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Wednesday, January 9, 2013

A Discourse By Grice

Speranza
 
Commentary on M. Mazzer,
"The Text as a Context:
Blurring the Boundaries between Sentence and Discourse"

Grice loved a motto.

He would say that one of the philosophical dicta that influenced him most he heard from Cook Wilson:

What we know we know.

This is a sentence -- and a discourse.

"I am; therefore I think" is false

but

"I think; therefore, I am" -- is possible a sentence AND a discourse. (Grice was careful with the use of 'therefore').

In general, Grice thought, oddly, that 'sentence', unlike 'discourse', was a value-oriented notion:

"The if not well Peter wasn't the the"

is NOT a sentence. The idea of a sentence is already value-oriented. Hence his opposition, in "Vacuous Names" (where he presents his System G-HP, a highly powerful version of System G) to otiose terms like "well-formed formula" -- and such.

Conversation, and discourse, Grice used "informally". In his Oxford Lectures on Logic and Conversation, that predated the William James ones, he is strict that he will deal with what he calls couplets, such as

A: What time is it?
B: Noon.

This is the origin of the idea of a conversational implicature, a refinement of Nowell-Smith's mere "contextual implication". Since then, Grice became obsessed, in a good way, with "CONVERSATION" as the unit for philosophical analysis.

A central and influential idea among researchers of language is that the
sentence, by virtue of its direct relationship with syntactic parsing,
represents the heart of language itself. Even in the field of pragmatics,
models rooted in classical theories tend to put sentence prominence
forward again.

Here, we present results from recordings of eventrelated
brain potentials that brings into question even the distinction
between sentence and discourse.

During natural communicative
exchanges, the human brain continuously and immediately relates
incoming words to the previous discourse, whether it is constituted of a
word, a sentence or complex speech. Moreover, focusing on discourse
instead of sentence represents a viable strategy to better understand the
relationship between language and other cognitive systems.
Keywords: Discourse; text; context; experimental pragmatics; ERPs
recordings.

Our theme is the pragmatics of discourse.

The aim is to highlight
the impact of discourse-level factors on language processing in order to
demonstrate that the classic separation between sentence and discourse may be
misleading if we want to investigate the processes that extract meaning from
language. Moreover, moving the attention from sentence as an abstract and
formal entity to discourse as a concrete and shaping context is a good way to
release language from isolation and consider it on the basis of its relationship
with other cognitive processes, in an interdisciplinary framework.

Communicative activity, generally, does not rely on the exchange of
isolated information but on the construction and transmission of meaningful
and coherent sequences of sentences. In spite of the evidence, in cognitive
science, for a long time, the study of discourse has received very little
attention.

Why?

According to most of the interpretative models developed in
the field of cognitive science, the proposition represents the essence of
language. Since proposition belongs to the domain of syntactic analysis,
assuming that proposition is the essence of language is equivalent to sustain
that sintax represents the core of linguistic processing.
In pragmatics there is a widespread agreement on the idea that syntactic
and semantic processing constitute just one side of the coin. The other side is
represented by additional ‘contextual’ factors that help to fix the final
interpretation of a sentence.

In fact, in order to comprehend the speaker’s
meaning, listeners are required to perform two basic tasks: decoding what is
said (semantic meaning) and understanding what is meant (pragmatic
meaning).

In other terms, “pragmatic theories agree in considering meaning as
comprising a semantic component (the meaning of what is said) and a
pragmatic component (the meaning derived by what is intended by the
speaker).

Both the processes involved in the unification of the two components
and the time-course of these processes are, however, still under debate”
(Balconi, 2010, p. 96).

The debate, in particular, is between supporters of a
“two step model” and supporters of a “one step model,” borrowing Hagoort’s
expressions (Hagoort, 2007). The first group argues that these two processes
are accomplished in a serial fashion – with semantic meaning processed first
and pragmatic meaning processed in a delayed time – while the second group
predicts an earlier interaction of linguistic and contextual information in order
to obtain a complete representation of what is meant by the speaker.


The two step model originates from Oxford philosopher Herbert Paul Grice’s distinction between
 
(a) “what is said” (literal meaning) and
 
(b) “what is implicitly meant” (pragmatic meaning)
(e.g. Grice, 1975, 1989).
 
To grasp the speaker’s communicative intentions,
listeners are required to pass first through the comprehension of literal
meaning. If their expectations are not attended (i.e. if the conversational
maxims are not respected) at the explicit level, then inferential processes
intervene to adjust literal meaning on the basis of linguistic and extra-linguistic
context.

Cognitive versions of the Gricean model predict that comprehension
process occurs in multiple stages:

(a) language module elaborates semantic
meaning

(b) the output of language module is related to contextual
information,

(c1) if there is agreement between the two outputs, the process
stops while

(c2) if there is no agreement, a mechanism of contextual
adjustment is activated. In the last case the processing time of language
comprehension increases (Bambini, 2003, p. 137).

Agreeing with the two step model implies accepting the idea that sentence
processing occurs always before discourse processing because, in this view,
the contextual constraints conveyed by the text are considered only after that
the literal meaning of the utterance is computed.

Cutler and Clifton (1999),
for example, state that, based on syntactic analysis and thematic processing,
utterance interpretation takes place first and integration into a discourse
model follows.

In line with these considerations, Lattner and Friederici (2003)
claim that mismatches between spoken message and speaker’s intentions are
detected relatively late, in slow pragmatic computations, that are different from
rapid semantic computations in which word meanings are combined.


According to Hagoort (2007), a model such this still embraces a
“syntactocentric perspective” which perceives sintax as the central aspect of
language (e.g. Chomsky, 1980).

It is possible to sum up this perspective in
two assumptions:

(1) The truly relevant aspects of language are coded in
syntax,

(2) The semantic interpretation of an expression is derived from its
syntactic structure (Hagoort, 2007, p. 801).

The heaviest consequence of this
inheritance is that language analysis continues to focus on the sentence first,
leaving the discourse behind.

The theoretical background of the one step model, instead, lies in the
immediacy assumption, formulated by Just and Carpenter in 1980, that states
that linguistic information relative to the single words together with the
linguistic and extralinguistic contextual information, concur, from the
beginning, to determine the meaning of the incoming words.

At a cognitive
level, having immediately access to all information at one’s disposal means, in
concrete terms, to bypass the stage of the literal processing. The focus of
attention is, in fact, on the effects of the context and the way it interacts with
the rest of the linguistic information. In line with this idea, a first extension of
the role of pragmatic processes has been made by relevance theorists: pragmatic processes concern the determination of both what is said and what is meant.

According to the relevance theory, the main aim
of inferential pragmatics is to detect speakers’ communicative intentions since
the processing of the literal meaning of an utterance is not sufficient to
determine what the speakers desire to communicate (underdeterminacy
thesis).
In the next paragraph we will see how experimental techniques can
contribute positively to the debate, showing that the one step model is more
appropriate than the two step model to suit the evidence provided by the study
of the working brain.


A good deal of experimental data in favor of the one step model is offered by
Gibbs’ various work on reading times (Gibbs, 1989, 2002, 2004).

Gibbs’
reading times data showed that linguistic and contextual information interact
early on to ensure the construction of contextually appropriate meanings and
the inhibition of contextually inappropriate ones. In other words, when given
enough contextual information, as in the ecological setting, listeners are able
to directly access the correct interpretation of what is said, without elaborating
conventional (but not appropriate) sentence meaning.

If reading-time experiments tend to concentrate on the processing of figurative
language, electrophysiological studies face the question of discourse
processing in a more direct way.

Electrophysiological studies, for more than
twenty years, have focused only on the processing of sentences rather than on
discourse.

According to Van Berkum, the reasons for this radical choice lie in
historical, social and concrete motives:


One reason is that psycholinguistic ERP research is for historical reasons
strongly rooted in the sentence processing community. This means that most of
the people with EEG expertise and easy access to EEG labs have sentence
processing issues in mind, whereas those most interested in discourse and
conversation are short of expertise and labs.

Furthermore combining EEG with
single sentences is already difficult enough as it is. Because at least 30-40 trials
are needed per condition to obtain a relatively clean ERP, factorial sentencelevel
EEG experiments require the presentation on many lengthy trials, as well
as sometimes months of work to create the materials.

Another problem is that
within each of these lengthy trials, people are not supposed to move their eyes,
head or body. With a longer fragment of text or conversation in each trial, all
this is only going to get worse.

In recent years, the fall of most of the ideological and practical obstacles has
finally allowed electrophysiology to approach the discourse with fruitful
results. For instance, the study of N400 component of the event-related
potentials (ERP)1 that, at first, was very useful to throw light on sentence
processing, in a second moment found a large application even in the field of
discourse.

Kutas and Hillyard (1980) were the first to observe this negativegoing
potential, comparing ERPs recordings to the last word of sentences that
either ended congruously (1) or incongruously (2):

1. I take my coffee with cream and sugar

2. I take my coffee with cream and dog

The authors found negativity in the brainwaves that was much larger for
incongruous sentence completions than for the congruous ones.

Because it
peaked about 400 milliseconds after the onset of the presentation of the word,
this negativity was called the N400. Since its original discovery, much has been
learned about the processing nature of the N400. In particular, as Hagoort and
Brown (1994) observed, the N400 effect does not rely on semantic violation.
For example, subtle differences in semantic expectancy, as between mouth and
pocket in the sentence context

“Jenny put the sweet in her mouth/pocket after
the lesson”,

can also modulate the N400 amplitude (Hagoort & Brown,
1994).

Specifically, as the degree of semantic fit between a word and its
context increases, the amplitude of the N400 goes down. Owing to such subtle
modulations, the word-elicited N400 is generally viewed as reflecting the
process that integrate the meaning of a word into the overall meaning
representation constructed by the preceding language input (Hagoort, 2007).
Among the pioneer works that applied the study of N400 component to
discourse processing figures the one of St George, Mannes and Hoffman
(1994), aimed to investigate whether the N400 is sensitive to global, as well as
local, semantic expectancy.

Global coherence refers to the ease with which
subjects can relate the current proposition they are reading with theme-related
ideas. In this study, the effect of global coherence on event-related brain
potentials was tested using four titled and untitled paragraphs, presented one
word at a time.

These paragraphs are non-coherent and are made coherent only
through the presentation of a title. The EEG was recorded in response to every
word in all four paragraphs. An example:

The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into different


The N400 components is a negative-going wave that peaks approximately 400 ms after the onset of
the stimulus and has a centro-parietal distribution (evident over the back of the head) which is slighty
larger over the right hemisphere (Kutas, Van Petten & Besson, 1988).
groups depending on their makeup. Of course, one pile may be sufficient
depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go somewhere else due to
lack of facilities that is the next step, otherwise you are pretty well set. It is
important not to overdo any particular endeavor.

That is, it is better to do too
few things at once than too many. In the shorter run this may not seem
important, but complications from doing too many can easily arise. A mistake
can be expensive as well. The manipulation of the appropriate mechanisms
should be self-explanatory, and we need not dwell on it here. At first the whole
procedure will seem complicated. Soon, however, it will become just another
facet of life. It is difficult to foresee any end to the necessity of this task in the
immediate future, but then one can never tell (St, George, Mannes & Hoffman,
1994 cited in Van Berkum, in press).

Whereas the story appears locally coherent in that its individual sentences
are interconnected and related to a single topic, it is rather difficult to
understand what it is about. When the story is provided with a title, however,
the subject becomes immediately clear (in this case, the title was “Procedure
for washing clothes”).

The ERP recordings, in fact, showed an increase in
N400 amplitude in response to the words in the Untitled paragraphs relative to
the Titled paragraphs, indicating that global coherence does affect the N400.
Building on this initial exploration, Van Berkum and colleagues (1999,
2003, 2008, 2009) performed Kutas and Hillyard’ experiment (1980) on a
large scale (micro-discourses compounded by two or more sentences). In
particular, they examined the brain’s response to words that were equally
acceptable in their local carrier sentence (i.e., 1a and 1b) but differed radically
in how well they fit the wider discourse (i.e., 2a and 2b) as in:

1. Jane told her brother that he was exceptionally…

a) Quick

b) Slow

2. By five in the morning, Jane’s brother had already showered and had even
gotted dressed. Jane told her brother that he was exceptionally…

a) Quick

b) Slow


Van Berkum and colleagues found that words which elicit N400s of
approximately equal amplitude in an isolated sentence (i.e., 1) do not elicit
equivalent N400s when they occur in a context that makes one version more
plausible that the other (i.e., 2).

Specifically, relative to the discourse-coherent
counterpart (i.e. quick), the discourse-anomalous words (i.e. slow) elicited a
larger N400 effect. Furthermore it is worthy to note that the discoursedependent
N400 effect emerged for clause-final words as well as for clausemedial
words. This means that every incoming word is immediately related to
the wider discourse. Furthermore, with spoken words (Van Berkum et al.,
2003), the effect of discourse-level fit emerged as early as 150 ms after
acoustic word onset, (i.e., only some 2-3 phonemes into the word). This
suggests that spoken words are actually related to the wider discourse
extremely rapidly, well before they have been fully pronounced, and possibly
even before they have become acoustically unique.

Finally, the timing, shape
and scalp distribution of the N400 effect elicited by discourse-dependent
anomalies did not differ from that of the ‘classic’ sentence-dependent N400
effect. This indicates that discourse and sentence-dependent semantic
constraints are brought to bear on comprehension as part of the same unified
interpretation process (Van Berkum, in press).

The relevance of identical sentence- and discourse-dependent anomaly
effects would of course be somewhat limited if the commonality simply
reflected some common error detection process, activated by two otherwise
very different comprehension processes. However, it has long been know that
the word-elicited N400 effect is not a simple anomaly detector, but a reliable
index of the ease with which lexical meaning is integrated into the wider
sentential context (Kutas & Van Petten, 1994). In line with this, Otten and
Van Berkum (2005) showed that in a sentence such as:


3. The brave knight saw that the dragon threatened the benevolent sorcerer. He
quickly reached for a:

a) Sword
b) Lance

relative to highly expected words in discourse (e.g., “sword”), words that are
merely somewhat less expected (e.g., “lance”) also elicit a N400 effect.


Until now, none evidence has been found in support of the standard model
according to which new words are related to the discourse model only after
they have been evaluated in terms of their contribution to local sentence
semantics. On the contrary, evidence from the N400 consistently indicates
that words are related immediately to the wider discourse and in a way that is no
different from how they are related to local sentence-level context. This
accords well with the models of language comprehension that do not make a
distinction between the computation of sentence- and discourse-level
meaning.

Considerations such as these bring into question the traditional and
well accepted idea that discourse-related information is not instantly available
and must be retrieved from memory when needed (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).


The relevant discourse information can sometimes be brought to bear on local
processing within a mere 150 ms after spoken word onset. This indication
appears to be at odds with estimates of how long it would take to retrieve
information about prior discourse from long-term memory, i.e., 300-400 ms
at least (Hagoort, 2007).

Fancy stories constitute a clear evidence of the power of discourse to
determine meaning because when knowledge of the real world is not useful to
make sense of the incoming words, the alternative way is to call upon the rest of
the story to find out what it is going on. Indeed, in cases such as these, the
immediate integration of lexical-semantic information into a discourse model is
particularly clear. Evidence regarding this has efficiently been provided by
Nieuwland & Van Berkum (2006).

They had subjects listening to short stories
in which the inanimate protagonist was attributed with different animacy
characteristics.2 For instance, one of these stories was about a peanut in love:
A woman saw a dancing peanut who had a big smile on his face. The peanut was
singing about a girl he had just met. And judging from the song, the peanut was
totally crazy about her. The woman thought it was really cute to see the peanut
singing and dancing like that. The peanut was salted/in love , and by the sound
of it, this was definitively mutual. He was seeing a little almond.


The canonical inanimate predicate (i.e., salted) for this inanimate object
(i.e, peanut) elicited a larger N400 than the locally anomalous, but
contextually appropriate predicate (i.e., in love). These results show that
2 Animacy is the classification of nouns, and the things these words refer, based on the degree
to which they are “alive” or animate.

discourse context can completely overrule constraints provided by animacy, a
feature claimed to be part of the evolutionary hardwired aspects of conceptual
knowledge (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) and often mentioned as a prime
example of the semantic primitives involved in the computation of context-free
sentence meaning. Therefore we agree with Van Berkum when he says that
what primarily seems to matter is how things fit what is being talked about right
now, be in the real world or in a fancy world of happy peanuts (Van Berkum,
2008, p. 377).

 

The observed identity of discourse- and sentence-level N400 effects can be
accounted for in terms of a processing model that abandons the distinction
between sentence and discourse.

One viable way to do this, according to
Hagoort (2007), is by invoking the notion of ‘common ground’ (see Clark,
1992 for a discussion about the definition of common ground). Linguistic
analyses have demonstrated that the meaning of utterances cannot be
determined without taking into account the knowledge that speaker and
listener share and mutually believe they share such as information that comes
from the bases of community membership, physical co-presence, and linguistic
co-presence.

For example, conversational participants would be able to infer
that they share various types of knowledge on the basis of both being in a
particular city, or by looking at a particular object at the same time.
Now we know, from electrophysiological evidences, that in the notion of
common ground we should also include a model of discourse which is
continually updated as the discourse unfolds. With a single sentence, the
relevant common ground only includes whatever discourse and world
knowledge has just been activated by the sentence fragment presented so far.
With a sentence embedded in a discourse context, the relevant common
ground will be somewhat richer, now also including information elicited by the
specific earlier discourse. But the unification process that integrates incoming
words with the relevant common ground should not really care about where the
interpretative constraints came from (Hagoort, 2007, p. 803).
According to an impressive analogy coined by McCarthy (1994),
processing the discourse is like watching an impressionist painting. When you
stop looking for strokes and brushworks, you can grasp the global meaning of
what is represented. What are the advantages from taking the landscape of the
text as our starting point rather than focusing on its constituent forms? First of
all, we are compelled to recognize that such a landscape is not just an
assemblage of linguistic strokes but a coherent entity purposefully
constructed.

Moreover, “the moment one starts to think of language as
discourse the entire landscape changes, usually forever”(McCarthy, 1994, p.
201). Admiring the beauty of the composition, instead of focusing on the
single strokes of the brush, obviously, is not a strategy to reduce the
importance of the components but merely a way of seeing how each of them
contributes to the entire project of the painting.


In the same vein, focusing on the deeper rather than on the shallow level of
comprehension is not a way of diminishing the relevance of lexical processing
or syntactic parsing at a surface plane. Blurring the boundaries between
sentence and discourse is not intended to deny the relevance of the sentential
structure for semantic interpretation. On the contrary, sentence-level syntactic
devices (such as word order, case marking, local phrase structure or
agreement) and thematic roles constrain the structure of discourse. However,
this is fully compatible with the claim that contextual information conveyed by
discourse are processed in parallel with local sentence meaning.


The scientific study of language has been shaped by the assumption that the
human language faculty evolved for thinking rather than for communicating
(e.g., Chomsky, 1980). This ‘‘language-as-product” tradition takes language
itself as the object of study, focusing on grammatical knowledge and the core
processes for recovering linguistic structure from sentences. As Brennan
states:

“This common focus has given generations of psycholinguists and other
cognitive scientists license to concentrate on the study of the linguistic
representation and processing in the mind and brain of a lone (and largely
generic) native speaker, independent of context. As a result, a great deal is
known about how individuals store, organize, and access knowledge in the
mental lexicon; how individuals parse sentences and resolve syntactic
ambiguity; and how individuals plan and articulate utterances. But there is
more to language processing than these (seemingly) autonomous processes”
(Brennan, 2010, p. 302).

What remains to investigate is what happens in the brain during
communicative processes. This implies, first of all, overcoming the Chomskyan
distinction between competence and performance, “one of the heaviest
burdens for a truly comprehensive approach to language” (Baggio, in press). In
my view, studying performance using experimental tools seems to be the best
way to enlighten the nature of language processing and “if experimental
research provides evidence which does not align with the introspective
judgments of the linguist or other native speakers, then, following common
practice in science, there is no other choice than to accept the results of the
former and reject the latter” (ibidem).

We have claimed that the brain does not seem to honor the classical division
between sentence and discourse. Indeed, electrophysiological data indicate
that there is no qualitative difference between processing a word in a sentence
or processing it in a discursive frame. In both cases, the brain adopts the
biggest frame at its disposal to interpret the word’s meaning:
To the language user, discourse-level processing is simply language-driven
conceptual processing, regardless of whether it occurs in a single sentence or a
longer discourse. And intuitively, this makes sense. Does it really matter, for
example, whether the targeted entity of a free referential pronoun like “he” has
been introduced in the previous sentence or in the current one? (Van Berkum,
in press, p. 16).

Two-step models, following the tradition launched by the Oxford philosopher Herbert Paul Grice, assume that comprehension processes take place in a two-step fashion.

First, the context-free meaning of a
sentence is computed by combining fixed word meanings in ways specified by
the syntax.

Second, the sentence meaning is integrated with information from
prior discourses, world knowledge, information about the speaker and
semantic information from extra-linguistic domains such as co-speech gestures
or the visual world.

Such ideas are not supported by electrophysiological
evidence and consequently are not adequate in light of our understanding of
the principles of brain function.

One-step models, instead, represent the
“neuro-friendly” alternative to two-step models. At the heart of these models
there is the idea that comprehension processes are based on the parallel use of
multiple clues of both a linguistic (phonology, syntax, semantics) and
pragmatic nature (knowledge about the context, the speaker, states of affairs in
the world and the rest of discourse) that operate under unification principles in
order to address the interpretation processes.

In every communicative situation, the brain selects from among the
information at its disposal that which is more suitable to the context and less
expensive from a cognitive point of view. The contextual information has a
double function: on the one hand it is necessary to interpret what has been said
in an appropriate way, on the other hand it allows to anticipate what is going to
be said. Looking forward positively affects the speed and efficiency of the
comprehension processes.

As Van Berkum states “what we see is an
opportunistic proactive brain at work” (Van Berkum, 2008, p. 379), a brain
that seeks, from the first moment, to pick up the communicative intentions of
the speaker without necessarily passing through a literal phase that is often
little informative from a pragmatic point of view.
Establishing the weight to be assigned to the discourse is not a question of
little importance. It determines, for example, which is the place of pragmatics
in relation to other levels of language analysis.

The discussion has two major
opponents; complementary theory and perspective theory. While the first
considers pragmatics as an additional linguistic component, the second
concerns pragmatic competence as a fundamental aspect of a more general
communicative competence (Balconi, 2010).

According to complementary
theory, it is possible to represent linguistic components in a hierarchical
fashion. Along imaginary stairs, discourse, as the “biggest chunk” (Van
Berkum, in press), has to be positioned on the top. Underneath we can find all
the others units, from sentences to phonemes, going through words and
morphemes.

This kind of approach tends to crumble the research object in
separate units to better understand it. The result is a puzzle of pieces waiting to
be connected to each other. If this strategy is fruitful from an analytic point of
view, it is not really useful to understand how communicative processes really
works.

On the other side, perspective theory states that pragmatics is not just a
level of analysis among others, but it is a way to interpret language as a
communicative phenomenon immersed into the contexts at all levels. As we
have seen, electrophysiological data go exactly in this direction, attesting
perspective view as the best way to describe linguistic processes as they really
happen in the brain.


In line with the perspective theory, discourse, intended as the widest
linguistic context at disposal, becomes the unit of reference of every linguistic
exchange.

Given the binding action that discourse exercises on interpretative
processes, it is endowed with cognitive priority, metaphorically representing
the dam of the spoken flux that constantly guides production and
comprehension processes. Interestingly, the distinguishing mark of discourse
is coherence intended as the thematic and conceptual unit of a text. It is
possible to conceive of coherence as the glue thanks to which words and
sentences are stuck together and connected to each other. It is not a
coincidence that the word “text” (from latin, “textus”) alludes to the fact that
the sentences that form the “biggest chunk” are interwoven with each other in
a specific, i.e. in a coherent, way (Simone, 2002, p. 406). In spite of its
importance, coherence has always been considered by linguists out of the
Pillars of Hercules (ivi, p. 449) because it is not just a linguistic phenomenon
but it is situated in a border zone where language interfaces other cognitive
processes such as memory and executive functions (e.g. Ferretti & Adornetti,
2012).

In general terms, studying language as a context-dependent phenomenon
means cutting the distances between language and other cognitive processes:
In its infinite variation, context permeates information processing: regularities
in the way the brain integrates and exploits context might bypass the
distinctions among cognitive modules, while maintaining the distinctiveness of
each faculty.

Indeed, we might be facing a point here where language and other
systems share mechanisms that developed evolutionarily in response to
environmental demands. So, in order to get a full account of processing
pragmatic fact in the brain, one cannot exclude that neuropragmatics should
dialogue with other context-sensitive ‘neuro’disciplines and become even more
interdisciplinary (Bambini, 2010, p. 15).

In the future, the pragmatics of discourse could surely gain important
successes if it will choose to follow the interdisciplinary route. Now that we are
moving away from the “modular era” and we are approaching a new “network
era”, the idea that language shares some mechanisms with other cognitive
processes is becoming so evident that it is not acceptable anymore to consider
language as an isolated system. Indeed, more and more studies, using fMRI or
PET, have proved the existence of a common network shared by discourse
processing and other cognitive processes such as social cognition or spatial
and temporal navigation (e.g, Ferstl, 2008, Spreng, 2008, Ferstl, 2010).
“Now that we can look under the hood of the car” , as Van Berkum states, (Van
Berkum, 2008, p. 379), what remains to do is to go into the conceptual
implications of the experimental data to see what the interaction between
language, cognition and perception can tell us about the nature of language
itself.

REFERENCES


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Clinical Grice

Speranza

Commentary on I. Adornetti,
"Why Philosophical Pragmatics Needs Clinical Pragmatics"

The study provides applications of Grice to clinical psychology, with extensive references.

Adoretti aims to show how clinical pragmatics (the study of pragmatic
deficits) can fruitfully inform the classical theoretical models proposed
by philosophical pragmatics.

In the first part of the essay Adornetti argues that
theories proposed in the domain of philosophical pragmatics, as those
elaborated by Herbert Paul Grice, are not plausible from a cognitive point
of view and that for this reason they cannot be useful to understand
pragmatic deficits.

In the second part, Adornetti shows that Relevance Theory
overcomes this limitation (being consistent with the data about actual
mind’s functioning), but I also argue that it offers a restricted view of
human communication which has to be integrated with a model of
language use that takes into account a central pragmatic property:
coherence of discourse.

Keywords: cognitive plausibility, discourse coherence, executive
functions, pragmatic impairments, relevance theory.



Pragmatics, since its dawn as a branch of the sciences of language, has been the
subject of numerous debates about the nature and definition of its object of
study.

While scholars of syntax and semantics agree, at least on a general level,
on what should be their field of study, among scholars of pragmatics there is no
general consensus on what constitutes the domain of study of their discipline.
The absence of such a consensus is evident, for example, in the various
definitions of pragmatics that it can be find among the authors who deal with it.

For example, some, assuming language centrality, define pragmatics in general terms as “the study of the use of language”, and more specifically as “the study of how contextual factors
interact with linguistic meaning in the interpretation of utterances”.

Other
authors, instead, focusing their attention on non-linguistic features (gaze,
gestures, postures, etc), describe pragmatic behavior as not dependent on the
use of language (Dronkers, Ludy, & Redfern, 1998).

In some others cases,
scholars distinguish, at least implicitly, between linguistic and non-linguistic
pragmatics by using terms such as ‘pragmatic language impairment’ (Bishop,
2000) or ‘pragmatic language disorders’ (Martin & MacDonald, 2003).


In recent decades, the definition of pragmatics has been strongly influenced
by the results from the field of clinical pragmatics: the study of clinical cases
has offered valuable new sources of data with respect to traditional issues in
philosophical and linguistic pragmatics (e.g. Cummings, 2009; Perkins,
2007).

At the basis of this kind of methodological approach there is the idea
that through the study of deficits it is possible to identify capacities and
processes that underlie pragmatic behavior: here the maximum is that we
become aware of the nature of a mechanism or process by examining what
happens when it goes wrong. From this perspective, therefore, it is possible to
propose a model of pragmatics that respects the cognitive plausibility (the
interpretive model should be compatible with the knowledge about the
functioning of our mind). In this paper I assume as working definition of
clinical pragmatics the following proposed by Cummings (2009, p. 6):


Clinical pragmatics is the study of the various ways in which an individual’s use
of language to achieve communicative purposes can be disrupted. The cerebral
injury, pathology or other anomaly that causes this disruption has its onset in
the developmental period or during adolescence or adulthood.

Developmental
and acquired pragmatic disorders have diverse aetiologies and may be the
consequence of, related to or perpetuated by a range of cognitive and linguistic
factors.

Adornetti's aim is to show that our understanding of pragmatics can be informed
and extended by the study of pragmatic impairments. In the next section I aim
to discuss the advantages of such an approach compared to some theories
proposed in the area of philosophical pragmatics.


Although classical pragmatic theory as those proposed by the Oxford philosopher such
Herbert Paul  Grice has had a remarkable impact on the study
of pragmatic impairments, understanding of communication deficits has not
always been particularly well served by these theories.

This is due to a large
extent to the fact that these theories provide a means of describing pragmatics
and pragmatic impairments that is rarely adequate for clinicians (for a
discussion, see Perkins, 2007).

Austin’s Speech Act Theory, for example,
although used to test communication in several clinical populations, including
adult with aphasia (Wilcox & Davis, 1977) and children with Asperger’s
syndrome (Ziatas, Durkin, & Pratt, 2003) and autism (Loveland et al., 1988),
shows some limitations (Allan, 1998) that can be problematic for clinicians. As
an example, consider the following transcript, spoken by a man with traumatic
brain injury (TBI).

I have got faults and. my biggest fault is.
I do enjoy sport .
It’s something that I’ve always done.
I’ve done it all my life.
I’ve nothing but respect for my mother and father and my sister. and basically sir.
I’ve only come to this conclusion this last two months. and as far as I’m concerned
my sister doesn’t exist.

From
Perkins, Body & Parker, 1995, p. 305).

As you can see, each single utterance is well formed and has the
illocutionary form of a statement.

 However, considered as a whole, this piece of
language appears inappropriate from a pragmatic point of view.

Indeed, it lacks
coherence: it is characterized by sudden and irrelevant topic shifts.

So,
according to Speech Act Theory, utterances produced by TBI subject are not
problematic, although they are ineffective from a more general communicative
perspective. Here the problem is that Speech Act Theory has tended to focus
on single isolated sentences independent from discourse context (Geiss,
1995), but (as I will discuss more specifically in the last paragraph) a central
property of pragmatics is coherence that pertains to the level of the discourse
rather than of the single sentence.

*********************************************

Herbert Paul Grice’s Theory has served as a
conceptual framework for understanding pragmatic impairment and has been
used for studying communicative problems of some clinical populations,
including adults with aphasia and right hemisphere damage

(Ahlsén, 1993;
Bloom et al, 1999; Stemmer, Giroux & Joannatte, 1994) or children with
autism (Surian et al., 1996).

********************

However, the application of theory of
Conversational Implicature proved problematic to study pragmatic deficits,
and its application is not always easy and straightforward.

The main problem of
this failure is that Gricean Theory (but the same is true, at a general level, for
philosophical pragmatics) doesn’t explain the underlying causes of pragmatic
behavior and pragmatic deficit.

However, the need to distinguish between such
levels, that of description and that of explanation, seems particularly
outstanding.

As an illustration of this, consider the following transcripts
discussed by Perkins (2007, p. 31).
a.

Prompt:
 the man who sits on the bench next to the oak tree is our mayor
Gary: amen

b.

Adult: can you think of anymore?

Matthew: a remote-controlled cactus

Transcripts (a) is the response of Gary, an 8 year old boy, to a task where the
subject is required to repeat the sentence heard.

Transcripts (b) shows a piece of
conversation between Matthew, aged 8, and an adult who has been asking
names for pets.

Gary’s and Matthew’s response may be apparently described in
a similar way.

They are examples of pragmatically anomalous behavior as they
appear to violate the Gricean maxim of relevance.

However, only Matthew’s response is a genuine case of pragmatic impairment.

Indeed, as Perkins (2007) shows, the underlying causes in each case are quite different.

Gary’s irrelevant
response is due to his problems with verbal memory and syntactic
comprehension.

The sentence

The man who sits on the bench next to the oak tree is our mayor.

is both too long and too syntactically complex for him.

On
the other hand, Matthew has normal syntax and verbal memory, but has a
diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder.

His problems in social cognition are
responsible for his incapacity to take proper account of prior and surrounding
context during conversation.

Here the distinction is between primary and secondary pragmatic disorders.

Clinicians and theorists
use the term ‘secondary’ to describe an individual’s pragmatic disorder that is not related to any
impairment of pragmatic competence as such – the disorder is secondary to an impairment of
structural language. Instead, an individual with a primary pragmatic disorder has intact structural

The arguments discussed lead us to highlight an important issue.

The idea
that the development of a theoretical model about the nature of communication
cannot be separated from the reference to empirical data. In our case, the idea
is that the elaboration of a pragmatic theory should be constrained by clinical
data. The analysis of the deficits permits building theoretical models (founded
in human cognition) that can explain the actual communication processes
rather than describe them in the abstract.

Now, although the existence of a
deficit does not constitute in itself evidence to support that a certain
processing system is involved in a given function, in my opinion the study of
the deficit, and therefore the reference to the functioning of cognition, remains
an indispensable tool (while not sufficient alone) to test the empirical
plausibility of a theoretical model. The issue of pragmatic impairments opens
the way to question the relationship between pragmatic theory and the theory
of cognition. In the next section I discuss such a question using other frameworks.


There is  is a perspective on the nature of communication
strongly related to theories on the architecture of the mind.

Unlike Speech Act
theory and Conversational Implicature, this framework characterizes pragmatics referring
to cognitive processing rather than contextualized action or usage principle.


This framework, in fact, tries to give an account of the processing systems at the base of
human communication: the scholars who work within this perspective of
research explicitly seek to respect cognitive plausibility to explain
communication processes. In such a perspective assumptions about the nature
of communication are subject to confirmation or refutation and reformulation
in the light of experimental work concerning the nature of cognition. The methods adopted are, in fact, those of cognitive
psychology: in addition to purely philosophical or linguistic arguments, the
appeal of cognitive plausibility binds authors to construct models of
communication processes in line with the evidence produced by experimental
language skills, but may fail to understand the significance of context features for his choice of
linguistic utterance (Cummings, 2009).

studies on the deficit or with interpretations that come from evolutionary
psychology.

Following Herbert Paul Grice’s intuition, according to which an essential feature of most
human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and
recognition of intentions (Grice, 1957), a framework sees
communication as an inferential pragmatic process in which the generation and
the detection of communicators' intentions is central.

More in detail, it is proposed an ostensive-inferential model of human communication
according to which the speaker provides just an evidence (e.g., an utterance) of
his intention to convey a certain meaning and the listener comprehends
speaker’s meaning by producing a series of inferences that are governed by
that evidence.

In this communicative process two intentions are involved:
1. the informative intention,

by which the speaker informs the listener of
something (the ostensive stimulus has to attract the attention of the
recipients);


2. the communicative intention
by which the speaker intends to inform the
listener of his own communicative intention (the ostensive stimulus has to
lead the attention of the recipients on the speaker’s intention).

Communication has a positive outcome when the recipient explicitly
recognizes the communicative intention of the speaker (therefore his
communicative behavior). To this end, the ostensive stimulus (behavior, verbal
utterance, etc.) must capture the attention of the recipient and direct the
attention on speaker’s intentions.

But, what does it make an ostensive stimulus
worth attending to? Some have argued that the answer to this
question is based on a theoretical notion of relevance. They wrote:
Relevance, as we see it, is a potential property of external stimuli (e.g.
utterances, actions) or internal representations (e.g. thoughts, memories)
which provide input to cognitive processes.

The relevance of an input for an
individual at a given time is a positive function of the cognitive benefits that he
would gain from processing it, and a negative function of the processing effort
needed to achieve these benefits.

2 The reference to evolutionary psychology is due to the fact that humans do have an automatic tendency to maximise relevance, not because we have a
choice in the matter […] but because of the way our cognitive systems have evolved, it is said.

Relevance is a guiding principle of communication. From this perspective,
the basic assumption of each conversational interaction is that speakers and
listeners have tried to make their contributions as relevant as possible and that
each one is interpreting the contributions of others taking relevance in mind.
However, the principle of relevance is also intended to apply to the domain of
cognition in general.

The idea is that relevance is a
feature of human cognition: human mind is geared toward the maximization of
relevance:

the human cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual
mechanisms tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our
memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant
assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process
them in the most productive way

Since we have said that this is a model of pragmatics that adheres to how the
mind works, it is important to analyze connections between this framework and theory of
human cognition.

At a general level, identification of the others’ intentions is
made possible by a specific cognitive system, Theory of Mind (ToM) module.


This term is used to describe the ability to attribute mental states such as
beliefs, intentions, and feelings to others and to explain and to predict the
actions that derive from them (Baron-Cohen, 1995). This framework sees
pragmatics as a specific component - a “relevance-based comprehension
module” – of the ToM module with its own proprietary concepts and
procedures distinct from general ToM module. From this point of view,
communication, and more specifically verbal comprehension, is a form of
mindreading.

Happé (1993) identifies different levels of mindreading capacity
that could be conceived as a continuum ranging from a basic capacity to
represent others’ mental state (i.e. representational ability) to the potentially
infinite representation of mental states about other mental states (i.e.
metarepresentational ability). According to Happé, representational ability
appears to be sufficient to understand metaphor, while metarepresentational
ability is needed to appreciate irony.

The condition most commonly associated with mindreading deficit is
autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 2001). Since this framework sees communication as an
exercise of mindreading, it has been a useful framework to analyze
communicative deficits of autistic people (e.g., Dennis, Lazenby & Lockyer
2001; Frith 1989; Happé 1995; Wearing, 2010). For example, a
mindreading deficit may be responsible for the incapacity of autistic subjects to
understand indirect requests. Consider the following transcripts:

T: can you turn the page over?

C: yes (non sign of continuing) (from Perkins, 2007, p. 67).



This is a piece of an interaction between C, a 4-year-old child with autistic
spectrum disorder, and T, a speech and language therapist. C seems unable to
infer that T’s utterance is intended as a request and is not just a question.


Another example of this kind of pragmatic impairment in autism is offered by
figure 1 that shows the response of a child with autism who was given a paper
with seven rectangles drawn on it and given the request to “write the days of
the week in these seven boxes” (Perkins & Firth, 1991).

It is evident that the
child’s response could be ascribed to a misreading of the speaker’s intention.
The Days of the Week


Fig. 1. The response of a child with autism to the request ‘write the days of the week in
these seven boxes’.


As we have seen so far, some characterize pragmatics
as “inferential comprehension” oriented to relevance detection.

This means
that the “relevance principle” characterizes, from a pragmatic point of view,
the essence of language. My opinion is that such a conception represents a too
limited view of human communication (a view that is heavily focused on the
aspects of language comprehension and therefore on the role of the hearer).


More specifically, I believe that it is opportune to put together with Relevance
Theory an interpretative model that takes into account another fundamental
pragmatic property, coherence, which has a key role in discourse processing
(clinical data show that it is a property that pertains, primarily, to the
dimension of language production). In next section I aim to show why
coherence is a central property of human communication and what kind of
devices make it possible.


Relevance is not the only principle that governs human communication.

As
highlighted, for example by Giora (1997, 1998), «speakers and hearers are
not constrained only by the search for relevance. In addition, coherence
considerations constrain communication and play a major role in discourse
structuring and understanding» (Giora, 1997, p. 31). As I have said in a
previous sections, my idea is that coherence pertains especially to the building
of discourse – to the production - and, for this reason, it is an effort principally
made by the speaker. To specify this point, I discuss briefly the case of TBI
subjects. This example allows us to emphasize the importance of production
dimension and the fundamental involvement of others cognitive systems,
specifically the executive functions of planning and monitoring, beyond ToM,
in pragmatic communication.

Before addressing this topic, I need to specify
more in detail the notion of coherence.

Coherence is a term that refers to conceptual organizational aspects of
discourse at the suprasentential level. The coherence of a text or discourse
depends, at least in part, on the speaker’s ability to maintain thematic unity
(Agar & Hobbs, 1982). When is a discourse coherent? The dominant idea,
especially among linguists, is that the coherence of discourse (spoken or
written) depends on the linear relations between adjacent sentences, that is to
say on cohesion between pairs of consecutive statements (Bellert, 1970;
Bublitz, 2011; Daneš, 1974; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Tanskanen, 2006).


The most influential work from this perspective is Halliday and Hasan’s
Cohesion in English published in 1976.

Their concept of cohesion is semantic
one. Indeed, in their opinion cohesion refers «to relations of meaning that exist
within the text» (Halliday & Hasan, 1976, p. 4) and «enable one part of the
text to function as the context for another» (Halliday & Hasan, 1989, p. 489).
In a text, the relations of cohesion are realized through grammatical and lexical
devices. Grammatical cohesion includes elements such as reference,
substitution, ellipsis and conjunctions, while lexical cohesion is based on
reiteration (repetition, synonymy, etc.) and collocation (co-occurrence of
lexical item). Consider the following text:

After the forming of the sun and the solar system, our star began its long
existence as a so-called dwarf star. In the dwarf phase of its life, the energy that
the sun gives off is generated in its core through the fusion of hydrogen into
helium (from Berzlánovich 2008, p. 2).

As we can see, in this text the sentences are connected through lexical
cohesion: the lexical cohesive relations hold among the lexical items sun, solar
system, star, dwarf star and dwarf phase in the text.


What is important to note for the purposes of my argument is that in this
perspective cohesion is a necessary condition for discourse coherence (for a
discussion see Giora, in press). Now, although the cohesive relations
(grammatical and lexical) have an important role in the expression and
recognition of coherence relations, my idea is that cohesion between
consecutive sentences is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the
coherence of utterances in the flow of speech.


With reference to this a crucial
distinction is that between global and local coherence. Global coherence refers
to the relationship between the content of a verbalization with that of the
general topic of conversation; local coherence concerns the conceptual links
between individual sentences or propositions that maintain meaning in a text
or discourse (Glosser & Deser, 1990).


While local coherence is made possible
by cohesion relationships, my hypothesis is that global coherence is
independent from linguistic mechanisms (it is independent from cohesion).
Consider the following sentences:

I bought a Ford. The car in which President Wilson rode down the Champs
Élysées was black. Black English has been widely discussed. The discussions
between the presidents ended last week. A week has seven days. Every days I
feed my cat. Cats have four legs. The cat is on the mat. Mat has three letters


(Enqvist, 1978, pp. 110-111).

In this text the sentences are connected through the mechanism of
repetition.

However, the set of sentences, despite the abundance of cohesive
ties, is not perceived as a coherent whole. In this text the sentences do not
“hang together” in a reasonable way: the text lacks of global coherence.
The example and the arguments discussed so far show that global
coherence is a pragmatic property independent from linguistic devices.
Indeed, my hypothesis is that coherence relies on more general cognitive
processes such as the executive functions of action planning and monitoring.


The processes of planning and monitoring play (even intuitively) an important
role in building the flow of discourse. As speech is composed of linear
sequences of words and expressions, the speaker must constantly form a plan
of verbal expressions in order to decide what to say and how to organize what
he says, if he wants to express himself in a coherent manner. Moreover, during
the execution of a plan, that is, during the stage of discourse production, it is
necessary to continue estimation of the task in order to make sure that the
elements introduced accord with the general topic of conversation. Empirical
evidence confirms the effective role of these executive processes in processing
discourse coherence.


The most interesting data in this regard comes from studies of patients with
TBI with executive dysfunctions. These subjects have deficits in action
planning and monitoring: they are unable to complete a goal-oriented behavior
through a series of simple actions (e.g., Eslinger et al., 2011; Shallice 1982;
Zalla et al., 2001). Because of this, TBI patients cannot organize and maintain
global discourse coherence (while they have no problems at the level of local
coherence). As an illustration of this, consider the following transcript
discussed by Perkins (2007, p. 86) in which C, a man with TBI, is talking with
T, a speech and language therapist, about trade unions.

C: I admit this government we’ve got is not doing a good job but the unions are trying
to make them sound worse than what they are

T: mm

C: they . they . cos I’m a Tory actually but I I do vote . if there’s a . er . a communist
bloke there I will vote communist but . it all depends what his principles are but I don’t
agree . with the Chinese communism . and the Russian communism

T: right

C: but I believe every . should be equal but . I’m not knocking the royal family because
y . you need them
T: mm
C: and they they they bring people in to see take photos

Despite the local sequential links between trade unions–government,
government–Tory, Tory–communist, communism–Chinese/Russian
communism, communism– equality, equality–Royal Family, Royal Family–
tourist attraction, C shows a form of ‘topic drift’: he is unable to monitor what
has already been talked about or to relate each individual utterance to some
overall coherent plan or goal. In fact, neurolinguistic experimental data show
that TBI subjects connect sentences correctly by using cohesion ties
(grammatical devices), but they are unable to construct and maintain the global
coherence of their verbal productions (they cannot relate the individual
sentences to a plan or to a more general purpose) and often introduce material
that is irrelevant to the current context in their verbal productions (Biddle et
al., 1996; Glosser &Deser, 1990; Hough & Barrow, 2003; Marini et al.,
2011).

Because of their inability to formulate and to pursue a communicative
goal, their discourses appear pragmatically inappropriate.



In order to elaborate an interpretative model of the nature of language, the
analysis and the study of clinical data appear very important: they allow us to
propose a theoretical model that respects the constraint of cognitive
plausibility. I have showed that philosophical pragmatics does not respect this
constraint and, because of this, it is not at all adequate for the study of
pragmatic deficits. A cognitive plausible model of pragmatics is offered by
Relevance Theory. However, the clinical data discussed here have pointed out
the necessity to go beyond relevance: although pragmatic theory based on
relevance detection explains many aspects of human communication, such a
theory should be integrated with a theoretical model that takes into account
discourse coherence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We  would like to thank Erica Cosentino and Francesco Ferretti for helpful
suggestions.

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Experimenting with Grice

Speranza

Commentary on F. Ervas & E. Gola, "The experimental turn in philosophical pragmatics", in "Philosophical perspectives on experimental pragmatics".

Grice was an experientialist.

He thought that 'experience', as understood by British empiricist philosophers, like he himself was, was the only tool a philosopher could use. Philosophical intuitions by Grice are ALWAYS based on 'experiences' and introspective intentional thinking that reflects his own unique considerations, which he hoped to (and succeeded in) sharing with his philosophical readers and friends.

Modern pragmatics has been defined as “philosophical” pragmatics, not only because its main representative author, Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988) was a philosophers of ordinary language, but also because it has used philosophical "conceptual" analysis as the key method to give an explanation of the communicative features of language.

If we consider language in general as an object of analysis, on the one hand, psychological language models have focused on aspects that are studied through an empirical method: phonological and syntactic modules, models of acquisition and memorization or “storage” of lexis, biological foundations of language, etc.

On the other hand, philosophical models have mainly focused on the notion of
meaning and rhetorical-pragmatic aspects of verbal communication.

This gap,which has deep-rooted historical origins, still persists in theories of language
and in the approaches and methods of such theories, including pragmatics.
As some  stated the understanding of language in context has been studied by two
disciplines – pragmatics alla Grice and psycholinguistics – even though there has been
little communication between them.

However, in the last years, plenty of studies have brought classical pragmatic theories in front of the tribunal of experience to test their power of explanation and prediction.

The result has been the growth of a flourishing interdiscipline, called “Experimental
Pragmatics”, which claims that understanding an utterance requires access to
the speaker’s intention in specific contexts and uses experimental techniques
coming from psycholinguistics, cognitive science and psychology to highlight
the comprehension mechanisms of non-literal and figurative language.

The aim of this issue is to discuss the main empirical results of Experimental Pragmatics
and to explore its theoretical influence on “philosophical” pragmatics in its
most important research subjects, such as figures of speech, presuppositions,
translation, etc.

How and to what extent do experimental methods and
conceptual analysis interact in pragmatics?

Which consequences does this experimental turn bear upon theorizing in pragmatics?
Answering these questions is the aim of this special issue of
Humana.Mente, entitled “Philosophical Perspectives in Experimental
Pragmatics”.

The issue collects eight papers, two book reviews, one
conference review, and two interviews.

The contributions are tied by a
common thread, namely the view that philosophical pragmatics could and
should pay attention to the main findings coming from other disciplines, such
as psycholinguistics, corpus linguistics and cognitive science, to better
understand the possibilities as well as the limits of its main theoretical
proposals.

The eight essays introduce different ways in which data and
experiments can bridge the gap between concrete communicative behaviour
and pragmatic theories.

The range of experimental techniques presented in the
volume vary from neurolinguistic experiments to the analysis of language
corpora, from behavioural tests to the pathologies of communication, to show
the ways data can be collected and analysed in order to test, support or falsify
different theoretical perspectives.

*****************************************************************

The essay “Experimental Investigations of the typology of Presupposition
Triggers” by C. Cummins, P. Amaral, and N.  Katsos, focuses on
presuppositions (Van der Sandt 1988) and the problem of distinguishing
backgrounded from foregrounded meanings (Shanon 1976), which influence
the interpretation of incoming information in a communicative encounter.

In
particular, the authors address the problem of potential differences between
presuppositions triggers, such as “continue”, “only” or “stop”. They discuss
alternative theories, also coming from the study of implicatures, and present
the results of a pilot study, a set of questions and answers containing
presuppositions triggers, to underpin the hypothesis according to which
lexical triggers entail their presupposed content and a negative answer to the
presupposed content should count as a negative answer to the question.

**********************************************************

S. Assimakopoulos, in his essay “On Encoded Lexical Meaning:
Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives”, considers the account of
meaning comprehension known as the “literal first hypothesis” (literal
meanings are processed first, easier and faster than figurative meanings), and
argues that the very psychological implausibility of this hypothesis is one of the
reason why Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995) shifts to the
account of ad hoc concept construction. A pragmatic process of lexical
adjustment, takes the linguistically encoded concept and generates an ad hoc
concept in the proposition the speaker intends to communicate, in order to
satisfy her expectations of relevance and make sense of the speaker’s utterance
(Wilson & Carston 2006). The mutual understanding does not necessarily
require that the speaker and listener share the same ad hoc concept: an
interpretive resemblance , i.e. a partial overlapping of logic and encyclopedic
knowledge of source and target concept, is sufficient (Wilson 2000). The
author argues that this view would have been incompatible with Fodorian
semantics, which instead had committed Relevance Theory with the “literal
first hypothesis”.

***************************************************************

A close look to the experimental data questioning the plausibility of the
“literal first hypothesis” is given in the paper by V. Bambini and
D. Resta, “Metaphor and experimental pragmatics: When theory meets
empirical investigation”.

In particular, the paper addresses an open problem in
non-literal language experimental literature, exploring the opposition between
the “literal-first hypothesis”, according to which the process of understanding
figurative language is indirect since it is necessarily dependent on a previous
literal interpretation (Janus & Bever, 1985) and the “direct access view”,
which does not imply the mandatory step of literal interpretation, supposed by
the “literal-first hypothesis” (Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989). The experimental
method taken into account to discuss these alternative hypotheses is functional
neuroimaging and the specific application field is the cognitive processes
involved in the comprehension of metaphors. The discussion concludes that
the process of metaphor understanding is far from being clear, but it shows that
the problem can be handled only from an experimental point of view. The
research on the cognitive architecture of mind-reading abilities can indeed
advance the research on metaphor, narrowing down the questions and allowing
the experimental paradigms to better address their theoretical key-points.
Advances in technology and artificial intelligence techniques represent
another way in which language use mechanisms come into play in the
redefinition of many questions which were previously the object of
philosophical disciplines.

**************************************************

The possibility to explore many linguistic data
applying algorithms and procedures allow scholars to discover regularities and
generalize relationships on texts, which represent (or can be considered a
mirror of) communicative behaviour. In the paper “Automated Translation
between lexicon and corpora” translations issues are examined, focusing, in
particular, on ways to solve representational and translation problems in
polysemy. The authors, E. Gola, N. Ruimy, S. Federici and
J. Wade, use tools coming from linguistics, metaphor and polysemy studies,
artificial intelligence and corpus analysis and review the state of the art of
Machine Translation (Hutchins 1986).

They present the computational
products they contributed to build up and proposed an integration between
lexical resources and corpus data throughout a machine learning technique.
Neuroimaging and behavioral evidence are instead discussed in Katarzyna
Bromberek-Dyzman’s paper, “Affective Twist in Irony Processing”, whose
main theme is irony. Verbal irony is one of the most difficult communicative
tasks and requires a very complex social ability. Irony adds a nuance of meaning
that changes the force of what is said and a full understanding of irony would
entail some appreciation of why speakers choose this communicative strategy
to express their thoughts. This question is even more urgent in case of
sarcasm, in which speakers are perceived as more angry and scornful (Leggitt
& Gibbs 2000), or as more verbally aggressive and offensive (Toplak & Katz
2000), or more insincere, impolite, non-instructional, and ambiguous (Katz,
Blasko & Kazmerski 2004) than speakers who pronounce a literal sentence. In
particular, the author focuses on the study of emotional meaning and she
argues that recognizing the ironic attitude is profoundly influenced by the
emotional load non-propositionally attached to the propositional contents.

*****************************************************

Other complex communicative phenomena that could be classified under
the umbrella-term “humour” are jokes and puns.

To puns, in particular, and to
the role of context in the comprehension process, is dedicated A.
Voltolini’s paper, “Puns for Contextualists”.

Voltolini discusses in detail
different sentences and cases of punny sentences from two points of view: the
contextualists (Recanati 2004) and the non-contextualists (Predelli 2005). He
argues in favour of the contextualist stand, showing that, in order to
understand a pun, it is not always necessary for the interpretive readings to
affect the truth-conditional level of what is said through such utterances. It is
indeed crucial to be able to grasp the speaker’s intention, which is a pragmatic
and contextual feature of meaning.

**********************************

The goal of experimental pragmatics is to
experimentally underpin or falsify this hypothesis, by establishing which
processes are in place among different possible ones, which range from the
supposition that there is an interpretation that removes the previous one, to
the judgment of “impossible” interpretations of the literal reading.
M. Mazzer’s paper, “The Text as a Context. Blurring the Boundaries
between Sentence and Discourse”, shown one more time, that sentence is not
enough to fully grasp a pragmatic phenomenon and thus a bigger unit of
analysis is needed: the text.

By reviewing data coming from recordings of
event-related brain potentials, Mazzer argues that cognitive mechanisms in
place in language understanding are better investigated when experimental
design focuses on discourse instead of sentence. Therefore, as widely
demonstrated by Josh Van Berkum and colleagues (1999, 2003, 2008,
2009), blurring the boundaries between sentence and discourse seems like a
mandatory step for meaning comprehension.


******************************


I. Adornetti’s essa “Why Philosophical Pragmatics Needs Clinical
Pragmatics” shows the ways knowledge on communicative impairments
(Perkins 2007), such as aphasia and autism, can fruitfully inform the classical
theoretical models in pragmatics.

Classical theories in pragmatics – as those
elaborated by Grice (1989) – do not fulfill the cognitive
assumption necessary to explain the effective communicative behaviour. An
answer comes from elsewhere which
try to be consistent with the data on the actual functioning of the mind. Lastly,
Ines Adornetti highlights that another important area, which remains
underestimated in philosophical pragmatics, should assume a more central role
through clinical pragmatics: the coherence of discourse.
The “book reviews” section is dedicated to the two main experimental
methods discussed in this volume: psycholinguistics and corpus linguistics.
The first book review, written by Roberta Cocco, is indeed a report and a
discussion of Bruno Bara, Cognitive Pragmatics . The Mental Processes of
Communication (MIT press: Cambridge, MA, 2010). In the reviewed book,
Bruno Bara joins his own theoretical proposal on the cognitive mechanisms of
behaviour and conversational games with psycholinguistic data coming from
his own personal research. The second book review, written by Giuliano
Vivanet, is instead an introduction to the main themes and techniques covered
by corpus linguistics, presented in the recent published guide edited by Anne
O'Keeffe, Michael McCarthy, The Routledge Handbook of Corpus Linguistics
(New York: Routledge, 2012). The computational analysis of corpora is used
to highlight the linguistic mechanisms involved at various levels of language
production: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, translation, etc.

*******************************************

The “interviews”section is mainly dedicated to two figures of speech, irony
and metaphor, through a discussion of the theories proposed by two influential
scholars, both employing experimental methods coming, respectively from
psycholinguistics and from artificial intelligence.

Rachel Giora (Tel Aviv
University, Israel) and Bipin Indurkhya (International Institute of Information
Technology, Hyderabad, India, AGH University of Science and Technology,
Cracow, Poland).

Rachel Giora discusses irony and other pragmatic
phenomena, such as idioms and jokes, in the light of her Graded Salience
Hypothesis (Giora 2003), a general view of language understanding that
postulates the activation of salient meaning in the first stage of language
processing, regardless of context.

Bipin Indurkhya, discusses his work on the
problem of metaphor, which escapes formalized methods and might be better
handled from an experimental point of view.

The interactionist theory of
metaphor he proposed (Indurkhya 1992) relies on the interaction between the
cognitive agent and her physical and cultural environment stands as the basic
principle also used for related problems, such as categorization, analogical
reasoning and creativity.

Finally, the conference report written by Tiziana Giudice (Metaphor and
Communication, international conference organised by the Italian Society for
Metaphor Studies and held in Cagliari in May 12-14, 2011) is also dedicated
to the issue of metaphor in relation to different communication fields. Indeed,
the main sections of the conference were concerned with i) the linguistic
aspects of metaphors as an intercultural communication process; ii) the
conceptual and imaginistic aspects of metaphors as an intercultural
communication process; iii) the use of metaphors in political communications
as a particularly relevant case study; and iv) metaphors in other forms of
communication, as for instance in education, arts and media.

Giudice presents
the contributions of the various fields, by underlying the reasons why metaphor
is a complex cognitive and communicative phenomenon, at the cross-road of
semantics and pragmatics, and why it can be considered a good litmus test to
experimentally investigate general hypotheses and theories.

The papers collected in this volume show that the tension between
philosophical and experimental pragmatics seems to be the dialectic motor of
the evolution of pragmatics itself. On the one hand, data, taken alone, do not
provide enough information to allow to produce a theoretically adequate
pragmatics. On the other hand, without seriously taking into account the
bottom-up constraints from neuroscience, corpora data, embodied
communicative situations, we will not be able to go far in inquiring the
pragmatic side of language and communication.

REFERENCES

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Austin, J. L. The Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Gibbs, R. W., & Gerrig, R. J. (1989).
How context makes metaphor comprehension seem special.
Metaphor and Symbolic Activity , 4, 145–158.

Giora, R. (2003). On our Mind: Salience, Context, and Figurative language . New
York: Oxford University Press.

Grice H. P. (1938). Negation. The Grice Papers, UC/Berkeley, Bancroft Library.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.

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Hutchins, J. (1986). Machine Translation: Past, Present, Future. Chichester : Ellis
Horwood Series in Computers and their Applications.

Indurkhya, B. (1992). Metaphor and Cognition. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.

Janus, R. A., & Bever, T. G. (1985). Processing of metaphoric language: An
investigation of the three-stage model of metaphor comprehension. Journal of
Psycholinguistic Research, 14, 473–487.
Katz A.N., Blasko D.G. & Kazmerski V.A. (2004). Saying What You Don't Mean:
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Leggitt, J.S. & Gibbs, R.W. (2000). Emotional reactions to verbal irony. Discourse
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Shanon, B. (1976). On the two kinds of presuppositions in natural language.
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Speranza -- Join the Grice Club.
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Table of Contents


ESSAYS:

Francesca Erabas, Elisabetta Gola
"The experimental turn in philosophical pragmatics" -- cfr. Rorty, "The linguistic TURN in philosophy"

Chris Cummins, Patricia Amaral, Napoleon Katsos,
"Experimental Investigations of the Typology of Presupposition Triggers"
cfr. Grice, "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature".

Stavros Assimakopoulos
"On Encoded Lexical Meaning: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives".

Valentina Bambini, Donatella Resta
"Metaphor and Experimental Pragmatics: When Theory Meets Empirical Investigation."
Grice's only example of metaphor/disimplicature: "You're the cream in my coffee".

Elisabetta Gola, Stefano Federici, Nilda Ruimy, John Wade
"Automated Translation Between Lexicon and Corpora"

Katarzyna Bromberek-Dyzman
"Affective Twist in Irony Processing"
cfr. Grice on irony in "Logic and Conversation" and "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation". The Greek root to the concept of English 'irony'.

Alberto Voltolini
"Puns for Contextualists"

Marzia Mazzer
"The Text as a Context. Blurring the Boundaries Between Sentence
and Discourse"

Ines Adornetti
"Why Philosophical Pragmatics Needs Clinical Pragmatics" 

(We thank the referees for all the support given to the publication of this volume, whose main idea
came from a research project funded by the European Science Foundation’s EURO-XPRAG Program, and the authors of the contributions, for their willingness to improve their own work and the overall volume. We are particularly grateful to Amaury Fourtet, Thomas Moraine, Jacopo Romoli, Massimo Sangoi and Silvano Zipoli Caiani for all their suggestions and help to improve the final version of the special issue)

Monday, January 7, 2013

Grice on conversational disimplicature

Speranza

The concept of conversational implicature is due to the work of Paul Grice (and so is the equally important concept of disimplicature (if not explicature -- which he disfavoured) and in particular to his paper "Logic and Conversation," which was delivered in 1967 and instantly became highly influential, although it was not published until 1975.
 
A key goal of this paper was to defend the traditional logical understanding of connectives like "and" (and "if" -- his target was Strawson's exaggerated claims in "Introduction to Logical Theory")  against what he saw as the excesses of ordinary language philosophy.
 
Grice did this by drawing a sharp distinction between what is strictly speaking said and what is conversationally implicated.

Herbert Paul Grice, of Harborne, Staffordshire

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Herbert Paul Grice was born and educated in England.

Grice taught at St. John's College Oxford until 1968, when he moved to the University of California–Berkeley.

Grice taught there until his death.

Grice published little until near the end of his life, but had a great influence through students and the wide circulation of unpublished manuscripts, which he called, amusingly, "unpublications".

Grice's earliest published work dealt with perception -- his earliest  UNPUBLISHED work deals with negation -- but he subsequently moved to problems in language, ethics, and metaphysics.

A concern with reason and rationality is a subtle thread which unites these investigations.

His historical idols were Aristotle and Kant, or Ariskant, for short.

I'll be back, thefore I am

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Terminator and Philosophy: I'll Be Back, Therefore I Am (The Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series) by William Irwin, Richard Brown and Kevin S. Decker



Grice revolutionized philosophy

I'll be back, therefore I am -- Grice revolutionised philosophy

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Terminator and Philosophy: I'll Be Back, Therefore I Am (The Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series) by William Irwin, Richard Brown and Kevin S. Decker



Grice revolutionized philosophy

The Grice Name in History

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The Grice Name in History


Herbert Grice, Harborne, Staffordshire.
Herbert Paul Grice (born Harborne, Staffordshire -- Mother: Mabel Felton. Brother: Derek Grice).

Grices: a monthly journal for power uses and engineers of implicature

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Grices: A monthly journal for power users and engineers

Herbert Paul Grice and Valandis Bardzokas: the bridge collapsed because (epeidi/giati) the girders were made of cellophane..

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Causality and Connectives: Grice (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series) 
by Valandis Bardzokas
Valandis Bardzokas's essay explores finely-grained distinctions in causal meaning.

To increase the challenge of this double task, i.e. a thorough as well as satisfactory account of cause and a detailed assessment of the theoretical model employed to this end, the current study involves an investigation carried out by way of contrasting the prototypical causal exponents of Modern Greek subordination, i.e.

(a) epeiδi and

(b) Î³iati.


In addition, this objective is achieved in the methodological framework of contrasting a range of contextual applications of the two connectives against their translated versions in English, realizable by means of

"because"

---

a favourite with Grice in "Aspects of Reason":

 Despite first impressions, a closer observation of the wide range of applications of these markers in the discourse of coherence relations illustrates divergences in their distribution, which, in turn, are taken to highlight differing aspects of causal interpretation. The proposal for the relevance-theoretic model emanates from a reaction to an array of problems undermining traditional tenets of pragmatic theory originating with Grice’s stance, but is also made in response to the common practice in pragmatic research (since its origin) to pay low regard for the contribution of typical causal markers to debates aiming at the determination of the distinction that has been instrumental to issues of cognition and pragmatic interpretation, i.e. propositional vs. non-propositional meaning.

Implicatures in Turkish

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COOPERATION AND COHERENCE IN WRITING: USING GRICE'S COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE AND ITS MAXIMS TO ANALYSE PROBLEMS OF COHERENCE IN TURKISH AND ENGLISH ESSAYS
by Bayram Mustafa Zor







"Why does not my writing cooperate?" is a frequently asked question by the learners of foreign languages.

The answer is most of the time related to "coherence".

Coherence in written discourse has been a problematic concept for both many Foreign Language Teachers and students when teaching/learning to write in the target language.

Besides, it is considered as a crucial part of academic written discourse, which students are expected to master to be able to pursue their academic studies.

The study in this book examined how much the coherence-related difficulties/problems of Turkish EFL students in writing English essays (i.e target language) are related to the problems in writing Turkish essays (i.e. Mother Tongue).

The subjects for the study in this book were chosen from the upper-intermediate level students at the Preparatory Program in an English-medium University, Istanbul Bilgi University, in Turkey.


For a detailed understanding of the nature of the coherence-related difficulties/problems of students's Turkish and English essays, this book used a pragmatic analysis, involving the use of Grice's Cooperative Principle and maxims and sub-maxims of cooperation.





Bayram Mustafa Zor, BA degree (1997) and MA degree (2006) in E.L.T. from Middle East Technical University(Ankara, Turkey). English Language Instructor since 1997. Currently, English Language Instructor at Istanbul Bilgi University. Interested in the fields of E.L.T. and Applied Linguistics.

What Happens in Griceland Stays in Griceland

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What Happens In Vegas, Stays in Vegas by Karyn Grice.

Yada Yada Grice

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Violating Grice's Cooperative Principle in Situational Comedies
by Cheryl Hindman 





Hindman
analyzes how humour and jokes in situational comedies (sitcoms) intentionally violate Grice’s Cooperative Principle, which states that interlocutors contribute to a conversation only that which is required of it. Grice’s maxims and humour is analyzed as is the violation of maxims in The Yada Yada episode of the sitcom Seinfeld.

Grice On Stage

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Grice's theory of the Cooperative Principle of Conversation and the Language of Punjabi Theatre: A Pragmatic Analysis
by Furrakh Abbas 

Abbas's research aims to apply the Gricean theory of Co-operative Principle to the language of Punjabi stage drama.

It analyzes how the Gricean work of application of conversational maxims and formation of implicatures play a significant role in the interpretation of the utterances spoken in the play.

It studies the difference between implicit and explicit meanings through the bridge of implicature and disimplicature and how the language is manipulated to create special effects in the Punjabi stage dramas.

It also draws a gender perspective on the flouting of conversation maxims.

The application of the theory involves a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods for the present study.

The quantitative part deals with calculating the flouts on each conversational maxim.

The qualitative methodology involves the discussion on the formation of implicatures by flouts of the conversational maxims and the factors that play an important role in the study of implicatures.

Mr. Furrakh Abbas has done MS / MPhil in Applied Linguistics and is a PhD scholar working on his PhD dissertation these days.

He has been associated in the capacity of part as well as full time Lecturer with Institutes like Kinnaird College, Lahore; IER, University of the Punjab, Lahore; UMT, Lahore; and Lahore Leads University, Lahore in Pakistan.

Grice's Handbook of Communication

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Communication: The Handbook by George L. Grice.

Grice liked to pun on Immanuel Kant's first name: Immanuel. Grice would say that what Immanuel Kant composed was a "manual" for good living -- the 'cooperative principle of conversation and its attending maxims being a submanual of it.

Grice on Deadly Animals

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The Book of Deadly Animals by Gordon Grice.

New book by Grice

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Mastering Public Speaking (7th Edition) by George L. Grice.

Herbert Paul Grice and Jennifer Mather Saul

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Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

 by Jennifer Mather Saul

 "Grice was the first philosopher to ..." do a few important things.

Etcetera.

New book by Grice

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"Lake of Dreams" by K. S. Grice

---

cfr.

"Lake of Implicatures".

Grice Deconstructed

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BOOK REVIEW:


On the Beginnings of Theory: Deconstructing Broken Logic in Grice
Peter Bornedal


In this exemplary essay, author Peter Bornedal promotes Deconstruction as a cogent analytical method whose distinctive critical object is foundational knowledge.
 
In this, he wants to restore Deconstruction as a rational discourse, while continuing to emphasize it as a critique of metaphysics.

The essays discusses the works of the Oxford philosopher Herbert Paul Grice and his theory on language and communication.
 
In this essay, the author demonstrates that despite the attempts of Grice to give ontological foundations for inherent communicative rationality, his endeavors are unsuccessful.

Ultimately, Bornedal argues that we cannot give metaphysical reasons for rationality.

We can only decide to pursue these ideals, but there is nothing beyond the decision that makes the pursuit necessary or inherent.

Peter Bornedal received his M.A. and Ph.D from the University of Chicago.

Of course we may not agree.

Cheers,

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