work unless we do allow that by uttering "YOu are the cream in my coffee" the utterer _SAID_ (if of course he never meant or asserted) that the addressee was the cream in his coffee. Or that by uttering that Smith was a fine friend, he meant that Smith was NOT a fine friend (Utterer was being ironic, you know).

Grice goes on to formulate 'central' meaning in terms of this 'dictive' dimension.

He would like to say that by uttering "You are the cream in my coffee" U CENTRALLY MEANT that... the addressee was the cream in his coffee? "By uttering "He is a fine friend" (ironically), U meant (centrally) that he was a fine friend? And so on.

Grice writes:

"We might perhaps ... express this suggestion
as being that special CENTRALITY
attaches to those instances of
signification in which

WHAT IS SIGNIFIED

is or is part of the 'dictive' content
of the signifying expression."

---- In this connection, cfr. Schiffer on Grice telling him that in Oxford,

"We should get together for lunch sometime" _MEANS_ "Get lost".

----

Grice goes on:

Note that in defining 'dictiveness' on p. 361 he does so in terms of EXPRESSION meaning, and I can't see how this can be CENTRAL:

"dictiveness (whether or not the relevant
signification is part of what _the signifying
expression_ [emphasis mine. Speranza] _says_"

-- But of course words don't necessarily say. People say. Although we may say:

--- "What does the sign read?"
---- "It reads: "Trespassers will be prosecuted"

Rather than the more pedantic, but perhaps more correct:

---- What do you read in the sign?
---- I read, "Apple's for sale"
---- You are reading greengrocers' plurals alright!

---

I agree with Grice, though, that

'fine friend' means _fine friend_. If 'He is a fine friend' is used ironically, this is neither here nor there.

It may be different with 'cream in the coffee', you know.

---

Grice goes on to provide FOUR SCENARIOS, which we have discussed at the Club:

formal, dictive
nonformal, dictive
formal, nondictive
nonformal, nondictive.

--- and it may do to revise the 'dictive'/nondictive dimension in those four scenarios, which Grice presents just to SHOW that there are two criteria involved.

---

Again, on p. 363 we see 'dictiveness' as applying to EXPRESSION meaning:

"there is an inner range of characteristics
which belong to the dictive content of
a signifying expression as forming part of
what such an expression SAYS."

----

Suppose 'Turk'. In "The OED", Burchfield notes that for a time, the OED has "Turk" as signifying, "person who misbehaves". I should re-visit that. But it seems that an 'implicature' was mentioned as part of the 'meaning'. So one has to be careful there.

Take yet another expression. A trick expression. Any trick expression. And ask yourself. What IS that the expression SAY? And so on.

----

Consider Joan Rivers:

"her dress was beautiful."


Versus Grice:

"an inner range of characteristics
which belong to the dictive content
of a signifying expression as forming
part of what such an expression says."

--- What does, "Her dress was beautiful", say?

-- and so on.

I can at most guess what JOAN RIVERS means, and since I usually don't share tastes with her, I can draw my own private inferences!

----

(It may be argued that "Her dress was beaootiful", as uttered by Joan Rivers, means that "her dressed pleased Joan Rivers (or generally, the utterer) aesthetically". And so on.).

Grice goes on to perhaps confuse things further (I love him) when he speaks of 'gentler' (p. 363).

He wants to say that, if, say "Turk" means what it means, there is an 'outer' range: "an outer range of cases involving characteristics which, though not part of what a signifying expression says, do form part of what such an expression CONVEYS IN SOME *GENTLER* and less forthright manner -- part, for example, of what is hints or suggests."

(Cfr. N. Allott on forthright negotiation in the press and in the language log recently).

----

"GENLER" -- as per principle?

It may seem that implicature arises precisely out of the need to 'keep' face, and save face.

"He hasn't been to prison yet"

is a gentler way of hinting that "Smith is potentially dishonest" -- as most human beings are -- in Fact, for Aristotle, to be human IS to have the capacity to be dishonest --.

----

Same with 'damn by faint praise'. You don't damn the student:

"He is hopeless, philosophically".

But praise him otherwise,

"He has beautiful handwriting".

In these cases, it's the dictiveness which is _gentler_. Perhaps the clearer case is what with T. Wh., we've called 'floral dictiveness':

SAY IT WITH FLOWERS.

as per title of Gracie (or "Gricie") Fields.

----

Grice goes on:

to note that dictiveness "RESTRICTS" "to the ground-floor level". This is the American(ised) Grice. "First-floor" with Brits, please.

First-floor level:

"U asserted that it was raining.

---

"U asserted that the weather had been delightful that summer".

A: Mrs Smith is an old bag (WoW:II)
B: The weather has been quite delightful this summer.

---- Whatever else B meant, it does not belong in the first-floor level.

A: War is war.
B: And Women are women

------ (Discussing the Falklands War with Mrs. Thatcher). B stated that women are women (This is first-floor level). Whether he meant to contrast his statement with A's -- as if by prefacing it, "however") that's a matter of higher-floors, provided they exist.

--- (And they SHOULD exist.)

---

Grice goes on to suggest (hint) that formality "may be in a better shape" than dictiveness (_pace_ Quine, he adds! (p. 363)).

----

It is in the list concerning FORMALITY that he mentions 'alethic' or truth-conditions. And where he forgets his points about the relevance of 'deeming'.

When it was deemed that the provost's dog was a _cat_. How formal can that be? Very formal! We's talking Oxford!

----

And it is with a proposal for a closer analysis of

"U hinted that p"

"U suggested that p"

which we've discussed when dealing with "How can you cancel what you never put forward?" that Grice closes the discussion of Strand 5. And so on.