Thursday, July 12, 2018
Implicature and Disimplicature
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Papers | Daniel Harris | Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Hunter ...
danielwharris.com/research.html
Draft of June 2018 (+Abstract). I argue that semantics is the ... Draft of May 2018 (+Abstract) ... Coauthored with Rachel McKinney; Down for Revision (+Abstract).Grice on the flouting of conversational maxims
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The Flouting of Grice's Conversational Maxim - IOSR journals
www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2023%20Issue5/...1/F2305014347.pdf
May 4, 2018 - Abstract: Ideally, people should apply the cooperative principle that consists of four maxims of conversation ... particular maxim that results in a conversational implicature. The interest of this ... Date of Submission: 18-04-2018.J. O. Urmson on scalar implicatures
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Scalar Implicatures: The Psychological Reality of Scales - NCBI - NIH
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5078746/
by A de Carvalho - 2016 - Cited by 2 - Related articles
Oct 25, 2016 - Abstract. Scalar implicatures, the phenomena where a sentence like “The ... Gricedistinguished among conversational implicatures those that ...Grice on conventional implicature
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Christopher Potts: Papers - Stanford University
https://web.stanford.edu/~cgpotts/papers.html
... Potts +> Papers. 2018. Lengerich, Benjamin J.; Andrew L. Maas; and Christopher Potts. 2018. ... Embedded implicatures as pragmatic inferences under compositional lexical uncertainty. Journal of .... Emergence of Gricean maxims from multi-agent decision theory. In Human .... [abstract; bibtex]; Potts, Christopher. 2003.Implicature and contextual cancellation
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On explicatures, cancellability and cancellation | SpringerPlus | Full Text
https://springerplus.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40064-016-2789-x
by G Walczak - 2016 - Cited by 1 - Related articles
Abstract. Within the Gricean framework only what is conversationally implicated is ... Explicit cancellability is given when one can cancel the implicature by ...Implicatures and Ads
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An Analysis of the Pragmatic Implicatures of Selected Advert ...
www.sciedupress.com/journal/index.php/ijelt/article/view/8220
by IY Tsojon - 2016 - Cited by 4 - Related articles
i10-index (January 2018): 2 ... Abstract. The essence of utterance in discourse, whether spoken or written is that it should elicit some ... of adherence or otherwise of these advert billboards to Grice(1975) Maxims of Cooperative Principle (CP).Grice -- Siena
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Scalar Implicatures - The LINGUIST List
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https://linguistlist.org/issues/29/29-1752.html
Apr 23, 2018 - Subject: Scalar Implicatures: Formal and Experimental Exploration ... Date: 11-JulImplicature and contextual cancellation
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Conversational implicature « Conversations and Contexts
https://mariakasmirli.com/conversational-implicature/
Mar 18, 2017 - Abstract. Conversational implicature is (roughly) the practice of ... Chapter 3 sets out some problems for Grice's approach and argues that we ...Grice Re-Assessed
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CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE: RE-ASSESSING THE GRICEAN ...
nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/k0711/mk_web/.../Kasmirli_thesis_front%20matter.pdf
by M Kasmirli - 2016 - Related articles
Abstract. Conversational implicature is (roughly) the practice of conveying one ... by the approach proposed by Paul Grice – the Gricean framework, as I call it –.
Missing: 2018
Implicatures and beyond
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Scalar Implicatures and Their Interface with Grammar | Annual Review ...
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https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011516-033846
by G Chierchia - 2017 - Cited by 6 - Related articles
Abstract. Scalar implicatures (SIs) and, more generally, quantity-based implicatures (QBIs) have been intensely investigated since Grice's seminal work.Grice on flouting the conversational maxims
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Conversational Implicature (Flouting the Maxims): Applying ...
www.macrothink.org › Home › Vol 3, No 2 (2012) › Alduais
by AM Alduais - 2012 - Cited by 20 - Related articles
i10-index (January 2018): 21 ... Abstract. Purpose: To investigate the fact that the theory of Conversational Implicature proposed by Austin and later on extended by Grice can be universal and can be applied to all languages of the world, ...Understanding implicature
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Comprehension of Generalized Conversational Implicatures by ...
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https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00272/full
by G Pastor-Cerezuela - 2018 - Related articles
Abstract; Introduction; Materials and Methods; Results; Discussion; Author ... Front. Psychol., 13 March2018 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00272 ... According to Grice (1975), in implicatures, social rules are in play that describe the ...How cancellable can implicatures get?
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Grice's Conversational Implicature - AIAC Journals - Australian ...
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https://journals.aiac.org.au/index.php/IJALEL/article/download/3964/3160
by A Igwedibia - 2017 - Cited by 1 - Related articles
Grice's Conversational Implicature: A Pragmatics Analysis of Selected Poems of Audre Lorde. Adaoma Igwedibia* ... ABSTRACT .... Published: January 05, 2018.Grice and poetry
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Grice's Conversational Implicature - AIAC Journals - Australian ...
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https://journals.aiac.org.au/index.php/IJALEL/article/download/3964/3160
by A Igwedibia - 2017 - Cited by 1 - Related articles
Grice's Conversational Implicature: A Pragmatics Analysis of Selected Poems of Audre Lorde. Adaoma Igwedibia* ... ABSTRACT .... Published: January 05, 2018.Do not multiply implicatures beyond necessity
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Two Types of Implicature: Material and Behavioural - JARY - 2013 ...
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/mila.12037
by M JARY - 2013 - Cited by 12 - Related articles
Oct 31, 2013 - Abstract. This article argues that what Grice termed 'particularized ... the explicit content of the utterance to the implicature without employing a ...Wednesday, July 11, 2018
Griceian Hope
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The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not.
The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not.
Grice’s Counteridentical
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A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem non-trivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or one could reject the orthodox theory of counterfactuals in favor of a hyperintensional semantics that accommodates non-trivial counterpossibles. In this paper, I argue that none of these approaches can account for all the peculiar features of counteridenticals. Instead, I propose a modified version of Lewis’s counterpart theory, which rejects the necessity of identity, and show that it can explain all the peculiar features of counteridenticals in a satisfactory way. I conclude by defending the plausibility of contingent identity from objections.
A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem non-trivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or one could reject the orthodox theory of counterfactuals in favor of a hyperintensional semantics that accommodates non-trivial counterpossibles. In this paper, I argue that none of these approaches can account for all the peculiar features of counteridenticals. Instead, I propose a modified version of Lewis’s counterpart theory, which rejects the necessity of identity, and show that it can explain all the peculiar features of counteridenticals in a satisfactory way. I conclude by defending the plausibility of contingent identity from objections.
Zeugma as Implicature
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In arguing against a supposed ambiguity, philosophers often rely on the zeugma test. In an application of the zeugma test, a supposedly ambiguous expression is placed in a sentence in which several of its supposed meanings are forced together. If the resulting sentence sounds zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence for ambiguity; if it does not sound zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence against ambiguity. The aim of this article is to show that arguments based on the second direction of the test are misguided: ambiguous expressions, and in particular philosophically contested ones, do not reliably lead to zeugmaticity, so an absence of zeugmaticity provides no meaningful evidence for an absence of ambiguity.
In arguing against a supposed ambiguity, philosophers often rely on the zeugma test. In an application of the zeugma test, a supposedly ambiguous expression is placed in a sentence in which several of its supposed meanings are forced together. If the resulting sentence sounds zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence for ambiguity; if it does not sound zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence against ambiguity. The aim of this article is to show that arguments based on the second direction of the test are misguided: ambiguous expressions, and in particular philosophically contested ones, do not reliably lead to zeugmaticity, so an absence of zeugmaticity provides no meaningful evidence for an absence of ambiguity.
Grice on quantification
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Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest.
Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest.
Grice’s First Person
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It is often assumed that singular thought requires that an agent be epistemically acquainted with the object the thought is about. However, it can sometimes truthfully be said of someone that they have a belief about an object, despite not being interestingly epistemically acquainted with that object. In defense of an epistemic acquaintance constraint on singular thought, it is thus often claimed that belief ascriptions are context-sensitive, and do not always track the contents of an agent’s mental states. This paper uses first-person attitude reports to argue that contextualism about belief ascriptions does not present an adequate defense of an acquaintance constraint on singular thought.
It is often assumed that singular thought requires that an agent be epistemically acquainted with the object the thought is about. However, it can sometimes truthfully be said of someone that they have a belief about an object, despite not being interestingly epistemically acquainted with that object. In defense of an epistemic acquaintance constraint on singular thought, it is thus often claimed that belief ascriptions are context-sensitive, and do not always track the contents of an agent’s mental states. This paper uses first-person attitude reports to argue that contextualism about belief ascriptions does not present an adequate defense of an acquaintance constraint on singular thought.
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