Speranza
Commentary on K. Bromberek-Dyzman's "Affective Twist in Irony Processing"
Grice was never intersted in irony. But his best friend, Rogers Albritton, was. Albritton was the operative behind Grice's getting to deliver the "William James Lectures" at Harvard, since Albritton, whom Grice had met at Oxford, was Chair of Harvard and the one who decided who the next "Philosophical" lecturer would be (remember that in those days, the lectures were held bi-annually rotating between the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Psychology -- James being what he awas.
In the first "Logic and Conversation" lecture Grice makes fun of the ways philosophers (who should know better) get confused about multiplying senses of words. He does not quote himself in "Meaning", where he writes that "mean" has two "senses"!, but he quotes himself in "Causal Theory of Perception", regarding the meaning of "seems". In the second lecture, he concocts "conversational implicature" to account for the anti-proliferation of senses (his modified Occam's razor).
As the classicist he was (of the Cliftonian school, to boot) he realised that his notion of conversational implicature shared some features with what classicists call a "figure of rhetoric", such as irony. His example is then to prove that
"He is a fine friend" ---> IMPLYING, "he is a scoundrel" -- or in general: BY uttering "p", Utterer, via irony, MEANS ~p --
fits his schema. And it does!
If it were NOT for the fact that Albritton was seated on the first row, and made commentaries after the second lecture.
The result -- unique in a philosopher (Kant would NEVER do this) -- shows the geniality of Grice. In his third William James Lectures, he provides a refinement to his analysis of "irony", just to deal with the alleged Albritton counterexamples:
"He is generally a fine friend, even though he could, on this occasion, be seen more of as a scoundrel".
Or, my favourite:
"That car has all its windows intact", as we pass an automobile with a crashed window.
Grice finds that his schema can be refined by merely paying attention to the Greek root in the notion of 'irony', which makes a reference to 'affection', and 'affective' attitudes.
Traditionally irony has been
researched as a verbal mode of
communicating non-literal meaning.
Yet, the
extant literal/non-literal
meaning oriented research provided conflicting
evidence and failed to
explain how irony vs. non-irony is processed.
The
dominant literal/nonliteral
meaning approach hasn’t accounted for the role of
attitudinal
non-propositional contents so crucially involved in
irony
communication and comprehension.
Employed to communicate
indirectly,
on top of non-literal meaning, irony serves to convey implicit
attitudes:
emotional load non-propositionally attached to the
propositional contents.
The role of emotional contents implicitly
communicated by irony has not been
acknowledged in irony research so
far.
This essay reviews irony and attitude
research, focusing on the nonpropositional,
emotional contents, aiming to
bridge the propositionalnon-
propositional meaning gap in irony research.
Neuroimaging and
behavioral evidence showing that emotional load profoundly
influences
communicative contents processing, priming its computation
and
determining its processing patterns, is presented, and its role for
irony
processing is highlighted.
Keywords: attitude; non-propositional
meaning; emotional contents;
affective load; valence.
It
seems obvious that everyday human communication is imbued with
emotions. On
top of what we say, we smuggle how we feel, what are our
attitudes,
preferences, biases.
There are numerous ways to convey emotional contents.
Most effective and efficient are the nonverbal
means: facial mimicry,
smile-to-frown range of (micro)expressions, emotional
prosody, rich
repertoire of gestures, and body postures. These ‘tell’ more
than words.
Emotion-wise that is.
They communicate feelings and attitudes.
Emotional
contours always tinge verbal interactions, yet remain as pervasive
as
unexplored. Accumulative experimental evidence shows that
emotional
contents attached to a message, beyond verbal code
(smiling-frowning range of
facial work, affective prosody) plays a
significant key role in message
comprehension, facilitating or delaying the
intended meaning grasp. Though
deeply interrelated with communication,
nonverbal emotional contents, and its
impact on verbal contents processing,
remains largely unexplored. Language
researchers have not developed effective
methods to capture the pervasive, yet
elusive (nonverbal) affective “matter”
attached to the verbal “matter”. Even the
language repertoire for
communicating attitude and affect by a spectrum of
explicit and implicit
means, is not well understood.
It seems highly
commendable to change this
inauspicious state of affairs. Language-emotion
interface offers to elucidate
a range of communicative phenomena. Irony is but
one of the intriguing
phenomena that might benefit from being explored in
language-emotion
interdisciplinary framework.
How does irony, so far
explored by linguistic
methods as a linguistic phenomenon, belong to emotion
research? This paper
attempts at showing that irony is a verbal, though implicit
means of
conveying attitude.
Attitude conveyed by ironic comments, has been
recognized
as substantial for irony comprehension
-- e.g. Sperber & Wilson,
1981;
1986; 1991; Wilson & Sperber, 1992; Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Kreuz
&
Glucksberg, 1989; Barbe, 1995; Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995; Kotthoff,
2003;
Partington, 2007).
Yet, despite this recognition, implicit
affective
evaluation communicated by irony, has not been explicitly explored.
Factoring
attitude in the experimental research, favors a recognition that
emotions are on
board. They are on board anyway, however their presence
remains
unaccounted for. Recognizing emotional contents in irony, might only
be
beneficial for irony research. It might also help in explaining the
inconclusive
results obtained so far in the extant irony processing
studies.
1. What does language research tell us about irony
processing?
Philosophers have attempted to grasp and explain the nature of
irony for the
last two thousand years (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,
Sophocles, Quintilian
and last but not least Herbert Paul Grice).
With
limited success.
The predominant rhetorical account centered
around indirect
criticism function of irony (Cutler, 1974; Muecke, 1970;
Booth, 1974; Grice,
1989).
Irony was seen as a power tool, affording one with
the liberty to
criticize publicly, without being committed to the literal value of
the
words.
Precious deniability, on the one hand.
A verbal means
legitimizing
polite impoliteness, on the other hand.
Ascribing to this
tradition, language
oriented philosophers (e.g. Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979)
pictured irony, as an
anomalous, deviant use of code, convenient to smuggle
in (implicitly)
unwelcome messages, veiled meanings.
Irony was ‘explained’ by
substitution
where the explicit (polite) needs to be substituted with the
implicit (impolite),
the literal with the non-literal.
What the speaker
literally says should be taken
to mean ‘something else’, conveniently assumed
to be the exact, or relative
opposite of what is said.
Yet, except for few
conventionalized cases, irony
communicates no readymade, one-to-one
substitutable meaning. Irony, does
not work on one-to-one basis: says ‘x’
hence means ‘~x’. Rational as it seemed,
substitution approach put paid to
‘explaining’ irony and unmasking the
inferential infrastructure involved in
its comprehension.
Processing oriented irony research chose not to abandon
the literal/nonliteral
meaning substitution as the overarching distinction,
and aimed at
finding out whether irony comprehension takes longer, shorter,
or as long as
non-irony comprehension.
Crucially, the goal was to test if
irony is
comprehended in two stages, as opposed to literal meaning, which is
a onestage
attempt.
Two major accounts to irony processing took the
experimental
stage:
(i) two-stage account (e.g. Grice, 1975, 1989; Giora,
1997, 2002,
2003),
(ii) one-stage account (e.g. Gibbs, 1986, 1994; Sperber
& Wilson,
1986/1995).
Both chose different ways and employed different
mechanisms
to explain irony.
These accounts differ significantly in how they
assess the role
of literal (salient or coded) meaning and the role of context
in irony processing.
Both supply empirical data to corroborate their claims.
The experimental
results are as incompatible as the theoretical
claims.
Two-stage account assumes that literal (salient or coded) meaning
is
interpreted in the first stage. If the interpretation makes no sense in
the
current context, it is rejected.
Contextually congruent interpretation
is
pursued in the second stage.
This account, strongly anchored in
rhetorical
tradition, pictures figurative meaning (as in the case of irony)
as a derivative of
literal meaning, considered as the default standard
meaning.
Non-literal
meaning is pictured as a deviation from the norm, an
“anomaly” that can only
be
grasped and explained by some special mechanism (i.e. implicature)
(Grice,
1975).
The two-stage account argues that irony processing always
takes longer
than literal meaning processing.
The comprehender arrives at the
figurative,
context-fit reading only after processing and rejecting the
literal meaning as
out-of synch. Extra time involved in irony
processing-rejecting and reprocessing
is not needed for literal/coded meaning
comprehension.
Hence,
irony takes longer to grasp when compared to the
code-based, literal
interpretation. Standard Pragmatic Model (Grice, 1975;
Searle, 1979), and
Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1995, 1997, 1999; 2003)
are the two
main models advocating the privileged status of code-based
(literal, salient)
meaning interpretation.
A number of experimental irony
studies support twostage
processing assumptions and demonstrate that irony
processing takes
longer than non-irony processing does (e.g. Giora et al.,
1998; Giora & Fein,
1999, Giora, et al. 1998; Dews & Winner, 1999;
Schwoebel et al., 2000).
One-stage account advocates context-dependent
interpretation in the first
and only stage.
It holds that comprehenders are
not bogged by the literality or
the non-literality of message meaning. They
care about the intended, contextembedded
meaning. This attempt makes no
processing distinctions for the
literal or non-literal meaning.
No special,
privileged status is ascribed to the
literal meaning. Literal meaning is a
constituent of pragmatic meaning, next to
other contextually cued meaning
constituents. No special or extra mechanism
is postulated to govern
non-literal meaning processing (Sperber & Wilson,
1986). Both literal and
non-literal meanings are processed in parallel manner
(Gibbs, 1986; 1994).
What matters in this account is the (degree of) context
supportiveness.
Supportive context facilitates the intended ironic
interpretation.
Unsupportive (or non-supportive enough) context slows the
comprehension down.
Irony processing takes no longer than the literal
equivalents processing
does, provided irony-supportive context (e.g. Gibbs,
1986, 1994, 2001, 2002;
Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). These claims
have been empirically
supported by a number of empirical studies showing that
irony comprehension
is not more time consuming than literal meaning
comprehension (e.g. Gibbs,
1986; 1994; Colston, 2002; Colston & O’Brien,
2000; Gerrig &
Goldvarg, 2000; Ivanko & Pexman, 2003).
These two accounts providing
conflicting results on irony processing,
legitimize questions about the
nature of irony and the essence of ironicity. If it
is not the
literal/non-literal meaning that generates the processing time
difference,
then literality/non-literality does not constitute the essence of
ironicity, as it has been stipulated. What then
makes the essence of ironicity?
What cues, features, properties make irony up
and influence its processing
speed?
Across a range of domains, irony
communicates more than it says,
apparently by exploiting one feature:
dichotomy. Barbe (1995) singles out
dichotomy as “the” constitutive feature
of irony. Irony is used to serve various
communicative functions (e.g.
funniness, implicit emotion display,
exaggeration, politeness, etc.) and may
employ various verbal and non-verbal
means to do the “doublespeak”:
communicate two dichotomous levels of
meaning. Barbe (1995) distinguishes
three potential levels of dichotomy in
irony: (i) semantic and pragmatic
incongruity – literal and intended meaning
dichotomy (cf. Colston, 2002;
Coston & O’Brien, 2000; Gerrig & Goldvarg,
2000; Ivanko & Pexman,
2003); (ii) linguistic meaning and behavior
incongruity (cf. Gibbs, 1986;
Jorgensen et al., 1984; Kreuz & Glucksberg,
1989; Kumon-Nakamura et al.,
1995; Sperber & Wilson, 1981,
1986/1995); (iii) linguistic meaning and
affective evaluative incongruity (cf.
Sperber & Wilson, 1981, Kreuz &
Glucksberg, 1989).
Literal meaning vs.
affective meaning dichotomy, sounds a
worthwhile line of investigation,
especially that irony markers, all of them,
conspire to manifest affective load, to
boost ironic reading.
A range of
irony markers may be employed to signal literal
meaning/affective meaning
dichotomy (e.g. range of facial expressions,
affective prosody). These
markers signal affective dichotomy by extra-linguistic
affective cues.
They
are not irony specific. Rather, they might be employed to
manifest contrasts
and mark incongruity between meaning levels in all forms of
communication
(e.g. Bryant & FoxTree, 2002; Bryant & FoxTree, 2005;
Attardo et al.,
2003). Markers facilitate irony recognition and comprehension.
Yet, irony
calls for subtle marking. Over-marking ironic intent is detrimental
to the
funniness, or poignancy of ironic message. Over-marked, irony loses
its
expressive impact (cf. Cutler, 1974, p. 117). Ironic markers of
affective
dichotomy such as non-anatomic, non-propositional structures, vary
and
depend on a range of subtly manifested extra-linguistic properties.
These
subtle, non-linguistic effects call for communicative granularity and
finesse in
ostensive manifestness on the one hand, and inferential
granularity, on the
other hand. Their elusive, non-propositional nature
escaped propositionalmeaning
driven research so far.
Exclusive focus on
the linguistic input, to the exclusion of extra-linguistic
cues,
co-manifested in ironic messages, failed to account for irony vs.
non88
irony differential speed
processing patterns. Visibly, there is more to irony
than the
literal/non-literal distinction. To account for this “more” and improve
the
limited, deficient picture of irony comprehension, a closer look at
context
and extra-linguistic cues manifesting ironic contents, might help.
Irony cannot
be grasped without context. Ironic non-propositional cues are
contextually
manifested. Yet, what makes irony context is not obvious. It
seems beneficial to
examine how the linguistic context: what is said, the
socio-situational context:
who-to-who, where, when, in what manner, blend
with mental context, i.e.
what the speakers/hearers assume, anticipate, feel
about what they say/hear.
The mental set up, and especially the feelings,
attitudes implicitly manifested,
may turn out as relevant a context for
irony, as the linguistic context. This
possibility though, has not been much
tested.
In communicative interactions in general, people care a lot about
emotional
contents: feelings and attitudes they share. In irony people care
about implicit
modal contents: the critical or praising attitudinal load they
communicate on
top of what they explicitly say.
Leggitt, Gibbs (2000)
emphasize that empirical
research has not so far accounted for the implicit
emotional layer in irony,
despite its crucial significance. This affective,
modal, non-propositional
communicative content that evidences how we feel
about what we say,
constitutes the backbone of human interpersonal
interaction (e.g. Tomasello
et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2008). Affective load in
interpersonal communication
is the core ingredient of social interaction.
While one can easily imagine
complex affective communication without words,
it is difficult to image humanto-
human communication devoid of affective
load.
Damasio (1994) observes
that we are never (unless in a comma) devoid of
affect (background affect
constitutes the most basic affective milieu that
prompts feelings and emotions).
It underpins human action and thought. It
permeates communication.
Affective code is more ancient than language code.
That might be the reason
why the ever present affective load has so far
escaped linguists’ attention (cf.
Zajonc 1980). It has been taken for
granted. If pragmatics is to account for the
gap between what people say and
what they mean, it needs to account for how
they manifest their attitudes and
how these shape communicative
comprehension.
According to Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) we manifest
meanings, rather than merely provide
propositions, which trigger
metarepresentational contents. When we
communicate we embed the
propositional meaning (linguistic evidence) within
the non-propositional,
affective
cover. These two combined, propositional and non-propositional
contents, make
the pragmatic meaning (cf. Moeschler, 2009).
2. What does attitude processing
research tell
and how is it relevant for irony?
Attitude is tightly
intertwined with communication and language in ways not
well understood.
Attitude construct is central to social psychology (e.g. Eagly
& Chaiken,
1993) due to its prime and crucial impact on social interactions.
Interest in
how attitude affects communication has not generated much
research in
language studies (with a notable exception of Hunston, Thompson,
2000; Martin
& White 2005). Yet, language/attitude relations, and especially
how
attitude enters linguistic contents, and whether it preempts verbal
contents
processing (e.g. Zajonc, 1980, 1984; LeDoux, 1996) seems crucial
for
pragmatics.
Since Thurston’s definition (1931, p. 261) of attitude as “affect
for or
against a psychological object”, attitudes have been researched
as
favorable/unfavorable feelings about, evaluative characterizations of,
and
action predispositions toward stimuli. This approach reflects
empirical
evidence showing that attitudes are reducible to the net difference
between the
positive and negative value they convey (cf. Allport, 1935;
Lewin, 1935; Ito et
al.,1998; Ito, Cacioppo, 2000; Ito, Cacioppo, 2001; Ito,
Cacioppo, 2005).
Eagly & Chaiken (1993, p. 1) notice that evaluative
tendency triggered by
attitude stimuli is “expressed by evaluating a
particular entity with some degree
of favor or disfavor.” Evaluation is a
basic, core ingredient of any attitudinal
disposition and refers to overt,
covert, cognitive, or affective response to
evaluative contents. Evaluative
dispositions are “a type of bias that predisposes
the individual toward
evaluative responses that are positive or negative.” (Eagly
& Chaiken,
1993, p. 2). Attitudinal responses are evaluative, and evaluation
is
connected with the imputation of some degree of goodness or badness to
an
entity (e.g. Lewin, 1935; Osgood et al., 1957; Thompson & Hunston,
2000).
Cacioppo and Gardner (1999) emphasize that environmental stimuli
are
diverse, complex, multidimensional, and seemingly incomparable.
Yet,
perceptual systems evolved to be tuned to the most significant
(survival
oriented) environmental features that might be represented on a
common
metric: good vs. bad. Recent studies of the conceptual organization of
emotion
support the view that people’s knowledge about emotions is
hierarchically
organized to
respect a super-ordinate division between positivity and
negativity (e.g.
Ortony et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1990; Cacioppo & Gardner,
1999).
Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) add that attitudes as positive/negative
affect
towards stimuli, generate two basic dispositions: attraction and
aversion
(cf. Shizgal, 1999; Davidson et al., 1990). Attitudinal dispositions
are
underpinned by biological mechanisms, physiological biases
and
predispositions triggered by emotionally competent stimuli. Attitudes
cannot
be fully understood without considering their biological and neural
substrates.
The biological, biochemical, and neural substrates of emotion, as
well as
neuropsychological aspects of emotional expressions should constitute
a
constant point of reference for attitude research, and should be recognized
as
viable meaning components in irony processing research.
Processing
oriented attitude research recognizes valence as a basic form of
valuation:
assessing whether something is good or bad, helpful or harmful,
rewarding or
threatening at a given instant in time (Barrett, 2006, p. 36).
Valence is
considered an elemental property of emotions (Barrett et al., 2007,
p. 183),
a semantic primitive (Osgood et al., 1957), a special semantic
feature,
accessed before activation of other semantic features (Zajonc, 1980,
1984),
and a core ingredient of meaning (e.g. Barrett, 2006; Barrett, Bar,
2009).
Valence refers to intrinsic attractiveness (positive valence) and
aversiveness
(negative valence) of an event, situation, object, or stimulus
(cf. Lewin, 1935;
Damasio, 1994). Van Berkum et al. (2009) notice that
language researchers
disregard valence as a semantic primitive and a core
ingredient of meaning.
Yet, if valence of a concept is encoded as part of its
meaning (cf. Barrett, Bar,
2009), the affective valuation corresponding to
goodness and badness, needs
to be viewed as an integral part of meaning. All
individuals “read” the
environment in terms of valence, and sense it as a
basic feature of their
experience (Lewin, 1935; Barrett, 2006).
These
readings concerning
goodness/badness of stimuli or events, shape the
perception and
interpretation of the incoming stimuli (communicative as
well). The growing
body of evidence demonstrates that valence is an invariant
property of
emotionally competent stimuli (e.g. Bargh, Chartrand, 1999;
Bargh,
Ferguson, 2000; Bargh, 2007). People continually and automatically
evaluate
situations and objects for their relevance and value, assessing
whether or not
they signify something relevant to well-being (e.g. Bargh,
Ferguson, 2000;
Ferguson, 2007; Brendl, Higgins, 1996; Tesser, Martin, 1996;
Duckworth et
al., 2002). Lang and colleagues (1990) propose that emotional
valence is a
general
information-processing category that permeates brain/mind
organization and
activity. If this is so, it seems only commendable to find out
how
attitudinal valence impacts irony processing.
Numerous attitude priming studies show
that attitudes (affective valence) are
processed rapidly and pre-consciously.
The main finding of attitude priming
paradigm is that attitude congruence
facilitates evaluative processing, while
attitude incongruence hinders it.
The extant studies corroborate this robust
finding in conscious processing
condition, when subjects are asked to evaluate
target stimulus as “good” or
“bad”, as well as in unconscious processing
condition, when affective stimuli
are subliminally presented, or the task is to
name/pronounce the target (e.g.
Fazio et al., 1986; Bargh et al., 1992; Bargh
et al., 1996; Chaiken &
Bargh 1993). Bargh and colleagues demonstrated that
all environmental stimuli
are subject to a constant and automatic evaluation.
The constant pressure to
rapidly tell apart the threatening from the
nonthreatening and respond
immediately and appropriately, produced
automaticity in evaluative processing
(e.g. Bargh, 2007; Barrett, Bar, 2009).
Attitude priming automaticity has
been found for lexical stimuli (Bargh et al.,
1992; Bargh et al.,1996; Fazio
et al., 1986; Chaiken & Bargh, 1993;
Hermans et al., 1994), pictures
(Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999; Fazio et al., 1995;
Hermans et al., 1994 ),
odors (Hermans et al., 1998), faces (Murphy &
Zajonc, 1993). The effect
of affective priming has been found for explicit and
implicit evaluative
tasks (Bargh et al., 1996; Duckworth et al., 2002), and
motor responses (Chen
& Bargh, 1999; Duckworth et al., 2002; Wentura,
2000). The priming effect
has also been obtained for subliminal priming
(Greenwald et al., 1989;
Greenwald et al., 1996; Murphy & Zajonc 1993;
Ferguson et al., 2004).
These results show that affect competent stimuli are
processed rapidly.
Attitude-congruity generates faster response times than
does
attitude-incongruity.
The
consistency of experimental results obtained in attitude priming
paradigm
evidences but one aspect of valence processing the facilitated
processing of
valence-congruent stimuli, and inhibited processing of
valence-incongruent
stimuli. The observed facilitated valence congruence and
impeded valence
92 Humana.Mente – Issue 23 – December 2012
incongruence
processing does not exhaust affective valence processing
mechanics. Quite
distinct valence processing effects have been observed for
positive versus
negative valence processing paradigm, researched as positivity
offset and
negativity bias (e.g. Cacioppo & Berntson,1994; Cacioppo et al.,
1997).
Positivity offset refers to enhanced positive valence processing.
Negativity
bias indexes inhibited negative valence processing (Ito et al., 1998;
Ito
& Cacioppo, 2000; Ito & Cacioppo, 2005). Positivity
offset/negativity
bias paradigm attests to the working of default affective
infrastructure
responsible for the differential processing of positive and
negative valence
(Lang et al., 1990; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo
et al., 1997;
Cacioppo et al., 1999; Cacioppo, 2004; Berntson & Cacioppo,
2008).
Positivity offset and negativity bias effects have been evidenced in
differential
chronometry, physiology and neuroarchitecture of evaluative
processing.
Valence chronometry is impressive. Within the range of mere
100-150
milliseconds, the brain already knows whether the activated
stimulus
“translates” into benefit or harm (e.g. Kawasaki et al., 2001;
Pizzagalli et al.,
2002; Schupp et al., 2004; Smith et al. 2003; Grandjean
& Scherer, 2008).
This astoundingly swift discrimination between affect
competent and affect
neutral stimuli is reflected in further processing
stages. Positive and negative
valence are processed by separate, or
non-overlapping neural systems
(Davidson, 1994, Cacioppo et al., 1999;
Barrett, Bar, 2009) with varied
speed (Smith et al., 2003; Kawasaki et al.,
2001; Ito et al., 1998) and intensity
(Ito & Cacioppo, 2000, 2005;
Kawasaki et al., 2001). Positivity offset and
negativity bias effects have
been observed at the biological (Cacioppo et al.,
1997; Davidson, 1994),
structural (Damasio, 2010), functional (LeDoux,
1996; Panksepp, 1998),
physiological (Davidson, 1992) and neural level
(Cacioppo, Gardner 1999;
LeDoux 1995; Damasio 1994; Cacioppo &
Berntson 1994).These effects seem
to wield too strong an impact on
brain/mind dynamics to be ignored in irony
communication and
comprehension research.
Positively valenced stimuli are processed swiftly and smoothly. Why
so? First
of all, positive valence translates into benefit. No threat – no
need to respond,
and mobilize to action. Disposition to approach elicits
leisurely response (e.g.
Shizgal, 1999; Davidson,1994). Peeters et al. (1971,
1989, 1990) notice
Affective Twist in Irony Processing 93
that positively
valenced stimuli are processed swiftly and less intensely than the
negative
ones because of sheer frequency. Positive stimuli predominate. They
are more
ubiquitous. To account for the privileged processing of positive
information,
Unkelbach et al. (2008) proposed the density hypothesis.
According to the
density hypothesis, positive information is processed faster
due to its high
associative density in memory network. Positive information is
more alike in
general, and therefore intensely interconnected. Negative
information, on the
other hand, is not even relatively alike. Therefore, much
less
interconnected.
Lack of highly interconnected associative network
elongates
processing, and demands higher processing cost. The density
hypothesis holds
that the more dense the associative network the faster and
smoother the
processing. Negative information associative density is lower
than positive,
hence slower processing. Ashby et al. (1999) proposed to
explain the enhanced
processing of positively valenced stimuli by dopamine
hypothesis, positing
that positive affect is connected with increased brain level
of dopamine.
Increased dopamine level (in the anterior cingulate cortex) has
been found to
impact increased speed and efficiency of processing. Positive
affect induced
by positive valence augments dopamine level, which impacts
directly the
processing fluency and creativity (e.g. Estrada et al., 1994; Isen et
al.,
1985), and facilitates access to positive information network (Isen et
al.,
1978). This systematically enhances the speed and quality of decision
making
(Isen et al., 1988; Isen et al., 1991). The insights this
neurophysiological
theory offers show the importance of positive affect
(boosted dopamine level)
in facilitated verbal contents processing, hence the
mechanisms it captures and
evidence it offers, seem directly relevant for
theories dedicated to explaining
the role of attitudinal contents in
contextualized meaning comprehension.
Negatively valenced stimuli generate asymmetric processing
patterns
(negativity bias) reflected in longer and more intense processing.
This effect is
manifested in behavioral, psychological and physiological
patterns. The high
processing intensity is connected with the physiological
mobilization to rapid
and concentrated response to adverse stimuli. It pays
to attend to and rapidly
respond to potential threats (Baumeister et al.,
2001; Rozin & Royzman,
2001; Taylor, 1991; Pratto & John 1991).
Negative, threatening stimuli claim
more intense processing than positive,
non-threatening stimuli, because
94 Humana.Mente – Issue 23 – December
2012
negative stimuli signify immediacy of responding. Threat works as an
alarm
that activates physiological know-how to respond (e.g. Taylor, 1991).
This
ancient mechanism has evolved to secure survival and wellbeing, by
focusing
processing resources on salient stimuli (LeDoux, 1996; Damasio,
1994).
From the evolutionary perspective negatively valenced input,
irrespective of
modality (audio, visual, olfactory, tactile), constitutes the
highest priority. The
mechanism at work has been perfected for millennia of
evolution to manage
adversity and support decision making, and to do it with
flawless automaticity
(LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Damasio, 2010; Shizgal,
1999). The alarm
is activated by all sorts of emotionally competent stimuli,
perceptual, cognitive
and linguistic (Baumeister et al., 2001; Barrett &
Bar, 2009). Ito and
Cacioppo (2000) emphasize that negative stimuli
processing is more intense
because the immediacy and necessity to respond
absorbs more processing
resources (e.g. Cacioppo et al., 1994; Ito et al.,
1998; Ito et al., 2000). A
range of physiological, all body involving
responses get activated. Kawasaki
and colleagues (2001) observed a
characteristic for aversive stimuli neural
pattern: a short-latency,
transient inhibition followed by a prolonged
excitation.
Neutral and pleasant
stimuli exhibit a strikingly different processing
pattern. Baumeister and
colleagues (2001) emphasize that negative valence
plays a fundamental role in
calibrating emotional system. Its main purpose is to
mobilize one to the
challenges of the environment. Positive valence, to the
contrary, serves to
stay the course and to explore the environment. These
positive and negative
valence processing patterns have been observed for
explicit and implicit
attitudinal meaning processing in studies on irony
processing
(Bromberek-Dyzman, 2010; Bromberek-Dyzman forthcoming;
Ivanko & Pexman
2003). Therefore, valence processing mechanism and
patterns so widely
evidenced in attitude research, deserve a more thorough
investigation and
recognition in irony research.
Recent
neuroimaging research points to proactive anticipatory processing of
the
brain infrastructure as an explanation of speed and efficiency of
even
cognitively complex pieces of information processing. Recent
accumulating
evidence shows that the brain specializes in generating
context-tailored
predictions cued by the incoming even most rudimentary, gist
evidence (Bar,
2007, 2009, 2011; Bar & Neta, 2008). This evidence seems
relevant for
irony research as it
provides insight into how linguistic and extra-linguistic
cues interact in
affect-loaded meaning processing. Research has demonstrated
that we
routinely, if unconsciously use the predictive skills to predict what
other
people might do (Frith & Frith, 2003, 2010) or say (Sperber &
Wilson,
2002). There is a growing support for the realization that brain is
proactive,
and evolved to predict and respond to the environment (Bar, 2007;
2009; Van
Berkum, 2010). Communication processing in general and
irony
comprehension in specific, seem to thrive on this evolutionarily
evolved
prediction mechanics. Any bit of manifested evidence, i.e. a word,
tone of
voice, facial expression, posture displayed while speaking,
contributes to
contextualized meaning making. This default predictive mode of
verbal input
processing, alters significantly irony processing picture. If
the affect driven
anticipatory default network plays a significant, if
implicit, role in verbal irony
processing, determining the speed and
intensity of its processing, it should
enjoy more explicit research interest.
For one, it would mean moving beyond
the literal/non-literal meaning dictum
to more explicit focus on extralinguistic
cues.
Recently Regel and
colleagues (2010) set to test when/how listeners
integrate extra-linguistic
and linguistic information to compute the intended
meaning. They wanted to
find out whether/how the implicit knowledge about
the speaker’s communicative
style (ironic vs. non-ironic communicative style)
activates predictions and,
how these reverberate in brainwave patterns. In two
sessions they manipulated
the speakers’ use of irony (70% vs. 30% irony
frequency) to see how irony
frequency implicitly cues anticipation for irony.
The study showed that
unexpected irony produced by the non-ironic speaker,
resulted in an increased
P600, and both ironic and literal statements made by
the ironic speaker,
elicited similar P600 amplitudes. Session two, conducted
one day later,
featured balanced irony use, yet the ERPs showed an ironyrelated
P600 for the
ironic speaker (thwarted anticipation), but not for the
non-ironic speaker.
This finding indicates that implicit knowledge about
speaker’s preference for
explicit/implicit attitude communication, does affect
language comprehension
in early processing (200 ms after the onset of a
critical word), as well as
in the later stages of comprehension (500-900 ms
post-onset). Bits of
pragmatic, extra-linguistic information about the speaker’s
communicative
style preferences (attitude display), have a direct bearing on
the
neurophysiology (brainwaves) of inferential processing. The study shows
that
predictive processing triggered by the style of attitude
communication,
determines
brainwaves patterns in anticipated vs. unanticipated
communicative contents
processing. The implicit, extra-linguistic cue
manifested by the frequency of
ironic/non-ironic comments, shows to play a
significant role in modulating
brainwaves and processing patterns. This finding
attests to the predictive
default brain activity. Implicit cues about a speaker’s
communicative style
modulate expectations and alter brainwaves patterns.
Regel and colleagues’
findings show that ironic and literal meanings were
processed differently,
depending on whether anticipation for irony or literal
comment was implicitly
triggered. Electric activity brain patterns differed as a
function of
implicit anticipation, and not literality/non-literality.
The impact of
extra-linguistic cues on communicative contents processing
has also been
posited by Higgins (1998). According to Higgins individuals by
default rely
on feelings, experiences, memory, or any non-specific bit of
information that
gets evoked while specific contents is being processed.
Higgins emphasized
that the influence of incidental, extra-linguistic,
experiential information,
reflects the operation of a tacit aboutness principle.
Accordingly, while we
process a cue, all the memory deposited contents
associated with the cue
(about the cue) gets activated and is co-processed.
Research seems to
belittle the role and impact of non-propositional, extralinguistic
cues on
the propositional contents processing. There is a widespread
assumption that
the mental contents: thoughts and feelings that appear while
we process
messages, get evoked by the propositional contents. The extralinguistic
cues
are subtle, vague and usually taken for granted. So much so that
they remain
“invisible” to conscious experience, and experimental research.
Yet, their
impact on message processing is as much inestimable as unexplored.
Winkielman
and colleagues (2002, 2003) put forward hedonic fluency
hypothesis to account
for a wide range of preference phenomena in terms of
their processing
dynamics. They propose that a range of non-specific features
(e.g.
extra-linguistic cues), next to the traditionally researched
propositional
contents of the message, impact fluency of processing.
According to hedonic
fluency hypothesis, perceptual and cognitive input
processing depends as
much on the specific, target related, as the
nonspecific cues, which often
influence processing dynamics before the
specific features are extracted from
the stimulus. Winkielman and colleagues
emphasize that evaluative contents
processing, hinges on two basic sources of
information: (i) declarative
information, such as features of the target, and
(ii) non-feature based
experiential information, such as the interpreter’
affective state, accompanying
feelings, biological, physiological markers consciously or
subconsciously
experienced at the moment of processing, and a wide range of
situational nonspecific
factors. Traditionally, only the declarative
(propositional) information
about the target has been explored as relevant
for the target processing.
According to Winkielman and colleagues, current
research is in no position to
decide how the propositional (stimulus
specific) and the non-propositional
(stimulus non-specific) merge to
influence the processing patterns. Extralinguistic,
“incidental” cues might
render the target specific cues more salient,
more accessible, and hence
might directly impact the processing dynamics.
Various biological markers,
such as neurotransmitter levels, electrical brain
activity, body posture or
facial expressions underpin affective states expression
as non-specific cues,
and “invisibly” affect the propositional contents
processing. These
non-feature-based cues are routinely evoked by affect
competent stimuli to be
indiscriminately interpreted as “about” the target (cf.
Higgins, 1998).
Winkielman and colleagues (2003) provide evidence that
affective,
non-specific cues are accessed before individuals fully process
stimuli
features (cf. Zajonc, 1980, 1984; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and
hence impact
further target processing (cf. Bar & Neta, 2008; Bar &
Barret, 2009).
Winkielman & Huber (2009) emphasize that processing
fluency concerns not
only perceptual fluency reflected in the ease of
low-level, perceptual operations
driven primarily by stimuli surface
features. Parallel effects have been observed
in conceptual fluency,
reflected in high level stages of processing, concerned
with identifying the
meaning of the stimulus. Hedonic fluency hypothesis
emphasizing equal
significance of non-specific (non-propositional) and
stimulus feature
specific (propositional) cues, might be taken to promote the
balance between
propositional and non-propositional contents in irony
processing
research.
Recent neuroimaging research shows that affective load is
recognized very
early on in the comprehension process (e.g. Kawasaki et al.,
2001; Smith et
al., 2003; Barrett & Bar, 2009). There is evidence showing
that affective
contents of verbal input is processed pre-consciously, unlike
the semantic
contents, which requires conscious access to stimulus
information (e.g.
Zajonc, 1980; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Bargh et al.,
1996; Greenwald et al.,
1989; Greenwald et al., 1996). Murphy and Zajonc
(1993), testing the
affective primacy hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980, 1984), found
that positive and
negative affective reactions can be evoked with minimal
stimulus input and
virtually no cognitive processing involved. Barrett and
Bar (2009) proposed
the
affective prediction hypothesis, in which they demonstrate that
recognition
of affective valence of a stimulus is not a separate, subsequent
processing
stage, initiated only after the stimulus has been recognized, but
runs parallel to
its identification and significance recognition. Barrett and
Bar (2009) provide
empirical data showing that the brain routinely
anticipates the affective value of
the incoming stimuli, and affective load
(stimuli positivity or negativity)
influences the processing style (speed,
intensity), and chronometry. Affective
load of perceptual and cognitive
stimuli has been found to impact directly
perception, identification,
recognition and valuation in a top-down manner.
Affect-dedicated neural
circuitry has evolved to handle valence in the brain. It
comprises a network
that includes primarily (stimuli and task depending)
amygdala, prefrontal
cortex, insula, cingulate cortex, hypothalamus, nucleus
accumbens, and the
brainstem (cf. Cacioppo et al., 2004; Dalgleish, 2004;
Damasio, 1994;
Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Dolan, 2002; Ledoux, 2000). This
affect network
is central to attitudinal contents processing, and
evaluationembedded
decision making (Damasio, 1994). Language sciences
cannot
ignore accumulating evidence showing that valence network
recognizes
affective contents within a mere 100-150 ms (e.g. Grandjean &
Scherer 2008;
Pizzagalli et al., 2002; Schupp et al., 2004; Smith et al.,
2003; Kawasaki et al.,
2001). If affective load is so preferentially accessed
and processed, valenced
cues need to be acknowledged as basic ingredients of
meaning whenever
affective meaning is communicated.
Recent irony
neuroimaging research shows that affective valence circuit
overlaps in some
critical areas with theory of mind (ToM) circuit which handles
irony
comprehension. How affective valence network cooperates with theory of
mind
circuit in handling irony, needs to be further researched. Yet,
recent
neuroimaging and lesion irony processing studies show that
irony
comprehension is impossible when ToM is deficient.
Fully fledged theory
of
mind faculty allows to comprehend others: their attitudes, intentions,
affective
(what they feel) and cognitive (what they think) states. It also
enables irony
comprehension (Frith & Frith, 2003, 2010; Wang et al.,2006;
Wakusawa et
al., 2007; Uchiyama et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005a,
2005b;
Shibata et al., 2010). Shamay-Tsoory et al., (2005a) emphasize that
emotions
and affective states are as crucial for irony
communication-comprehension as
the cognitive states are. In a series of
studies Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005a,
2005b), Uchiyama et al. (2006), Wakusawa
et al. (2007) examined how ToM
circuit navigates irony comprehension, and how
cognitive and affective systems
Affective Twist in Irony Processing 99
are
involved. These studies confirm the role of theory of mind in
irony
comprehension and point to the role of affective ToM, to be as crucial
for irony
comprehension as cognitive ToM ( Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005
a,b).
Rhetoric tradition pictured irony as a figurative, non-literal
meaning, a
substitute to literal meaning. This paradigm harnessed to
empirical testing
produced inconclusive, conflicting results showing that
irony can be processed
slower, as fast as, or faster than literal
equivalents. The contradictory results
might be a side effect of not tapping
the essence of ironicity and unaccounting
for it in research designs.
Approaches striving to account for irony
comprehension, by relying
exclusively on the traditional philosophical and
linguistic (language
autonomy approach) methods, no longer suffice to explain
the emerging
intricacies of mental and neural infrastructure employed for
pragmatic
inferential tasks. New mounting evidence challenges the
traditional
language-autonomy based accounts, and sets new research agendas
striving to
master interdisciplinary goals by means of experimental methods
in
multidimensional perspectives. Recent accumulative research shows that
on
top of propositional meaning so far exclusively researched,
irony
communicates non-propositional, implicit, attitude contents. This
implicit,
evaluative load appears of key significance, processing-wise.
Communication
serves to exchange the contents of our minds: what matters
most. On top of
what we say, we piggyback attitudes, feelings, moods.
Affective contents seems
to be the engine of human interaction. The
linguistic meaning does not
exhaust the communicative potential of
non-propositional contents. The
propositional contents of the “said” is but
one level of the ironic message.
What we say matters, but how we say it,
manifested by extra-linguistic cues, is
at least equally
important.
Research needs to find out more specifically what extra-linguistic
cues
manifested non-propositionally in communicative context, impact
irony
comprehension and how this happens. Experimental pragmatics, with
its
processing, variable-oriented experimental design, seems fit to tap
the
propositional and non-propositional processing mechanics involved. It
needs
to pin down the extra-linguistic, affective factors and
mechanisms
underpinning irony communication and comprehension.
Neuropragmatics
inspired by new research methods on mind and brain dynamics,
offers quite
new insights into
the mental and neural infrastructure of communicative
comprehension. Irony
research has already been slightly redefined by the
insights offered by
recent neuroimaging research (Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2005a,b; Uchiyama et al.,
2006;Wakusawa et al., 2007; Shibata et al., 2010;
Regel et al., 2010).
Intriguing results observed for evaluative valence
processing seem to have a
direct bearing on how irony is handled mind/brainwise.
The significance of
valence circuit and ToM circuit overlapping, needs to
be explored at length.
Language research cannot afford to ignore affective
valence, which boasts as
rapid an activation time window as 100-150 ms.
Hence, traditional models on
irony comprehension need to be revised to
accommodate for the attitudinal
contents. Attitude is onboard. Specific
predictions as to the role of
implicit attitude in irony processing, need to be
worked out and tested
explicitly.
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123
Wednesday, January 9, 2013
A Griceian Pun
Speranza
Commentary on A. Voltolini, "Puns for Contextualists"
Grice loved a pun. "Grice to the Mill" was perhaps his favourite. But he possibly couldn't deliver too many sentences in a whole discourse without relying on puns.
"He was caught in the grip of a vyse" was another of his favourites.
He understood puns perfectly, "He fell upon his sword" is a great pun he explores in the seldom quoted, "Actions and Events", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Unhappy with Locke's parots which are almost rational, Grice coins the "intelligent, almost rational pirots".
And so on.
Kantotle, and Ariskant, featured as his best philosophical friends.
Language was too boring for Grice without the ability to pun about it.
"Don't strawson if you can grice". That would be disgriceful.
And so on.
In this essay, Voltolini first tries to provide a new argument in favour of the
contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. I will argue
that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in the
non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively
involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a
pre-, or at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve
ambiguous utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns
show that the wide context affecting them has a semantic role: it
provides many truth-conditions for a single utterance. Moreover, I will
try to show that the contextualist can provide a unitary account of the
general phenomenon of puns. On the one hand, this account explains
multi-stable puns as well as those puns the non-contextualist claims to
deal with successfully, i.e., the ones involving a speaker-induced
removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding. On the other hand, it
also explains zeugmatic puns, i.e., those involving an ‘impossible’
meaning.
Keywords: Contextualism, non-contextualism, wide context, puns,
multi-stability.
In this paper, Voltolini first tries to provide a new argument in favour of the
contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. The argument is
based on an evaluation of the phenomenon of ambiguity as it occurs in puns. I
will argue that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in
the non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively
involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a pre-, or
at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve ambiguous
utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns show that the wide
context affecting them has a semantic role: it provides many truth-conditions
for a single utterance. Moreover, I will try to show not only that noncontextualist
replies to the contextualist account of this phenomenon of
ambiguous utterances do not work, but also that the contextualist can provide a
unitary account of the general phenomenon of puns. On the one hand, this
account explains multi-stable puns as well as those puns the non-contextualist
claims to deal with successfully, i.e., the ones involving a speaker-induced
removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding. On the other hand, it also
explains zeugmatic puns, i.e., those involving an ‘impossible’ meaning.
1. The contextualist/non-contextualist opposition
and the role of ambiguity
As regards the divide between semantics and pragmatics, nowadays two main
options confront each other: non-contextualism and contextualism. In point of
fact, contextualism varies in type.1 Yet the opposite position lacks even a
common label.2 Nevertheless, there is a clear-cut way to cash out the main
distinction affecting these two positions à propos of the above divide. This
distinction concerns the different conceptions those options have with respect
to the so-called wide context, i.e., the concrete situation of discourse. To put it
in Perry’s (1997) terms, according to non-contextualists, wide context never
has a semantic role, that is, it never fixes the truth-conditions a sentence has in
1 Not only truth-conditional pragmatics à la Recanati (2004a) - according to which primary pragmatic processes determining contextual truth-conditional contributions of sub-sentential expressions may
even bypass the linguistic meaning of such expressions – but also broad indexicalism à la Stanley
(2007) - according to which linguistic meaning merely underdetermines contextual truth-conditions –
turn out to be forms of contextualism, a radical and a moderate one respectively. For in broad
indexicalism, linguistic meaning plus narrow context may well be unable to determine the truthconditions
of an utterance, i.e., of a sentence in wide context (for the notions of narrow and wide
context see later).
(2 To outline this position, some use the label semantic minimalism (cf. Cappellen & Lepore 2005) –
or the similar one minimal semantics (cf. Borg 2004). Predelli speaks of the “traditional approach”
(2005, p. 13). By following a proposal put forward by Recanati (2004a), one might name this position
literalism. Yet as Recanati himself admits, since according to this position what is semantically
evaluated are sentences in context, one might well be justified in taking this position as a form of
narrow indexicalism, according to which linguistic meaning automatically determines truth-conditions
given a narrow kind of context (see immediately later in the text).
narrow context, or index, i.e., a set of a limited series of parameters – typically,
agent, space, time, and world.3 Typically, for non-contextualists wide context
has the post-semantic, genuinely pragmatic, role of determining whatever
extra-truthconditional factor of significance is conveyed by means of such a
sentence in context. By a first approximation, for non-contextualists the proper
objects of semantic evaluation are therefore sentence - narrow context pairs,
theoretical representations of utterances, the concrete wide-contextual
tokenings of sentences on the speakers’ part.4 Whereas according to
contextualists, wide context may well have the semantic role in question.
Properly speaking, in fact, in order for the contextualist to win the battle
against her enemy, it is enough for her to show that contextualism is correct
with respect to the purportedly semantic role of wide context in at least one
case.5 As a result, for contextualists the proper objects of semantic evaluation
are utterances themselves, qua (roughly) sentences in wide context.6
Here is why the contextualist/non-contextualist distinction must be drawn
this way. On the non-contextualist side, since wide context never has a
semantic role, truth-conditions are assigned to sentences in narrow context by
computing the truth-conditional contributions (in narrow context) of the subsentential
components of such sentences, together with certain syntactic and
compositional principles. Since such a computation turns out to be an utterly
automatic process, even a semantic mechanism, something that is programmed
to make that computation, may perform a truth-conditional assignment.
In this respect, the fact that what is semantically evaluated is a sentence in
narrow context raises no problem. For the relevant truth-conditional
computation remains entirely automatic. This is paradigmatically shown by
indexical sentences, for which narrow context effectively is truth-conditionally
relevant. Granted, without a narrow context an indexical sentence has no truth-
(3 For this distinction between wide and narrow context cf. Perry (1997, p. 595). Predelli (1998,
2005) has shown that narrow context has to be considered a context of interpretation rather than a
context of utterance. For the narrow context’s parameters can well differ from the parameters of a
context of utterance. For a general reason as to why this must be the case, cf. Voltolini (2006)).
(4 More precisely, for non-contextualists the objects of semantic evaluations have to be clause (a
linguistic representation of a natural language sentence) – index (narrow context) pairs. See slightly
later in the text).
(5 As Recanati (2004a, p.116) claims).
(6 Kaplan (1989b, pp. 584-585) argues that sentence – (narrow) context pairs are the right objects of
semantic evaluation, for sometimes there are non-uttered sentences yet true in a context. However,
contextualists simply put this argument aside. For according to them language use, hence utterances,
is the starting point of semantic evaluation. Cf. e.g. Recanati (2004a)).
conditions. Yet once one such context is provided, that sentence again obtains
a certain truth-condition automatically.
For that sentence also has a linguistic
meaning, or better a character , which is completely determined by the
linguistic meanings, or better the characters, of its sub-sentential elements.
Character is a function mapping narrow contexts onto truth-conditional
contributions. When one such sub-sentential element is indexical, its character
specifies which parameter in narrow context has to be mobilized in order to
give that indexical a certain truth-conditional contribution in a given narrow
context. Thus, that parameter automatically determines the truth-conditional
contribution that sub-sentential element gives in that context to the indexical
sentence in which it figures.7
Consider e.g.:
1. I am an American.
Given its linguistic meaning,
(1)
conveys that whoever is the (contextual)
agent is an American.
Yet since (1) is an indexical sentence for it contains the
indexical “I”, not the sentence itself, but that sentence in a certain narrow
context, has truth-conditions.
Now, the character of “I” constituting the
sentence’s linguistic meaning is a function mapping narrow contexts onto
referents, i.e., the truth-conditional contributions of “I” in those contexts.
As
is shown by its linguistic description, roughly “the agent in context”, such a
character specifies the ‘agent’-parameter in narrow context so as to
automatically obtain the agent in one such context as the referent of “I” in that
context, i.e., as its truth-conditional contribution in that context.
As a result,
once (1) is taken along with a narrow context whose agent is Barack Obama,
then (1) is eo ipso true in that context iff Obama is an American.
Something that
even a mechanism may compute.
Now, contextualists reject this whole picture by appealing to the idea that
language functioning is a matter of intentional use, not a matter of automatic
applications of semantic operations. For them, therefore, there is no need to
represent utterances by means of linguistic representations of any kind. Since
utterances are the speakers’ concrete productions, they can be semantically
(7 For this whole picture on indexicals, cf. Kaplan (1989a,b). Recanati (2004b, p. 1) claims that the
character of an indexical is given by a token-reflexive rule. Since for each indexical its own tokenreflexive
rule specifies the narrow context parameter that has to be mobilized in order to provide the
relevant indexical sentence its truth-conditions in a given narrow context, truth-conditional
assignments for such sentences remain automatic).
evaluated in the concrete situations where they are uttered, i.e., in their wide
contexts.
As is well known, it is rather controversial nowadays whether by means of
the above account the non-contextualist manages to deal with all cases of
context-sensitivity, especially those involving so-called hidden contextsensitivity,
i.e., the contextuality that is not sententially articulated by means of
the occurrence in a sentence of a context-sensitive expression.8 Yet I want to
stress here that even if the non-contextualist managed to deal with hidden
context-sensitivity,9 the contextualist should not worry, since there may turn
out to be a very basic semantic phenomenon that preliminarily hinders any
non-contextualist account.
Ambiguity seems to be one such phenomenon, according to which one and
the same sentence of a natural language has different meanings, either because
at least one of its terms has different meanings – lexical ambiguity – or because
the sentence has different syntactic structures – structural ambiguity. At first
glance, ambiguity indeed brings grist to the contextualist’s mill. For the
contextualist may well point out that disambiguation is a matter of wide
context: a factor in the concrete situation of discourse helps one to settle
whether the ambiguous sentence is used with one or another meaning. Yet the
fact that a sentence is ambiguous is none other but the fact that it has different
truth-conditions. Thus, proceeds the contextualist’s argument, assigning to an
utterance of that sentence certain truth-conditions rather than other ones is a
matter of wide context. But this shows that in the case of ambiguity, it is
precisely wide context that has a semantic role.
More formally:
1. That a sentence is ambiguous is wide-contextually dependent
2. That a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence has many truth-conditions
3. That a sentence has many truth-conditions is wide-contextually dependent
[from 1,2]
4. Hence, wide context has a semantic role.
Yet the non-contextualist will immediately reply to the contextualist, you have
run too fast. One may well accept the wide-contextual dependence of
ambiguity. Yet this wide-contextual dependence merely shows that neither
(8 For this label cf. Borg (2004). Sentence (9) below presents a case of hidden context-sensitivity).
(9 I myself, for one, do not believe this: cf. Voltolini (2009). Yet for many attempts at non-contextually
dealing with overall context-sensitivity, cf. e.g. the afore-mentioned Borg (2004), Cappellen-Lepore
(2005), Predelli (2005).
natural language sentences nor their utterances are the objects of semantics.
For wide context is certainly appealed to in disambiguation, but only in a presemantic
role (to get back again to Perry’s 1997 terminology).
Wide context
indeed serves just in order to select the real object of semantic evaluation,
namely an underlying linguistic representation – e.g., a Mentalese sentence10 –
that automatically has its own truth-conditions, as the non-contextualist holds.
Such a representation will represent an utterance of a certain natural language
sentence. Theoretically speaking, one and the same natural language
ambiguous sentence can be paired with different underlying linguistic
representations, each endowed with its own truth-conditions.11 Yet once one
considers the wide context in which such a sentence is uttered, this context
simply settles which underlying linguistic representation with its own truthconditions
has to be selected by the semantic mechanism as representing the
relevant utterance of that sentence, i.e., the utterance of that sentence which is
uttered in that wide context.
To be sure, for a more precise picture that accounts for indexicality as well,
the non-contextualist must reintroduce narrow context and say that the real
objects of semantic evaluations are those underlying linguistic representations
plus narrow context.
On behalf of the non-contextualist, Predelli (2005) has
formulated this idea in the most articulated way. First of all, for him one and the
same natural language sentence is to be associated, in accordance with its
being uttered in different wide contexts, with different syntactically
transparent12 linguistic representations. He calls one such representation a
clause. Moreover, he says, in order to account for indexicality, too, what really
has to be associated with one such sentence are different clause-index pairs,
namely, couples made by a linguistic representation plus a certain narrow
context. From a theoretical point of view, one such pair indeed represents an
utterance of that sentence, i.e., (roughly) such a sentence in a certain wide
context. Now, for Predelli that pair is the real object of semantic evaluation.
For that pair is automatically assigned certain truth-conditions, in conformity
with non-contextualist desiderata about truth-conditional computation.
(10 For this idea, cf. e.g. Pinker (1994, p. 79)).
(11 Since ambiguity is both lexical and structural, this formulation must be taken with a grain of salt. It
would be more precise to say that what is paired with different underlying linguistic representations
each one endowed with its own truth-conditions is a sentence as syntactically opaque. On their turn,
such representations are instead syntactically transparent for their primary task is precisely that of
presenting the different syntactic structures that sentence possesses).
(12. See the previous footnote).
As a result of this picture, ambiguity amounts to the fact that different
clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances of one and the
same natural language sentence – i.e., respectively representing that sentence
as taken in different wide contexts – respectively have different truthconditions
(automatically as it were). Thus, wide context plays a mere presemantic
role. For it merely points out which pair has to be mobilized in order
to represent the relevant utterance of that sentence.13
Consider e.g. the following both indexical and ambiguous sentence:
2. I am taking a babe to the bank.
This sentence is indexical for it contains the indexical “I” and is ambiguous
because it contains the ambiguous term “bank”.
Given such an ambiguity, in
accordance with its being uttered in different wide contexts, (2) is respectively
associated with two clauses, clause c containing a term such as “bank1” and
clause c’ containing a different term “bank2”. Consider now a narrow context,
an index i whose agent is the former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi. I
n
accordance with its being uttered in different wide contexts, (2) is properly
associated with two different clause-index pairs, namely C (c-i) and C’ (c’-i).
Now, C and C’ are the proper objects of semantic evaluation: C is true iff
Berlusconi takes the babe in question to a certain financial institution, while C’
is true iff Berlusconi takes that babe to a certain river edge. In this perspective,
wide context simply selects whether (2) should really associated with C or with
C’, respectively having different truth-conditions. The selected pair will thus
represent a certain utterance of (2), i.e., (roughly) (2) in that wide context. As a
result, pace contextualists wide context has no semantic role.
More formally, a non-contextualist following Predelli rejects the previous
contextualist argument, for she denies premise 2) of that argument. Instead,
she puts forward this different argument:
1) That a sentence is ambiguous is wide-contextually dependent
2*) That a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence is associated with
different clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances
of that sentence and endowed with its own truth-conditions
(13 In point of fact, since for Predelli an utterance is roughly a sentence in wide context, it would be
more precise to say that by selecting the right clause-index pair with its own truth-conditions, wide
context makes it clear which utterance of the sentence has been really uttered. Yet for my present
purposes I can leave this aside).
3*) That a sentence is associated with different clause-index pairs
respectively representing different utterances of that sentence and
endowed with its own truth-conditions is wide-contextually dependent
[from 1), 2*)]
4*) Hence, wide context has no semantic, but simply a pre-semantic, role.
To be sure, a non-contextualist acknowledges that the situation at stake
may be more complicated. Consider an utterance of an ambiguous sentence. It
may be the case that, in order to fix the relevant clause-index pair representing
that utterance, wide context operates not at a pre-semantic level, but so to
speak within the semantic level itself. In other terms, it may be the case that
only once that sentence is uttered, does it become wide-contextually clear
which clause-index pair represents the relevant utterance. Thus, the semantic
mechanism must be able to store all the pairs that may theoretically speaking be
associated with that sentence. Yet once the relevant pair is selected, wide
context still plays no semantic role. For that pair is automatically assigned
certain truth-conditions. That pair wears those truth-conditions on its sleeve,
as one might put it.14
2. Why puns really bring grist to the contextualist’s mill
In his perspective, puns seem to cause no particular trouble to the noncontextualist.
Granted, in order for a pun to work, it must exploit natural
language ambiguity in some way or other. Yet the way it works is simply a
speaker-induced removal of misunderstanding that is well-grounded, for it
depends on the fact that the relevant natural language sentence is ambiguous.
In an ordinary well-grounded misunderstanding, an interlocutor erroneously
believes that a given utterance of an ambiguous sentence has a certain truthconditional
interpretation. Such a belief is mistaken, for that utterance actually
has a different truth-conditional interpretation. In this respect, wide context
makes it clear that the truth-conditional interpretation of a certain utterance is
different from the expected one. In the theoretical terms Predelli provides for
the non-contextualist, wide context makes it clear that the utterance
corresponding to that sentence in such a context has to be represented by a
certain clause-index pair endowed with its own truth-conditions rather than by
another clause-index pair with its own truth-conditional interpretation. Once
(14 For these complications cf. Borg (2004, p.140-146)).
the interlocutor realizes that, she may well remove her erroneous conviction
and represent that utterance by the right clause-index pair with its own truthconditional
interpretation. Now, the only difference between an ordinary wellgrounded
misunderstanding and one prompted by a pun is that the latter
misunderstanding is due to intentional factors. A pun’s creator wants her
interlocutor, first, to be led astray by a certain possible yet incorrect truthconditional
interpretation for an utterance of an ambiguous sentence, and
second, to be led back to the correct truth-conditional interpretation of that
utterance, just in order to have fun thanks to the clash of her semantic
expectations.15
In order to see these cases, take first an ordinary case of well-grounded
misunderstanding. Suppose Wim utters:
3. Paris is beautiful.
Typically, her interlocutor will believe that by (3) Wim is talking about the
capital of France. Yet once Wim continues by saying:
4. I like the desert surrounding it
then wide context, specifically the wide-contextual factors of co-text and
background knowledge (a noun such as “desert” and the background
knowledge that the capital of France has no desert), will induce such an
interlocutor to revise her interpretation and suppose that Wim, as he was
indeed doing, was talking instead of Paris, Texas.
In Predelli’s terms, this
means that the above utterance of (3) has to be represented by a certain clauseindex
pair containing the name “Paris2”, which is true iff the city in Texas so
named is beautiful, rather than by another clause-index pair containing the
name “Paris1”, which is true iff the capital of France so named is beautiful, as
the interlocutor erroneously believed.16 Second, consider one of the most
famous puns by Oscar Wilde:
15 In such a case, the comical effect will therefore conform to the so-called ‘incongruity theory’ of
humor. On it cf. Morreal (2009:chap.1).
(16 For the purpose of this example, I take the name “Paris”, hence any sentence containing it, to be
ambiguous. In point of fact, along with some others I believe that proper names are indexicals (cf.
Voltolini 1995). But if I assumed indexicality for proper names, it would make no big difference. For
in Predelli’s terms, a non-contextualist might then account for the misunderstanding by saying that the
utterance of (3) should be represented by another clause-index pair. This pair differs from the pair the
interlocutor erroneously took that utterance to be represented by because its index, not its clause, is
different.
5. To lose one parent, Mr. Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to
lose both looks like carelessness.
The Importance of Being Earnest ,
1895)
In order for such a pun to work, an interlocutor is first erroneously induced
by the presence in (5) of the noun “misfortune”, to think that in the relevant
utterance of (5) the ambiguous “to lose” means to suffer deprivation, so as to
assign that utterance a certain truth-conditional interpretation.
Yet as the
utterance proceeds, a better look at the wide context in which (5) is actually
uttered, more specifically at the fact that the wide-contextual factor of “to
lose”’s cotext in (5) contains not only the noun “misfortune”, but also the
noun “carelessness”, makes it clear that “to lose” here means to misplace, so
that its correct truth-conditional interpretation is another. In this predicament,
moreover, the interlocutor realizes that, by so construing (5), it was Wilde’s
intention to lead his interlocutor into such a misunderstanding. For he wanted
to obtain a comical effect by means of his interlocutor’s removal of the
misunderstanding.
In Predelli’s terms, instead of being erroneously
represented by the clause-index pair containing the term “to lose1”, which is
true iff to suffer deprivation from one parent’s death may be regarded as a
misfortune and to suffer deprivation from both parents’ looks like carelessness,
the relevant utterance of (5) has to be correctly represented by another clauseindex
pair containing the term “to lose2”, which is true iff to misplace one
parent may be regarded as a misfortune and to misplace both parents looks like
carelessness.17
(17 For another example of a pun mobilizing a speaker-induced well-grounded misunderstanding yet
involving structural rather than lexical ambiguity, take the famous Groucho Marx pun “I shot an
elephant in my pyjamas. How he got into my pyjamas I don’t know!” (cf. on this Borg 2004, p.
143fn.91). A similar explanation may be given for puns involving: i) indexicality rather than
ambiguity; ii) sameness of meaning rather than difference of meaning contrary to previous
expectations. Consider the joke Pinker (1994, p.80) presents: “First guy: I didn’t sleep with my wife
before we were married, did you? Second guy: I don’t know. What was her maiden name?” Given the
first sentence, an interlocutor would expect the second guy’s utterance of his second sentence to be
represented by a clause-index pair in which the theoretical counterpart of the pronoun “her” referred
to a certain individual, the second guy’s wife. This individual obviously differs from the individual, the first guy’s wife, the theoretical counterpart of the description “my wife” denotes in the representation of the first guy’s utterance. What’s punny is that, contrary to previous expectations, the clause-index pair that really represents the second guy’s utterance of his second sentence contains a theoretical counterpart of “her” yet referring to the very same individual the theoretical counterpart of “my wife”
denotes in the representation of the first guy’s utterance.
Yet, one may now immediately wonder, is this always the case with puns? As
we have just seen, from the cognitive point of view, the non-contextualist
considers puns as speaker-induced well-grounded misunderstandings, hence
as things falling into the general category of aware misrecognitions. This is to
say, for non-contextualists puns are cognitively on a par with cases of illusory
perceptions in which one discovers that what one illusorily took in her
perception to be a certain thing is in point of fact another. In the most famous
example, Carneades discovered that what he illusorily took in his perception to
be a snake was in point of fact a rope. If this is the case, puns have to be
characterized by non-reversibility of interpretation. As a matter of fact, once
we discover that what we illusorily took in our perception to be a certain thing
is another thing, we can no longer even seem to see that thing as being the
previous one. Once Carneades made the above discovery, the rope no longer
appeared to him to be a snake. By parity of reasoning, in the case of puns once
we discover the truth-conditional interpretation a certain sentence in wide
context, hence a certain utterance, has to be assigned, we can no longer take
that sentence in context, hence that utterance, as having the truth-conditional
interpretation we previously and erroneously gave to it. The utterance remains
linked with what we have discovered to be its correct truth-conditional
interpretation. In Predelli’s terms, we discover once for all that such an
utterance is represented by a certain clause-index pair having a certain truthconditional
interpretation rather than by another clause-index pair having
another truth-conditional interpretation, as we erroneously thought.
Yet cognitively speaking this does not always happen with puns. On the
contrary, for many puns reversibility obtains. In such cases, an utterance first
receives a certain interpretation, then another one, yet once it receives the
latter interpretation the former is still at play. Once we realize that we have to
do with one such pun, we continue going back and forth between the different
interpretations for that utterance, precisely because neither prevails. From the
cognitive point of view, this reversibility is easily accounted for once we find
the right explanation for such puns. As Wittgenstein (1953, 1980, 1982,
1992) originally grasped, the general cognitive category under which such
puns fall is not that of aware misrecognition, but that of seeing-as, at least the
kind of seeing-as characterized by Gestalt switches. In our case, such puns are
indeed characterized by the fact that certain linguistic configurations are
endowed with multi-, or at least bi-, stability of interpretation. Unlike cases of
aware misrecognition, in seeing-as of this kind reversibility indeed occurs. For
instance, one can pass from seeing a certain array of dots as being a twodimensional
cross to seeing them as being a rhombus and vice versa. Likewise,
one can pass from seeing a certain configuration as being (a picture of) a duck
to seeing it as being (a picture of) a rabbit and vice versa , right up to passing
from seeing an Arcimboldo painting as being (a picture of) a face to seeing it as
being (a picture of) a cluster of fruit and vegetables and vice versa. In this
respect, the cognitive upshot of facing an ambiguous figure is a mixture of
astonishment and disorientation. For although in one sense, or better at a
certain experiential level, that of direct visual perception, we are experiencing
one and the same thing, i.e., the item we actually have before us, yet in another
sense or better at another experiential level, that of seeing-as, we have an
alternate visual experience as of different things. Now, in many cases the
inventor of a pun wants to get her audience to be involved in precisely the same
predicament.
That is to say, someone who understands one such pun is in a
certain sense, or better at a certain experiential level, that of direct
auditory/visual perception, still hearing/seeing the very same utterance she
has before her, yet in another sense or better another experiential level, that of
hearing/seeing as, she is having an alternate experience of hearing/seeing that
utterance as having now one meaning, now another one.
This alternation of
meaning experiences, or more radically this ambiguity of the sentence’s
utterance rather than of the sentence itself, is what the inventor of a pun
intends her interlocutor to have.
Consider for instance the following cases:
6. Condoms should be used on every conceivable occasion
7. Without geometry, life is pointless.
8. Santa’s helpers are subordinate Clauses.
18
In all these cases, a sentence is ideally uttered in complete isolation. This may
help the interlocutor not to be led astray by other possible factors of the
specific wide context involved (co-text, gestures, salience effects, etc.) so as to
focus just on the relevant wide-contextual factor, i.e., the utterer’s intention to
convey different meanings by means of the very same utterance . Thus, by
(18 Wittgenstein (1980, I§77) gives another such example. In this example, a singer playing Wagner’sThe Rhine-gold on stage addresses another singer who had just whispered to him something about egg-cooking by singing “Weiche, Wotan, weiche!”. By that utterance, does the first singer mean the same as “Go away, Wotan, Go away!” or the same as “Soft, Wotan, soft”? Both, Wittgenstein would urge)
exploiting the ambiguity of the adjective “conceivable”, the relevant utterance
of (6) is meant to convey two different interpretations, namely not only that
condoms should be used whenever there is a risk of pregnancy, but also that
they should be used in any logically thinkable situation. By exploiting the
ambiguity of the adjective “pointless”, the relevant utterance of (7) is meant to
convey two different interpretations, namely not only that a non-geometrical
life is devoid of geometric points, but also that such a life is meaningless. By
exploiting the ambiguity of the very same plural form, “clauses”, of both the
noun “clause” and the name “Claus”, the relevant utterance of (8) is meant to
convey two different interpretations, namely not only that those who help Santa
are subordinate to him, but also that they are linguistic constructions.19
Now, the contextualist may well rely on such examples of puns in order to
reply to her non-contextualist opponent as follows.
Suppose we buy the noncontextualist
account of ambiguity. As we have seen, in order to deny wide
context a semantic role when ambiguity obtains, the non-contextualist claims
that one and the same natural language sentence in different wide contexts has
to be associated with different clause-index pairs that respectively represent
the relevant different utterances of that sentence and automatically have
different truth-conditions. So each utterance of the sentence, via its
representing pair, has just one truth-conditional interpretation. In such a
predicament, wide context simply selects which clause-index pair with its own
truth-conditions represents the relevant utterance. Yet in the present cases of
puns, we have one and the same utterance of a sentence having different
interpretations, not just one interpretation. As the non-contextualist is instead
supposed to claim, by making one such interpretation the truth-conditional
interpretation of just one clause-index pair representing that utterance. On the
contrary, for the contextualist those different interpretations amount to
different truth-conditions for that very utterance – e.g. the relevant utterance
of (7) for instance is true both iff a non-geometrical life has no geometrical
point and iff that life is meaningless. But these different truth-conditional
(19 In advertisement, many puns work this way. Cf. Tanaka (1992). Here I have chosen cases of puns in which one can say that just one utterance of one and the same natural language sentence is involved,
for the ambiguity on which the multi-stability of the utterance is involved is merely lexical. If the
ambiguity involved were both lexical and structural, as in “My girl criticized my apartment, so I
knocked her flat”, we should more properly speak of a multi-stable utterance of one and the same
syntactically opaque sentence, if not merely of one and the same string of uttered words . Whereas in
case of a pun involving mere homophony, as in “Seven days without laughter makes one weak”, we
should rather speak of a multi-stable utterance of one and the same string of uttered sounds .
interpretations for that utterance depend on wide context; notably, on the fact
that the utterer’s intention is precisely to convey two meanings at one and the
same time by means of the same utterance of a certain sentence. Thus,
contextualism is vindicated. For in the case of our puns, wide context has a
semantic role. More formally, the contextualist first rejects:
2*) That a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence is associated with
different clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances
of that sentence and endowed with their own truth-conditions
of the previous Predelli-inspired non-contextualist argument. Then, she puts
forward this new argument:
1’) That an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context, is
ambiguous is wide-contextually dependent
2’) That an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context, is
ambiguous = that an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context,
has many truth-conditions
3’) That an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context, has many
truth-conditions is wide-contextually dependent [from 1’, 2’]
4) Hence, wide context has a semantic role.20
Now, the claim that a contextualist account fits multi-stable puns nicely can be
further corroborated. Consider that in the case of multi-stable puns, as in all
cases in which a contextualist account suggests itself, not only is it widecontextual
for an utterance to have certain truth-conditions, but it is also widecontextual
which factor of the concrete situation of use is relevant for that
truth-conditional assignment. Contextualism involves meta-contextualism, as
some put it (cf. Bianchi 1999).
In this respect, take an utterance of:
9. Bill cuts the grass.
(20 Let me just stress once more that what the contextualist advocates here is that one and the same
utterance has more than one truth-conditional interpretation, not that it is indeterminate whether one
and the same utterance has a truth-conditional interpretation. Borg (2004, pp. 221-5) claims that
Travis’ version of contextualism, as it emerges e.g. from Travis (1997), amounts to the latter form of
meaning eliminativism. Whether or not Borg’s interpretation of Travis is correct, this form of
eliminativism is not what I am defending here. The point is not that there is no such thing as a truthconditional
meaning for a punny utterance, as Borg might claim in reconstructing Travis’
contextualism. The point is rather that there are as many truth-conditional meanings for that utterance
as its utterer intends it to have in her multi-stable pun)
which presents a typical case for which a contextualist account seems to work.
For a contextualist, that utterance has no truth-conditions in isolation; a
certain wide context, i.e., the concrete situation in which (9) is uttered, fixes
for it a truth-conditional interpretation. Yet according to a contextualist, this
means not only that in order for that utterance to have truth-conditions one has
to appeal to the concrete situation in which (9) is uttered, but also that it
depends on that situation which of its factors is relevant in order to settle which
truth-condition that utterance has. In a certain wide-contextual situation, one
has to appeal to the fact that (9) is uttered within a story one is telling about the
endings of a soccer match, hence to the co-textual factor of that wide context of
(9), in order to settle that that very utterance is true iff Bill rips the grass to
pieces. If instead (9) had been uttered in the course of garden care practice,
one would have had to appeal to this factor of the new wide-contextual situation
in order to settle that this utterance of (9) is true iff Bill trims the grass with a
lawnmower.
Now, the same holds with our multi-stable puns. If somebody uttered (6)
within some anti-AIDS campaign, that utterance would not be punny at all, for
in such an utterance “conceivable” would merely mean logically thinkable . So,
that utterance would be true merely iff condoms should be used in any logically
thinkable situation. Yet if a comedian utters (6), in this new wide-contextual
situation the prevailing wide-contextual factor is the comedian’s intention that
the new utterance of (6) be taken as a multi-stable pun. So, this utterance is
true both iff condoms have to be used in every logically thinkable situation and
iff condoms have to be used just in a pregnancy-inducing situation. Thus, it is
not only wide-contextual for that utterance of (6) to receive a truth-conditional
interpretation, but it is also wide-contextual which factor of the wide context
provides the punny, bi-stable, interpretation: the utterer’s intention.
Up to now, I have first of all presented what I take to be a new interesting
datum: a multi-stable pun counts as an utterance having different
interpretations. Moreover, I have put forward a contextualist account of that
datum: such interpretations for one and the same utterance are different truthconditional
interpretations for that utterance prompted by wide context, which
thereby has a semantic role. Yet to say that the datum may be accounted for in
contextualist terms does not yet obviously prove that it must be so accounted
for. Perhaps the non-contextualist can still shoot some arrows from his bow.
What I will try to show in this Section is that the non-contextualist’s arrows are
blunt.
To begin with, a non-contextualist might try to deny the datum altogether.
That is, she may suggest that in the case of a multi-stable pun different
utterances are involved for one and the same sentence. Perhaps these are not
physical utterances, but mental ones – typically, one in the speaker’s, the other
in the interlocutor’s, mind. Moreover, such utterances are respectively
represented by different clause-index pairs with their own truth-conditions.
Thus, the case raises no particular problem.21
To be sure, such a strategy is appealing when we want to draw a distinction
between a physical token of a sentence and its different interpretations due to
different (mental) readings, hence different (mental) utterances, of it. For
instance, this may happen with the case of a road sign such as:
10. (You) drive slowly.
In this case one and the same physical token – the road sign itself – of a certain
sentence is matched by different (mental) utterances that are differently
interpreted by each of the different drivers that pass in front of that sign. I
interpret my reading of (10) as meaning that I have to drive slowly, you
interpret your reading as (10) as meaning that you have to drive slowly, and so
on.
Yet no such account is legitimately involved in the case of a multi-stable
pun.
Let me set well aside the single outer utterance that is involved in such a
case, the concrete uttering of the relevant sentence on the speaker’s part. Yet if
we stick to inner utterances, here again we have, first of all, just one and the
same mental utterance on the speaker’s part. Yet this inner utterance has again
different interpretations, as well as the speaker’s outer utterance. Simply, we
have just moved one step back – from outer to inner utterances – so as to focus
on the speaker’s mental utterance as our relevant datum. Moreover, if over and
above that mental utterance that has different interpretations there is another
mental utterance on an interlocutor’s part that has just one interpretation, this
is just an irrelevant utterance in the situation at stake. If in such a situation we
have to choose between the interlocutor and the utterer, clearly it is the utterer
who counts.22 For as I said before, by uttering certain sentences in mere
(21 I owe this suggestion to Genoveva Marti).
(22 At least in normal cases. Sometimes, a punny effect is created in the interlocutor’s mind completely
regardless of the utterer’s intentions. Everyone remembers John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s saying in
isolation, pun creators often mean the relevant utterances as having different
meanings and thereby want their interlocutors to understand those utterances
as having such different meanings. So, taking one step back, from the outer to
the inner, is really no advantage for the non-contextualist.
Incidentally, one similar ambiguity of the utterance does not take place with
puns only. Sometimes speakers want to be interpreted as if they had uttered
something that has different meanings even if there is nothing punny about
it.23 Consider Mozart’s saying to Salieri à propòs of his compositions
(according to the movie Amadeus):
11. I never thought that such a music were possible.24
Or take a lover saying to her lover who has finally chosen someone else:
12. I wish you what you really deserve.
In both cases, two interpretations are intended to be available for one and the
same utterance: in the case of (11), both that Salieri’s music is excellent and
that it is very bad, in the case of (12), both that the errant lover has a happy life
and that s/he has an unhappy one. All in all, therefore, it seems better for the
non-contextualist to accept the datum as it occurs at the level of a physical
utterance. For it presents itself again at the level of a mental utterance.
At this point, the non-contextualist may agree to put 2*) of her original
argument aside in its overall scope – 2*), remember, states the following
identity: that a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence is associated with
different clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances of
that sentence and endowed with their own truth-conditions. For she may
modify 2*) in the light of the claim that one and the same clause-index pair, as a
linguistic representation of an utterance, may have different truth-conditions.
Berlin
“Ich bin ein Berliner”
in order to say that he was to be taken as a real inhabitant of the city.
Although his German interlocutors well grasped JFK’s intention, they could not stop laughing when
thinking of the other possible interpretation of the utterance as meaning that JFK is a pastry of a
particular sort. (I thank Dan Zeman for having attracted my attention to this point).
(23 This is as it should be. For multi-stability is one thing, humor is another. If one wanted to stick to
the ‘incongruity theory’ (cf. fn.15) to also account for the comical effect of multi-stable puns, one
might say that humor here again depends on the reciprocal incongruity of the different interpretations
involved).
(24 For the present moral of this example see also Sperber and Wilson (1987, p. 751). For Sperber and
Wilson, this example indeed presents no problem for their relevance theory, as Morgan and Green
instead claim (1987, p.727).
By so doing, the pair remains the real truth-conditional bearer; simply, in
certain cases it has more than one truth-condition.
To begin with, this move seems to betray the spirit of non-contextualism.
As we have seen, non-contextualists have put forward clause-index pairs
wearing their own truth-conditions on their sleeves in order to satisfactorily
deal with sentence ambiguity. Yet if some of such pairs have different truthconditions,
doesn’t ambiguity come back in through the rear door? In any case,
this move does not seem promising. Once one and the same clause-index pair
is assigned many truth-conditions, the pair becomes not only a wheel that turns
idly, but also something on which a semantic mechanism cannot operate. It is a
wheel that turns idly, because there is no reason to assign different truthconditions
to one and the same pair rather than straightforwardly to one and
the same utterance. But it is also something a semantic mechanism can no
longer operate on. For how can a semantic mechanism not only
computationally assign many truth-conditions to a pair, but also settle to which
pair many such conditions are to be assigned? In order to do both things, the
mechanism should be able to compute not only complex meanings out of
simple ones (given a syntax) but also the utterer’s intention, which as I said
before is in this respect the decisive factor. Yet to begin with, it is not clear how
a semantic mechanism can manage to compute that intention. As I said before,
the fact that in a multi-stable pun a sentence is uttered in isolation may help the
interlocutor to grasp the intention of that pun’s utterer, hence its multistability;
such a grasp does not seem to be an automatic matter. To be sure,
there may be a mechanism for mindreading that allows one to compute the
utterer’s intentions, as some claim.25 Yet this is no semantic mechanism. As
any other mechanism, a semantic mechanism is domain-specific: it purportedly
delivers the meanings (in narrow context) of complex expressions out of the
meanings of their constituent expressions given a certain syntactical structure.
The non-contextualist may now be tempted by the opposite move. Why not
stick to 2*) while representing one and the same utterance by many clauseindex
pairs, each with its own truth-conditions?
There may be an immediate justification for this move. For a noncontextualist
may say that in a clause-index pair one may increase the index
parameters. For instance, one may add a ‘language’- parameter to an index. In
such a case, the pair would be made by a linguistic representation obviously no
25 Cf e.g. Leslie (1997).
longer of a natural language sentence, but of a string of words (or of sounds),
plus an enriched index that pairs that representation not only with agent,
space, time, and world, but also with a language. This new parameter fixes
which language the above string belongs to.26 As a result, one and the same
utterance – or at least one and the same string of uttered words, or better of
uttered sounds – may be represented by different pairs whose indexes’
parameters are differently saturated; those pairs wear different truthconditions
on their sleeves, as it were. So, why not saying that something along
these lines happens in the case of an utterance of a multi-stable pun? Take the
sentence:
13. Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall.
If you focus on the sound of it, (13) is like the French sentence:
14. Un petit d’un petit s’étonné aux Halles.27
Now, a non-contextualist may say that the same string of uttered sounds
involved both by (13) and by (14) may be represented not only by a pair C
whose index i contains English at its ‘language’-parameter, which is true iff
there is someone identical with Humpty Dumpty who sat on a wall, but also by
a pair C’ whose index i’ differs from i for it contains French as its ‘language’-
parameter, which is true iff a child’s child was astonished at les Halles.28
Conceived as an appeal to enriched indexes, perhaps this move accounts for
the first of the two problems afflicting the previous non-contextualist move,
superfluity (why not assign the different truth-conditions directly to the
utterance rather than to a pair representing it?). Yet it does not account for the
second of the two problems afflicting the previous non-contextualist move,
arbitrariness (how can the semantic mechanism not only computationally
assign many pairs to an utterance, but also settle when an utterance is multiply
represented in this way?).
Granted, by appealing to the idea of enriched indexes, hence enriched
pairs, the non-contextualist may say that this move raises no issue of
arbitrariness. First, any utterance of the relevant sounds/words is represented
26 Such an idea is envisaged by Recanati (2000).
(27 This pun can be found in a collection of English yet homophonically French nursery rhymes by van
Rooten (1967)).
(28 For an example involving the same string of uttered words , consider
I vitelli dei romani sono belli.
which in Italian is true iff Romans’ calves are beautiful while in Latin is true iff Vitellius goes to the call
of war of the Roman god).
by all the pairs that one may obtain by giving different values to the new extraparameter
in the index. Second, the semantic mechanism searches for the
extra-parameter in the index in order to compute truth-conditions for each of
those pairs; in the case presented by (13), we have at least two pairs for one and
the same utterance of sounds.
Yet the contextualist may reply that the idea of enriched indexes is rather ad
hoc, or at least is ad hoc if one wants to apply it to the case of multi-stable puns.
Theoretically speaking, one can always take a factor of wide context and put it
in a suitable index. Yet one has to provide an independent reason as to why
such a move should be performed.29 To be sure, a non-contextualist might find
a justification as to why one should add a ‘language’-parameter to an index of a
clause to be assigned to an utterance. The idea would be, an utterance of
sounds or even of words cannot be semantically evaluated until it is established
which language that utterance belongs to.30 However, all the previous cases of
multi-stable puns are precisely cases of puns in which it has already been
settled which language a certain utterance of sounds/words belongs to;
nevertheless, the utterance of the resulting sentence of that language counts as
ambiguous. So, let us assume for argument’s sake that by adding a ‘language’-
parameter the non-contextualist move accounts for bilingual multi-stable puns.
Yet in order to account for all monolingual multi-stable puns, which are the
overwhelming majority of such puns, the non-contextualist should find another
parameter over and above the ‘language’- parameter to be added to the relevant
index. Yet what parameter could it be?
Yet the non-contextualist may reply, appealing to enriched indexes is not
the right way for this move to be understood. In order to have different pairs for
one and the same utterance, one should not enrich indexes, but rather
duplicate clauses. So, one has to pair the same ambiguous utterance with pairs
that differ with respect to their different clauses, which make those pairs
possess different truth-conditional interpretations.
Yet this non-contextualist way of understanding the present move is rather
artificial. It treats utterance ambiguity in the same way as the non-contextualist
(29 For an analogous criticism of the idea that when demonstratives are involved in a truth-conditional
assignment the typical wide-contextual factors that are prima facie relevant for such an assignment,
namely either demonstrations or demonstrata, have to be put in the relevant index, cf. Recanati
(2004a, p.57).)
(30 As Borg (2004, p. 140) accurately claims, by pointing to an original example by Davidson: does one
string of uttered sounds/words count as an utterance of the English sentence “Empedocles leapt” or
of the German sentence “Empedocles liebt”?)
treated sentence ambiguity.
An ambiguous sentence is such that it must be
paired with different clauses, hence with difference clause-index pairs, that
respectively have a different truth-conditional interpretation. Likewise for an
ambiguous utterance. Yet in the case of an ambiguous sentence, the two
different clauses hence the two different pairs respectively represent different
utterances of such a sentence. But in the case of an ambiguous utterance, what
are the different things that the two different clauses hence the two different
pairs respectively represent? Mental utterances? Yet as we have seen before, in
the case of a multistable pun an inner utterance is as ambiguous as an outer
utterance. So, there are no different mental utterances the underlying clauses
hence the pairs respectively represent. Or perhaps different meaning
experiences, i.e., the experiences of hearing/reading an utterance as having a
certain meaning rather than another one? Definitely, in the case of a
multistable pun we have different such experiences. Yet a meaning experience
is not what an underlying clause, hence a pair, should represent. What should
be represented should be something that, unlike a meaning experience, has no
meaning by itself, for it should receive its meaning precisely from the
underlying clause, hence a pair, endowed with its own truth-conditional
interpretation. So, the analogy between ambiguous sentences and ambiguous
utterances the non-contextualist appeals to breaks down. In uttering an
ambiguous sentence, its utterer means it in a particular way insofar her
utterance is represented by an underlying clause – possibly, a Mentalese
sentence – having its own truth-conditions and lending them to the utterance
itself. But in thinking one and the same ambiguous utterance, its thinker means
in a particular way insofar as her clause with its own truth-conditions represent
what?
At this point, the non-contextualist may put forward another, perhaps more
obvious, move. True enough, the datum that in the case of multi-stable puns
one and the same utterance has different significances is undeniable. Yet, the
non-contextualist may go on saying, since such different significances are
precisely a matter of the utterer’s intentions, as the contextualist has pointed
out, they have to be taken as implicatures in Grice’s (1975) classical sense
rather than as explicatures (to put in Carston’s (2002) terms); namely, as far as
a sentence in (narrow) context is concerned, such different significances affect
the level of what is implicated rather than the level of what is said, hence an
extra-truthconditional level rather than the truth-conditional level. If this is the
case, wide context is certainly involved, but in its typical post-semantic role. In
this case, wide context helps in assigning an utterance, which already has (via
the proper clause-index pair representing it) just certain truth-conditions,
different implicatures at one and the same time. In this respect, a noncontextualist
may say, the comparison between the utterances of multi-stable
puns such as (6)-(7)-(8) and the utterances of insidious sentences such as
(11)-(12) is welcome. For, she would continue, each of the latter utterances is
insidious.
For by means of each such utterance its utterer intends to convey a
plurivocal significance over and above the unambiguous truth-conditional
meaning it already has. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds of each of the punny
utterances of (6)-(7)-(8).
Yet this move again seems ad hoc. For the non-contextualist has claimed
that in the case of puns involving a speaker-induced well-grounded
misunderstanding to be removed, like the one presented by (5) before,
meaning interpretation has to be accounted for at the semantic level. As a
result, the non-contextualist has insisted that in such cases wide context
operates at the pre-semantic level. Given the utterer’s intentions, the relevant
utterance has just one truth-conditional interpretation. Simply, as wide context
enables one to discover, that interpretation is not the one originally supposed
by the interlocutor. Yet why then in the case of multi-stable puns should wide
context be appealed to at the post-semantic level? In other terms, it seems
arbitrary to account for one and the same phenomenon of signification now at
the pre-, now at the post-, semantic level.
In this respect, the contextualist account is more elegant. For it appeals to a
unitary explanation enabling her to account for all kinds of puns – not only the
two previously mentioned, but also a third case of puns involving zeugmas –
precisely at the semantic level. The idea is, wherever there is a punny content
for an utterance, this content has to be accounted for at the truth-conditional
level: it is what the utterance says. Hence, the role wide context plays in the
relevant pun depends on how to ensure that the punny content is what the
utterance says. Let me describe things more in detail.
To begin with, the contextualist may even acknowledge that in the case of
puns involving a speaker-induced well-grounded misunderstanding, wide
context has a merely pre-semantic role. For she agrees that in such a case the
relevant utterance of the sentence in question is not ambiguous. Yet for her
what really counts in this move is that it saves the point of the pun, which is to
let the interlocutor realize that the utterance says a certain thing (rather than
another). For that utterance has certain truth-conditions, the punny ones. Yet
the contextualist will add that if we also want to save the point of the pun in the
case of multi-stable puns, we have to claim that wide context should play a
semantic role in such a case. For this time the point of the pun is to let the
utterance say different things. The contextualist accounts for this utterance
ambiguity by saying that in such a case wide context makes one and the same
utterance have many truth-conditions. According to the contextualist,
moreover, also in a third kind of case, namely the case of zeugmatic puns, wide
context must play a semantic role. For this time the point of the pun is to let the
utterance say an ‘impossible’ thing. On the one hand, the relevant sentence
contains an anaphoric link syntactically suggesting that in the relevant
utterance of that sentence, a certain sub-sentential token of a term yields the
same truth-conditional contribution as another token of that term to which that
token is anaphorically linked. Yet on the other hand, the anaphora
notwithstanding, in that utterance the relevant token yields a truth-conditional
contribution (possibly radically) different from the one provided by the token it
is anaphorically linked to. As wide context, notably the utterer’s intentions,
again causes the utterance to say, thereby again playing a semantic role.
Consider:
15. After two unsuccessful marriages, I find myself keeping my guard up,
along with my underpants
16. I called her a whore and myself a cab
17. John and his driving licence expired yesterday.
In all the punny utterances of those sentences, a meaning shift occurs.
Sometimes this shift is less radical, involving only different yet somehow
related polysemical senses, sometimes it is more radical, involving ambiguity.
Now, the anaphorical link subsisting in all these sentences does not prevent
that shift from occurring. In the relevant utterance of (15), an implicit token of
“keeping” refers back to a previous explicit token of the same word, yet the
implicit token has a ‘physical’ reading while the explicit one has a metaphorical
reading: underpants, not guard, are physically kept up. In the utterance of
(16), an implicit token of “called” refers back to a previous explicit token of
the same word, yet the implicit token means retrieved someone’s attention
while the explicit one means labelled. In the utterance of (17), an explicit token
of “expired” refers back to a previous implicit token of the same word, yet the
explicit token means came to an end while the implicit one means died.31 In all
these cases, the anaphorical link would prompt one to interpret the second
token exactly like the first one. Yet such a syntactically driven interpretation is
rejected. For one realizes that the utterer’s purpose was precisely to create a
punny effect in which the meaning of the second token is shifted, the anaphoric
link notwithstanding. This is precisely why the interpretation of the whole
utterance is ‘impossible’. For the contextualist, this interpretation is again a
truth-conditional interpretation of such utterances: they say something
‘impossible’.
Incidentally, once again this phenomenon – anaphorical link plus meaning
shift in one and the same utterance – does not obtain in punny cases only.32
Consider two utterances of:
18. Norman Mailer likes to read himself
19. He drank the whole bottle and smashed it to the floor.33
Contextualists would again say that also in these cases, the anaphoric link
respectively tying “himself” to “Norman Mailer” and “it” to “the (whole)
bottle” notwithstanding, those utterances of (18) and (19) are respectively
true iff Norman Mailer likes to read some work or other of his and iff the
demonstrated person drank the whole content of a bottle and smashed that
bottle to the floor. Unlike the zeugmatic cases presented by (15)-(16)-(17),
however, that the relevant utterances of (18)-(19) have such ‘impossible’ truthconditions
depends not on the utterer’s intentions, but rather on other widecontextual
factors. These factors are i) co-text – the fact that the pronoun
“himself” follows the verb “to read” in (18) and the fact that in (19) the first
token of “bottle” is linked with the verb “to drink” and the adjective “whole”,
while the second token is linked with the verb “to smash” – and ii) pragmatic
relations linking the ordinary referents with the extended referents of the
relevant expressions in those utterances, namely a pragmatic relation linking
(31 Of course, in order to fully vindicate the anaphora, one may postulate an ad hoc concept that would be the
disjunctive referent of both the first and the second token of the relevant subsentential term. Yet, as Carston
and Wilson implicitly admit in putting forward such a proposal - cf. (1996, p. 427), (1997) - this move
would annihilate the punny effect of the utterance. See also Lascarides, Copestake and Briscoe (1996, p.
47).
(32 Once again, one thing is the meaning shift, another is the comical effect. On behalf of the ‘incongruity’
theory of humor (cf. fn.15), one may again say that even here the meaning shift is comical for the ‘impossible’
interpretation is incongruous).
(33 For those examples, cf. Fauconnier (1985, p. 7) and Sainsbury (2010, p.139) respectively_
an author with his work in the case of (18) and another pragmatic relation
linking a container to its content in the case of (19).34
Clearly enough, in such cases of meaning shift meta-contextualism is again
at work. For it is wide-contextual which wide-contextual factor is relevant to
determine the utterance’s truth-conditions: utterer’s intentions in the case of
the above utterances of (15)-(16)-(17), factors i) and ii) in the case of the
above utterances of (18)-(19). Such a meta-contextualism is even more evident
if we consider different utterances of one and the same sentence, a punny and a
non-punny one. Consider a punny utterance of:
20. I’m reading a book about anti-gravity. I can’t put it down.
In this utterance, the meaning shift from literary work to physical copy of a
work involving the first token and the second (implicit) token of “book”
respectively leads that utterance to have ‘impossible’ truth-conditions. These
truth-conditions are induced by the utterer’s comical intention to generate a
zeugmatic effect. Yet if (20) were uttered without such an intention, the
resulting utterance would not have such truth-conditions. Rather, it would just
have the normal truth-conditions according which that utterance would be true
iff the agent of the context were reading a work on anti-gravity and that reading
could not be interrupted.
In this paper I have not only provided an interesting datum concerning
multistable puns, according to which punny utterances of certain sentences
have multiple readings, but I have also claimed that those readings affect the
truth-conditional level of what is said by such utterances. As such different
readings are prompted by a wide-contextual factor, namely the speaker’s
intentions, with respect to such utterances wide context plays a semantic role.
Moreover, I have claimed, this account is grounded by the idea that punny
interpretations affect the truth-conditional level of what is said also when puns
of other kinds are at stake, namely both the puns involving a speaker-induced
removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding and the zeugmatic puns. Simply,
while in the former case wide context plays a pre-semantic role – it selects a
given interpretation for an utterance of a sentence by choosing which meaning
that sentence actually mobilizes – in the latter case it again plays a semantic
)34 For this way of putting the referential distinction in question cf. Nunberg (1979)).
role, by making the utterance funnily say something ‘impossible’ in virtue of
the speaker’s intentions. Now, experimental pragmatics may further
corroborate this latter idea, if it will experimentally turn out that, as I believe,
language users straightforwardly interpret a punny utterance according to one
of the three possibilities just sketched: a) by proving an interpretation that
removes a previous interpretation; b) by providing a multistable interpretation;
c) by providing an ‘impossible’ interpretation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper was originally presented at the LOGOS Seminar, Department of
Logic and Philosophy of Science, November 10, 2010, Barcelona and then at
the Institut for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information, June 10, 2011,
San Sebastian. I also thank Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Andrea Iacona,
Genoveva Marti and Stefano Predelli, for their important comments on
previous versions of this paper.
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Commentary on A. Voltolini, "Puns for Contextualists"
Grice loved a pun. "Grice to the Mill" was perhaps his favourite. But he possibly couldn't deliver too many sentences in a whole discourse without relying on puns.
"He was caught in the grip of a vyse" was another of his favourites.
He understood puns perfectly, "He fell upon his sword" is a great pun he explores in the seldom quoted, "Actions and Events", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Unhappy with Locke's parots which are almost rational, Grice coins the "intelligent, almost rational pirots".
And so on.
Kantotle, and Ariskant, featured as his best philosophical friends.
Language was too boring for Grice without the ability to pun about it.
"Don't strawson if you can grice". That would be disgriceful.
And so on.
In this essay, Voltolini first tries to provide a new argument in favour of the
contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. I will argue
that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in the
non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively
involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a
pre-, or at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve
ambiguous utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns
show that the wide context affecting them has a semantic role: it
provides many truth-conditions for a single utterance. Moreover, I will
try to show that the contextualist can provide a unitary account of the
general phenomenon of puns. On the one hand, this account explains
multi-stable puns as well as those puns the non-contextualist claims to
deal with successfully, i.e., the ones involving a speaker-induced
removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding. On the other hand, it
also explains zeugmatic puns, i.e., those involving an ‘impossible’
meaning.
Keywords: Contextualism, non-contextualism, wide context, puns,
multi-stability.
In this paper, Voltolini first tries to provide a new argument in favour of the
contextualist position on the semantics/pragmatics divide. The argument is
based on an evaluation of the phenomenon of ambiguity as it occurs in puns. I
will argue that many puns, notably multi-stable ones, cannot be dealt with in
the non-contextualist way, i.e., as displaying a phenomenon that effectively
involves wide context, the concrete situation of discourse, yet only in a pre-, or
at least inter-, semantic sense. For, insofar as they involve ambiguous
utterances rather than ambiguous sentences, these puns show that the wide
context affecting them has a semantic role: it provides many truth-conditions
for a single utterance. Moreover, I will try to show not only that noncontextualist
replies to the contextualist account of this phenomenon of
ambiguous utterances do not work, but also that the contextualist can provide a
unitary account of the general phenomenon of puns. On the one hand, this
account explains multi-stable puns as well as those puns the non-contextualist
claims to deal with successfully, i.e., the ones involving a speaker-induced
removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding. On the other hand, it also
explains zeugmatic puns, i.e., those involving an ‘impossible’ meaning.
1. The contextualist/non-contextualist opposition
and the role of ambiguity
As regards the divide between semantics and pragmatics, nowadays two main
options confront each other: non-contextualism and contextualism. In point of
fact, contextualism varies in type.1 Yet the opposite position lacks even a
common label.2 Nevertheless, there is a clear-cut way to cash out the main
distinction affecting these two positions à propos of the above divide. This
distinction concerns the different conceptions those options have with respect
to the so-called wide context, i.e., the concrete situation of discourse. To put it
in Perry’s (1997) terms, according to non-contextualists, wide context never
has a semantic role, that is, it never fixes the truth-conditions a sentence has in
1 Not only truth-conditional pragmatics à la Recanati (2004a) - according to which primary pragmatic processes determining contextual truth-conditional contributions of sub-sentential expressions may
even bypass the linguistic meaning of such expressions – but also broad indexicalism à la Stanley
(2007) - according to which linguistic meaning merely underdetermines contextual truth-conditions –
turn out to be forms of contextualism, a radical and a moderate one respectively. For in broad
indexicalism, linguistic meaning plus narrow context may well be unable to determine the truthconditions
of an utterance, i.e., of a sentence in wide context (for the notions of narrow and wide
context see later).
(2 To outline this position, some use the label semantic minimalism (cf. Cappellen & Lepore 2005) –
or the similar one minimal semantics (cf. Borg 2004). Predelli speaks of the “traditional approach”
(2005, p. 13). By following a proposal put forward by Recanati (2004a), one might name this position
literalism. Yet as Recanati himself admits, since according to this position what is semantically
evaluated are sentences in context, one might well be justified in taking this position as a form of
narrow indexicalism, according to which linguistic meaning automatically determines truth-conditions
given a narrow kind of context (see immediately later in the text).
narrow context, or index, i.e., a set of a limited series of parameters – typically,
agent, space, time, and world.3 Typically, for non-contextualists wide context
has the post-semantic, genuinely pragmatic, role of determining whatever
extra-truthconditional factor of significance is conveyed by means of such a
sentence in context. By a first approximation, for non-contextualists the proper
objects of semantic evaluation are therefore sentence - narrow context pairs,
theoretical representations of utterances, the concrete wide-contextual
tokenings of sentences on the speakers’ part.4 Whereas according to
contextualists, wide context may well have the semantic role in question.
Properly speaking, in fact, in order for the contextualist to win the battle
against her enemy, it is enough for her to show that contextualism is correct
with respect to the purportedly semantic role of wide context in at least one
case.5 As a result, for contextualists the proper objects of semantic evaluation
are utterances themselves, qua (roughly) sentences in wide context.6
Here is why the contextualist/non-contextualist distinction must be drawn
this way. On the non-contextualist side, since wide context never has a
semantic role, truth-conditions are assigned to sentences in narrow context by
computing the truth-conditional contributions (in narrow context) of the subsentential
components of such sentences, together with certain syntactic and
compositional principles. Since such a computation turns out to be an utterly
automatic process, even a semantic mechanism, something that is programmed
to make that computation, may perform a truth-conditional assignment.
In this respect, the fact that what is semantically evaluated is a sentence in
narrow context raises no problem. For the relevant truth-conditional
computation remains entirely automatic. This is paradigmatically shown by
indexical sentences, for which narrow context effectively is truth-conditionally
relevant. Granted, without a narrow context an indexical sentence has no truth-
(3 For this distinction between wide and narrow context cf. Perry (1997, p. 595). Predelli (1998,
2005) has shown that narrow context has to be considered a context of interpretation rather than a
context of utterance. For the narrow context’s parameters can well differ from the parameters of a
context of utterance. For a general reason as to why this must be the case, cf. Voltolini (2006)).
(4 More precisely, for non-contextualists the objects of semantic evaluations have to be clause (a
linguistic representation of a natural language sentence) – index (narrow context) pairs. See slightly
later in the text).
(5 As Recanati (2004a, p.116) claims).
(6 Kaplan (1989b, pp. 584-585) argues that sentence – (narrow) context pairs are the right objects of
semantic evaluation, for sometimes there are non-uttered sentences yet true in a context. However,
contextualists simply put this argument aside. For according to them language use, hence utterances,
is the starting point of semantic evaluation. Cf. e.g. Recanati (2004a)).
conditions. Yet once one such context is provided, that sentence again obtains
a certain truth-condition automatically.
For that sentence also has a linguistic
meaning, or better a character , which is completely determined by the
linguistic meanings, or better the characters, of its sub-sentential elements.
Character is a function mapping narrow contexts onto truth-conditional
contributions. When one such sub-sentential element is indexical, its character
specifies which parameter in narrow context has to be mobilized in order to
give that indexical a certain truth-conditional contribution in a given narrow
context. Thus, that parameter automatically determines the truth-conditional
contribution that sub-sentential element gives in that context to the indexical
sentence in which it figures.7
Consider e.g.:
1. I am an American.
Given its linguistic meaning,
(1)
conveys that whoever is the (contextual)
agent is an American.
Yet since (1) is an indexical sentence for it contains the
indexical “I”, not the sentence itself, but that sentence in a certain narrow
context, has truth-conditions.
Now, the character of “I” constituting the
sentence’s linguistic meaning is a function mapping narrow contexts onto
referents, i.e., the truth-conditional contributions of “I” in those contexts.
As
is shown by its linguistic description, roughly “the agent in context”, such a
character specifies the ‘agent’-parameter in narrow context so as to
automatically obtain the agent in one such context as the referent of “I” in that
context, i.e., as its truth-conditional contribution in that context.
As a result,
once (1) is taken along with a narrow context whose agent is Barack Obama,
then (1) is eo ipso true in that context iff Obama is an American.
Something that
even a mechanism may compute.
Now, contextualists reject this whole picture by appealing to the idea that
language functioning is a matter of intentional use, not a matter of automatic
applications of semantic operations. For them, therefore, there is no need to
represent utterances by means of linguistic representations of any kind. Since
utterances are the speakers’ concrete productions, they can be semantically
(7 For this whole picture on indexicals, cf. Kaplan (1989a,b). Recanati (2004b, p. 1) claims that the
character of an indexical is given by a token-reflexive rule. Since for each indexical its own tokenreflexive
rule specifies the narrow context parameter that has to be mobilized in order to provide the
relevant indexical sentence its truth-conditions in a given narrow context, truth-conditional
assignments for such sentences remain automatic).
evaluated in the concrete situations where they are uttered, i.e., in their wide
contexts.
As is well known, it is rather controversial nowadays whether by means of
the above account the non-contextualist manages to deal with all cases of
context-sensitivity, especially those involving so-called hidden contextsensitivity,
i.e., the contextuality that is not sententially articulated by means of
the occurrence in a sentence of a context-sensitive expression.8 Yet I want to
stress here that even if the non-contextualist managed to deal with hidden
context-sensitivity,9 the contextualist should not worry, since there may turn
out to be a very basic semantic phenomenon that preliminarily hinders any
non-contextualist account.
Ambiguity seems to be one such phenomenon, according to which one and
the same sentence of a natural language has different meanings, either because
at least one of its terms has different meanings – lexical ambiguity – or because
the sentence has different syntactic structures – structural ambiguity. At first
glance, ambiguity indeed brings grist to the contextualist’s mill. For the
contextualist may well point out that disambiguation is a matter of wide
context: a factor in the concrete situation of discourse helps one to settle
whether the ambiguous sentence is used with one or another meaning. Yet the
fact that a sentence is ambiguous is none other but the fact that it has different
truth-conditions. Thus, proceeds the contextualist’s argument, assigning to an
utterance of that sentence certain truth-conditions rather than other ones is a
matter of wide context. But this shows that in the case of ambiguity, it is
precisely wide context that has a semantic role.
More formally:
1. That a sentence is ambiguous is wide-contextually dependent
2. That a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence has many truth-conditions
3. That a sentence has many truth-conditions is wide-contextually dependent
[from 1,2]
4. Hence, wide context has a semantic role.
Yet the non-contextualist will immediately reply to the contextualist, you have
run too fast. One may well accept the wide-contextual dependence of
ambiguity. Yet this wide-contextual dependence merely shows that neither
(8 For this label cf. Borg (2004). Sentence (9) below presents a case of hidden context-sensitivity).
(9 I myself, for one, do not believe this: cf. Voltolini (2009). Yet for many attempts at non-contextually
dealing with overall context-sensitivity, cf. e.g. the afore-mentioned Borg (2004), Cappellen-Lepore
(2005), Predelli (2005).
natural language sentences nor their utterances are the objects of semantics.
For wide context is certainly appealed to in disambiguation, but only in a presemantic
role (to get back again to Perry’s 1997 terminology).
Wide context
indeed serves just in order to select the real object of semantic evaluation,
namely an underlying linguistic representation – e.g., a Mentalese sentence10 –
that automatically has its own truth-conditions, as the non-contextualist holds.
Such a representation will represent an utterance of a certain natural language
sentence. Theoretically speaking, one and the same natural language
ambiguous sentence can be paired with different underlying linguistic
representations, each endowed with its own truth-conditions.11 Yet once one
considers the wide context in which such a sentence is uttered, this context
simply settles which underlying linguistic representation with its own truthconditions
has to be selected by the semantic mechanism as representing the
relevant utterance of that sentence, i.e., the utterance of that sentence which is
uttered in that wide context.
To be sure, for a more precise picture that accounts for indexicality as well,
the non-contextualist must reintroduce narrow context and say that the real
objects of semantic evaluations are those underlying linguistic representations
plus narrow context.
On behalf of the non-contextualist, Predelli (2005) has
formulated this idea in the most articulated way. First of all, for him one and the
same natural language sentence is to be associated, in accordance with its
being uttered in different wide contexts, with different syntactically
transparent12 linguistic representations. He calls one such representation a
clause. Moreover, he says, in order to account for indexicality, too, what really
has to be associated with one such sentence are different clause-index pairs,
namely, couples made by a linguistic representation plus a certain narrow
context. From a theoretical point of view, one such pair indeed represents an
utterance of that sentence, i.e., (roughly) such a sentence in a certain wide
context. Now, for Predelli that pair is the real object of semantic evaluation.
For that pair is automatically assigned certain truth-conditions, in conformity
with non-contextualist desiderata about truth-conditional computation.
(10 For this idea, cf. e.g. Pinker (1994, p. 79)).
(11 Since ambiguity is both lexical and structural, this formulation must be taken with a grain of salt. It
would be more precise to say that what is paired with different underlying linguistic representations
each one endowed with its own truth-conditions is a sentence as syntactically opaque. On their turn,
such representations are instead syntactically transparent for their primary task is precisely that of
presenting the different syntactic structures that sentence possesses).
(12. See the previous footnote).
As a result of this picture, ambiguity amounts to the fact that different
clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances of one and the
same natural language sentence – i.e., respectively representing that sentence
as taken in different wide contexts – respectively have different truthconditions
(automatically as it were). Thus, wide context plays a mere presemantic
role. For it merely points out which pair has to be mobilized in order
to represent the relevant utterance of that sentence.13
Consider e.g. the following both indexical and ambiguous sentence:
2. I am taking a babe to the bank.
This sentence is indexical for it contains the indexical “I” and is ambiguous
because it contains the ambiguous term “bank”.
Given such an ambiguity, in
accordance with its being uttered in different wide contexts, (2) is respectively
associated with two clauses, clause c containing a term such as “bank1” and
clause c’ containing a different term “bank2”. Consider now a narrow context,
an index i whose agent is the former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi. I
n
accordance with its being uttered in different wide contexts, (2) is properly
associated with two different clause-index pairs, namely C (c-i) and C’ (c’-i).
Now, C and C’ are the proper objects of semantic evaluation: C is true iff
Berlusconi takes the babe in question to a certain financial institution, while C’
is true iff Berlusconi takes that babe to a certain river edge. In this perspective,
wide context simply selects whether (2) should really associated with C or with
C’, respectively having different truth-conditions. The selected pair will thus
represent a certain utterance of (2), i.e., (roughly) (2) in that wide context. As a
result, pace contextualists wide context has no semantic role.
More formally, a non-contextualist following Predelli rejects the previous
contextualist argument, for she denies premise 2) of that argument. Instead,
she puts forward this different argument:
1) That a sentence is ambiguous is wide-contextually dependent
2*) That a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence is associated with
different clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances
of that sentence and endowed with its own truth-conditions
(13 In point of fact, since for Predelli an utterance is roughly a sentence in wide context, it would be
more precise to say that by selecting the right clause-index pair with its own truth-conditions, wide
context makes it clear which utterance of the sentence has been really uttered. Yet for my present
purposes I can leave this aside).
3*) That a sentence is associated with different clause-index pairs
respectively representing different utterances of that sentence and
endowed with its own truth-conditions is wide-contextually dependent
[from 1), 2*)]
4*) Hence, wide context has no semantic, but simply a pre-semantic, role.
To be sure, a non-contextualist acknowledges that the situation at stake
may be more complicated. Consider an utterance of an ambiguous sentence. It
may be the case that, in order to fix the relevant clause-index pair representing
that utterance, wide context operates not at a pre-semantic level, but so to
speak within the semantic level itself. In other terms, it may be the case that
only once that sentence is uttered, does it become wide-contextually clear
which clause-index pair represents the relevant utterance. Thus, the semantic
mechanism must be able to store all the pairs that may theoretically speaking be
associated with that sentence. Yet once the relevant pair is selected, wide
context still plays no semantic role. For that pair is automatically assigned
certain truth-conditions. That pair wears those truth-conditions on its sleeve,
as one might put it.14
2. Why puns really bring grist to the contextualist’s mill
In his perspective, puns seem to cause no particular trouble to the noncontextualist.
Granted, in order for a pun to work, it must exploit natural
language ambiguity in some way or other. Yet the way it works is simply a
speaker-induced removal of misunderstanding that is well-grounded, for it
depends on the fact that the relevant natural language sentence is ambiguous.
In an ordinary well-grounded misunderstanding, an interlocutor erroneously
believes that a given utterance of an ambiguous sentence has a certain truthconditional
interpretation. Such a belief is mistaken, for that utterance actually
has a different truth-conditional interpretation. In this respect, wide context
makes it clear that the truth-conditional interpretation of a certain utterance is
different from the expected one. In the theoretical terms Predelli provides for
the non-contextualist, wide context makes it clear that the utterance
corresponding to that sentence in such a context has to be represented by a
certain clause-index pair endowed with its own truth-conditions rather than by
another clause-index pair with its own truth-conditional interpretation. Once
(14 For these complications cf. Borg (2004, p.140-146)).
the interlocutor realizes that, she may well remove her erroneous conviction
and represent that utterance by the right clause-index pair with its own truthconditional
interpretation. Now, the only difference between an ordinary wellgrounded
misunderstanding and one prompted by a pun is that the latter
misunderstanding is due to intentional factors. A pun’s creator wants her
interlocutor, first, to be led astray by a certain possible yet incorrect truthconditional
interpretation for an utterance of an ambiguous sentence, and
second, to be led back to the correct truth-conditional interpretation of that
utterance, just in order to have fun thanks to the clash of her semantic
expectations.15
In order to see these cases, take first an ordinary case of well-grounded
misunderstanding. Suppose Wim utters:
3. Paris is beautiful.
Typically, her interlocutor will believe that by (3) Wim is talking about the
capital of France. Yet once Wim continues by saying:
4. I like the desert surrounding it
then wide context, specifically the wide-contextual factors of co-text and
background knowledge (a noun such as “desert” and the background
knowledge that the capital of France has no desert), will induce such an
interlocutor to revise her interpretation and suppose that Wim, as he was
indeed doing, was talking instead of Paris, Texas.
In Predelli’s terms, this
means that the above utterance of (3) has to be represented by a certain clauseindex
pair containing the name “Paris2”, which is true iff the city in Texas so
named is beautiful, rather than by another clause-index pair containing the
name “Paris1”, which is true iff the capital of France so named is beautiful, as
the interlocutor erroneously believed.16 Second, consider one of the most
famous puns by Oscar Wilde:
15 In such a case, the comical effect will therefore conform to the so-called ‘incongruity theory’ of
humor. On it cf. Morreal (2009:chap.1).
(16 For the purpose of this example, I take the name “Paris”, hence any sentence containing it, to be
ambiguous. In point of fact, along with some others I believe that proper names are indexicals (cf.
Voltolini 1995). But if I assumed indexicality for proper names, it would make no big difference. For
in Predelli’s terms, a non-contextualist might then account for the misunderstanding by saying that the
utterance of (3) should be represented by another clause-index pair. This pair differs from the pair the
interlocutor erroneously took that utterance to be represented by because its index, not its clause, is
different.
5. To lose one parent, Mr. Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to
lose both looks like carelessness.
The Importance of Being Earnest ,
1895)
In order for such a pun to work, an interlocutor is first erroneously induced
by the presence in (5) of the noun “misfortune”, to think that in the relevant
utterance of (5) the ambiguous “to lose” means to suffer deprivation, so as to
assign that utterance a certain truth-conditional interpretation.
Yet as the
utterance proceeds, a better look at the wide context in which (5) is actually
uttered, more specifically at the fact that the wide-contextual factor of “to
lose”’s cotext in (5) contains not only the noun “misfortune”, but also the
noun “carelessness”, makes it clear that “to lose” here means to misplace, so
that its correct truth-conditional interpretation is another. In this predicament,
moreover, the interlocutor realizes that, by so construing (5), it was Wilde’s
intention to lead his interlocutor into such a misunderstanding. For he wanted
to obtain a comical effect by means of his interlocutor’s removal of the
misunderstanding.
In Predelli’s terms, instead of being erroneously
represented by the clause-index pair containing the term “to lose1”, which is
true iff to suffer deprivation from one parent’s death may be regarded as a
misfortune and to suffer deprivation from both parents’ looks like carelessness,
the relevant utterance of (5) has to be correctly represented by another clauseindex
pair containing the term “to lose2”, which is true iff to misplace one
parent may be regarded as a misfortune and to misplace both parents looks like
carelessness.17
(17 For another example of a pun mobilizing a speaker-induced well-grounded misunderstanding yet
involving structural rather than lexical ambiguity, take the famous Groucho Marx pun “I shot an
elephant in my pyjamas. How he got into my pyjamas I don’t know!” (cf. on this Borg 2004, p.
143fn.91). A similar explanation may be given for puns involving: i) indexicality rather than
ambiguity; ii) sameness of meaning rather than difference of meaning contrary to previous
expectations. Consider the joke Pinker (1994, p.80) presents: “First guy: I didn’t sleep with my wife
before we were married, did you? Second guy: I don’t know. What was her maiden name?” Given the
first sentence, an interlocutor would expect the second guy’s utterance of his second sentence to be
represented by a clause-index pair in which the theoretical counterpart of the pronoun “her” referred
to a certain individual, the second guy’s wife. This individual obviously differs from the individual, the first guy’s wife, the theoretical counterpart of the description “my wife” denotes in the representation of the first guy’s utterance. What’s punny is that, contrary to previous expectations, the clause-index pair that really represents the second guy’s utterance of his second sentence contains a theoretical counterpart of “her” yet referring to the very same individual the theoretical counterpart of “my wife”
denotes in the representation of the first guy’s utterance.
Yet, one may now immediately wonder, is this always the case with puns? As
we have just seen, from the cognitive point of view, the non-contextualist
considers puns as speaker-induced well-grounded misunderstandings, hence
as things falling into the general category of aware misrecognitions. This is to
say, for non-contextualists puns are cognitively on a par with cases of illusory
perceptions in which one discovers that what one illusorily took in her
perception to be a certain thing is in point of fact another. In the most famous
example, Carneades discovered that what he illusorily took in his perception to
be a snake was in point of fact a rope. If this is the case, puns have to be
characterized by non-reversibility of interpretation. As a matter of fact, once
we discover that what we illusorily took in our perception to be a certain thing
is another thing, we can no longer even seem to see that thing as being the
previous one. Once Carneades made the above discovery, the rope no longer
appeared to him to be a snake. By parity of reasoning, in the case of puns once
we discover the truth-conditional interpretation a certain sentence in wide
context, hence a certain utterance, has to be assigned, we can no longer take
that sentence in context, hence that utterance, as having the truth-conditional
interpretation we previously and erroneously gave to it. The utterance remains
linked with what we have discovered to be its correct truth-conditional
interpretation. In Predelli’s terms, we discover once for all that such an
utterance is represented by a certain clause-index pair having a certain truthconditional
interpretation rather than by another clause-index pair having
another truth-conditional interpretation, as we erroneously thought.
Yet cognitively speaking this does not always happen with puns. On the
contrary, for many puns reversibility obtains. In such cases, an utterance first
receives a certain interpretation, then another one, yet once it receives the
latter interpretation the former is still at play. Once we realize that we have to
do with one such pun, we continue going back and forth between the different
interpretations for that utterance, precisely because neither prevails. From the
cognitive point of view, this reversibility is easily accounted for once we find
the right explanation for such puns. As Wittgenstein (1953, 1980, 1982,
1992) originally grasped, the general cognitive category under which such
puns fall is not that of aware misrecognition, but that of seeing-as, at least the
kind of seeing-as characterized by Gestalt switches. In our case, such puns are
indeed characterized by the fact that certain linguistic configurations are
endowed with multi-, or at least bi-, stability of interpretation. Unlike cases of
aware misrecognition, in seeing-as of this kind reversibility indeed occurs. For
instance, one can pass from seeing a certain array of dots as being a twodimensional
cross to seeing them as being a rhombus and vice versa. Likewise,
one can pass from seeing a certain configuration as being (a picture of) a duck
to seeing it as being (a picture of) a rabbit and vice versa , right up to passing
from seeing an Arcimboldo painting as being (a picture of) a face to seeing it as
being (a picture of) a cluster of fruit and vegetables and vice versa. In this
respect, the cognitive upshot of facing an ambiguous figure is a mixture of
astonishment and disorientation. For although in one sense, or better at a
certain experiential level, that of direct visual perception, we are experiencing
one and the same thing, i.e., the item we actually have before us, yet in another
sense or better at another experiential level, that of seeing-as, we have an
alternate visual experience as of different things. Now, in many cases the
inventor of a pun wants to get her audience to be involved in precisely the same
predicament.
That is to say, someone who understands one such pun is in a
certain sense, or better at a certain experiential level, that of direct
auditory/visual perception, still hearing/seeing the very same utterance she
has before her, yet in another sense or better another experiential level, that of
hearing/seeing as, she is having an alternate experience of hearing/seeing that
utterance as having now one meaning, now another one.
This alternation of
meaning experiences, or more radically this ambiguity of the sentence’s
utterance rather than of the sentence itself, is what the inventor of a pun
intends her interlocutor to have.
Consider for instance the following cases:
6. Condoms should be used on every conceivable occasion
7. Without geometry, life is pointless.
8. Santa’s helpers are subordinate Clauses.
18
In all these cases, a sentence is ideally uttered in complete isolation. This may
help the interlocutor not to be led astray by other possible factors of the
specific wide context involved (co-text, gestures, salience effects, etc.) so as to
focus just on the relevant wide-contextual factor, i.e., the utterer’s intention to
convey different meanings by means of the very same utterance . Thus, by
(18 Wittgenstein (1980, I§77) gives another such example. In this example, a singer playing Wagner’sThe Rhine-gold on stage addresses another singer who had just whispered to him something about egg-cooking by singing “Weiche, Wotan, weiche!”. By that utterance, does the first singer mean the same as “Go away, Wotan, Go away!” or the same as “Soft, Wotan, soft”? Both, Wittgenstein would urge)
exploiting the ambiguity of the adjective “conceivable”, the relevant utterance
of (6) is meant to convey two different interpretations, namely not only that
condoms should be used whenever there is a risk of pregnancy, but also that
they should be used in any logically thinkable situation. By exploiting the
ambiguity of the adjective “pointless”, the relevant utterance of (7) is meant to
convey two different interpretations, namely not only that a non-geometrical
life is devoid of geometric points, but also that such a life is meaningless. By
exploiting the ambiguity of the very same plural form, “clauses”, of both the
noun “clause” and the name “Claus”, the relevant utterance of (8) is meant to
convey two different interpretations, namely not only that those who help Santa
are subordinate to him, but also that they are linguistic constructions.19
Now, the contextualist may well rely on such examples of puns in order to
reply to her non-contextualist opponent as follows.
Suppose we buy the noncontextualist
account of ambiguity. As we have seen, in order to deny wide
context a semantic role when ambiguity obtains, the non-contextualist claims
that one and the same natural language sentence in different wide contexts has
to be associated with different clause-index pairs that respectively represent
the relevant different utterances of that sentence and automatically have
different truth-conditions. So each utterance of the sentence, via its
representing pair, has just one truth-conditional interpretation. In such a
predicament, wide context simply selects which clause-index pair with its own
truth-conditions represents the relevant utterance. Yet in the present cases of
puns, we have one and the same utterance of a sentence having different
interpretations, not just one interpretation. As the non-contextualist is instead
supposed to claim, by making one such interpretation the truth-conditional
interpretation of just one clause-index pair representing that utterance. On the
contrary, for the contextualist those different interpretations amount to
different truth-conditions for that very utterance – e.g. the relevant utterance
of (7) for instance is true both iff a non-geometrical life has no geometrical
point and iff that life is meaningless. But these different truth-conditional
(19 In advertisement, many puns work this way. Cf. Tanaka (1992). Here I have chosen cases of puns in which one can say that just one utterance of one and the same natural language sentence is involved,
for the ambiguity on which the multi-stability of the utterance is involved is merely lexical. If the
ambiguity involved were both lexical and structural, as in “My girl criticized my apartment, so I
knocked her flat”, we should more properly speak of a multi-stable utterance of one and the same
syntactically opaque sentence, if not merely of one and the same string of uttered words . Whereas in
case of a pun involving mere homophony, as in “Seven days without laughter makes one weak”, we
should rather speak of a multi-stable utterance of one and the same string of uttered sounds .
interpretations for that utterance depend on wide context; notably, on the fact
that the utterer’s intention is precisely to convey two meanings at one and the
same time by means of the same utterance of a certain sentence. Thus,
contextualism is vindicated. For in the case of our puns, wide context has a
semantic role. More formally, the contextualist first rejects:
2*) That a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence is associated with
different clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances
of that sentence and endowed with their own truth-conditions
of the previous Predelli-inspired non-contextualist argument. Then, she puts
forward this new argument:
1’) That an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context, is
ambiguous is wide-contextually dependent
2’) That an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context, is
ambiguous = that an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context,
has many truth-conditions
3’) That an utterance, i.e., (roughly) a sentence in wide context, has many
truth-conditions is wide-contextually dependent [from 1’, 2’]
4) Hence, wide context has a semantic role.20
Now, the claim that a contextualist account fits multi-stable puns nicely can be
further corroborated. Consider that in the case of multi-stable puns, as in all
cases in which a contextualist account suggests itself, not only is it widecontextual
for an utterance to have certain truth-conditions, but it is also widecontextual
which factor of the concrete situation of use is relevant for that
truth-conditional assignment. Contextualism involves meta-contextualism, as
some put it (cf. Bianchi 1999).
In this respect, take an utterance of:
9. Bill cuts the grass.
(20 Let me just stress once more that what the contextualist advocates here is that one and the same
utterance has more than one truth-conditional interpretation, not that it is indeterminate whether one
and the same utterance has a truth-conditional interpretation. Borg (2004, pp. 221-5) claims that
Travis’ version of contextualism, as it emerges e.g. from Travis (1997), amounts to the latter form of
meaning eliminativism. Whether or not Borg’s interpretation of Travis is correct, this form of
eliminativism is not what I am defending here. The point is not that there is no such thing as a truthconditional
meaning for a punny utterance, as Borg might claim in reconstructing Travis’
contextualism. The point is rather that there are as many truth-conditional meanings for that utterance
as its utterer intends it to have in her multi-stable pun)
which presents a typical case for which a contextualist account seems to work.
For a contextualist, that utterance has no truth-conditions in isolation; a
certain wide context, i.e., the concrete situation in which (9) is uttered, fixes
for it a truth-conditional interpretation. Yet according to a contextualist, this
means not only that in order for that utterance to have truth-conditions one has
to appeal to the concrete situation in which (9) is uttered, but also that it
depends on that situation which of its factors is relevant in order to settle which
truth-condition that utterance has. In a certain wide-contextual situation, one
has to appeal to the fact that (9) is uttered within a story one is telling about the
endings of a soccer match, hence to the co-textual factor of that wide context of
(9), in order to settle that that very utterance is true iff Bill rips the grass to
pieces. If instead (9) had been uttered in the course of garden care practice,
one would have had to appeal to this factor of the new wide-contextual situation
in order to settle that this utterance of (9) is true iff Bill trims the grass with a
lawnmower.
Now, the same holds with our multi-stable puns. If somebody uttered (6)
within some anti-AIDS campaign, that utterance would not be punny at all, for
in such an utterance “conceivable” would merely mean logically thinkable . So,
that utterance would be true merely iff condoms should be used in any logically
thinkable situation. Yet if a comedian utters (6), in this new wide-contextual
situation the prevailing wide-contextual factor is the comedian’s intention that
the new utterance of (6) be taken as a multi-stable pun. So, this utterance is
true both iff condoms have to be used in every logically thinkable situation and
iff condoms have to be used just in a pregnancy-inducing situation. Thus, it is
not only wide-contextual for that utterance of (6) to receive a truth-conditional
interpretation, but it is also wide-contextual which factor of the wide context
provides the punny, bi-stable, interpretation: the utterer’s intention.
Up to now, I have first of all presented what I take to be a new interesting
datum: a multi-stable pun counts as an utterance having different
interpretations. Moreover, I have put forward a contextualist account of that
datum: such interpretations for one and the same utterance are different truthconditional
interpretations for that utterance prompted by wide context, which
thereby has a semantic role. Yet to say that the datum may be accounted for in
contextualist terms does not yet obviously prove that it must be so accounted
for. Perhaps the non-contextualist can still shoot some arrows from his bow.
What I will try to show in this Section is that the non-contextualist’s arrows are
blunt.
To begin with, a non-contextualist might try to deny the datum altogether.
That is, she may suggest that in the case of a multi-stable pun different
utterances are involved for one and the same sentence. Perhaps these are not
physical utterances, but mental ones – typically, one in the speaker’s, the other
in the interlocutor’s, mind. Moreover, such utterances are respectively
represented by different clause-index pairs with their own truth-conditions.
Thus, the case raises no particular problem.21
To be sure, such a strategy is appealing when we want to draw a distinction
between a physical token of a sentence and its different interpretations due to
different (mental) readings, hence different (mental) utterances, of it. For
instance, this may happen with the case of a road sign such as:
10. (You) drive slowly.
In this case one and the same physical token – the road sign itself – of a certain
sentence is matched by different (mental) utterances that are differently
interpreted by each of the different drivers that pass in front of that sign. I
interpret my reading of (10) as meaning that I have to drive slowly, you
interpret your reading as (10) as meaning that you have to drive slowly, and so
on.
Yet no such account is legitimately involved in the case of a multi-stable
pun.
Let me set well aside the single outer utterance that is involved in such a
case, the concrete uttering of the relevant sentence on the speaker’s part. Yet if
we stick to inner utterances, here again we have, first of all, just one and the
same mental utterance on the speaker’s part. Yet this inner utterance has again
different interpretations, as well as the speaker’s outer utterance. Simply, we
have just moved one step back – from outer to inner utterances – so as to focus
on the speaker’s mental utterance as our relevant datum. Moreover, if over and
above that mental utterance that has different interpretations there is another
mental utterance on an interlocutor’s part that has just one interpretation, this
is just an irrelevant utterance in the situation at stake. If in such a situation we
have to choose between the interlocutor and the utterer, clearly it is the utterer
who counts.22 For as I said before, by uttering certain sentences in mere
(21 I owe this suggestion to Genoveva Marti).
(22 At least in normal cases. Sometimes, a punny effect is created in the interlocutor’s mind completely
regardless of the utterer’s intentions. Everyone remembers John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s saying in
isolation, pun creators often mean the relevant utterances as having different
meanings and thereby want their interlocutors to understand those utterances
as having such different meanings. So, taking one step back, from the outer to
the inner, is really no advantage for the non-contextualist.
Incidentally, one similar ambiguity of the utterance does not take place with
puns only. Sometimes speakers want to be interpreted as if they had uttered
something that has different meanings even if there is nothing punny about
it.23 Consider Mozart’s saying to Salieri à propòs of his compositions
(according to the movie Amadeus):
11. I never thought that such a music were possible.24
Or take a lover saying to her lover who has finally chosen someone else:
12. I wish you what you really deserve.
In both cases, two interpretations are intended to be available for one and the
same utterance: in the case of (11), both that Salieri’s music is excellent and
that it is very bad, in the case of (12), both that the errant lover has a happy life
and that s/he has an unhappy one. All in all, therefore, it seems better for the
non-contextualist to accept the datum as it occurs at the level of a physical
utterance. For it presents itself again at the level of a mental utterance.
At this point, the non-contextualist may agree to put 2*) of her original
argument aside in its overall scope – 2*), remember, states the following
identity: that a sentence is ambiguous = that a sentence is associated with
different clause-index pairs respectively representing different utterances of
that sentence and endowed with their own truth-conditions. For she may
modify 2*) in the light of the claim that one and the same clause-index pair, as a
linguistic representation of an utterance, may have different truth-conditions.
Berlin
“Ich bin ein Berliner”
in order to say that he was to be taken as a real inhabitant of the city.
Although his German interlocutors well grasped JFK’s intention, they could not stop laughing when
thinking of the other possible interpretation of the utterance as meaning that JFK is a pastry of a
particular sort. (I thank Dan Zeman for having attracted my attention to this point).
(23 This is as it should be. For multi-stability is one thing, humor is another. If one wanted to stick to
the ‘incongruity theory’ (cf. fn.15) to also account for the comical effect of multi-stable puns, one
might say that humor here again depends on the reciprocal incongruity of the different interpretations
involved).
(24 For the present moral of this example see also Sperber and Wilson (1987, p. 751). For Sperber and
Wilson, this example indeed presents no problem for their relevance theory, as Morgan and Green
instead claim (1987, p.727).
By so doing, the pair remains the real truth-conditional bearer; simply, in
certain cases it has more than one truth-condition.
To begin with, this move seems to betray the spirit of non-contextualism.
As we have seen, non-contextualists have put forward clause-index pairs
wearing their own truth-conditions on their sleeves in order to satisfactorily
deal with sentence ambiguity. Yet if some of such pairs have different truthconditions,
doesn’t ambiguity come back in through the rear door? In any case,
this move does not seem promising. Once one and the same clause-index pair
is assigned many truth-conditions, the pair becomes not only a wheel that turns
idly, but also something on which a semantic mechanism cannot operate. It is a
wheel that turns idly, because there is no reason to assign different truthconditions
to one and the same pair rather than straightforwardly to one and
the same utterance. But it is also something a semantic mechanism can no
longer operate on. For how can a semantic mechanism not only
computationally assign many truth-conditions to a pair, but also settle to which
pair many such conditions are to be assigned? In order to do both things, the
mechanism should be able to compute not only complex meanings out of
simple ones (given a syntax) but also the utterer’s intention, which as I said
before is in this respect the decisive factor. Yet to begin with, it is not clear how
a semantic mechanism can manage to compute that intention. As I said before,
the fact that in a multi-stable pun a sentence is uttered in isolation may help the
interlocutor to grasp the intention of that pun’s utterer, hence its multistability;
such a grasp does not seem to be an automatic matter. To be sure,
there may be a mechanism for mindreading that allows one to compute the
utterer’s intentions, as some claim.25 Yet this is no semantic mechanism. As
any other mechanism, a semantic mechanism is domain-specific: it purportedly
delivers the meanings (in narrow context) of complex expressions out of the
meanings of their constituent expressions given a certain syntactical structure.
The non-contextualist may now be tempted by the opposite move. Why not
stick to 2*) while representing one and the same utterance by many clauseindex
pairs, each with its own truth-conditions?
There may be an immediate justification for this move. For a noncontextualist
may say that in a clause-index pair one may increase the index
parameters. For instance, one may add a ‘language’- parameter to an index. In
such a case, the pair would be made by a linguistic representation obviously no
25 Cf e.g. Leslie (1997).
longer of a natural language sentence, but of a string of words (or of sounds),
plus an enriched index that pairs that representation not only with agent,
space, time, and world, but also with a language. This new parameter fixes
which language the above string belongs to.26 As a result, one and the same
utterance – or at least one and the same string of uttered words, or better of
uttered sounds – may be represented by different pairs whose indexes’
parameters are differently saturated; those pairs wear different truthconditions
on their sleeves, as it were. So, why not saying that something along
these lines happens in the case of an utterance of a multi-stable pun? Take the
sentence:
13. Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall.
If you focus on the sound of it, (13) is like the French sentence:
14. Un petit d’un petit s’étonné aux Halles.27
Now, a non-contextualist may say that the same string of uttered sounds
involved both by (13) and by (14) may be represented not only by a pair C
whose index i contains English at its ‘language’-parameter, which is true iff
there is someone identical with Humpty Dumpty who sat on a wall, but also by
a pair C’ whose index i’ differs from i for it contains French as its ‘language’-
parameter, which is true iff a child’s child was astonished at les Halles.28
Conceived as an appeal to enriched indexes, perhaps this move accounts for
the first of the two problems afflicting the previous non-contextualist move,
superfluity (why not assign the different truth-conditions directly to the
utterance rather than to a pair representing it?). Yet it does not account for the
second of the two problems afflicting the previous non-contextualist move,
arbitrariness (how can the semantic mechanism not only computationally
assign many pairs to an utterance, but also settle when an utterance is multiply
represented in this way?).
Granted, by appealing to the idea of enriched indexes, hence enriched
pairs, the non-contextualist may say that this move raises no issue of
arbitrariness. First, any utterance of the relevant sounds/words is represented
26 Such an idea is envisaged by Recanati (2000).
(27 This pun can be found in a collection of English yet homophonically French nursery rhymes by van
Rooten (1967)).
(28 For an example involving the same string of uttered words , consider
I vitelli dei romani sono belli.
which in Italian is true iff Romans’ calves are beautiful while in Latin is true iff Vitellius goes to the call
of war of the Roman god).
by all the pairs that one may obtain by giving different values to the new extraparameter
in the index. Second, the semantic mechanism searches for the
extra-parameter in the index in order to compute truth-conditions for each of
those pairs; in the case presented by (13), we have at least two pairs for one and
the same utterance of sounds.
Yet the contextualist may reply that the idea of enriched indexes is rather ad
hoc, or at least is ad hoc if one wants to apply it to the case of multi-stable puns.
Theoretically speaking, one can always take a factor of wide context and put it
in a suitable index. Yet one has to provide an independent reason as to why
such a move should be performed.29 To be sure, a non-contextualist might find
a justification as to why one should add a ‘language’-parameter to an index of a
clause to be assigned to an utterance. The idea would be, an utterance of
sounds or even of words cannot be semantically evaluated until it is established
which language that utterance belongs to.30 However, all the previous cases of
multi-stable puns are precisely cases of puns in which it has already been
settled which language a certain utterance of sounds/words belongs to;
nevertheless, the utterance of the resulting sentence of that language counts as
ambiguous. So, let us assume for argument’s sake that by adding a ‘language’-
parameter the non-contextualist move accounts for bilingual multi-stable puns.
Yet in order to account for all monolingual multi-stable puns, which are the
overwhelming majority of such puns, the non-contextualist should find another
parameter over and above the ‘language’- parameter to be added to the relevant
index. Yet what parameter could it be?
Yet the non-contextualist may reply, appealing to enriched indexes is not
the right way for this move to be understood. In order to have different pairs for
one and the same utterance, one should not enrich indexes, but rather
duplicate clauses. So, one has to pair the same ambiguous utterance with pairs
that differ with respect to their different clauses, which make those pairs
possess different truth-conditional interpretations.
Yet this non-contextualist way of understanding the present move is rather
artificial. It treats utterance ambiguity in the same way as the non-contextualist
(29 For an analogous criticism of the idea that when demonstratives are involved in a truth-conditional
assignment the typical wide-contextual factors that are prima facie relevant for such an assignment,
namely either demonstrations or demonstrata, have to be put in the relevant index, cf. Recanati
(2004a, p.57).)
(30 As Borg (2004, p. 140) accurately claims, by pointing to an original example by Davidson: does one
string of uttered sounds/words count as an utterance of the English sentence “Empedocles leapt” or
of the German sentence “Empedocles liebt”?)
treated sentence ambiguity.
An ambiguous sentence is such that it must be
paired with different clauses, hence with difference clause-index pairs, that
respectively have a different truth-conditional interpretation. Likewise for an
ambiguous utterance. Yet in the case of an ambiguous sentence, the two
different clauses hence the two different pairs respectively represent different
utterances of such a sentence. But in the case of an ambiguous utterance, what
are the different things that the two different clauses hence the two different
pairs respectively represent? Mental utterances? Yet as we have seen before, in
the case of a multistable pun an inner utterance is as ambiguous as an outer
utterance. So, there are no different mental utterances the underlying clauses
hence the pairs respectively represent. Or perhaps different meaning
experiences, i.e., the experiences of hearing/reading an utterance as having a
certain meaning rather than another one? Definitely, in the case of a
multistable pun we have different such experiences. Yet a meaning experience
is not what an underlying clause, hence a pair, should represent. What should
be represented should be something that, unlike a meaning experience, has no
meaning by itself, for it should receive its meaning precisely from the
underlying clause, hence a pair, endowed with its own truth-conditional
interpretation. So, the analogy between ambiguous sentences and ambiguous
utterances the non-contextualist appeals to breaks down. In uttering an
ambiguous sentence, its utterer means it in a particular way insofar her
utterance is represented by an underlying clause – possibly, a Mentalese
sentence – having its own truth-conditions and lending them to the utterance
itself. But in thinking one and the same ambiguous utterance, its thinker means
in a particular way insofar as her clause with its own truth-conditions represent
what?
At this point, the non-contextualist may put forward another, perhaps more
obvious, move. True enough, the datum that in the case of multi-stable puns
one and the same utterance has different significances is undeniable. Yet, the
non-contextualist may go on saying, since such different significances are
precisely a matter of the utterer’s intentions, as the contextualist has pointed
out, they have to be taken as implicatures in Grice’s (1975) classical sense
rather than as explicatures (to put in Carston’s (2002) terms); namely, as far as
a sentence in (narrow) context is concerned, such different significances affect
the level of what is implicated rather than the level of what is said, hence an
extra-truthconditional level rather than the truth-conditional level. If this is the
case, wide context is certainly involved, but in its typical post-semantic role. In
this case, wide context helps in assigning an utterance, which already has (via
the proper clause-index pair representing it) just certain truth-conditions,
different implicatures at one and the same time. In this respect, a noncontextualist
may say, the comparison between the utterances of multi-stable
puns such as (6)-(7)-(8) and the utterances of insidious sentences such as
(11)-(12) is welcome. For, she would continue, each of the latter utterances is
insidious.
For by means of each such utterance its utterer intends to convey a
plurivocal significance over and above the unambiguous truth-conditional
meaning it already has. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds of each of the punny
utterances of (6)-(7)-(8).
Yet this move again seems ad hoc. For the non-contextualist has claimed
that in the case of puns involving a speaker-induced well-grounded
misunderstanding to be removed, like the one presented by (5) before,
meaning interpretation has to be accounted for at the semantic level. As a
result, the non-contextualist has insisted that in such cases wide context
operates at the pre-semantic level. Given the utterer’s intentions, the relevant
utterance has just one truth-conditional interpretation. Simply, as wide context
enables one to discover, that interpretation is not the one originally supposed
by the interlocutor. Yet why then in the case of multi-stable puns should wide
context be appealed to at the post-semantic level? In other terms, it seems
arbitrary to account for one and the same phenomenon of signification now at
the pre-, now at the post-, semantic level.
In this respect, the contextualist account is more elegant. For it appeals to a
unitary explanation enabling her to account for all kinds of puns – not only the
two previously mentioned, but also a third case of puns involving zeugmas –
precisely at the semantic level. The idea is, wherever there is a punny content
for an utterance, this content has to be accounted for at the truth-conditional
level: it is what the utterance says. Hence, the role wide context plays in the
relevant pun depends on how to ensure that the punny content is what the
utterance says. Let me describe things more in detail.
To begin with, the contextualist may even acknowledge that in the case of
puns involving a speaker-induced well-grounded misunderstanding, wide
context has a merely pre-semantic role. For she agrees that in such a case the
relevant utterance of the sentence in question is not ambiguous. Yet for her
what really counts in this move is that it saves the point of the pun, which is to
let the interlocutor realize that the utterance says a certain thing (rather than
another). For that utterance has certain truth-conditions, the punny ones. Yet
the contextualist will add that if we also want to save the point of the pun in the
case of multi-stable puns, we have to claim that wide context should play a
semantic role in such a case. For this time the point of the pun is to let the
utterance say different things. The contextualist accounts for this utterance
ambiguity by saying that in such a case wide context makes one and the same
utterance have many truth-conditions. According to the contextualist,
moreover, also in a third kind of case, namely the case of zeugmatic puns, wide
context must play a semantic role. For this time the point of the pun is to let the
utterance say an ‘impossible’ thing. On the one hand, the relevant sentence
contains an anaphoric link syntactically suggesting that in the relevant
utterance of that sentence, a certain sub-sentential token of a term yields the
same truth-conditional contribution as another token of that term to which that
token is anaphorically linked. Yet on the other hand, the anaphora
notwithstanding, in that utterance the relevant token yields a truth-conditional
contribution (possibly radically) different from the one provided by the token it
is anaphorically linked to. As wide context, notably the utterer’s intentions,
again causes the utterance to say, thereby again playing a semantic role.
Consider:
15. After two unsuccessful marriages, I find myself keeping my guard up,
along with my underpants
16. I called her a whore and myself a cab
17. John and his driving licence expired yesterday.
In all the punny utterances of those sentences, a meaning shift occurs.
Sometimes this shift is less radical, involving only different yet somehow
related polysemical senses, sometimes it is more radical, involving ambiguity.
Now, the anaphorical link subsisting in all these sentences does not prevent
that shift from occurring. In the relevant utterance of (15), an implicit token of
“keeping” refers back to a previous explicit token of the same word, yet the
implicit token has a ‘physical’ reading while the explicit one has a metaphorical
reading: underpants, not guard, are physically kept up. In the utterance of
(16), an implicit token of “called” refers back to a previous explicit token of
the same word, yet the implicit token means retrieved someone’s attention
while the explicit one means labelled. In the utterance of (17), an explicit token
of “expired” refers back to a previous implicit token of the same word, yet the
explicit token means came to an end while the implicit one means died.31 In all
these cases, the anaphorical link would prompt one to interpret the second
token exactly like the first one. Yet such a syntactically driven interpretation is
rejected. For one realizes that the utterer’s purpose was precisely to create a
punny effect in which the meaning of the second token is shifted, the anaphoric
link notwithstanding. This is precisely why the interpretation of the whole
utterance is ‘impossible’. For the contextualist, this interpretation is again a
truth-conditional interpretation of such utterances: they say something
‘impossible’.
Incidentally, once again this phenomenon – anaphorical link plus meaning
shift in one and the same utterance – does not obtain in punny cases only.32
Consider two utterances of:
18. Norman Mailer likes to read himself
19. He drank the whole bottle and smashed it to the floor.33
Contextualists would again say that also in these cases, the anaphoric link
respectively tying “himself” to “Norman Mailer” and “it” to “the (whole)
bottle” notwithstanding, those utterances of (18) and (19) are respectively
true iff Norman Mailer likes to read some work or other of his and iff the
demonstrated person drank the whole content of a bottle and smashed that
bottle to the floor. Unlike the zeugmatic cases presented by (15)-(16)-(17),
however, that the relevant utterances of (18)-(19) have such ‘impossible’ truthconditions
depends not on the utterer’s intentions, but rather on other widecontextual
factors. These factors are i) co-text – the fact that the pronoun
“himself” follows the verb “to read” in (18) and the fact that in (19) the first
token of “bottle” is linked with the verb “to drink” and the adjective “whole”,
while the second token is linked with the verb “to smash” – and ii) pragmatic
relations linking the ordinary referents with the extended referents of the
relevant expressions in those utterances, namely a pragmatic relation linking
(31 Of course, in order to fully vindicate the anaphora, one may postulate an ad hoc concept that would be the
disjunctive referent of both the first and the second token of the relevant subsentential term. Yet, as Carston
and Wilson implicitly admit in putting forward such a proposal - cf. (1996, p. 427), (1997) - this move
would annihilate the punny effect of the utterance. See also Lascarides, Copestake and Briscoe (1996, p.
47).
(32 Once again, one thing is the meaning shift, another is the comical effect. On behalf of the ‘incongruity’
theory of humor (cf. fn.15), one may again say that even here the meaning shift is comical for the ‘impossible’
interpretation is incongruous).
(33 For those examples, cf. Fauconnier (1985, p. 7) and Sainsbury (2010, p.139) respectively_
an author with his work in the case of (18) and another pragmatic relation
linking a container to its content in the case of (19).34
Clearly enough, in such cases of meaning shift meta-contextualism is again
at work. For it is wide-contextual which wide-contextual factor is relevant to
determine the utterance’s truth-conditions: utterer’s intentions in the case of
the above utterances of (15)-(16)-(17), factors i) and ii) in the case of the
above utterances of (18)-(19). Such a meta-contextualism is even more evident
if we consider different utterances of one and the same sentence, a punny and a
non-punny one. Consider a punny utterance of:
20. I’m reading a book about anti-gravity. I can’t put it down.
In this utterance, the meaning shift from literary work to physical copy of a
work involving the first token and the second (implicit) token of “book”
respectively leads that utterance to have ‘impossible’ truth-conditions. These
truth-conditions are induced by the utterer’s comical intention to generate a
zeugmatic effect. Yet if (20) were uttered without such an intention, the
resulting utterance would not have such truth-conditions. Rather, it would just
have the normal truth-conditions according which that utterance would be true
iff the agent of the context were reading a work on anti-gravity and that reading
could not be interrupted.
In this paper I have not only provided an interesting datum concerning
multistable puns, according to which punny utterances of certain sentences
have multiple readings, but I have also claimed that those readings affect the
truth-conditional level of what is said by such utterances. As such different
readings are prompted by a wide-contextual factor, namely the speaker’s
intentions, with respect to such utterances wide context plays a semantic role.
Moreover, I have claimed, this account is grounded by the idea that punny
interpretations affect the truth-conditional level of what is said also when puns
of other kinds are at stake, namely both the puns involving a speaker-induced
removal of a well-grounded misunderstanding and the zeugmatic puns. Simply,
while in the former case wide context plays a pre-semantic role – it selects a
given interpretation for an utterance of a sentence by choosing which meaning
that sentence actually mobilizes – in the latter case it again plays a semantic
)34 For this way of putting the referential distinction in question cf. Nunberg (1979)).
role, by making the utterance funnily say something ‘impossible’ in virtue of
the speaker’s intentions. Now, experimental pragmatics may further
corroborate this latter idea, if it will experimentally turn out that, as I believe,
language users straightforwardly interpret a punny utterance according to one
of the three possibilities just sketched: a) by proving an interpretation that
removes a previous interpretation; b) by providing a multistable interpretation;
c) by providing an ‘impossible’ interpretation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper was originally presented at the LOGOS Seminar, Department of
Logic and Philosophy of Science, November 10, 2010, Barcelona and then at
the Institut for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information, June 10, 2011,
San Sebastian. I also thank Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Andrea Iacona,
Genoveva Marti and Stefano Predelli, for their important comments on
previous versions of this paper.
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