Grice joins forces with Carnap against Frege

A matter of speaking.

Further from Janseen, online, as per previous blog posts:

"Carnap discusses extensively the role of the substitution properties in
Frege and argues that they are heuristic principles."

"Carnap gives the following characterization of the differences with Frege’s method."

CARNAP writes:

"A decisive difference between my method

and Frege’s consists in the fact that my use of

'concept', in distinction to Frege’s, it is

independent of the context."

---

"An expression," -- such as Pirots karulise elatically -- "in a well-constructed language SYSTEM _always_ has the same extension and the same intension."

"But [in Frege’s theory] in some contexts it has its ordinary nominatum and its ordinary sense, in other contexts its oblique nominatum and its oblique sense."

----

Janssen notes:

"Carnap presents several arguments why his method is preferable over Frege’s."

"Frege's theory, Carnap argues, gives an

unnecessary multiplicity of entities and names

(with a word is associated its meaning, its sense, the sense of its sense, etc.), and in certain contexts a name may have simultaneously several nominata."

"Indeed, Montague’s successful work [42] was based upon Carnap’s intension-extension
distinction, and not on Frege’s Sinn-Bedeutung distinction."

-- which Horn got via his 'mother', Partee.

Janseen continues:

"The conclusion is that Frege’s statements concerning substitution properties
give no basis at all for a compositional reconstruction of Frege’s ideas, neither for
meaning, nor for sense."

"On the contrary, Frege would attack compositionality because that goes against his conviction that the meaning of an expression depends on the context, and that conviction is fundamental to his approach." But not to ours, of course.

Although, I'm with Stephen Yablo (a son of Grice) when he says, "Implicature happens" (with an air of disappointment).