J wrote in commentary to previous blog post:
"--Quine sounded a bit Peircean at times (from my readings)--even the Two Dogmas, and web of beliefs, or something."
Yes. There are TWO DOGMAS. Grice (and Strawson) dismissed the second dogma. "One dogma too many," they would argue. The first dogma concerns the important point (by which Quine is betraying Carnap) about the 'vicious circle' involved in stuff like 'analytic/synthetic'. The OTHER dogma concerns 'empiricism' itself, and the idea that experience is basic. One would think Quine is a spiritualist, challenging that, but he is going "French" and quoting from Duhem, instead.
J:
"But he sort of gave in to the behaviorist impulse--but lets not forget he's taking on the platonic-realist tradition as well."
Yes. I'm glad Quine was never my tutor. I'm currently reseraching on how biased uni research is. It is so subtle to _teach_. You have Grice as teacher and you would think you should need to write and defend implicature. You have Strawson as tutor and you come out thinking there are truth-value gaps.
Quine did teach at Harvard. He spent most of his life drawing ideas from other people and travelling around, though. He was from Ohio, originally (Akron). I should find that quote where he notes that Grice's teeth left a lot to be desired. At least Grice was the very athletic type that Quine never was!
---
J:
"--there's another issue with Russell's descriptions, which we might call...scope of the existence quantifier (attached to the front of his DD formula, raht). Does BR actually know whether ...in the ENTIRE universe there is or is not a bald King of France??"
Well, it is never clear which king he means. I suppose he means the _last_. Cfr. "The king of Italy". Apparently, there is a gentleman, who lives not far from where _I_ live, who claims he is the present king of Italy (since he dismisses Mussolini).
"Bald" is possibly hyperbolic. Dummett's example was:
"Queen Elizabeth I was bald"
He holds that this is very difficult to prove (as per intuitions), and thus neither true nor false.
"Bald" applies to people as they live. Once the king of France 'dies' (or is beheaded), it would be otiose to say that a corpse is bald. The particles that made up for "the king of France" (Marie Antoinette's husband) MUST exist somewhere.
If the quantification held over those particles, then it makes sense to ask whether those particles _are_ bald. Or not.
It may be said that 'bald' applies to things which the particles composing a body do not portray. I wouldn't know.
But then, WHAT physical property can we predicate of "the king of France" and the particles that composed him? Surely not: "The king of France was well read", since particles are hardly 'well-read' or fail to do so.
"White" seems a stretch. For while "the King of France is white", while hyperbolic, is intelligible, I wouldn't know if a little particle can be said to be _white_. I don't think atoms are colourful.
"weighty" is perhaps a good one. Grice considers Boyle and Locke on _bulk_ and primary qualities of matter.
"The king of France is weighty".
The particles which now exist, somewhere (in some French cemetery) composing what once was the King of France, are weighty.
It may be said that Russell's phrase is:
"The PRESENT king of France"
as opposed to 'past'. I prefer 'current'. In this respect, "the present King of France" is more like an irreal object, alla Meinong.
Grice was obsessed with Meinong. In particular, he thought that Strawson was a closet Meinongian. On the other hand, Grice writes, in "Vacuous Names": "My system creates no Meinongian jungle". R. B. Jones knows about this.
"Meinong" is possibly non-referential, today.
---- Oddly, Brentano, who followed Meinong, may refer to (a) a philosopher, (b) a city in Italy.
---
J goes on:
"OK--safe bet there isn't. But he can't really verify that. Galaxy Andromeda might have a planet with a bald KIng and country named France. So again, the logician overlooks something like scope (also seen among shall we say naive atheists--who claim there is no "God"--well, maybe He, or They live in the Ring Nebula. Not saying They're necessarily biblical ). Russell's DD"s may be astute analysis but a somewhat sloppy use of quantifiers."
Yes. There is a further complication, which I'm currently researching. A lot of the stuff logic is made of is based on natural language:
vel (p v q) is supposed to be a Latin-language particle, 'vel' (versus 'aut').
And there are others. When Frege used
(x)Fx
and
(Ex)Fx
he is using the inverted "A", above, to mean, "Alle", which is German for "All". As in "allemanic", the German people. Hyperbolic for 'all-man'. So one has to be careful. He was polite enough to invert the "A".
When it comes to (Ex) he also inverted the E. But the idea is that of "Existenz". There 'exists'. A rather technical term. We don't use it often. We say,
"There are figs in the bridge"
NOT that 'figs exist' in the Fridge.
If you IN-sist, I may stick with "EX-ist". But why should I?
So, yes, there is a domain-restriction, which is usually underestimated by Russell, but not by Boole or Venn (their 'universe of discourse').
This may relate to:
---- questions of what Chomsky calls "LF" logical form simpliciter versus "ILF" (interpreted logical form). When we _interpret_ (alla Grice, "Vacuous Name") an existential or quantificational in general, wff (well formed formula), which are the least committed ways to do so?
--- questions of decidability. Propositional or sentential logic for some reason IS decidable. Quantificational logic is NOT. Surely this is because the interpretation of a 'relation' (and predicate in general) is a difficult thing, and there's no Goedel number co-rrelated to each formula. Etc.
J goes on:
"That said, I still think the Toulmin had a point on ...excessive formality of the analytical phil. posse."
Yes. Toulmin does extend on the syllogism. (by introducing 'backing', warrants, etc.) But one should also revise Grice, "Aspects of Reason". Grice, drawing from the early Hare and Kenny ("Practical Inferences", Analysis), considers various
alethic
non-alethic
types of reasoning. These are ignored by Toulmin.
If you say
.p & .(p ) q), then .q
this is alethic modus ponens.
But there are patterns which extend BEYOND the alethic (or the indicative mode, as Grice preferred): imperative inferences, deontic inferences, inferences in the 'optative' mode, etc.
So, there is no need NOT to be formal when dealing with those inferences which are NOT in the indicative mode, or that go beyond a restricted view of what logicians are up to.
Oddly, Grice used one formal symbol too many. He confesses in "Reply to Richards". "I have ceased to use so many formal symbols, after Putnam, of all people, told me that I was too formal".
----
So there!
Monday, February 21, 2011
Deviant Implicatures
In his commentary to this blog post, J writes:
"Quine's Phil. Of logic I have and read a chapter per annum or so. Doesn't WVOQ allude to Peirce's prag. verificationist criteria, a few times? (not quite the same as the positivist sort): what difference does the truth or falsity of some proposition/statement mean in terms of experience, ie measurable criteria, or something like that."
---- Yes. I was surprised, as per wiki's entry "Deviant logic", that indeed Haack borrows directly from Quine. Deviant is not a TERM *I* would use. We tend to associate it here with alternative sexualities. Just teasing!
-- But yes, that would be the Quine of "Word and object".
--- Note incidentally, that Quine provides an answer to Grice's and Strawson's "In defense of a dogma" in that manifesto, "Word and object". Recall too that Grice contributed to a lovely volume against Quine, "Words and ObjectIONS".
J goes on:
"And while not too pleasing to logicians or mathematicians, most ordinary research/science works in that manner--. In that sense Toulmin was a bit of a pragmatist too, eschewing pure formality in favor of applicability and evidentialism of a sort."
Yes, the tradition in Quine must come via Skinner ("Verbal behaviour") and perhaps the Chicago school of semiotics (Peirce, Morris, etc.). Very American.
J writes:
"Some of modern logic--such as quantification --may have had applications. But much was merely cold routine. Most humans, hearing some egghead say the King of France is bald would, say that's gibberish."
Oddly, in Latin, that would come out as
"Rex Franciae", rather than "THE" King of France. This possibly would mean that (ix), iota operator, as in the logical-form of Latin-language sentences, would seem otiose.
The problem is with the king of France _not_ being bald, which is true. The king of France is bald -- that's not gibberish, to Grice. It is false. But yes, blame Strawson on the gibberish. In fact, he is relying on Russell, as we well know. Oddly, Strawson writes,
"The king of France is not wise".
'bald' is Grice's and Russell's choice; Strawson's is 'bald'.
J goes on:
"Russell wants to insist it's not just gibberish but..false, because there is no such King. OK. But compared to trench warfare or the Great Depression or Hiroshima, logical analysis seems rather trivial, if not slightly...macabre, IMHE--as with the mysterious Charlie Dodgson hisself. The positivist Weltanschauung WAS Carrollian in a sense."
Yes. Recall that Russell attacked the Hegelians, too. When he closes the thing,
----
"Hegelians, who like a synthesis, may conclude that the King of France wears a wig".
Similarly Horn has noted a glitch in Strawson's way of finishing HIS discussion of "King of France": "The logic of ordinary language is neither Russellian nor Aristotelian; ordinary language hasn't got a logic".
Horn notes that
"The logic of ordinary language is not Russellian"
is a bit like
"The king of France is bald"
if you are going to back THAT claim on 'ordinary language having no logic'. Etc.
---
J goes on:
"Hegelian tradition while not without problems--had a rather greater scope--not just oxbridge or Harvard philosophers, but World History, the State, nations, peoples, languages."
Yes. Good you mention that. When Elinor Ochs went to Malagasy she found that speakers there were NOT Gricean:
"My sisters is in the garden or in the music-room"
was NOT understood, as "I don't know where she is"
Ochs note, "These people are very reluctant to give information, especially about their sisters; Grice is refuted here."
The last chapter of my PhD dissertation I entitled, "The cunning of conversational reasoning", since I thought that, naive as Och's argumentation is -- it required a better answer than that provided by Gazdar and others. So, I thought a way to combine Grice's "universalism" (Kantian in nature) with neo-Hegelian evidence to the effect that Grice's scheme is Not universal would be in order. Or not.
J goes on:
"Even Peirce respected Hegel, in some sense. Don't forget the peeps, JLS."
No. M. Hollis has written extensively on "cunning of reason" which is a lovely concept. I learned about Hollis et al via my PhD thesis supervisor, who would have us read, "Rationality and relativism". In that area, you get a lot of literature from anthropology, etc. British anthropologists, the idea of 'magic', why 'rationality' may be a European concept, and so on. All very odd.
-----
Etc.
"Quine's Phil. Of logic I have and read a chapter per annum or so. Doesn't WVOQ allude to Peirce's prag. verificationist criteria, a few times? (not quite the same as the positivist sort): what difference does the truth or falsity of some proposition/statement mean in terms of experience, ie measurable criteria, or something like that."
---- Yes. I was surprised, as per wiki's entry "Deviant logic", that indeed Haack borrows directly from Quine. Deviant is not a TERM *I* would use. We tend to associate it here with alternative sexualities. Just teasing!
-- But yes, that would be the Quine of "Word and object".
--- Note incidentally, that Quine provides an answer to Grice's and Strawson's "In defense of a dogma" in that manifesto, "Word and object". Recall too that Grice contributed to a lovely volume against Quine, "Words and ObjectIONS".
J goes on:
"And while not too pleasing to logicians or mathematicians, most ordinary research/science works in that manner--. In that sense Toulmin was a bit of a pragmatist too, eschewing pure formality in favor of applicability and evidentialism of a sort."
Yes, the tradition in Quine must come via Skinner ("Verbal behaviour") and perhaps the Chicago school of semiotics (Peirce, Morris, etc.). Very American.
J writes:
"Some of modern logic--such as quantification --may have had applications. But much was merely cold routine. Most humans, hearing some egghead say the King of France is bald would, say that's gibberish."
Oddly, in Latin, that would come out as
"Rex Franciae", rather than "THE" King of France. This possibly would mean that (ix), iota operator, as in the logical-form of Latin-language sentences, would seem otiose.
The problem is with the king of France _not_ being bald, which is true. The king of France is bald -- that's not gibberish, to Grice. It is false. But yes, blame Strawson on the gibberish. In fact, he is relying on Russell, as we well know. Oddly, Strawson writes,
"The king of France is not wise".
'bald' is Grice's and Russell's choice; Strawson's is 'bald'.
J goes on:
"Russell wants to insist it's not just gibberish but..false, because there is no such King. OK. But compared to trench warfare or the Great Depression or Hiroshima, logical analysis seems rather trivial, if not slightly...macabre, IMHE--as with the mysterious Charlie Dodgson hisself. The positivist Weltanschauung WAS Carrollian in a sense."
Yes. Recall that Russell attacked the Hegelians, too. When he closes the thing,
----
"Hegelians, who like a synthesis, may conclude that the King of France wears a wig".
Similarly Horn has noted a glitch in Strawson's way of finishing HIS discussion of "King of France": "The logic of ordinary language is neither Russellian nor Aristotelian; ordinary language hasn't got a logic".
Horn notes that
"The logic of ordinary language is not Russellian"
is a bit like
"The king of France is bald"
if you are going to back THAT claim on 'ordinary language having no logic'. Etc.
---
J goes on:
"Hegelian tradition while not without problems--had a rather greater scope--not just oxbridge or Harvard philosophers, but World History, the State, nations, peoples, languages."
Yes. Good you mention that. When Elinor Ochs went to Malagasy she found that speakers there were NOT Gricean:
"My sisters is in the garden or in the music-room"
was NOT understood, as "I don't know where she is"
Ochs note, "These people are very reluctant to give information, especially about their sisters; Grice is refuted here."
The last chapter of my PhD dissertation I entitled, "The cunning of conversational reasoning", since I thought that, naive as Och's argumentation is -- it required a better answer than that provided by Gazdar and others. So, I thought a way to combine Grice's "universalism" (Kantian in nature) with neo-Hegelian evidence to the effect that Grice's scheme is Not universal would be in order. Or not.
J goes on:
"Even Peirce respected Hegel, in some sense. Don't forget the peeps, JLS."
No. M. Hollis has written extensively on "cunning of reason" which is a lovely concept. I learned about Hollis et al via my PhD thesis supervisor, who would have us read, "Rationality and relativism". In that area, you get a lot of literature from anthropology, etc. British anthropologists, the idea of 'magic', why 'rationality' may be a European concept, and so on. All very odd.
-----
Etc.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Deviant Implicatures
From wiki:
"Philosopher Susan Haack uses the term "deviant logic" to describe certain non-classical systems of logic. In these logics."
"1. the set of well-formed formulas generated equals the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic."
"2. the set of theorems generated is different from the set of theorems generated by classical logic."
3. The set of theorems of a deviant logic can differ in any possible way from classical logic's set of theorems: as a proper subset, superset, or fully exclusive set."
"A notable example of this is the trivalent logic developed by Polish logician and mathematician Jan Łukasiewicz."
"Under this system, any theorem necessarily dependent on classical logic's principle of bivalence would fail to be valid."
"The term first appears in Chapter 6 of W.V.O. Quine's Philosophy of Logic, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (1970), which is cited by Haack on p.15 of her book."
Quasi-deviant and extended logics
"Haack also described what she calls a quasi-deviant logic. These logics are different from pure deviant logics in that."
"1. the set of well-formed formulas generated is a proper superset of the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic."
"2. the set of theorems generated is a proper superset of the set of theorems generated by classical logic, both in that the quasi-deviant logic generates novel theorems using well-formed formulas held in common with classical logic, as well as novel theorems using novel well-formed formulas."
"Finally, Haack defined a class of merely extended logics. In these,
"1. the set of well-formed formulas generated is a proper superset of the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic."
"2. the set of theorems generated is a proper superset of the set of theorems generated by classical logic, but only in that the novel theorems generated by the extended logic are only a result of novel well-formed formulas."
"Some systems of modal logic meet this definition."
"In such systems, any novel theorem would not parse in classical logic due to modal operators."
"While deviant and quasi-deviant logics are typically proposed as rivals to classical logic, the impetus behind extended logics is normally only to provide a supplement to it."
References
Haack, S. (1996). Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
"Philosopher Susan Haack uses the term "deviant logic" to describe certain non-classical systems of logic. In these logics."
"1. the set of well-formed formulas generated equals the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic."
"2. the set of theorems generated is different from the set of theorems generated by classical logic."
3. The set of theorems of a deviant logic can differ in any possible way from classical logic's set of theorems: as a proper subset, superset, or fully exclusive set."
"A notable example of this is the trivalent logic developed by Polish logician and mathematician Jan Łukasiewicz."
"Under this system, any theorem necessarily dependent on classical logic's principle of bivalence would fail to be valid."
"The term first appears in Chapter 6 of W.V.O. Quine's Philosophy of Logic, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (1970), which is cited by Haack on p.15 of her book."
Quasi-deviant and extended logics
"Haack also described what she calls a quasi-deviant logic. These logics are different from pure deviant logics in that."
"1. the set of well-formed formulas generated is a proper superset of the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic."
"2. the set of theorems generated is a proper superset of the set of theorems generated by classical logic, both in that the quasi-deviant logic generates novel theorems using well-formed formulas held in common with classical logic, as well as novel theorems using novel well-formed formulas."
"Finally, Haack defined a class of merely extended logics. In these,
"1. the set of well-formed formulas generated is a proper superset of the set of well-formed formulas generated by classical logic."
"2. the set of theorems generated is a proper superset of the set of theorems generated by classical logic, but only in that the novel theorems generated by the extended logic are only a result of novel well-formed formulas."
"Some systems of modal logic meet this definition."
"In such systems, any novel theorem would not parse in classical logic due to modal operators."
"While deviant and quasi-deviant logics are typically proposed as rivals to classical logic, the impetus behind extended logics is normally only to provide a supplement to it."
References
Haack, S. (1996). Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Alicubi in meridiano Franciae
ălĭcŭbi in mĕrīdĭāno Franciæ.
Where does C live?
Somewhere in the South of France.
----
What sort of expression is "Somewhere in the South of France?". How subpropositional can we get as we fail to 'explicate'?
----
What does "Locative" to do with it all?
"Locative (abbreviated loc) is a grammatical case which indicates a location."
"It corresponds vaguely to the English prepositions "in", "on", "at", and "by"."
As in
"Somewhere _IN_ the south of France".
"The locative case belongs to the general local cases together with the lative and separative case. The locative case exists in many language groups."
"Indo-European languages. The Proto-Indo-European language had a locative case expressing "place where", an adverbial function."
"The ending depended on the last vowel of the stem (consonant, a-, o-, i-, u-stems) and the number (singular or plural)."
"Subsequently the locative case tended to merge with other cases: the genitive or dative.[1]"
"Some daughter languages retained it as a distinct case."
"The locative case is found in: modern Balto-Slavic languages (see however prepositional case) some classical Indo-European languages, particularly Sanskrit and Old LATIN, uncommon, archaic or literary use in certain modern Indian languages (such as Marathi in which a separate ablative case has however disappeared)"
Latin
"In Latin, the functions of the locative case were mostly absorbed by the ablative, but a separate locative is found in a few words."
"The Latin locative case applies only to the names of cities and small islands and to a few other isolated words."
"The Romans considered all islands to be small except for Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, and Cyprus."
"There are a few nouns that use the locative
INSTEAD OF A PREPOSITION."
"domus becomes "domī" (at home).
"rūs becomes rūrī (in the country).
"humus becomes humī (on the ground)
"militia becomes militiae (in military service, in the field), and
focus becomes focī (at the hearth; at the center of the community).
----
"For singular first and second declension, the locative is identical to the genitive singular form, and for the singular third declension the locative is identical to the ablative singular form."
"For plural nouns of all declensions, the locative is also identical to the ablative form."
"The few fourth and fifth declension place-name words would also use the ablative form for locative case."
"In archaic times, the locative singular of third declension nouns was actually interchangeable between ablative and dative forms, but in the Augustan Period the use of the ablative form became fixed."
"Therefore, both forms
Where does C live?
Somewhere in the countryside.
---- Ruri.
---- Rure.
"rūrī" and "rūre" may be encountered."
"The first declension locative is by far the most common, because so many Roman place names were first declension: mostly singular (
Roma, Rome;
Hibernia, Ireland; etc., and therefore
Romae, at Rome;
Hiberniae, at Ireland)"
---
Franciae -- at France. Somewhere in (the south of) France
"but some plural (Athenae, Athens; Cumae, Cuma etc., with Athenis, at Athens; Cumis, at Cumae)."
"But there are a number of second declension names that would have locatives, too (Brundisium, Brindisi; Eboracum, York; with locatives Brundisiī, at Brindisi; Eboraci, at York, etc.)"
Greek
"In Ancient Greek, the locative merged with the Proto-Indo-European dative, so that the Greek dative represents the Proto-Indo-European dative, instrumental, and locative."
"The dative with the preposition
ἐν (en)
"in" and the dative of time (e.g.,
τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ tēî trítēi hēmérāi
"on the third day") are examples of locative datives.
Slavic languagesUnusual in other Indo-European branches but common among Slavic languages, the ending depends on whether the word is a noun or an adjective (among other factors). CzechThe Czech language uses the locative case to denote location (v České Republice/in the Czech Republic), but as in the Russian language, the locative case may be used after certain prepositions with meanings other than location (o Praze/about Prague, po revoluci/after the revolution). Cases other than the locative may be used to denote location in Czech as well (U Roberta/at Robert's house -genitive, or nad stolem/above the table -instrumental). See Czech declension for declension patterns for all Czech grammatical cases, including locative. PolishThere are several different locative endings in Polish: -ie Used for singular nouns of all genders, e.g. niebo → niebie. In a few cases, the softening indicated by i has led to consonant alternations: brat → bracie rzeka → rzece noga → nodze rower → rowerze
piekło → piekle For a complete list, see Polish hard and soft consonants.
-u Used for: Some masculine singular nouns, e.g. syn → synu, dom → domu, bok → boku, brzuch → brzuchu, worek → worku*, nastrój → nastroju*, deszcz → deszczu, miś → misiu, koń → koniu, Poznań → Poznaniu, Wrocław → Wrocławiu, Bytom → Bytomiu** [* In a few cases, a vowel change may occur, e.g. ó → o, or a vowel may be dropped. ** Final consonants in Wrocław and Bytom used to be soft, which is still reflected in suffixed forms, hence -i-.] All neuter singular nouns ending in -e, e.g. miejsce → miejscu, życie → życiu Some neuter singular nouns ending in -o, e.g. mleko → mleku, łóżko → łóżku, ucho → uchu -i Used for: Feminine nouns ending in -ia, e.g. Kasia ("Katie") → o Kasi ("about Katie"), Austria → w Austrii ("in Austria")
Feminine nouns ending in -ść, e.g. miłość ("love") → o miłości ("about love")
-ach Used for plural nouns of all genders, e.g. kobiety ("women") → o kobietach ("about women") -ich / -ych Used for plural adjectives of all genders, e.g. małe sklepy ("small shops") → w małych sklepach ("in small shops")
-im / -ym Used for masculine and neuter singular adjectives, e.g. polski język ("Polish language") → w polskim języku ("in the Polish language")
-ej Used for feminine singular adjectives, e.g. duża krowa ("big cow") → o dużej krowie ("about a big cow") RussianIn the Russian language, the locative case has been largely superseded by the prepositional case. This case is used only after a preposition and not always to indicate location, while other cases can also be used to specify a location, e.g. the genitive case as in у окна́ ("by the window"). Statements such as "в библиотеке" v biblioteke ("in the library") or "на Аляске" na Alyaske ("in Alaska") demonstrate the usage of the prepositional case to indicate location. However, this case is also used after the preposition "о" ("about") as in "о студенте" o studente ("about the student"). Nevertheless a number of masculine nouns (150 or so) exist a distinct form for the locative case, used only after "в" and "на". These forms end in "-у́" or "-ю́": "лежать в снегу́" lezhat v snegu (to lie in the snow), but "думать о снеге" dumat o snege (to think about snow). Other examples are рай ray (paradise) - "в раю́", дым dym (smoke) - "в дыму́" v dymú. (As indicated here by the accent marks, the stress is always on the last syllable, unlike the dative case forms with the same spelling.) A few feminine nouns ending in the soft sign, such as дверь and пыль, also have a locative form differing from the prepositional in that the stress shifts to the final syllable, thus "на двери́" na dverí ("on the door") but "при две́ри" pri dvéri ("by the door"). These distinct forms are sometimes referred to as "second locative" or "new locative" because it developed independently of the true locative case which existed in the Old Russian.[2][3] With some words, such as дом dom (house), the second locative form is used only in certain idiomatic expressions while the prepositional is used elsewhere. For example, "на дому́" na domu ("at the house" or "at home") would be used to describe activity performed at home, while "на до́ме" ("on the house") would be used to specify the location of the roof. ArmenianIn the Armenian language nouns take -ում (-um) for the locative form. համալսարանը (hamalsaranə, the university) → համալսարանումը (hamalsaranumə, in/at the university)
ճաշարան (chasharan, a restaurant) → ճաշարանում (chasharanum, in/at a restaurant)
Turkic languagesSome Turkic languages have a locative.
TurkishThe locative case exists in Turkish, as the suffix generally specified by "-DA". For instance, in Turkish, okul means the school, and okulda means in the school. The morpheme may exist in four different forms, depending on the preceding consonant and vowel. The first phoneme of the locative, "D", changes according to the previous consonant: it is "t" after voiceless consonants, but "d" elsewhere. The vowel changes depending on the phonetic characteristics of the previous vowel: it is "a" after a preceding back vowel, and "e" after a preceding front vowel, congruent with the vowel harmony of the language. This gives four different versions of the morpheme:
-ta, as in "kitapta", "in the book". -te, as in "kentte", "in the city". -da, as in "odada", "in the room". -de, as in "evde", "in the house".
UzbekThe locative case exists also in Uzbek. For example, in Uzbek, shakhar means city, and shakharda means in the city, so using -da suffix, the locative case is marked.
Finno-Ugric languagesSome Finno-Ugric languages have a locative.Inari SamiIn Inari Sami, the locative suffix is -st.kyeleest 'in the language'
kieđast 'in the hand'. HungarianIn the Hungarian language, nine such cases exist, yet the name locative case refers to a form (-t/-tt) used only in a few city/town names along with the inessive case or superessive case. It can also be observed in a few local adverbs and postpositions. It is no longer productive.
Examples:Győrött (also Győrben), Pécsett (also Pécsen), Vácott (also Vácon), Kaposvárt and Kaposvárott (also Kaposváron), Vásárhelyt (also Vásárhelyen)
itt (here), ott (there), imitt, amott (there yonder), alatt (under), fölött (over), között (between/among), mögött (behind) etc.
The town/city name suffixes -ban/-ben are the inessive ones, and the -on/-en/-ön are the superessive ones.
EstonianThe Estonian language has a set of 6 locative cases, 3 interior and 3 exterior ones. They are formed by adding a suffix to the genitive form of the noun.
The interior locative cases are:Illative - majasse 'into a/the house', or the irregular short form majja which is used mostly
Inessive - majas 'in a/the house'
Elative - majast 'from inside a/the house'
The exterior locative cases are:
Allative - majale '(on)to a/the house'
Adessive - majal 'on (top of) a/the house' or 'at a/the house'
Ablative - majalt 'from a/the house'
(http://www.einst.ee/publications/language/cases.html)
All nouns have a regular version of all these 6 cases, but many words have a more commonly used irregular short version for the illative case which, instead of adding a sse suffix to the genitive, change their stress/phoneme length without adding an extra syllable for the suffix.
Estonian, like some Indo-European languages (Latin, Russian, Irish), does not normally use the verb to have to show possession. The adessive case and the verb to be is used instead. For example, I have a car in Estonian would be Mul on maja in which mul is in the adessive case, on is the third singular of to be (is), and maja is in nominative, not accusative. So maja is the subject, on is the verb and mul is the indirect object. This could be translated to English as At me is a house or A house is at me or There is a house at me. For this reason, it has been argued that the Estonian adessive case is really a dative one. Statistically, the majority of the occurrences of the exterior locative cases show possession, not location (also Ta andis mulle maja 'He gave (to) me a house', Ta võttis minult mu maja 'He took from me my house').
(http://repository.tufs.ac.jp/bitstream/10108/21802/1/jaas046011.pdf)
EtruscanThe Etruscan language has a locative ending in -thi: velsnalthi, "at Velznani", with reference to Volsinii.[citation needed]Algonquian languagesAlgonquian languages have a locative.
CreeIn Cree, the locative suffix is -ihk.
misâskwatômin (Saskatoon berry) → misâskwatôminihk (at the Saskatoon berry) = "[in] Saskatoon, SK"
misâskwatôminiskâ- (be many Saskatoon berries) → misâskwatôminiskâhk (at the place of many Saskatoon berries) = "[in] Saskatoon, SK"
mînis (berry) → mînisihk (at the berry) = "[in] Saskatoon, SK"
Innu-aimunIn Innu-aimun, the locative suffix is -(i)t.
shipu (river) → shipit (at the river)
katshishkutamatsheutshuap (school) → katshishkutamatsheutshuapit (at school)
nuitsheuakan (my friend) → nuitsheuakanit (at my friend's house)
nipi (water) → nipit (in the water)
utenau (town) → utenat (in town)
Notes^ Buck, page 172
^ The Locative Case
^ Everything you always wanted to know about Russian grammar but were afraid to ask, AATSEEL Newsletter, October 2007, pp. 7-8.
BibliographyBuck, Carl Darling (1933). Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.
Where does C live?
Somewhere in the South of France.
----
What sort of expression is "Somewhere in the South of France?". How subpropositional can we get as we fail to 'explicate'?
----
What does "Locative" to do with it all?
"Locative (abbreviated loc) is a grammatical case which indicates a location."
"It corresponds vaguely to the English prepositions "in", "on", "at", and "by"."
As in
"Somewhere _IN_ the south of France".
"The locative case belongs to the general local cases together with the lative and separative case. The locative case exists in many language groups."
"Indo-European languages. The Proto-Indo-European language had a locative case expressing "place where", an adverbial function."
"The ending depended on the last vowel of the stem (consonant, a-, o-, i-, u-stems) and the number (singular or plural)."
"Subsequently the locative case tended to merge with other cases: the genitive or dative.[1]"
"Some daughter languages retained it as a distinct case."
"The locative case is found in: modern Balto-Slavic languages (see however prepositional case) some classical Indo-European languages, particularly Sanskrit and Old LATIN, uncommon, archaic or literary use in certain modern Indian languages (such as Marathi in which a separate ablative case has however disappeared)"
Latin
"In Latin, the functions of the locative case were mostly absorbed by the ablative, but a separate locative is found in a few words."
"The Latin locative case applies only to the names of cities and small islands and to a few other isolated words."
"The Romans considered all islands to be small except for Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, and Cyprus."
"There are a few nouns that use the locative
INSTEAD OF A PREPOSITION."
"domus becomes "domī" (at home).
"rūs becomes rūrī (in the country).
"humus becomes humī (on the ground)
"militia becomes militiae (in military service, in the field), and
focus becomes focī (at the hearth; at the center of the community).
----
"For singular first and second declension, the locative is identical to the genitive singular form, and for the singular third declension the locative is identical to the ablative singular form."
"For plural nouns of all declensions, the locative is also identical to the ablative form."
"The few fourth and fifth declension place-name words would also use the ablative form for locative case."
"In archaic times, the locative singular of third declension nouns was actually interchangeable between ablative and dative forms, but in the Augustan Period the use of the ablative form became fixed."
"Therefore, both forms
Where does C live?
Somewhere in the countryside.
---- Ruri.
---- Rure.
"rūrī" and "rūre" may be encountered."
"The first declension locative is by far the most common, because so many Roman place names were first declension: mostly singular (
Roma, Rome;
Hibernia, Ireland; etc., and therefore
Romae, at Rome;
Hiberniae, at Ireland)"
---
Franciae -- at France. Somewhere in (the south of) France
"but some plural (Athenae, Athens; Cumae, Cuma etc., with Athenis, at Athens; Cumis, at Cumae)."
"But there are a number of second declension names that would have locatives, too (Brundisium, Brindisi; Eboracum, York; with locatives Brundisiī, at Brindisi; Eboraci, at York, etc.)"
Greek
"In Ancient Greek, the locative merged with the Proto-Indo-European dative, so that the Greek dative represents the Proto-Indo-European dative, instrumental, and locative."
"The dative with the preposition
ἐν (en)
"in" and the dative of time (e.g.,
τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ tēî trítēi hēmérāi
"on the third day") are examples of locative datives.
Slavic languagesUnusual in other Indo-European branches but common among Slavic languages, the ending depends on whether the word is a noun or an adjective (among other factors). CzechThe Czech language uses the locative case to denote location (v České Republice/in the Czech Republic), but as in the Russian language, the locative case may be used after certain prepositions with meanings other than location (o Praze/about Prague, po revoluci/after the revolution). Cases other than the locative may be used to denote location in Czech as well (U Roberta/at Robert's house -genitive, or nad stolem/above the table -instrumental). See Czech declension for declension patterns for all Czech grammatical cases, including locative. PolishThere are several different locative endings in Polish: -ie Used for singular nouns of all genders, e.g. niebo → niebie. In a few cases, the softening indicated by i has led to consonant alternations: brat → bracie rzeka → rzece noga → nodze rower → rowerze
piekło → piekle For a complete list, see Polish hard and soft consonants.
-u Used for: Some masculine singular nouns, e.g. syn → synu, dom → domu, bok → boku, brzuch → brzuchu, worek → worku*, nastrój → nastroju*, deszcz → deszczu, miś → misiu, koń → koniu, Poznań → Poznaniu, Wrocław → Wrocławiu, Bytom → Bytomiu** [* In a few cases, a vowel change may occur, e.g. ó → o, or a vowel may be dropped. ** Final consonants in Wrocław and Bytom used to be soft, which is still reflected in suffixed forms, hence -i-.] All neuter singular nouns ending in -e, e.g. miejsce → miejscu, życie → życiu Some neuter singular nouns ending in -o, e.g. mleko → mleku, łóżko → łóżku, ucho → uchu -i Used for: Feminine nouns ending in -ia, e.g. Kasia ("Katie") → o Kasi ("about Katie"), Austria → w Austrii ("in Austria")
Feminine nouns ending in -ść, e.g. miłość ("love") → o miłości ("about love")
-ach Used for plural nouns of all genders, e.g. kobiety ("women") → o kobietach ("about women") -ich / -ych Used for plural adjectives of all genders, e.g. małe sklepy ("small shops") → w małych sklepach ("in small shops")
-im / -ym Used for masculine and neuter singular adjectives, e.g. polski język ("Polish language") → w polskim języku ("in the Polish language")
-ej Used for feminine singular adjectives, e.g. duża krowa ("big cow") → o dużej krowie ("about a big cow") RussianIn the Russian language, the locative case has been largely superseded by the prepositional case. This case is used only after a preposition and not always to indicate location, while other cases can also be used to specify a location, e.g. the genitive case as in у окна́ ("by the window"). Statements such as "в библиотеке" v biblioteke ("in the library") or "на Аляске" na Alyaske ("in Alaska") demonstrate the usage of the prepositional case to indicate location. However, this case is also used after the preposition "о" ("about") as in "о студенте" o studente ("about the student"). Nevertheless a number of masculine nouns (150 or so) exist a distinct form for the locative case, used only after "в" and "на". These forms end in "-у́" or "-ю́": "лежать в снегу́" lezhat v snegu (to lie in the snow), but "думать о снеге" dumat o snege (to think about snow). Other examples are рай ray (paradise) - "в раю́", дым dym (smoke) - "в дыму́" v dymú. (As indicated here by the accent marks, the stress is always on the last syllable, unlike the dative case forms with the same spelling.) A few feminine nouns ending in the soft sign, such as дверь and пыль, also have a locative form differing from the prepositional in that the stress shifts to the final syllable, thus "на двери́" na dverí ("on the door") but "при две́ри" pri dvéri ("by the door"). These distinct forms are sometimes referred to as "second locative" or "new locative" because it developed independently of the true locative case which existed in the Old Russian.[2][3] With some words, such as дом dom (house), the second locative form is used only in certain idiomatic expressions while the prepositional is used elsewhere. For example, "на дому́" na domu ("at the house" or "at home") would be used to describe activity performed at home, while "на до́ме" ("on the house") would be used to specify the location of the roof. ArmenianIn the Armenian language nouns take -ում (-um) for the locative form. համալսարանը (hamalsaranə, the university) → համալսարանումը (hamalsaranumə, in/at the university)
ճաշարան (chasharan, a restaurant) → ճաշարանում (chasharanum, in/at a restaurant)
Turkic languagesSome Turkic languages have a locative.
TurkishThe locative case exists in Turkish, as the suffix generally specified by "-DA". For instance, in Turkish, okul means the school, and okulda means in the school. The morpheme may exist in four different forms, depending on the preceding consonant and vowel. The first phoneme of the locative, "D", changes according to the previous consonant: it is "t" after voiceless consonants, but "d" elsewhere. The vowel changes depending on the phonetic characteristics of the previous vowel: it is "a" after a preceding back vowel, and "e" after a preceding front vowel, congruent with the vowel harmony of the language. This gives four different versions of the morpheme:
-ta, as in "kitapta", "in the book". -te, as in "kentte", "in the city". -da, as in "odada", "in the room". -de, as in "evde", "in the house".
UzbekThe locative case exists also in Uzbek. For example, in Uzbek, shakhar means city, and shakharda means in the city, so using -da suffix, the locative case is marked.
Finno-Ugric languagesSome Finno-Ugric languages have a locative.Inari SamiIn Inari Sami, the locative suffix is -st.kyeleest 'in the language'
kieđast 'in the hand'. HungarianIn the Hungarian language, nine such cases exist, yet the name locative case refers to a form (-t/-tt) used only in a few city/town names along with the inessive case or superessive case. It can also be observed in a few local adverbs and postpositions. It is no longer productive.
Examples:Győrött (also Győrben), Pécsett (also Pécsen), Vácott (also Vácon), Kaposvárt and Kaposvárott (also Kaposváron), Vásárhelyt (also Vásárhelyen)
itt (here), ott (there), imitt, amott (there yonder), alatt (under), fölött (over), között (between/among), mögött (behind) etc.
The town/city name suffixes -ban/-ben are the inessive ones, and the -on/-en/-ön are the superessive ones.
EstonianThe Estonian language has a set of 6 locative cases, 3 interior and 3 exterior ones. They are formed by adding a suffix to the genitive form of the noun.
The interior locative cases are:Illative - majasse 'into a/the house', or the irregular short form majja which is used mostly
Inessive - majas 'in a/the house'
Elative - majast 'from inside a/the house'
The exterior locative cases are:
Allative - majale '(on)to a/the house'
Adessive - majal 'on (top of) a/the house' or 'at a/the house'
Ablative - majalt 'from a/the house'
(http://www.einst.ee/publications/language/cases.html)
All nouns have a regular version of all these 6 cases, but many words have a more commonly used irregular short version for the illative case which, instead of adding a sse suffix to the genitive, change their stress/phoneme length without adding an extra syllable for the suffix.
Estonian, like some Indo-European languages (Latin, Russian, Irish), does not normally use the verb to have to show possession. The adessive case and the verb to be is used instead. For example, I have a car in Estonian would be Mul on maja in which mul is in the adessive case, on is the third singular of to be (is), and maja is in nominative, not accusative. So maja is the subject, on is the verb and mul is the indirect object. This could be translated to English as At me is a house or A house is at me or There is a house at me. For this reason, it has been argued that the Estonian adessive case is really a dative one. Statistically, the majority of the occurrences of the exterior locative cases show possession, not location (also Ta andis mulle maja 'He gave (to) me a house', Ta võttis minult mu maja 'He took from me my house').
(http://repository.tufs.ac.jp/bitstream/10108/21802/1/jaas046011.pdf)
EtruscanThe Etruscan language has a locative ending in -thi: velsnalthi, "at Velznani", with reference to Volsinii.[citation needed]Algonquian languagesAlgonquian languages have a locative.
CreeIn Cree, the locative suffix is -ihk.
misâskwatômin (Saskatoon berry) → misâskwatôminihk (at the Saskatoon berry) = "[in] Saskatoon, SK"
misâskwatôminiskâ- (be many Saskatoon berries) → misâskwatôminiskâhk (at the place of many Saskatoon berries) = "[in] Saskatoon, SK"
mînis (berry) → mînisihk (at the berry) = "[in] Saskatoon, SK"
Innu-aimunIn Innu-aimun, the locative suffix is -(i)t.
shipu (river) → shipit (at the river)
katshishkutamatsheutshuap (school) → katshishkutamatsheutshuapit (at school)
nuitsheuakan (my friend) → nuitsheuakanit (at my friend's house)
nipi (water) → nipit (in the water)
utenau (town) → utenat (in town)
Notes^ Buck, page 172
^ The Locative Case
^ Everything you always wanted to know about Russian grammar but were afraid to ask, AATSEEL Newsletter, October 2007, pp. 7-8.
BibliographyBuck, Carl Darling (1933). Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.
Deviant Implicatures
J wrote in "More on Grice on logical form:
"According to J's "pragmatic analyticity" (treatise to arrive at later date), we keep the LOEM and LONC, like we keep the rules of chess--thats how the logic-game is played. But are they written like in some timeless platonic abode? Un f-ing likely."
Oddly, for my PhD degree, I had to pass a course on the philosophy of logic; which I did. The required text was Haack, "Philosophy of logic", which I devoured. Of course, I did my paper and research on her treatment of Grice - chapter i, luckily.
But then I found out more. Haack had a second book, called "Deviant logics". It's all about Quine, and Strawson, and Grice.
You see, for Grice, logic is _simple_, as it was for Witters.
Strawson complicated things, with his "truth-value gaps", that Grice detested. This does not have to do what with Chomsky would call "LF", logical form, but "ILF", interpreted logical form.
"The king of France is a bastard"
is neither true nor false, for Strawson, since the King of France does not refer. For Grice,
"The king of France is not a bastard"
is true, since, well, there is no King of France. On the other hand, for Grice, "The king of France is a bastard" is _false_.
----
Quine also is brought in.
So consider things like (ix), the iota operator, for the description of "the" in "The king of France", or the horseshoe (better), ), for "p ) q", "if p, q".
For Grice, 'if', in English, mirrors "p ) q" and vice versa. For Strawson it doesn't. He thinks that by uttering "if", speakers mean MORE than the material conditional. This is yet a different disagreement than that over the meaning of 'the'.
When Grice starts his "Logic and Conversation" piece he mentions that he will try to defend "classical logic", as he calls it, "in a two-valued interpretation", as he also adds.
So
"p v -p"
would for Grice be a 'law' of some type. In a non-two-valued interpretation, things are different. A non-two-valued interpretation may be a 'truth-value' gappy interpretation, alla Strawson. Or more deviantly, it may be a three-valued interpretation.
Haack analyses all that.
Where Quine fits in. Quine offers a principle of charity (alla Davidson) to approach people's speech. We tend to assume that foreigners', say, use of the language will be isomorphic with us. But what if their interpreation of the logical constants is NOT two-valued. What if in some Southern Pacific tribe, truth-value gaps ARE the norm? What if the logical form of their 'conditional' utterances imply something like C. I. Lewis's 'strict implication' (the fishhook) rather than the horseshoe?
-----
Grice tended to be a universalist. As far as homo sapiens is concerned, the laws of logic _ARE_ universal. Not so much because logicians are, oh-so-clever. But because the laws of logic are supposed to mirror homo-sapiens's psychological correlations with Reality, as homo-sapiens conceive it.
Chimpanzees may operate on a different logic. They may _perceive_ Reality in a different perspective.
So I WOULD relativise logic to 'homo-sapiens', first, and English, second.
The idea of a formal system (like Grice's System Q, or Myro's System G) should then be understood as a way to 'model' the language of a Quine (System Q) or a Grice (System G). Within those parameters, the law of the excluded middle, or non-contradiction, hold. But as J notes, in different languages, they may not.
Etc.
----
Van Fraasen also elaborated on this, even if he failed.
"According to J's "pragmatic analyticity" (treatise to arrive at later date), we keep the LOEM and LONC, like we keep the rules of chess--thats how the logic-game is played. But are they written like in some timeless platonic abode? Un f-ing likely."
Oddly, for my PhD degree, I had to pass a course on the philosophy of logic; which I did. The required text was Haack, "Philosophy of logic", which I devoured. Of course, I did my paper and research on her treatment of Grice - chapter i, luckily.
But then I found out more. Haack had a second book, called "Deviant logics". It's all about Quine, and Strawson, and Grice.
You see, for Grice, logic is _simple_, as it was for Witters.
Strawson complicated things, with his "truth-value gaps", that Grice detested. This does not have to do what with Chomsky would call "LF", logical form, but "ILF", interpreted logical form.
"The king of France is a bastard"
is neither true nor false, for Strawson, since the King of France does not refer. For Grice,
"The king of France is not a bastard"
is true, since, well, there is no King of France. On the other hand, for Grice, "The king of France is a bastard" is _false_.
----
Quine also is brought in.
So consider things like (ix), the iota operator, for the description of "the" in "The king of France", or the horseshoe (better), ), for "p ) q", "if p, q".
For Grice, 'if', in English, mirrors "p ) q" and vice versa. For Strawson it doesn't. He thinks that by uttering "if", speakers mean MORE than the material conditional. This is yet a different disagreement than that over the meaning of 'the'.
When Grice starts his "Logic and Conversation" piece he mentions that he will try to defend "classical logic", as he calls it, "in a two-valued interpretation", as he also adds.
So
"p v -p"
would for Grice be a 'law' of some type. In a non-two-valued interpretation, things are different. A non-two-valued interpretation may be a 'truth-value' gappy interpretation, alla Strawson. Or more deviantly, it may be a three-valued interpretation.
Haack analyses all that.
Where Quine fits in. Quine offers a principle of charity (alla Davidson) to approach people's speech. We tend to assume that foreigners', say, use of the language will be isomorphic with us. But what if their interpreation of the logical constants is NOT two-valued. What if in some Southern Pacific tribe, truth-value gaps ARE the norm? What if the logical form of their 'conditional' utterances imply something like C. I. Lewis's 'strict implication' (the fishhook) rather than the horseshoe?
-----
Grice tended to be a universalist. As far as homo sapiens is concerned, the laws of logic _ARE_ universal. Not so much because logicians are, oh-so-clever. But because the laws of logic are supposed to mirror homo-sapiens's psychological correlations with Reality, as homo-sapiens conceive it.
Chimpanzees may operate on a different logic. They may _perceive_ Reality in a different perspective.
So I WOULD relativise logic to 'homo-sapiens', first, and English, second.
The idea of a formal system (like Grice's System Q, or Myro's System G) should then be understood as a way to 'model' the language of a Quine (System Q) or a Grice (System G). Within those parameters, the law of the excluded middle, or non-contradiction, hold. But as J notes, in different languages, they may not.
Etc.
----
Van Fraasen also elaborated on this, even if he failed.
J writes in his interesting commentary to "More on Grice on logical form":
"Why JLS, the White Knight proffered the Law of the Excluded middle! And quite correctly. Yll either cry, or won't---at least within the space of the tune, or something. But at times a domain (or is it a "state description" issue or something) would need to be attached. Maybe Alice doesn't cry right then. But later that evening, she recalls the sad melody, and tears up. Of course proving that the tune produced the tears is another matter. Alice might be an actress and fib about it."
Good. I will try to elaborate on this:
We are discussing:
"Either it will bringt tears to your eyes, this song, or else... it won't". Cited by Ramsey, "Foundations of Mathematics" and other essays.
J goes on:
"Joking aside, attacks on the LOEM and LONC are not exactly new. As that ancient creep Heraclitus said, the sun is new every day. I do think in some way humans have an addiction to discreteness, even when its not ...present ( some PoMos said that as well--false binaries, etc). According to J's "pragmatic analyticity" (treatise to arrive at later date), we keep the LOEM and LONC, like we keep the rules of chess--thats how the logic-game is played. But are they written like in some timeless platonic abode? Un f-ing likely."
Yes. You are right -- and the title is DEVIANT! (Next blog post!)
"Why JLS, the White Knight proffered the Law of the Excluded middle! And quite correctly. Yll either cry, or won't---at least within the space of the tune, or something. But at times a domain (or is it a "state description" issue or something) would need to be attached. Maybe Alice doesn't cry right then. But later that evening, she recalls the sad melody, and tears up. Of course proving that the tune produced the tears is another matter. Alice might be an actress and fib about it."
Good. I will try to elaborate on this:
We are discussing:
"Either it will bringt tears to your eyes, this song, or else... it won't". Cited by Ramsey, "Foundations of Mathematics" and other essays.
J goes on:
"Joking aside, attacks on the LOEM and LONC are not exactly new. As that ancient creep Heraclitus said, the sun is new every day. I do think in some way humans have an addiction to discreteness, even when its not ...present ( some PoMos said that as well--false binaries, etc). According to J's "pragmatic analyticity" (treatise to arrive at later date), we keep the LOEM and LONC, like we keep the rules of chess--thats how the logic-game is played. But are they written like in some timeless platonic abode? Un f-ing likely."
Yes. You are right -- and the title is DEVIANT! (Next blog post!)
Russell Dale
--- There was a discussion elsewhere, by J. Constable, editor of Richards, "The meaning of meaning" (to be) for Routledge. This is all accessible online and archived. In any case, I did mention to Constable this thesis by Dale. The result is GREAT: Grice is NOW cited -- thanks to yours truly -- in the Routledge reprint of Richards. Along with a reference to Dale!
---
R. B. Jones writes:
"I recently stumbled across a PhD by Russell Elliot Dale, in which he (en passant) traces some of Grice's ideas on meaning to a Lady Victoria Welby (which just happens to be a place in Lincolnshire a couple of miles up the road from here)."
--- Yes. As Constable provides the right citation. This is a PhD that Dale composed in New York for the appreciation of Schiffer. It contains some interesting historic stuff, that should be quoted more often. E.g. by Chapman's biography of Grice. I would need to doublecheck if she relies on Dale. Since Dale makes some very interesting points about Stevenson, verificationism, and the rest, as it combines with the very early Grice of "Meaning".
Yes, the grand dame "Lady Welby" of Significs fame.
Jones goes on:
"In the manner of London buses I then notice that Russell mentions the same lady in his "Our Knowledge of the External World as a field of study for scientific philosophy" (in a not particularly flattering way)."
She is the sort of posh character Lord Russell would quote, isn't she? (As Grice, going more 'lowbrow', would quote from "Mrs. Jack" in the retrospective epilogue to WoW).
I think Lady Welby based his life in London, and I think her books are available online (to read, rather than to buy -- who would buy them? :().
Jones:
"So I thought I would (presumably unnecessarily) provoke the third by asking whether you (JL, or anyone else who cares to comment) have come across Dale's dissertation and what you think of that part of his thesis (or of the rest)."
Yes. I possibly came across it -- some time _ago_. I know then that it was well before Constable reprinted Richards's "Meaning of meaning", which quotes from Dale. I have NOT cited Dale explicitly on publications or unpublications, -- except the occasional publicly accessible fragment, as the one Constable uses to manage to cite Grice (via Dale) in his reprint.
---- It would have been nice if Dale had further continued with his researches. It is New-York-based, and quotes from standard editions of classics. Constable, and others, being England-based, can access 'unpublications', etc. In any case, it was excellent for Dale to have Schiffer as advisor.
Jones:
"He does, for my money, field what looks at first glance like a rather facile critique of formal semantics, but I don't suppose that need impact what he has to say about Grice."
I think it's sort of a typical PhD dissertation in that it attempts to cover too much. Just the HISTORICAL aspects are interesting enough, but it is good (for Dale's own sake) that he proposed to contribute substantially rather than just historically or exegetical. Exegesis and history are always second and third rate respectively in philosophical research.
So, one would need to double check his references. He does then mention
WELBY
and cares to provide some welcome bibliographical references to her work.
Then it's Husserl. This is cited by Richards rather. The book, "Meaning of Meaning" is of course by OGDEN and Richards. Constable just reprinted the book in the Richards's "Complete Works" Routledge reprint. Poor Ogden.
Then it's Stevenson.
How does it connect with Grice?
Since Grice kept ALL HIS NOTES, Dale (provided one would use his research to provide further research) should consider authors like PEIRCE. How early in the history should we go back?
Grice left some pretty complete notes on "Peirce on the theory of signs". I take THAT to be the immediate antecedent for "Meaning", by Grice.
The casual references to the 'causal theories' of Stevenson, and -- shall we add, Ayer, Ogden/Richards, -- are a different sort of fish.
Grice is never clear that he wants to OPPOSE 'causal theories' of the Stevenson type, because he DOESN'T. I have discussed this with some experts, notably Stampe, and we do agree that Grice is deep down in his blessed heart a 'causalist'.
------ Russell dealt with all this in his inquiry into meaning and truth.
When I did research on Grice I started to concentrate on OXFORD authors. Peirce, then, out. Russell, then out. Ogden/Richards, then out. But it IS important!
---
But note that Grice does quote from Stevenson. And if you do read Stevenson, "Ethics and language" (1944 and recall that Grice's "Meaning" is dated 1948) you do see many references to Ogden/Richards. Ogden/Richards as almost the first theorists of 'emotivism'.
And so on.
Excellent to be reminded of Dale and Welby, then!
---
R. B. Jones writes:
"I recently stumbled across a PhD by Russell Elliot Dale, in which he (en passant) traces some of Grice's ideas on meaning to a Lady Victoria Welby (which just happens to be a place in Lincolnshire a couple of miles up the road from here)."
--- Yes. As Constable provides the right citation. This is a PhD that Dale composed in New York for the appreciation of Schiffer. It contains some interesting historic stuff, that should be quoted more often. E.g. by Chapman's biography of Grice. I would need to doublecheck if she relies on Dale. Since Dale makes some very interesting points about Stevenson, verificationism, and the rest, as it combines with the very early Grice of "Meaning".
Yes, the grand dame "Lady Welby" of Significs fame.
Jones goes on:
"In the manner of London buses I then notice that Russell mentions the same lady in his "Our Knowledge of the External World as a field of study for scientific philosophy" (in a not particularly flattering way)."
She is the sort of posh character Lord Russell would quote, isn't she? (As Grice, going more 'lowbrow', would quote from "Mrs. Jack" in the retrospective epilogue to WoW).
I think Lady Welby based his life in London, and I think her books are available online (to read, rather than to buy -- who would buy them? :().
Jones:
"So I thought I would (presumably unnecessarily) provoke the third by asking whether you (JL, or anyone else who cares to comment) have come across Dale's dissertation and what you think of that part of his thesis (or of the rest)."
Yes. I possibly came across it -- some time _ago_. I know then that it was well before Constable reprinted Richards's "Meaning of meaning", which quotes from Dale. I have NOT cited Dale explicitly on publications or unpublications, -- except the occasional publicly accessible fragment, as the one Constable uses to manage to cite Grice (via Dale) in his reprint.
---- It would have been nice if Dale had further continued with his researches. It is New-York-based, and quotes from standard editions of classics. Constable, and others, being England-based, can access 'unpublications', etc. In any case, it was excellent for Dale to have Schiffer as advisor.
Jones:
"He does, for my money, field what looks at first glance like a rather facile critique of formal semantics, but I don't suppose that need impact what he has to say about Grice."
I think it's sort of a typical PhD dissertation in that it attempts to cover too much. Just the HISTORICAL aspects are interesting enough, but it is good (for Dale's own sake) that he proposed to contribute substantially rather than just historically or exegetical. Exegesis and history are always second and third rate respectively in philosophical research.
So, one would need to double check his references. He does then mention
WELBY
and cares to provide some welcome bibliographical references to her work.
Then it's Husserl. This is cited by Richards rather. The book, "Meaning of Meaning" is of course by OGDEN and Richards. Constable just reprinted the book in the Richards's "Complete Works" Routledge reprint. Poor Ogden.
Then it's Stevenson.
How does it connect with Grice?
Since Grice kept ALL HIS NOTES, Dale (provided one would use his research to provide further research) should consider authors like PEIRCE. How early in the history should we go back?
Grice left some pretty complete notes on "Peirce on the theory of signs". I take THAT to be the immediate antecedent for "Meaning", by Grice.
The casual references to the 'causal theories' of Stevenson, and -- shall we add, Ayer, Ogden/Richards, -- are a different sort of fish.
Grice is never clear that he wants to OPPOSE 'causal theories' of the Stevenson type, because he DOESN'T. I have discussed this with some experts, notably Stampe, and we do agree that Grice is deep down in his blessed heart a 'causalist'.
------ Russell dealt with all this in his inquiry into meaning and truth.
When I did research on Grice I started to concentrate on OXFORD authors. Peirce, then, out. Russell, then out. Ogden/Richards, then out. But it IS important!
---
But note that Grice does quote from Stevenson. And if you do read Stevenson, "Ethics and language" (1944 and recall that Grice's "Meaning" is dated 1948) you do see many references to Ogden/Richards. Ogden/Richards as almost the first theorists of 'emotivism'.
And so on.
Excellent to be reminded of Dale and Welby, then!
Labels:
and an Oxford don (Grice),
Lady Welby,
Lord Rusell
More on Grice on logical form
In "Canonical logical form", J writes:
"We say Tractatus; you say Trac-tah-tus."
Oddly, Witters said neither. "Abhandlung" from what I recall. The best example of how Ogden really made a serious book out of a soldier's notes in the trenches. (An Austrian soldier, on top).
J adds:
"If formal logic can't map language (ie syntax, propositions, statements, etc)...then what is it good for?"
Dunno. But surely, Frege wanted to _go beyond_ language. His idea of quantification, via 'function', a mathematical term, is not linguistic. When I was doing some work (recent one) on 'negation', I did notice that the tilde, or as I prefer, squiggly,
-p.
Not-p.
Derives from the negation sign in mathematics, the MINUS. This and other considerations (later ones) by Boole, make you wonder that a _language_ (as 'natural language') was NOT what logicians are having in mind. They are onto _serious_ stuff like the ontological structure of language or the components of the thoughts of 'homo sapiens', not the way homo-sapiens chats.
J goes on:
"Maybe helping Microsoft, Apple, Google, etc optimize their warez. An insignificant play of tautologies, JLS? (which still faces the Church/Turing issues...and Goedel--tho' I don't think Goedel the final word--proof to be posted at a later date)."
I do think tautologies play a rather small play, or role. Grice only gives two examples:
(A: So what is, in short, your summing up of Margaret Thatcher's decision to sink the Argentine ship, 'the Belgrano'?)
---- B: Well, women are women.
---- C: War is war.
Grice notes that both "Women are women" (we knew that) and 'War is war' (we didn't know that) cannot but _implicate_, since their 'explicatures' are _stoopid enough_ as it were!
----
J adds:
"That said, there are weirdnesses to logic's relation to language many overlook--
law of excluded middle--A or not-A.
The light's on or off.
But what about....she loves him, OR she loves not?? Hardly discrete in the sense that the circuit is on or off. Or even..Its raining, or its not raining?? Well its raining on Elm Street; two blocks away on Cedar, it's not. Would have to define a domain or something
The myth of the discrete [is pervasive but wrong]".
I agree. Of course, I think Strawson would think that 'or' is a bad word. He does consider "or" and 'v' in a subsection of "Introduction to Logical Theory". The Tertiur non Datur complicates things by bringing in "-" as contradictory negation (which Grice and I take it to be) and 'or'.
Strawson does not think '-' is always contradictory negation. "Some pigs are not fat", I think his example is.
Levinson, in his Pragmatics, book, considers something like
"Either she loves him or she doesn't"
The implicature he discusses is:
"What can YOU do about it".
----- ("Either he'll come or he won't" -- "There's nothing you gain by worrying about it"). I think I once heard John Lennon, in film "Imagine" say exactly THAT, implicating something else.
The White Knight in "Alice in Wonderland" poses Alice with a similar disjunctive which is discussed by Ramsey in "Foundations of Mathematics", ed. Mellor as "foundations":
--- I'll sing you a song.
--- I hope it's not a long one.
--- No. It's not. But it's a sad one. Very sad. Either it will bring tears to your eyes... [The knight made a long pause]
--- Or else what?
--- Or else it won't, you know.
Note that Alice is working on the assumption of Grice's cooperative principle and its attendant maxims. But surely it is all cancellable and the White Knight is ALSO making a point.
Strangely, the song is _not_ sad.
"We say Tractatus; you say Trac-tah-tus."
Oddly, Witters said neither. "Abhandlung" from what I recall. The best example of how Ogden really made a serious book out of a soldier's notes in the trenches. (An Austrian soldier, on top).
J adds:
"If formal logic can't map language (ie syntax, propositions, statements, etc)...then what is it good for?"
Dunno. But surely, Frege wanted to _go beyond_ language. His idea of quantification, via 'function', a mathematical term, is not linguistic. When I was doing some work (recent one) on 'negation', I did notice that the tilde, or as I prefer, squiggly,
-p.
Not-p.
Derives from the negation sign in mathematics, the MINUS. This and other considerations (later ones) by Boole, make you wonder that a _language_ (as 'natural language') was NOT what logicians are having in mind. They are onto _serious_ stuff like the ontological structure of language or the components of the thoughts of 'homo sapiens', not the way homo-sapiens chats.
J goes on:
"Maybe helping Microsoft, Apple, Google, etc optimize their warez. An insignificant play of tautologies, JLS? (which still faces the Church/Turing issues...and Goedel--tho' I don't think Goedel the final word--proof to be posted at a later date)."
I do think tautologies play a rather small play, or role. Grice only gives two examples:
(A: So what is, in short, your summing up of Margaret Thatcher's decision to sink the Argentine ship, 'the Belgrano'?)
---- B: Well, women are women.
---- C: War is war.
Grice notes that both "Women are women" (we knew that) and 'War is war' (we didn't know that) cannot but _implicate_, since their 'explicatures' are _stoopid enough_ as it were!
----
J adds:
"That said, there are weirdnesses to logic's relation to language many overlook--
law of excluded middle--A or not-A.
The light's on or off.
But what about....she loves him, OR she loves not?? Hardly discrete in the sense that the circuit is on or off. Or even..Its raining, or its not raining?? Well its raining on Elm Street; two blocks away on Cedar, it's not. Would have to define a domain or something
The myth of the discrete [is pervasive but wrong]".
I agree. Of course, I think Strawson would think that 'or' is a bad word. He does consider "or" and 'v' in a subsection of "Introduction to Logical Theory". The Tertiur non Datur complicates things by bringing in "-" as contradictory negation (which Grice and I take it to be) and 'or'.
Strawson does not think '-' is always contradictory negation. "Some pigs are not fat", I think his example is.
Levinson, in his Pragmatics, book, considers something like
"Either she loves him or she doesn't"
The implicature he discusses is:
"What can YOU do about it".
----- ("Either he'll come or he won't" -- "There's nothing you gain by worrying about it"). I think I once heard John Lennon, in film "Imagine" say exactly THAT, implicating something else.
The White Knight in "Alice in Wonderland" poses Alice with a similar disjunctive which is discussed by Ramsey in "Foundations of Mathematics", ed. Mellor as "foundations":
--- I'll sing you a song.
--- I hope it's not a long one.
--- No. It's not. But it's a sad one. Very sad. Either it will bring tears to your eyes... [The knight made a long pause]
--- Or else what?
--- Or else it won't, you know.
Note that Alice is working on the assumption of Grice's cooperative principle and its attendant maxims. But surely it is all cancellable and the White Knight is ALSO making a point.
Strangely, the song is _not_ sad.
Dale, Grice, Welby
I recently stumbled across a PhD by Russell Elliot Dale, in which he (en passant) traces some of Grice's ideas on meaning to a Lady Victoria Welby (which just happens to be a place in Lincolnshire a couple of miles up the road from here).
In the manner of London buses I then notice that Russell mentions the same lady in his "Our Knowledge of the External World as a field of study for scientific philosophy" (in a not particularly flattering way).
So I thought I would (presumably unnecessarily) provoke the third by asking whether you (JL, or anyone else who cares to comment) have come across Dale's dissertation and what you think of that part of his thesis (or of the rest).
He does, for my money, field what looks at first glance like a rather facile critique of formal semantics, but I don't suppose that need impact what he has to say about Grice.
Roger Jones
In the manner of London buses I then notice that Russell mentions the same lady in his "Our Knowledge of the External World as a field of study for scientific philosophy" (in a not particularly flattering way).
So I thought I would (presumably unnecessarily) provoke the third by asking whether you (JL, or anyone else who cares to comment) have come across Dale's dissertation and what you think of that part of his thesis (or of the rest).
He does, for my money, field what looks at first glance like a rather facile critique of formal semantics, but I don't suppose that need impact what he has to say about Grice.
Roger Jones
Martian implicatures
One thing Grice has to be given credit for: Martians. He introduced Martian (doppelgaenger thought-experiments) in the philosophy literature.
In "Some remarks about the senses", he describes Martians as having not one pair of eyes -- as homo sapiens do -- (it's odd that eyes, in all animals, came in pairs -- Aristotle noted something similar about legs. There are no animals with just one leg, or three legs).
Rather, Martians, for Grice, have TWO pairs of eyes.
Grice wants to say that experience, as we know it, is as we know it. Martians may have different _experiences_. Our use of 'see' (we see with our 'eyes') is functionaliist and anatomical.
In WoW:Retrospective Epilogue Grice considers ears. If we were to be told that we can see with our ears, we wouldn't understand what is being said to us.
----
Martians, if they exist, possibly could NOT 'implicate' as WE do.
Etc.
In "Some remarks about the senses", he describes Martians as having not one pair of eyes -- as homo sapiens do -- (it's odd that eyes, in all animals, came in pairs -- Aristotle noted something similar about legs. There are no animals with just one leg, or three legs).
Rather, Martians, for Grice, have TWO pairs of eyes.
Grice wants to say that experience, as we know it, is as we know it. Martians may have different _experiences_. Our use of 'see' (we see with our 'eyes') is functionaliist and anatomical.
In WoW:Retrospective Epilogue Grice considers ears. If we were to be told that we can see with our ears, we wouldn't understand what is being said to us.
----
Martians, if they exist, possibly could NOT 'implicate' as WE do.
Etc.
Grice and homo sapiens
There was recently an entry on 'unnatural' in Quinion and this Club. How much of non-natural meaning is indeed 'human' in the strict sense of 'human' (homo sapiens). A lot.
'Homo sapiens' is a rigid designation. A lot of what philosophers say with a general overtone about it, is indeed, rather anthropocentric, in this homo-sapiens technical side to it.
Meaning, for example, as we know it, is a homo-sapiens phenomenon. Of course, ditto "conversational implicature". We do not expect 'chimps' to implicate conversationally.
We do not expect 'infants' (so-miscalled) to implicate converationally. Conversational implicature belongs to a specific stage of homo sapiens. Or not.
'Homo sapiens' is a rigid designation. A lot of what philosophers say with a general overtone about it, is indeed, rather anthropocentric, in this homo-sapiens technical side to it.
Meaning, for example, as we know it, is a homo-sapiens phenomenon. Of course, ditto "conversational implicature". We do not expect 'chimps' to implicate conversationally.
We do not expect 'infants' (so-miscalled) to implicate converationally. Conversational implicature belongs to a specific stage of homo sapiens. Or not.
Canonical logical form
"a pretty good guide"
---
Grammar as "a pretty good guide to logical form", Russell wrote in one of his moments. It was a quote that delighted Grice.
Now, how much of our conception of logical form is _English_? Or Indo-European in general? I don't know.
Suppose they tell us that a certain tribe in Polynesia do not go by "classical logic", when "interpreted in two-valued systems", as Grice writes in WoW:II.
I would tend to think that such a tribe cannot exist. But I would need to FIGHT to defend my position...
Etc.
So, when you next check a 'logical form' as used by a philosopher, share! Check how much of the 'logical form' is really language-independent, as it perhaps should be.
---
Grammar as "a pretty good guide to logical form", Russell wrote in one of his moments. It was a quote that delighted Grice.
Now, how much of our conception of logical form is _English_? Or Indo-European in general? I don't know.
Suppose they tell us that a certain tribe in Polynesia do not go by "classical logic", when "interpreted in two-valued systems", as Grice writes in WoW:II.
I would tend to think that such a tribe cannot exist. But I would need to FIGHT to defend my position...
Etc.
So, when you next check a 'logical form' as used by a philosopher, share! Check how much of the 'logical form' is really language-independent, as it perhaps should be.
"A great deal more than that!"
In "Alice's adventures in Wonderland" Alice says,
"I only said if".
"You said a great deal more than that".
I like to think that the whole point of "Logic and Conversation", as written by Grice, is a reply to Strawson.
Note that of all the examples in WoW:I, there is only ONE that touches on Logic. It is Strawson's idea that
"p ) q"
is not a good representation of what we do with "if".
----
The result of the polemic is vague. Grandy is the one that best expounded it, when Grandy gave a lecture on Grice two years after Grice died. "Legacy of Grice", 1990, Berkeley.
---
Grandy suggests, and I follow that suggestion, that the polemic boils down to the conversational vs. conventional implicature distinction.
Grice wants to say, and Strawson agreed on that ("If and )") that for Strawson, the inferrability that we attach to 'if' is a matter of conventional implicature. For Grice it is merely conversational. Etc.
"I only said if".
"You said a great deal more than that".
I like to think that the whole point of "Logic and Conversation", as written by Grice, is a reply to Strawson.
Note that of all the examples in WoW:I, there is only ONE that touches on Logic. It is Strawson's idea that
"p ) q"
is not a good representation of what we do with "if".
----
The result of the polemic is vague. Grandy is the one that best expounded it, when Grandy gave a lecture on Grice two years after Grice died. "Legacy of Grice", 1990, Berkeley.
---
Grandy suggests, and I follow that suggestion, that the polemic boils down to the conversational vs. conventional implicature distinction.
Grice wants to say, and Strawson agreed on that ("If and )") that for Strawson, the inferrability that we attach to 'if' is a matter of conventional implicature. For Grice it is merely conversational. Etc.
"Somewhere in the South of France"
This is an example used by Grice in WoW:II. Since that article starts with
(Ex) some
(ix) the
and seeing that
"SOMEwhere in THE south of France"
features at least 'some' and 'the', I wonder what canonical logical form one may provide for the 'structure'. Or not!
(Ex) some
(ix) the
and seeing that
"SOMEwhere in THE south of France"
features at least 'some' and 'the', I wonder what canonical logical form one may provide for the 'structure'. Or not!
Pdf4me: Grice
Club members may want to spend some time at the link below checking different pdf stuff on Grice. The bother with pdf stuff is that you cannot do one of my favourite internet activities with them: copy and paste. But hey, one can allso learn. I write "allso" as I do, since I do believe it is a variation on "all" and "so", no?
Cheers.
pdf free download : Grice maxims.pdf
Grice'smaxims considered harmful A misleading taxonomy Several researchers have tried to implement Grice's maxims in some fashion (for example, [Gazdar 79, ...
www.pdf4me.net/pdf-data/grice-maxims.php
Cheers.
pdf free download : Grice maxims.pdf
Grice'smaxims considered harmful A misleading taxonomy Several researchers have tried to implement Grice's maxims in some fashion (for example, [Gazdar 79, ...
www.pdf4me.net/pdf-data/grice-maxims.php
Frederking expounds Grice at the AAAI Spring Symposium on "Implicature"
Frederking refers online to "a paper I wrote attacking Gricean Implicature for the AAAI 1996 Spring Symposium. (Cite as: Frederking, Robert E. Grice's Maxims: ``Do the Right Thing''. Presented at the Computational Implicature workshop at the AAAI-96 Spring Symposium Series, Stanford, 1996.)"
---
Frederking, R. "Grice's maxims". Implicature. Symposium organised by the AAAI at Stanford, 1996.
---
---
Frederking, R. "Grice's maxims". Implicature. Symposium organised by the AAAI at Stanford, 1996.
---
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Would you name your child, "Herbert"?
That's what Mrs. Grice (Grice's mother) did.
J writes:
"The name Ezra's biblical but ...Id say OT rather than NT. So ironically EP, somewhat infamous for his non PC talk-radio for Mussolini, had a trad. name semitic."
Yes. It seems typical that die-hard Christians bear very Semitic first names. Jacob Willoughby, etc.
"Pound..not sure and don't have time for etymo-meter, but fairly common Anglo-scots name . His pa was an Idaho judge;and mama related to Longfellow, some irish and french blood. EP looks mo' gaelic than WASP IMHE, at least in his youth."
"Pound" seems an Anglo-Saxon name. Oddly, it is abbreviated as "lb" in English, but that's neither here nor there.
"I have the ABC, and also his classic "How to Read", but couldn't quite finish it--Villon's greatest hits was one of his faves . Pound finally dissed Joyce from what I read. Considered him mad, or at least not blackshirt material. Others say EP was mad--upon being released from the sanitorium (after what 12 years?), he immediately gave the hail Caesar."
My favourite sanitorium story has to be Minor's who was a long-time correspondent for the OED dictionary. Murray, the editor, thought that Minor worked at the sanitoriu, whereas he was a patient therein. Etc.
J writes:
"The name Ezra's biblical but ...Id say OT rather than NT. So ironically EP, somewhat infamous for his non PC talk-radio for Mussolini, had a trad. name semitic."
Yes. It seems typical that die-hard Christians bear very Semitic first names. Jacob Willoughby, etc.
"Pound..not sure and don't have time for etymo-meter, but fairly common Anglo-scots name . His pa was an Idaho judge;and mama related to Longfellow, some irish and french blood. EP looks mo' gaelic than WASP IMHE, at least in his youth."
"Pound" seems an Anglo-Saxon name. Oddly, it is abbreviated as "lb" in English, but that's neither here nor there.
"I have the ABC, and also his classic "How to Read", but couldn't quite finish it--Villon's greatest hits was one of his faves . Pound finally dissed Joyce from what I read. Considered him mad, or at least not blackshirt material. Others say EP was mad--upon being released from the sanitorium (after what 12 years?), he immediately gave the hail Caesar."
My favourite sanitorium story has to be Minor's who was a long-time correspondent for the OED dictionary. Murray, the editor, thought that Minor worked at the sanitoriu, whereas he was a patient therein. Etc.
Warrants and premises in Grice's schemata
In "Lord Grice", J adds to the polemic.
We are considering J:
"It can be...upgraded, sort of--add the stats/data/evidence or whatever as backing.""
I proposed emotivism. Emotivism, the theory of meaning, etc., put forward by C. L. Stevenson, which Grice adored, is all about the _emotions_ provoked by this or that, and the intention on the part of utterers to provoke those emotions in one's recipients, as in
"She is a bitch".
---
J comments:
"Likely, but a posteriori, JLS. All or some of the time? Wd need a pie graph, per Toulmin-- "Bitchness quotient" or something."
Yes. "Bitch" tends to get overused. Cfr.
Grice,
"You're the cream in my coffee". (metaphor qua conversational implicature).
Strictly, as per Quine's 'meaning postulates' which he abhorred,
it's like
"No bachelor is married"
BACHELORx --> -MARRIEDx
For 'bitch' we have
CANINEx & FEMALEx
But there is an unwanted implicature. Similarly, Chomsky observed that while the decompositional analysis of 'woman' is female-adult.
To say, 'She is a pretty female adult' projects different implicatures 'than' (or 'from') 'She is a pretty woman'.
Odd.
-----
Note that 'bitchy' can be used of MALES, too, and hardly 'metaphorical'.
"His remark was bitchy".
---- It would be otiose to think that only a _bitch_ (female dog) can utter 'bitchy' remarks. Etc.
---
In Italian, 'bitch' is always mistranslated as 'whore', which brings a new sort of decompositional elements.
---
In English, there is a cancellability of an 'explicature', for a change. As Grice did not say:
"You hardly hear, "She is the daughter of a bitch", but the briefer (but hardly truth-conditional equivalent), "She is a bitch". On the other hand, you hear, 'son of bitches' all the time, and they tell us it's not a feminist culture".
J goes on:
"Granted Toulmin's schema is pretty dull stuff, compared to Borges or Conrad.. But probably superior to Foxnews windbag-speak (or parisian maoists)."
---- Yes, it's a neat paperback. It's good for courses in American unis to have it in their uni bookshops. "Oh, I see Toulmin's Uses of Arguments is required reading for "Informal logic" -- PHI 271 --". Sort of stuff.
Toulmin wrote other stuff. I think I once saw in a book by Toulmin an illustration of
"The cat is on the mat"
--- as per a drawing. But I have never been able to retrieve that drawing, even if I must have it somewhere (to scan) since I used it in publications and lectures. Etc.
---
And as you say, Toulmin, like Grice, contributed to the 'festschrift' for Quine, "Words and objections".
I think Toulmin was the literary executor of Hanson, too. Of "Patterns of Discovery" infame.
J goes on:
"HG Wells wrote clean, precise prose and was reportedly a bright lad though a bit....quotidian IMHE. ORwell also in that class."
Yes. Perhaps the most quotidian stuff by Orwell (ne Blair) is
"Keep the aspidistra flying"
I saw it with Bonham Carter in title role ("The Aspidistra"). It was translated in the USA as "The merry war", for some reason.
Orwell was a bright lad. Very middle-Class English, even if born in India hisself.
---
Wells was good. Kipps and Co. He has a lot of 'lowbrow' as Huxley called it stuff. The invisible man Borges found philosophical. Time machine is possibly related to M. A. E. Dummett's arguments against pro-reactive time causation.
Etc.
We are considering J:
"It can be...upgraded, sort of--add the stats/data/evidence or whatever as backing.""
I proposed emotivism. Emotivism, the theory of meaning, etc., put forward by C. L. Stevenson, which Grice adored, is all about the _emotions_ provoked by this or that, and the intention on the part of utterers to provoke those emotions in one's recipients, as in
"She is a bitch".
---
J comments:
"Likely, but a posteriori, JLS. All or some of the time? Wd need a pie graph, per Toulmin-- "Bitchness quotient" or something."
Yes. "Bitch" tends to get overused. Cfr.
Grice,
"You're the cream in my coffee". (metaphor qua conversational implicature).
Strictly, as per Quine's 'meaning postulates' which he abhorred,
it's like
"No bachelor is married"
BACHELORx --> -MARRIEDx
For 'bitch' we have
CANINEx & FEMALEx
But there is an unwanted implicature. Similarly, Chomsky observed that while the decompositional analysis of 'woman' is female-adult.
To say, 'She is a pretty female adult' projects different implicatures 'than' (or 'from') 'She is a pretty woman'.
Odd.
-----
Note that 'bitchy' can be used of MALES, too, and hardly 'metaphorical'.
"His remark was bitchy".
---- It would be otiose to think that only a _bitch_ (female dog) can utter 'bitchy' remarks. Etc.
---
In Italian, 'bitch' is always mistranslated as 'whore', which brings a new sort of decompositional elements.
---
In English, there is a cancellability of an 'explicature', for a change. As Grice did not say:
"You hardly hear, "She is the daughter of a bitch", but the briefer (but hardly truth-conditional equivalent), "She is a bitch". On the other hand, you hear, 'son of bitches' all the time, and they tell us it's not a feminist culture".
J goes on:
"Granted Toulmin's schema is pretty dull stuff, compared to Borges or Conrad.. But probably superior to Foxnews windbag-speak (or parisian maoists)."
---- Yes, it's a neat paperback. It's good for courses in American unis to have it in their uni bookshops. "Oh, I see Toulmin's Uses of Arguments is required reading for "Informal logic" -- PHI 271 --". Sort of stuff.
Toulmin wrote other stuff. I think I once saw in a book by Toulmin an illustration of
"The cat is on the mat"
--- as per a drawing. But I have never been able to retrieve that drawing, even if I must have it somewhere (to scan) since I used it in publications and lectures. Etc.
---
And as you say, Toulmin, like Grice, contributed to the 'festschrift' for Quine, "Words and objections".
I think Toulmin was the literary executor of Hanson, too. Of "Patterns of Discovery" infame.
J goes on:
"HG Wells wrote clean, precise prose and was reportedly a bright lad though a bit....quotidian IMHE. ORwell also in that class."
Yes. Perhaps the most quotidian stuff by Orwell (ne Blair) is
"Keep the aspidistra flying"
I saw it with Bonham Carter in title role ("The Aspidistra"). It was translated in the USA as "The merry war", for some reason.
Orwell was a bright lad. Very middle-Class English, even if born in India hisself.
---
Wells was good. Kipps and Co. He has a lot of 'lowbrow' as Huxley called it stuff. The invisible man Borges found philosophical. Time machine is possibly related to M. A. E. Dummett's arguments against pro-reactive time causation.
Etc.
The ABC of Implicature
J was quoting from Pound, Ezra:
"Only in James Joyce's "Stephen Dedalus" does one find
an equal intensity, and Joyce is, by comparison, cold and
meticulous, where Lewis is, if uncouth, at any rate brim-
ming with energy, the man with a leaping mind."
"Despite its demonstrable faults I do not propose to
attack this novel.*"
"It is a serious work, it is definitely
an attempt to express, and very largely a success in ex-
pressing, something."
"The "average novel," the average
successful commercial proposition at 6s. per 300 to 600
pages is nothing of the sort."
"It is merely a third-rate mind's imitation of a perfectly well-known type-novel."
"Of let us say Dickens, or Balzac, or Sir A. Conan-Doyle,
or Hardy, or Mr. Wells, or Mrs. Ward, or some other
and less laudable proto- or necro-type."
----
Oddly, Borges's grandmother's favourite novelist (and a favourite with Borges, too) was Alan Bennett. Borges's grandmother was from Hanley.
Grice does not quote from novelists much, but he refers to (later Nobel Prize) William Golding, in "Prejudices and predilections, of one Paul Grice, being the life and opinions of himself".
"Only in James Joyce's "Stephen Dedalus" does one find
an equal intensity, and Joyce is, by comparison, cold and
meticulous, where Lewis is, if uncouth, at any rate brim-
ming with energy, the man with a leaping mind."
"Despite its demonstrable faults I do not propose to
attack this novel.*"
"It is a serious work, it is definitely
an attempt to express, and very largely a success in ex-
pressing, something."
"The "average novel," the average
successful commercial proposition at 6s. per 300 to 600
pages is nothing of the sort."
"It is merely a third-rate mind's imitation of a perfectly well-known type-novel."
"Of let us say Dickens, or Balzac, or Sir A. Conan-Doyle,
or Hardy, or Mr. Wells, or Mrs. Ward, or some other
and less laudable proto- or necro-type."
----
Oddly, Borges's grandmother's favourite novelist (and a favourite with Borges, too) was Alan Bennett. Borges's grandmother was from Hanley.
Grice does not quote from novelists much, but he refers to (later Nobel Prize) William Golding, in "Prejudices and predilections, of one Paul Grice, being the life and opinions of himself".
Further on Grice's Aunt Matilda
J quotes, in "He is a runt", M. Quinion's remark on the English idiom,
"piss-rotten".
(By uttering 'x is piss-rotten', the utterer implicated that...).
Quinion:
"Ezra Pound invented "piss-rotten" in 1940 (the first example on record) and since then we've had "piss-easy" (very easy), "piss-elegant" (affectedly refined, pretentious) and other forms. "Piss-poor" just means 'extremely poor'."
J comments:
"Good ol' Ez--probably worth a boxcar of Oxbridgeans or Harvardians (what did he say about modern philosophers, apres Decartes?--third rate minds, or something)."
Yes. I always loved that Christian name. Ezra. It has an Anglo-Saxon ring to it, as does his surname ("pound". Cfr. Genesis, "Selling England by the pound").
J adds:
"We shan't mention whom, or what he was referring to, else the GC be included on the not-nice lists."
We should include something about Pound, too. He wrote the "ABC of Writing". I think it was a sequel to "The ABC of reading".
---
"piss-rotten".
(By uttering 'x is piss-rotten', the utterer implicated that...).
Quinion:
"Ezra Pound invented "piss-rotten" in 1940 (the first example on record) and since then we've had "piss-easy" (very easy), "piss-elegant" (affectedly refined, pretentious) and other forms. "Piss-poor" just means 'extremely poor'."
J comments:
"Good ol' Ez--probably worth a boxcar of Oxbridgeans or Harvardians (what did he say about modern philosophers, apres Decartes?--third rate minds, or something)."
Yes. I always loved that Christian name. Ezra. It has an Anglo-Saxon ring to it, as does his surname ("pound". Cfr. Genesis, "Selling England by the pound").
J adds:
"We shan't mention whom, or what he was referring to, else the GC be included on the not-nice lists."
We should include something about Pound, too. He wrote the "ABC of Writing". I think it was a sequel to "The ABC of reading".
---
Lord Grice
Joseph Conrad wrote "Lord Jim"
We are discussing implicatures with J.
J writes, in "Oxford Town" ("An Oxford Town Set of Mind", to the tune of Billy Joel).
"yes JLS the T[oulmi]-schema has legalistic aspects, but not sure that quite describes it completely."
Yes. A lawyer is a lawyer is a lawyer. Kramer is an attorney. Each country is different. We shouldn't overuse 'legalistic'. My type of law is criminal law. I find all lawyers which are not 'criminal' rather too naive to be trusted, etc.
J:
"We might term it practical reason rather than the pure sort but he's still an evidentialist of a sort (ergo....philistine to some probably)."
Yes, lawyers -- especially criminal lawyers, which are lawyers which are criminal (alla Grice) use 'evidence' the worst: they can electrify a person with their misuse of 'evidence', so called. I use 'scare quotes' here for more than a literal reason.
J:
"It can be...upgraded, sort of--add the stats/data/evidence or whatever as backing."
As in
"She is a bitch".
---- I mean. Some 'propositions' need NO BACKING.
http://contingenciesblog.blogspot.com/2008/01/toulmin-toulmins-system-suggests-middle.html
you commented on it while back...whatever
---- Thanks for reminding us!
J then 'implicates' Conrad into the picture:
"Conrad's first language was polish but as with many poles he was also fluent in french (probably knew goiman and Russ. as well. GOIMAN?); and 3rd tongue Anglo. There may have been a slight....accent to his complex writing but quite beyond the usual victorian sap---few are the mortals who could pen tale such as Lord Jim or Heart of Darkness. It's a bit cliche now, but like, intense, somber, deep. Even Uncle Bertie admired Kount Conrad."
Yes, and Jorge-Luis Borges, the Argentine icon. I should KNOW about Borges, and I do.
Borges was born in Buenos Ayres, in a bad sort of area (which I love, though -- Tucuman street). When he was 2 years old, his family moved to a BORING part of town, on a street which is NOW called "Jorge Luis Borges".
Borges's father was half-English. His (Borges's father's) mother would FORBID Borges Sr. to read ANYTHING but English. Since books were expensive in the Buenos Aires of the day (early 1900), English books was ALL that J. L. Borges could read. Conrad, etc.
Oddly, Borges Jr, like Borges Sr., became 'blind'. It was a hereditary desease from the English MALE line of his family. His grandfather had also been 'blind' and indeed a case study in victorian England.
So, at a time of his life Borges was UNALLOWED to _read_ simpliciter, because he was blind. Therefore, he spent the rest of his life MEMORISING or reminiscing the books he had read as a child, which were the 'juvenile' books that were owned by his father. Notably "Lord Jim".
When Borges became "Professor of English Literature" at the University of Buenos Aires (his classes were a hoot, since people could _Cheat_ like that. He would not see (+< he was blind), his programme looked something like this:
BEOWULF: why it should be memorised by heart. What makes it sound so "rough". Anglo-Saxon metrics.
Piers Plowman. The silly story behind it.
Bill the Quill and his racial remarks in "Otello". Why Verdi set it to music.
Joseph Conrad.
Sherlock Holmes.
The Invisible man, by Wells, and why Wells is the greatest English living writer that ever lived.
-----
He also liked Chesterton, and a few others. I once attended an exhibit of all the books owned by Borges. They were displayed in a posh building on Arenales street. I was fascinated (if that's the word) to see that he owned a copy of "Bede" Cuthbert, "The adventures of Green". This was typical juvenile literature.
-----
So, yes, we love Conrad.
---
Borges was once asked what book he would take to a desert island. He cheated and mentioned the 24-volume set of the 1911 Edinburgh edition of _Encyclopaedia Britannica_.
Ah well. I guess I would take WoW (Grice's Way of Words). But then I wonder what use would 'conversational implicature' have on a desert island...
We are discussing implicatures with J.
J writes, in "Oxford Town" ("An Oxford Town Set of Mind", to the tune of Billy Joel).
"yes JLS the T[oulmi]-schema has legalistic aspects, but not sure that quite describes it completely."
Yes. A lawyer is a lawyer is a lawyer. Kramer is an attorney. Each country is different. We shouldn't overuse 'legalistic'. My type of law is criminal law. I find all lawyers which are not 'criminal' rather too naive to be trusted, etc.
J:
"We might term it practical reason rather than the pure sort but he's still an evidentialist of a sort (ergo....philistine to some probably)."
Yes, lawyers -- especially criminal lawyers, which are lawyers which are criminal (alla Grice) use 'evidence' the worst: they can electrify a person with their misuse of 'evidence', so called. I use 'scare quotes' here for more than a literal reason.
J:
"It can be...upgraded, sort of--add the stats/data/evidence or whatever as backing."
As in
"She is a bitch".
---- I mean. Some 'propositions' need NO BACKING.
http://contingenciesblog.blogspot.com/2008/01/toulmin-toulmins-system-suggests-middle.html
you commented on it while back...whatever
---- Thanks for reminding us!
J then 'implicates' Conrad into the picture:
"Conrad's first language was polish but as with many poles he was also fluent in french (probably knew goiman and Russ. as well. GOIMAN?); and 3rd tongue Anglo. There may have been a slight....accent to his complex writing but quite beyond the usual victorian sap---few are the mortals who could pen tale such as Lord Jim or Heart of Darkness. It's a bit cliche now, but like, intense, somber, deep. Even Uncle Bertie admired Kount Conrad."
Yes, and Jorge-Luis Borges, the Argentine icon. I should KNOW about Borges, and I do.
Borges was born in Buenos Ayres, in a bad sort of area (which I love, though -- Tucuman street). When he was 2 years old, his family moved to a BORING part of town, on a street which is NOW called "Jorge Luis Borges".
Borges's father was half-English. His (Borges's father's) mother would FORBID Borges Sr. to read ANYTHING but English. Since books were expensive in the Buenos Aires of the day (early 1900), English books was ALL that J. L. Borges could read. Conrad, etc.
Oddly, Borges Jr, like Borges Sr., became 'blind'. It was a hereditary desease from the English MALE line of his family. His grandfather had also been 'blind' and indeed a case study in victorian England.
So, at a time of his life Borges was UNALLOWED to _read_ simpliciter, because he was blind. Therefore, he spent the rest of his life MEMORISING or reminiscing the books he had read as a child, which were the 'juvenile' books that were owned by his father. Notably "Lord Jim".
When Borges became "Professor of English Literature" at the University of Buenos Aires (his classes were a hoot, since people could _Cheat_ like that. He would not see (+< he was blind), his programme looked something like this:
BEOWULF: why it should be memorised by heart. What makes it sound so "rough". Anglo-Saxon metrics.
Piers Plowman. The silly story behind it.
Bill the Quill and his racial remarks in "Otello". Why Verdi set it to music.
Joseph Conrad.
Sherlock Holmes.
The Invisible man, by Wells, and why Wells is the greatest English living writer that ever lived.
-----
He also liked Chesterton, and a few others. I once attended an exhibit of all the books owned by Borges. They were displayed in a posh building on Arenales street. I was fascinated (if that's the word) to see that he owned a copy of "Bede" Cuthbert, "The adventures of Green". This was typical juvenile literature.
-----
So, yes, we love Conrad.
---
Borges was once asked what book he would take to a desert island. He cheated and mentioned the 24-volume set of the 1911 Edinburgh edition of _Encyclopaedia Britannica_.
Ah well. I guess I would take WoW (Grice's Way of Words). But then I wonder what use would 'conversational implicature' have on a desert island...
A Gricean Quickie
Allott was writing, elsewhere, about
"questions about the psychological reality of mental representations"
and
"the importance or otherwise of a realist view of mental representation"
While I revise some notes on Grice on 'LF' (logical form), and 'ILF' (interpreted logical form) it may do to reconsider the keyword of this essay by Saul below: 'psychological reality
Saul, J., 2002b, "What is said and psychological reality: Grice's project and ... criticisms", Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 347-372.
-----
Gibbs has focused on the issue of 'Logical Form' in online psycholinguistic processing. I would like to bring to the forum a quote by, you know who. No. I don't mean Grice. I mean Allott. In his online PhD Rationality and pragmatics Allott deals with an issue that has always interested Griceians -- 'and their ilk': criticisms of alleged lack of 'psychological reality'. I don't have Allott's PhD thesis to hand, but when I read it I made this note to myself about Grice's P. E. R. E.
This is the principle of economy of rational effort. When I read about it, in Grice's Reply to Richards, I was in the middle of some discussions of a philosophical sort with authors who were publishing on 'knowledge of a semantic theory' in the pages of _Mind_: Davies, and others. The issue was whether we should make sense of something like 'tacit' knowledge (of these things like 'logical form' or subpropositional logical forms in the enrichment of the input for implicature generation, and the like.
So, I was refreshed to hear of Grice, charmingly, referring to 'subterranean' here. The metaphor is clear. Grice (and I would claim, Griceians) need NEVER postulate 'subterranean' processes, which are then judged (by psycholinguists) to lack this or that degree of psychological reality. (And it is amusing that while Saul sees the RT as criticising Grice for 'lack of psychological reality', a similar claim has been made elsewhere regarding RT itself).
So, how does Grice express the thing?
So: Consider:
A: I'm _so_ hungry.
B: On the top shelf.
(with Allott allowing something like 'on the top shelf' as provided a _warrant_ rather than a premise, in the over-all reasoning the addressee undertakes to 'retrive' what U means).
Now think Grice:
Grice writes:
"[The] ability to produce, without the aid of
overt ratiocination, transitions which accord
with approved standards of inference does NOT
demand that such rationacination be PRESENT
in an unconsciour OR COVERT form; it
requires at most that our propensity to
PRODUCE such transitions be dependent
in some way upon our acquisition or possession
of a capacity to reason explicitly. Similarly, our
ability to produce satisfactory utterances [thereby
meaning this or that] does NOT require a
*subterranean* ratiocination to account for
their satisfactory character; it needs only
be dependent on our learning of, or use of, a
rule-governed language."
And so on.
Fascinating. Look in the Grice Club search engines for "quickie", too, since Allott has used Grice's fascinating distinction between a hard-way and a quick-way of approaching rationality -- and stuff.
"questions about the psychological reality of mental representations"
and
"the importance or otherwise of a realist view of mental representation"
While I revise some notes on Grice on 'LF' (logical form), and 'ILF' (interpreted logical form) it may do to reconsider the keyword of this essay by Saul below: 'psychological reality
Saul, J., 2002b, "What is said and psychological reality: Grice's project and ... criticisms", Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 347-372.
-----
Gibbs has focused on the issue of 'Logical Form' in online psycholinguistic processing. I would like to bring to the forum a quote by, you know who. No. I don't mean Grice. I mean Allott. In his online PhD Rationality and pragmatics Allott deals with an issue that has always interested Griceians -- 'and their ilk': criticisms of alleged lack of 'psychological reality'. I don't have Allott's PhD thesis to hand, but when I read it I made this note to myself about Grice's P. E. R. E.
This is the principle of economy of rational effort. When I read about it, in Grice's Reply to Richards, I was in the middle of some discussions of a philosophical sort with authors who were publishing on 'knowledge of a semantic theory' in the pages of _Mind_: Davies, and others. The issue was whether we should make sense of something like 'tacit' knowledge (of these things like 'logical form' or subpropositional logical forms in the enrichment of the input for implicature generation, and the like.
So, I was refreshed to hear of Grice, charmingly, referring to 'subterranean' here. The metaphor is clear. Grice (and I would claim, Griceians) need NEVER postulate 'subterranean' processes, which are then judged (by psycholinguists) to lack this or that degree of psychological reality. (And it is amusing that while Saul sees the RT as criticising Grice for 'lack of psychological reality', a similar claim has been made elsewhere regarding RT itself).
So, how does Grice express the thing?
So: Consider:
A: I'm _so_ hungry.
B: On the top shelf.
(with Allott allowing something like 'on the top shelf' as provided a _warrant_ rather than a premise, in the over-all reasoning the addressee undertakes to 'retrive' what U means).
Now think Grice:
Grice writes:
"[The] ability to produce, without the aid of
overt ratiocination, transitions which accord
with approved standards of inference does NOT
demand that such rationacination be PRESENT
in an unconsciour OR COVERT form; it
requires at most that our propensity to
PRODUCE such transitions be dependent
in some way upon our acquisition or possession
of a capacity to reason explicitly. Similarly, our
ability to produce satisfactory utterances [thereby
meaning this or that] does NOT require a
*subterranean* ratiocination to account for
their satisfactory character; it needs only
be dependent on our learning of, or use of, a
rule-governed language."
And so on.
Fascinating. Look in the Grice Club search engines for "quickie", too, since Allott has used Grice's fascinating distinction between a hard-way and a quick-way of approaching rationality -- and stuff.
"Ordinary English" as _proper_ English
The English "ordinary language" philosophers (Grice) would not state it so bluntly, but the implicature allways (sic) was that proper English is ordinary-language (rather than, say, some technical Cantabrigensis idiom). Ordinary, proper colloquial, man-in-the-street English flourishes in Oxford -- 'town' rather than 'gown'. Grice loved it.
Quinion reviews in today's World Wide Words this new book by Hitchings.
The Language Wars
-------------------------------------------------------------------
"Henry Hitchings's previous works include a biography of the man he
wrote his PhD thesis on, Dr Samuel Johnson. Here he turns to the
history of disputes about what constitutes good English. To call it
warfare is to seriously overstate matters - nobody has ever manned
a barricade in defence of the right to split an infinitive - but
publishers do like catchpenny titles."
"He unpacks the history of proper usage, occasionally diverting to
offer up examples from other languages as mirrors to English. He
shows that complaints about the decline of our language are almost
always illogical, that later generations frequently find the view
of pundits to be either irrelevant or risible and that attempts to
hold back change are futile. He is sympathetic to the view that
there is nothing absolute about grammar; its rules are not laws of
nature but conventional beliefs which are modified through changing
fashion and shifting everyday use."
"Debate over meaning and standards isn't peculiar to our times. But
today's prescribers and proscribers may be surprised to learn for
how many centuries the idea of good usage has been debated and how
much standards have varied. As one example, the apostrophe has been
the subject of unending debate since it was first used in English
in 1559 (the next century, John Donne could write "any mans death
diminishes me" without needing it). Writers in the early eighteenth
century used it to mark the plurals of nouns. It wasn't until the
late nineteenth century that usage settled down. Today's mistakes
with it aren't a sudden eruption of ignorance but a continuation of
misunderstandings and differences of opinion that are centuries
old. The author believes the apostrophe is likely to disappear, not
least through a desire for crisper design and less cluttered pages."
"The value of individual words has long been debated, often with a
sense that there are good words and bad words. The history of such
objections shows how ill-judged most of them are. Eric Partridge
hated "economic". Fowler objected to "gullible", "antagonise",
"placate" and "transpire". Last century, as they became known
through the talkies and other imports, British writers complained
about Americanisms such as "reliable", "lengthy", "curvaceous",
"hindsight" and "mileage". In 1978, the Lake Superior University
Banned Words unavailingly deprecated "parenting" and "medication".
Conversely, many Words of the Year selections ("pod slurping",
"locavore") show that the usual fate of new words, even fashionable
ones, is obscurity."
"We all speak more than one variety of the language. We pitch our
vocabulary and style to suit our hearers, whether those are our
children, our friends, our colleagues or the unseen readership of
public prose. Standard English has the highest prestige, the one
appropriate to formal communication, and the one we need to master
if we're to be taken seriously in that world. But it's useless to
apply the rules of standard English to the informal registers of
conversation or of slang and dialect. Hitchings argues that - in
spite of widespread condemnation - instant messaging, textspeak,
with all its abbreviations, informality and often casual disregard
for the rules of the standard language, doesn't degrade English. He
contents that the people who use it are easily able to distinguish
it from the language needed in an essay or report."
"Some parts of The Language Wars will be familiar to anyone who has
read previous works on the evolution of language. But Hitchings
provides a wealth of examples to illustrate his points. He writes
well and is never dull. Even if you're predisposed to disagree with
him, he's worth reading."
[The Language Wars: A History of Proper English by Henry Hitchings,
published by John Murray in the UK on 3 Feb. 2010; hardback, pp408,
including bibliography and index; publisher's UK price, GBP17.99;
ISBN 978-1-84854-2082.]
Quinion reviews in today's World Wide Words this new book by Hitchings.
The Language Wars
-------------------------------------------------------------------
"Henry Hitchings's previous works include a biography of the man he
wrote his PhD thesis on, Dr Samuel Johnson. Here he turns to the
history of disputes about what constitutes good English. To call it
warfare is to seriously overstate matters - nobody has ever manned
a barricade in defence of the right to split an infinitive - but
publishers do like catchpenny titles."
"He unpacks the history of proper usage, occasionally diverting to
offer up examples from other languages as mirrors to English. He
shows that complaints about the decline of our language are almost
always illogical, that later generations frequently find the view
of pundits to be either irrelevant or risible and that attempts to
hold back change are futile. He is sympathetic to the view that
there is nothing absolute about grammar; its rules are not laws of
nature but conventional beliefs which are modified through changing
fashion and shifting everyday use."
"Debate over meaning and standards isn't peculiar to our times. But
today's prescribers and proscribers may be surprised to learn for
how many centuries the idea of good usage has been debated and how
much standards have varied. As one example, the apostrophe has been
the subject of unending debate since it was first used in English
in 1559 (the next century, John Donne could write "any mans death
diminishes me" without needing it). Writers in the early eighteenth
century used it to mark the plurals of nouns. It wasn't until the
late nineteenth century that usage settled down. Today's mistakes
with it aren't a sudden eruption of ignorance but a continuation of
misunderstandings and differences of opinion that are centuries
old. The author believes the apostrophe is likely to disappear, not
least through a desire for crisper design and less cluttered pages."
"The value of individual words has long been debated, often with a
sense that there are good words and bad words. The history of such
objections shows how ill-judged most of them are. Eric Partridge
hated "economic". Fowler objected to "gullible", "antagonise",
"placate" and "transpire". Last century, as they became known
through the talkies and other imports, British writers complained
about Americanisms such as "reliable", "lengthy", "curvaceous",
"hindsight" and "mileage". In 1978, the Lake Superior University
Banned Words unavailingly deprecated "parenting" and "medication".
Conversely, many Words of the Year selections ("pod slurping",
"locavore") show that the usual fate of new words, even fashionable
ones, is obscurity."
"We all speak more than one variety of the language. We pitch our
vocabulary and style to suit our hearers, whether those are our
children, our friends, our colleagues or the unseen readership of
public prose. Standard English has the highest prestige, the one
appropriate to formal communication, and the one we need to master
if we're to be taken seriously in that world. But it's useless to
apply the rules of standard English to the informal registers of
conversation or of slang and dialect. Hitchings argues that - in
spite of widespread condemnation - instant messaging, textspeak,
with all its abbreviations, informality and often casual disregard
for the rules of the standard language, doesn't degrade English. He
contents that the people who use it are easily able to distinguish
it from the language needed in an essay or report."
"Some parts of The Language Wars will be familiar to anyone who has
read previous works on the evolution of language. But Hitchings
provides a wealth of examples to illustrate his points. He writes
well and is never dull. Even if you're predisposed to disagree with
him, he's worth reading."
[The Language Wars: A History of Proper English by Henry Hitchings,
published by John Murray in the UK on 3 Feb. 2010; hardback, pp408,
including bibliography and index; publisher's UK price, GBP17.99;
ISBN 978-1-84854-2082.]
"He is a runt," Grice's Aunt Matilda thought
Grice considers,
"he is a runt".
NOT to mean, literally, what it may mean ('the runt of the litter') but metaphorically, an oversized person.
He wants to say that some people may know what words mean but never use them (his prim and proper Aunt Matilda). So it cannot be that, as Wittgenstein said, 'meaning is use'.
But cfr.
'piss poor'.
An utterer may use this expression because it means something whereas it means something else.
From the pages of today's use of M. Quinion's "World Wide Words".
Q.
"An item circulating online under the title Interesting History
claims, "They used to use urine to tan animal skins, so families
used to all pee in a pot and then once a day it was sold to the
tannery. If you had to do this to survive you were 'piss poor'."
This screams of folk etymology. Can you offer real clarity? [Bob
Fleck]"
Quinion's answer includes:
"[T]he expression "piss-poor" is recent and has nothing to do
with tanning. The current state of research suggests it may have
been invented during World War Two, because the first examples in
print date from 1946. Though it is still classed as low slang by
dictionaries, its mildly unpleasant associations have become
blunted by time and familiarity."
"The origin is straightforward. "Piss" began to be attached to other
words during the twentieth century to intensify their meaning. Ezra
Pound invented "piss-rotten" in 1940 (the first example on record)
and since then we've had "piss-easy" (very easy), "piss-elegant"
(affectedly refined, pretentious) and other forms. "Piss-poor" just
means extremely poor."
He provides one source:
"Larkin's letters, wrote Philippe Auclair, writer and
broadcaster, were "very funny, very beautiful, and very
sad; the grace of an angel, the precision of a geometer,
and the short-sighted, intolerant piss-poor idées fixes
of a provincial buffoon".
[The Spectator, 27 Nov. 2010.]"
Usually, lexicological cites like that I can't swallow. Dictionary makers quote a source as evidence that the word is used to mean M, rather than M'. But what do we know about Larkin's utterer-meaning. Perhaps he was thinking of 'piss' as, literally, 'involved in the urine-business that many families were forced to involved themselves with'. Or something.
Of course I am being thick.
"he is a runt".
NOT to mean, literally, what it may mean ('the runt of the litter') but metaphorically, an oversized person.
He wants to say that some people may know what words mean but never use them (his prim and proper Aunt Matilda). So it cannot be that, as Wittgenstein said, 'meaning is use'.
But cfr.
'piss poor'.
An utterer may use this expression because it means something whereas it means something else.
From the pages of today's use of M. Quinion's "World Wide Words".
Q.
"An item circulating online under the title Interesting History
claims, "They used to use urine to tan animal skins, so families
used to all pee in a pot and then once a day it was sold to the
tannery. If you had to do this to survive you were 'piss poor'."
This screams of folk etymology. Can you offer real clarity? [Bob
Fleck]"
Quinion's answer includes:
"[T]he expression "piss-poor" is recent and has nothing to do
with tanning. The current state of research suggests it may have
been invented during World War Two, because the first examples in
print date from 1946. Though it is still classed as low slang by
dictionaries, its mildly unpleasant associations have become
blunted by time and familiarity."
"The origin is straightforward. "Piss" began to be attached to other
words during the twentieth century to intensify their meaning. Ezra
Pound invented "piss-rotten" in 1940 (the first example on record)
and since then we've had "piss-easy" (very easy), "piss-elegant"
(affectedly refined, pretentious) and other forms. "Piss-poor" just
means extremely poor."
He provides one source:
"Larkin's letters, wrote Philippe Auclair, writer and
broadcaster, were "very funny, very beautiful, and very
sad; the grace of an angel, the precision of a geometer,
and the short-sighted, intolerant piss-poor idées fixes
of a provincial buffoon".
[The Spectator, 27 Nov. 2010.]"
Usually, lexicological cites like that I can't swallow. Dictionary makers quote a source as evidence that the word is used to mean M, rather than M'. But what do we know about Larkin's utterer-meaning. Perhaps he was thinking of 'piss' as, literally, 'involved in the urine-business that many families were forced to involved themselves with'. Or something.
Of course I am being thick.
Grice on unnatural
From today's World Wide Words, ed. Quinion:
"FRANKENSTEINIAN? The word ANTHROPOEIA has appeared several times in
my reading in the past week, because it has featured in discussions
of Philip Ball's new book Unnatural. He invented it for the concept
of artificially creating human beings by processes such as cloning.
It's from classical Greek "anthros", man + "poiein", to make (as in
"onomatopoeia", forming a word from a sound, and "mythopoeia", the
creation of myths)."
"FRANKENSTEINIAN? The word ANTHROPOEIA has appeared several times in
my reading in the past week, because it has featured in discussions
of Philip Ball's new book Unnatural. He invented it for the concept
of artificially creating human beings by processes such as cloning.
It's from classical Greek "anthros", man + "poiein", to make (as in
"onomatopoeia", forming a word from a sound, and "mythopoeia", the
creation of myths)."
What Colour is Your Dog?
From today's World Wide Words, ed. M. Quinion:
"TITULAR ODDITIES Yesterday, the Bookseller magazine announced its
shortlist for the Diagram Prize, which showcases the strangest book
titles of the year. A Mills & Boon bonkbuster, an examination of
the ongoing debate surrounding organ procurement, and a guide to
managing a dental practice are among the titles. The literary award
was conceived in 1978 to avoid boredom at the annual Frankfurt Book
Fair and has been held in all but two years since. The shortlist
is: What Color Is Your Dog?; Managing a Dental Practice the Genghis
Khan Way; Myth of the Social Volcano; The Generosity of the Dead;
the 8th International Friction Stir Welding Symposium Proceedings;
and The Italian's One-night Love-child. Public voting is now open
at http://www.thebookseller.com/. The winner will be announced on
25 March."
"TITULAR ODDITIES Yesterday, the Bookseller magazine announced its
shortlist for the Diagram Prize, which showcases the strangest book
titles of the year. A Mills & Boon bonkbuster, an examination of
the ongoing debate surrounding organ procurement, and a guide to
managing a dental practice are among the titles. The literary award
was conceived in 1978 to avoid boredom at the annual Frankfurt Book
Fair and has been held in all but two years since. The shortlist
is: What Color Is Your Dog?; Managing a Dental Practice the Genghis
Khan Way; Myth of the Social Volcano; The Generosity of the Dead;
the 8th International Friction Stir Welding Symposium Proceedings;
and The Italian's One-night Love-child. Public voting is now open
at http://www.thebookseller.com/. The winner will be announced on
25 March."
Grice on sense data
From today's Quinion's World Wide Words:
"Several readers queried my writing in the last issue, "The
data so far is unsurprising" because for them "data" is plural. It
may be worth noting that British non-specialist usage has settled
on "data" as a singular mass noun."
"Several readers queried my writing in the last issue, "The
data so far is unsurprising" because for them "data" is plural. It
may be worth noting that British non-specialist usage has settled
on "data" as a singular mass noun."
Grice, of Oxford Town
In his own evidence for
"Why Hacker isn't a greater philosopher than Grice", this blog (almost), J writes:
"As some old number went,
to oxford town, I have not been, or-- I have not to Oxford town been. Neither the Anglo, or Missisippi one. Oxnard, though, ive visited. ah, Olde Oxnard towne."
I should do some research on that. I collect notes and queries on Ox- towns. Of course, you don't see the 'ford', much. It was originally called, in a more logical , Oxen-ford, since the place operated as a 'ford' (or bridge) for the oxen (rather than just one The Ox) to cross the water. The water is the Royal Tamesis, Thames. But it changes name there: Isis and Cherwell.
---- Then it becomes Thames again further upstream. Oddly, the Thamesis originates in either Staffordshire or some other place. Laurence Tapper, a Griceian, once objected to the idiomatic expression,
"the mouth of the river"
-- for the Tamesis, the Estuary.
Not so much on its poor metaphorical character (cfr. Grice, "You're the cream in my coffee"), but because, literally (almost) it should best be called,
--- The arse*ole of the river.
seeing that the 'mouth', if mouth it is, should be where a river originates, and not where it dies. Similarly, Tapper objects to the use of 'leg' in "leg of the chair" and refers to them as 'modular limbs'. ("Less rude").
----
J adds about Toulmin's "Uses of Argument" -- Indeed Toulmin was never renewed his contract in Leeds, and had to emigrate to America, on account of his having had an affair with one of his female students. Some uses of argument.
About the book,
"[It is] helpful. To a Wittgenquine, or GC reg, or commies, probably dull."
I was reading some material by N. Allott the other day -- his PhD thesis for UCL is on "Rationality" and he notes that things like,
"Hey!"
"My mother!"
"Heavens!"
etc. -- very "like" as his examples are other --
should not count as 'premises' in the recovery of conversational implicature.
It would be odd to count "Heavens, no!" as a premise. Yet, the logical form is
-p
not p.
Allott possibly after Toulmin thinks Grice would classify that subpropositional or subsentential material as "warrant" rather than 'premise'.
So, yes, a helpful book.
J goes on:
"To students who barely made it through a Cali. public school ...quite reasonable, though a bit British."
Yes. There are two many examples from the courts -- British system, which cannot but bore the Un-Brit. But then, Toulmin is arguing that our epitome of 'argument' is what lawyers do. I once taught logic in the USA, and one day I was evaluating the whole class on whether they had survived, in an educational way, to my exposure on the topic of 'argue' and 'argument'. A student said, and aloud too,
"So, if I understood you 'right, 'to argue', is like to _fight_, but only with words".
(E.g. "Stop arguing with me").
J goes on:
"American educators (and students)--whether at a UC level, or the 'burbs, simply don't care for the British, whether its Schackaspeare, or Bertrand Russell."
Right. I tend to call Grice "Paul Grice", on occasion, to seduce the Americans. Americans would use initials, like "H. P. Grice" only on very special occasions. They think that what the Brits called the "Christian" name (or names) should NEVER be hidden (from 'explicature').
In Clifton, where Grice studied, he would be referred to as "Grice" -- by everybody. In the programme -- he played the piano for a 1932 concert -- his name is 'explicated' as
"H. P. Grice".
The first time Grice disclosed, in print, that his name was "Paul" was circa 1970.
His first name was "Herbert".
His _second_ name was Paul.
The whole thing of names is a bother. Strawson NEVER USED "Peter" in his writings. It is always "P. F. Strawson". This provoked a little argument when the Queen knighted him.
"Sir P. F."
is not the right thing to utter when 'explicating' who is at a party, so "Sir Peter" was used.
----
"Grice" is a very English surname. It originally means 'pig' (in Scots) or 'grey' (in French).
----
Herbert Grice (Junior)'s father was called "Herbert Grice" (Senior). Hence the name, "Herbert". His other brother was "Derek Grice".
Their mother was Mabel Felton. Both the Feltons and the Grices were wealthy Harborne families.
Grice never had to work in the harbour raising packs of sugar, say.
---
J goes on:
"Considered weak, effeminate, too cerebral, difficult--or something."
Right. Or is _it_ right? In Boston, though, they say,
"pa:k" the "ca:", rather than PaRRk the CARR. But then they think they ARE British (cfr. the Boston Tea Party). ---
The English have been emigrating to the USA for centuries, but they are what they themselves call 'the invisible immigrant'. I lived for a time (one summer or two) in Guilford, Connecticut (don't spread the news), and there was a hot debate in the pages of the local daily, as to where the name of the Towne originated.
Everybody thought it was Guildford in Surrey, with the typical American droppage of the 'd'.
Then, one invisible immigrant to Guilford made some further investigation at the local library and discovered that the first immigrants to Guilford in Connecticut (a charming town which is on the water -- the Guilford marina was my favourite place to bike --) came from EAST GUILFORD north of London, on the Estuary. "It looks pretty much like East Guilford, this town," she added.
But the local residents never accepted the history, and continue to think that it is from "Guildford" in Surrey.
----
I would say that parts of America _are_ very English. Toponymy on the Long Island Sound (seabord) is an example.
-----
J goes on:
"They will read Dewey, James (or Quine for logic/maths types), even Hegelians, but a Toulmin's reserved for like USC students."
Yes. I AM SURPRISED by the load of Brit stuff they have to read, for, say, "English literature". If I were mastering (as per MA) in English in America I would make a point of _NOT_ reading Shakespeare, Marlowe, and all the other minor dramatists of English origin, etc. that they have to digest to call themselves an "English graduate". Ditto for novel. Instead of sticking with the grand novels of Steinbeck, or what have you, they give conferences on:
"Performing bodies in the pre-Victorian trash novels of Elisabetta Curry"
---
Many "literary societies" which cater for the Anglo-philes abound in the USA, with members of the "International Lewis Carroll Society" or the "Virginia Woolf Club" visiting their shrines in the summer.
But then, it is a big country and it caters for anything (everything, as Quine would prefer, with 'substitutional quantification' preferred).
J goes on:
"Some rhetorical/lit. people may have used it (not much AFAIK), but UoA offers a applicable structure---induction, really. Applicable to social science too. Warrants/claims/conclusion. Boring, perhaps.
Well, it was a bit of an 'island'. It has the features of a _textbook_. My favourite chapter, I would think, is the "Probability" chapter which Toulmin did publish, as an article, in Flew, "Conceptual Analysis". At a time Toulmin was considered a 'linguistic botaniser', and reading that chapter by Toulmin is like reading Urmson on 'validity' -- also repr. in Flew. Uses of "I know", "Probably", "it may seem as if", etc.
The reason why Toulmin THEN never stuck with English academia was that it attempted to cover the same ground as Strawson, "Introduction to logical theory". Indeed, I believe Sir Peter reviewed Toulmin's book. Universities were ordering zillions of copies of the Strawson volume for students to have a first grasp of "Logic". So they were NOT going to allow a 'newcomer' as Toulmin was, to sweep Strawson and have the students recite the 'lawyer's' way of arguing in that little book as epitome of what Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine had said much more abstractedly. Or something.
J goes on:
"But MLA and APA format (Amer. psych. Asso) are boring as well. Really I think that all writing should be APA, or in something like Toulmin's form. Think of all the brainfarts, like plugged. ...APA philosophy? Like Phil. as a social science--tho' would not please the Phil. mavens."
Yes. As I say, I enjoy Toulmin when he analyses common features of discourse. He even has a few things to say that pre-date Grice on 'implicature'. "The weather forecast man, when he says "It will rain" does not really _imply_ that he knows it", or stuff like that.
------ There is a new science, "Argumentation theory", which has made Toulmin the first book to consider. Walton, for example.
I wouldn't know about what style of philosophical writing is best. I read Toulmin as providing clues as to how to interpret what a weather forecast man says, NOT what a philosopher says, because, well, they don't SAY. They _argue_.
Philosophical argument, as Grice knew, can and SHOULD be very abstract. It should be 'metaphysical argument' that counts first. This Grice saw as 'eschatological'. He was planning to write a huge book on that, "From Genesis to Revelations: studies in philosophical methodology". He did write the title for it, but he died (before completing the project).
J notes:
"Actually the later Russell at times sounded Toulminesque, did he not."
The later-day Russell. He married so many times, no? He was an agnostic, British Left sort of type by THAT time. I never understood how many Russells there were. My favourite (in terms of hateful type) is the one portrayed by Nicholas G. in "Tom and Viv", the film with Miranda Richardson, on the life of T. S. Eliot and his English wife. They socialised with Lord Russell a lot, and I think indeed Lord Russell had the hots for Mrs. E.
---
Russell was born in, er, England, er, Wales. Monmouthshire. Where he was born would be regarded, TODAY, a part of Wales. WHEN HE CRIED, "wooooow!" on seeing the light, as a baby, it was part of England. So one may call him an Englishman. But then he was so titled.
His first mistake was possibly to go to King's College and Trinity, Cambridge, rather than Oxford. THAT WOULD HAVE MADEH HIM A TOULMIN.
Cambridge is very hard-science oriented, and perhaps Toulmin was attacking that when suggesting that lawyers should be taken more seriously.
O. T. O. H., the right one usually, Oxford was ALWAYS more on the urbanite side, and they had one lawyer too many.
Recall this was the time (when Toulmin wrote) when at Oxford they were instituting the PPE programme (versus the Lit. Hum. programme that Grice was familiar with). The philosophy-politics-economics programme rather than the 'classics' programme -- litterae humaniores.
J goes on:
"Not merely formal arguments/verification, but...plausibility,persuasion. Philosophy with pie graphs! Or maybe that's political science or economics."
Odd you should say that. The present Prime Minister of England indeed studied philosophy at Wolfson, or Brasenose. He belonged to that P. P. E. programme ("Philosophy, Politics, Economics") hence his current career as Prime Minister. We don't want our prime ministers to be masters in neo-Platonistic approaches to Leibniz monadicism. We want them to be practical types, well imbued with all the informal technicalities (if that's not an oxymoron) of a Toulmin.
J adds:
"Any sort of ...truth criteria are not great for the publishing biz, or Hollywood though. The publishing, entertainment, and US media depends on marketing fantasies, hype, folderol. Fact checking's bad for business."
Yes, plus we never know what a _fact_ is. The Italians call it 'fatto'. It is the past participle of 'do'. "A fact". So, that the sun is shining should NOT be a 'fact' (who makes the sun shine?).
"Fact" is possibly one of the most overused words on television.
--- But then it is hard to find a replacement. I use 'explicature' but I agree it is a mouthful.
J goes on:
"That said, exceptions should be made for the authentic..literatteurs, at least those who've completed like the Joseph Conrad or James Joyce curriculum, and wouldn't call avoir et etre the work of the debbil."
--- That's talking! Of course, Joyce is overrated. He should be restricted to "minor in neo-Anglo-Irish lettres. I never understood all that hype for "Finnegans wake". It is just an Irish drinking song! Joyce had a lot of sexual problems if you've seen the film with Ewan McGregor ("Norah") and even if you haven't seen it. He would masterubate in cinemas in Dublin. And _she_ was possibly some bad influence. Note her surname, Barnacle. She stuck with him.
Conrad is a good example of the 'good immigrant', and thus I sort of dislike him. The 'success-story' type, gone, for me, wrong. Note: he forgot his mother tongue (Polish) altogether, truncated his lovely Polish name, and wrote superficial stuff on an English sailor ("Jim"). I would not count him as "English literature" and would never attend a seminar on "Polish attempts to destroy the Englishness of English literature by writing commercial stuff on marine subject-matters". Or something.
No. Give me E. M. Forster anyday! (Just teasing).
"Why Hacker isn't a greater philosopher than Grice", this blog (almost), J writes:
"As some old number went,
to oxford town, I have not been, or-- I have not to Oxford town been. Neither the Anglo, or Missisippi one. Oxnard, though, ive visited. ah, Olde Oxnard towne."
I should do some research on that. I collect notes and queries on Ox- towns. Of course, you don't see the 'ford', much. It was originally called, in a more logical , Oxen-ford, since the place operated as a 'ford' (or bridge) for the oxen (rather than just one The Ox) to cross the water. The water is the Royal Tamesis, Thames. But it changes name there: Isis and Cherwell.
---- Then it becomes Thames again further upstream. Oddly, the Thamesis originates in either Staffordshire or some other place. Laurence Tapper, a Griceian, once objected to the idiomatic expression,
"the mouth of the river"
-- for the Tamesis, the Estuary.
Not so much on its poor metaphorical character (cfr. Grice, "You're the cream in my coffee"), but because, literally (almost) it should best be called,
--- The arse*ole of the river.
seeing that the 'mouth', if mouth it is, should be where a river originates, and not where it dies. Similarly, Tapper objects to the use of 'leg' in "leg of the chair" and refers to them as 'modular limbs'. ("Less rude").
----
J adds about Toulmin's "Uses of Argument" -- Indeed Toulmin was never renewed his contract in Leeds, and had to emigrate to America, on account of his having had an affair with one of his female students. Some uses of argument.
About the book,
"[It is] helpful. To a Wittgenquine, or GC reg, or commies, probably dull."
I was reading some material by N. Allott the other day -- his PhD thesis for UCL is on "Rationality" and he notes that things like,
"Hey!"
"My mother!"
"Heavens!"
etc. -- very "like" as his examples are other --
should not count as 'premises' in the recovery of conversational implicature.
It would be odd to count "Heavens, no!" as a premise. Yet, the logical form is
-p
not p.
Allott possibly after Toulmin thinks Grice would classify that subpropositional or subsentential material as "warrant" rather than 'premise'.
So, yes, a helpful book.
J goes on:
"To students who barely made it through a Cali. public school ...quite reasonable, though a bit British."
Yes. There are two many examples from the courts -- British system, which cannot but bore the Un-Brit. But then, Toulmin is arguing that our epitome of 'argument' is what lawyers do. I once taught logic in the USA, and one day I was evaluating the whole class on whether they had survived, in an educational way, to my exposure on the topic of 'argue' and 'argument'. A student said, and aloud too,
"So, if I understood you 'right, 'to argue', is like to _fight_, but only with words".
(E.g. "Stop arguing with me").
J goes on:
"American educators (and students)--whether at a UC level, or the 'burbs, simply don't care for the British, whether its Schackaspeare, or Bertrand Russell."
Right. I tend to call Grice "Paul Grice", on occasion, to seduce the Americans. Americans would use initials, like "H. P. Grice" only on very special occasions. They think that what the Brits called the "Christian" name (or names) should NEVER be hidden (from 'explicature').
In Clifton, where Grice studied, he would be referred to as "Grice" -- by everybody. In the programme -- he played the piano for a 1932 concert -- his name is 'explicated' as
"H. P. Grice".
The first time Grice disclosed, in print, that his name was "Paul" was circa 1970.
His first name was "Herbert".
His _second_ name was Paul.
The whole thing of names is a bother. Strawson NEVER USED "Peter" in his writings. It is always "P. F. Strawson". This provoked a little argument when the Queen knighted him.
"Sir P. F."
is not the right thing to utter when 'explicating' who is at a party, so "Sir Peter" was used.
----
"Grice" is a very English surname. It originally means 'pig' (in Scots) or 'grey' (in French).
----
Herbert Grice (Junior)'s father was called "Herbert Grice" (Senior). Hence the name, "Herbert". His other brother was "Derek Grice".
Their mother was Mabel Felton. Both the Feltons and the Grices were wealthy Harborne families.
Grice never had to work in the harbour raising packs of sugar, say.
---
J goes on:
"Considered weak, effeminate, too cerebral, difficult--or something."
Right. Or is _it_ right? In Boston, though, they say,
"pa:k" the "ca:", rather than PaRRk the CARR. But then they think they ARE British (cfr. the Boston Tea Party). ---
The English have been emigrating to the USA for centuries, but they are what they themselves call 'the invisible immigrant'. I lived for a time (one summer or two) in Guilford, Connecticut (don't spread the news), and there was a hot debate in the pages of the local daily, as to where the name of the Towne originated.
Everybody thought it was Guildford in Surrey, with the typical American droppage of the 'd'.
Then, one invisible immigrant to Guilford made some further investigation at the local library and discovered that the first immigrants to Guilford in Connecticut (a charming town which is on the water -- the Guilford marina was my favourite place to bike --) came from EAST GUILFORD north of London, on the Estuary. "It looks pretty much like East Guilford, this town," she added.
But the local residents never accepted the history, and continue to think that it is from "Guildford" in Surrey.
----
I would say that parts of America _are_ very English. Toponymy on the Long Island Sound (seabord) is an example.
-----
J goes on:
"They will read Dewey, James (or Quine for logic/maths types), even Hegelians, but a Toulmin's reserved for like USC students."
Yes. I AM SURPRISED by the load of Brit stuff they have to read, for, say, "English literature". If I were mastering (as per MA) in English in America I would make a point of _NOT_ reading Shakespeare, Marlowe, and all the other minor dramatists of English origin, etc. that they have to digest to call themselves an "English graduate". Ditto for novel. Instead of sticking with the grand novels of Steinbeck, or what have you, they give conferences on:
"Performing bodies in the pre-Victorian trash novels of Elisabetta Curry"
---
Many "literary societies" which cater for the Anglo-philes abound in the USA, with members of the "International Lewis Carroll Society" or the "Virginia Woolf Club" visiting their shrines in the summer.
But then, it is a big country and it caters for anything (everything, as Quine would prefer, with 'substitutional quantification' preferred).
J goes on:
"Some rhetorical/lit. people may have used it (not much AFAIK), but UoA offers a applicable structure---induction, really. Applicable to social science too. Warrants/claims/conclusion. Boring, perhaps.
Well, it was a bit of an 'island'. It has the features of a _textbook_. My favourite chapter, I would think, is the "Probability" chapter which Toulmin did publish, as an article, in Flew, "Conceptual Analysis". At a time Toulmin was considered a 'linguistic botaniser', and reading that chapter by Toulmin is like reading Urmson on 'validity' -- also repr. in Flew. Uses of "I know", "Probably", "it may seem as if", etc.
The reason why Toulmin THEN never stuck with English academia was that it attempted to cover the same ground as Strawson, "Introduction to logical theory". Indeed, I believe Sir Peter reviewed Toulmin's book. Universities were ordering zillions of copies of the Strawson volume for students to have a first grasp of "Logic". So they were NOT going to allow a 'newcomer' as Toulmin was, to sweep Strawson and have the students recite the 'lawyer's' way of arguing in that little book as epitome of what Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine had said much more abstractedly. Or something.
J goes on:
"But MLA and APA format (Amer. psych. Asso) are boring as well. Really I think that all writing should be APA, or in something like Toulmin's form. Think of all the brainfarts, like plugged. ...APA philosophy? Like Phil. as a social science--tho' would not please the Phil. mavens."
Yes. As I say, I enjoy Toulmin when he analyses common features of discourse. He even has a few things to say that pre-date Grice on 'implicature'. "The weather forecast man, when he says "It will rain" does not really _imply_ that he knows it", or stuff like that.
------ There is a new science, "Argumentation theory", which has made Toulmin the first book to consider. Walton, for example.
I wouldn't know about what style of philosophical writing is best. I read Toulmin as providing clues as to how to interpret what a weather forecast man says, NOT what a philosopher says, because, well, they don't SAY. They _argue_.
Philosophical argument, as Grice knew, can and SHOULD be very abstract. It should be 'metaphysical argument' that counts first. This Grice saw as 'eschatological'. He was planning to write a huge book on that, "From Genesis to Revelations: studies in philosophical methodology". He did write the title for it, but he died (before completing the project).
J notes:
"Actually the later Russell at times sounded Toulminesque, did he not."
The later-day Russell. He married so many times, no? He was an agnostic, British Left sort of type by THAT time. I never understood how many Russells there were. My favourite (in terms of hateful type) is the one portrayed by Nicholas G. in "Tom and Viv", the film with Miranda Richardson, on the life of T. S. Eliot and his English wife. They socialised with Lord Russell a lot, and I think indeed Lord Russell had the hots for Mrs. E.
---
Russell was born in, er, England, er, Wales. Monmouthshire. Where he was born would be regarded, TODAY, a part of Wales. WHEN HE CRIED, "wooooow!" on seeing the light, as a baby, it was part of England. So one may call him an Englishman. But then he was so titled.
His first mistake was possibly to go to King's College and Trinity, Cambridge, rather than Oxford. THAT WOULD HAVE MADEH HIM A TOULMIN.
Cambridge is very hard-science oriented, and perhaps Toulmin was attacking that when suggesting that lawyers should be taken more seriously.
O. T. O. H., the right one usually, Oxford was ALWAYS more on the urbanite side, and they had one lawyer too many.
Recall this was the time (when Toulmin wrote) when at Oxford they were instituting the PPE programme (versus the Lit. Hum. programme that Grice was familiar with). The philosophy-politics-economics programme rather than the 'classics' programme -- litterae humaniores.
J goes on:
"Not merely formal arguments/verification, but...plausibility,persuasion. Philosophy with pie graphs! Or maybe that's political science or economics."
Odd you should say that. The present Prime Minister of England indeed studied philosophy at Wolfson, or Brasenose. He belonged to that P. P. E. programme ("Philosophy, Politics, Economics") hence his current career as Prime Minister. We don't want our prime ministers to be masters in neo-Platonistic approaches to Leibniz monadicism. We want them to be practical types, well imbued with all the informal technicalities (if that's not an oxymoron) of a Toulmin.
J adds:
"Any sort of ...truth criteria are not great for the publishing biz, or Hollywood though. The publishing, entertainment, and US media depends on marketing fantasies, hype, folderol. Fact checking's bad for business."
Yes, plus we never know what a _fact_ is. The Italians call it 'fatto'. It is the past participle of 'do'. "A fact". So, that the sun is shining should NOT be a 'fact' (who makes the sun shine?).
"Fact" is possibly one of the most overused words on television.
--- But then it is hard to find a replacement. I use 'explicature' but I agree it is a mouthful.
J goes on:
"That said, exceptions should be made for the authentic..literatteurs, at least those who've completed like the Joseph Conrad or James Joyce curriculum, and wouldn't call avoir et etre the work of the debbil."
--- That's talking! Of course, Joyce is overrated. He should be restricted to "minor in neo-Anglo-Irish lettres. I never understood all that hype for "Finnegans wake". It is just an Irish drinking song! Joyce had a lot of sexual problems if you've seen the film with Ewan McGregor ("Norah") and even if you haven't seen it. He would masterubate in cinemas in Dublin. And _she_ was possibly some bad influence. Note her surname, Barnacle. She stuck with him.
Conrad is a good example of the 'good immigrant', and thus I sort of dislike him. The 'success-story' type, gone, for me, wrong. Note: he forgot his mother tongue (Polish) altogether, truncated his lovely Polish name, and wrote superficial stuff on an English sailor ("Jim"). I would not count him as "English literature" and would never attend a seminar on "Polish attempts to destroy the Englishness of English literature by writing commercial stuff on marine subject-matters". Or something.
No. Give me E. M. Forster anyday! (Just teasing).
Friday, February 18, 2011
Grice or the Syntax of Illusion
Grice (or his ghost) has a folder, deposited at the Univ. of Berkeley/Library (Yes, one shouldn't SAY "univ of Berkeley" but I want to sound parochial) entitled,
"The syntax of illusion"
It's about his joint work with Sir Geoffrey Warnock on stuff like:
"It seems to me as though there may be a pillar-box just in front of me which may look red to me."
"It IS red"
"I never said it wasn't"
------
Hacker ignored all this and called HIS BOOK, Insight and illusion. I would have called it "Illusion and insight", since the latter came latter.
----
"The syntax of illusion"
It's about his joint work with Sir Geoffrey Warnock on stuff like:
"It seems to me as though there may be a pillar-box just in front of me which may look red to me."
"It IS red"
"I never said it wasn't"
------
Hacker ignored all this and called HIS BOOK, Insight and illusion. I would have called it "Illusion and insight", since the latter came latter.
----
Why Hacker is a better philosopher than Grice
-- he isn't!
(I'm studying the cancellability of 'why' implicatures in restricted contexts:
----- I want to study in Oxford.
----- JLS: You should study with Grice.
----- Prospective Student: But Grice is dead.
(end of conversation).
Prospective Student: I want to study Grice.
Speranza: You should study with Grice.
Prospective Student: But Grice is dead.
Speranza: Is he? So is Aristotle.
If you go to Oxford, don't miss Hacker. He lives, and has tea, in the same room where Grice taught FOR YEARS.
Grice was engaged by St John's back in the day. The tutor there was a Scots, by the name of Mabbott. "Good ole Mabb", Grice called him. Alas they are both dead, now, but just before he (Grice) died, Grice was pleased to learn that "good ole Mabb" had such an excellent concept(ion) of Grice, -- "an excellent philosopher", Mabb calls Grice in "Oxford Memories" a book which is NOT listed by Oprah Winfrey's Monthly Book Club.
----
When Grice left for the States. He just left Oxford, but as the Americans say, "for the States" sounds _nice_. St John's found itself without a tutor. Yes, there was Mabb, but who wanted Mabb?
So they engaged Gordon Baker. Gordon P. Baker, if you must. He is dead now, too. And he was or is American.
When Baker was a tutor, and Grice living in the USA, St. John's also engaged P. M. S. Hacker.
Now with Baker dead, Hacker succeeded Grice, as it were, as philosophy tutor at Oxford.
Prospective Student: I would like to study philosophy at Oxford.
Speranza: You should study at St. John's with Grice.
Prospective Student. But Grice is dead.
Speranza: So? So is Plato.
----
J writes:
"Hacker seems like an authentic philosopher. Or sounds like it, at least."
Yes. And have you seen his beautiful handwriting?
----
"I don't always agree, completely with his traditional readings of St. Witt but he's a weighty figure."
Yes, I dunno what's with these St. John's types, newish ones. It took DECADES to Grice to find himself independent from all bad Continental influences ("Wittgenstein can't speak English," he would implicate) to have the new generations of tutors all crazy about Witters.
A worse case is D. F. Pears. He was so English in outlook when he discussed things with Grice. Grice leaves for the USA, and Grice dies, and Pears concentrates his WHOLE LIFE in writing and writing and writing about Witters.
-----
J:
"[Hacker's] critique of Quine's naturalism a few years ago sort of...modified my thinking for a bit."
----- I don't like Quine. He would often criticised Grice for his lack of 'hygiene', if that's the word. I should revise Quine's autobiography ("My days in Oxford"). In a sort of praise by faint damn, he noted that ONLY ON ONE OCCASION he (Quine) found that Grice had dressed appropriately. It was fair day at St. John's.
-----
J:
"That said, I don't think the ordinary language types (whether Witt. or Strawson, Toulmin, etc) did what they wanted to, or something."
Yes. Toulmin possibly wasn't an ordinary language type. Ordinary yes, but language no.
The best of the lot, if you heard of him, was called Grice. There is a club to his honour -- somewhere.
---
J:
"Doesn't mean one defends the logic choppers exactly... but in certain contexts, it's difficult to get away from proof and evidentialism (or ...formality--e.g....programming)."
Yes. If you've been to Oxford you won't see much of those charming 'logic choppers'. They finally got rid of Formal Logic altogether. Wiliamson taught as Wykeham professor of Logic. If you read Williamson you'll see what he writes is 'hardly' logic the type Quine wanted logic to be!
There is a Chair called "Mathematical Logic" at Oxford. But this is dependent on St. Giles Institute of Mathematics, and usually taught by Poles or other continental types. The Oxonian crowd has realised that you don't need to speak (or write) English to teach logic. Or learn it, as the case may be.
J:
"Toulmin seemed like a reasonable compromise to me for some time until I discovered that pro. philosophers, links oder rechts considered Toulmin....a dilettante or something--mere rhetorician."
Yes. His book on Witters's Vienna I'm surprised does not contain sheet music for Strauss's Waltzes. I mean...
Imagine if I were to write a booklet:
Grice's Harborne.
(Grice was born in Harborne, in Staffordshire. Other philosophers born in Staffordshire include R. B. Jones).
---- I mean, it becomes pretty _unphilosophical_. It's different,
Grice's Dreaming Spires (meaning Oxford), because Oxford (unlike Harborne) is full of philosophers.
Oddly, Grice never owned a house in Oxford. St. John's provided him with an apartment on Woodstock Road, walking distance to the college.
So, you shouldn't be surprised by THE LOVE he grew for his beautiful 'colonial' house up in the hills of Berkeley, with a lovely view to the Bay -- always sprinkled with them lovely white sail boats --.
He would drive a Wolkswagen up and down the hills, and would often have a drink at the bar of the one-and-only 5-star hotel in Berkeley. When he was not dining in that odd little Italian restaurant in Oakland.
Ah, the good leisurable life of a philosopher!
J:
"I don't think he was exactly--mo' like a pragmatist of a sort, w-o the Rortyian hype."
Bayne, who runs a list on the history of analytic philosophy, likes Toulmin. I find Toulmin slightly boring. Indeed, his book on "Uses of Arguments" Toulmin was scandalised to learn was treated as a mere 'rhetorical' bookie in the New World.
"St. Witt. also supposedly well-read in Wm James." -- and TOULMIN.
I never liked that anecdote on Witters. Witters had been 'publishing' his views on reason and its place in ethics at his seminars at Cambridge. Toulmin attended. Eventually, Toulmin wrote his DPhil, "The place of reason in Ethics". Witters was OFFENDED. He thought Toulmin had stolen the ideas from him. As if philosophical ideas could be copyrighted like that...
In this respect, what they did WITH GRICE'S IDEAS we should explore in a different blog post, on a longer day. From Strawson's sending (unbeknownst to Grice) a copy of Grice's Meaning to "Philosophical Review" to Lakoff photocopying a thousand copies of the mimeo (not typed by Grice), on implicature.
In those days linguists were, 'like a vacuum cleaner', Partee recalls, drawing from Grice. Kaplan commented. "Odd that. Since it's usually _dust_ that a vacuum cleaner cares to collect."
Ah well.
(I'm studying the cancellability of 'why' implicatures in restricted contexts:
----- I want to study in Oxford.
----- JLS: You should study with Grice.
----- Prospective Student: But Grice is dead.
(end of conversation).
Prospective Student: I want to study Grice.
Speranza: You should study with Grice.
Prospective Student: But Grice is dead.
Speranza: Is he? So is Aristotle.
If you go to Oxford, don't miss Hacker. He lives, and has tea, in the same room where Grice taught FOR YEARS.
Grice was engaged by St John's back in the day. The tutor there was a Scots, by the name of Mabbott. "Good ole Mabb", Grice called him. Alas they are both dead, now, but just before he (Grice) died, Grice was pleased to learn that "good ole Mabb" had such an excellent concept(ion) of Grice, -- "an excellent philosopher", Mabb calls Grice in "Oxford Memories" a book which is NOT listed by Oprah Winfrey's Monthly Book Club.
----
When Grice left for the States. He just left Oxford, but as the Americans say, "for the States" sounds _nice_. St John's found itself without a tutor. Yes, there was Mabb, but who wanted Mabb?
So they engaged Gordon Baker. Gordon P. Baker, if you must. He is dead now, too. And he was or is American.
When Baker was a tutor, and Grice living in the USA, St. John's also engaged P. M. S. Hacker.
Now with Baker dead, Hacker succeeded Grice, as it were, as philosophy tutor at Oxford.
Prospective Student: I would like to study philosophy at Oxford.
Speranza: You should study at St. John's with Grice.
Prospective Student. But Grice is dead.
Speranza: So? So is Plato.
----
J writes:
"Hacker seems like an authentic philosopher. Or sounds like it, at least."
Yes. And have you seen his beautiful handwriting?
----
"I don't always agree, completely with his traditional readings of St. Witt but he's a weighty figure."
Yes, I dunno what's with these St. John's types, newish ones. It took DECADES to Grice to find himself independent from all bad Continental influences ("Wittgenstein can't speak English," he would implicate) to have the new generations of tutors all crazy about Witters.
A worse case is D. F. Pears. He was so English in outlook when he discussed things with Grice. Grice leaves for the USA, and Grice dies, and Pears concentrates his WHOLE LIFE in writing and writing and writing about Witters.
-----
J:
"[Hacker's] critique of Quine's naturalism a few years ago sort of...modified my thinking for a bit."
----- I don't like Quine. He would often criticised Grice for his lack of 'hygiene', if that's the word. I should revise Quine's autobiography ("My days in Oxford"). In a sort of praise by faint damn, he noted that ONLY ON ONE OCCASION he (Quine) found that Grice had dressed appropriately. It was fair day at St. John's.
-----
J:
"That said, I don't think the ordinary language types (whether Witt. or Strawson, Toulmin, etc) did what they wanted to, or something."
Yes. Toulmin possibly wasn't an ordinary language type. Ordinary yes, but language no.
The best of the lot, if you heard of him, was called Grice. There is a club to his honour -- somewhere.
---
J:
"Doesn't mean one defends the logic choppers exactly... but in certain contexts, it's difficult to get away from proof and evidentialism (or ...formality--e.g....programming)."
Yes. If you've been to Oxford you won't see much of those charming 'logic choppers'. They finally got rid of Formal Logic altogether. Wiliamson taught as Wykeham professor of Logic. If you read Williamson you'll see what he writes is 'hardly' logic the type Quine wanted logic to be!
There is a Chair called "Mathematical Logic" at Oxford. But this is dependent on St. Giles Institute of Mathematics, and usually taught by Poles or other continental types. The Oxonian crowd has realised that you don't need to speak (or write) English to teach logic. Or learn it, as the case may be.
J:
"Toulmin seemed like a reasonable compromise to me for some time until I discovered that pro. philosophers, links oder rechts considered Toulmin....a dilettante or something--mere rhetorician."
Yes. His book on Witters's Vienna I'm surprised does not contain sheet music for Strauss's Waltzes. I mean...
Imagine if I were to write a booklet:
Grice's Harborne.
(Grice was born in Harborne, in Staffordshire. Other philosophers born in Staffordshire include R. B. Jones).
---- I mean, it becomes pretty _unphilosophical_. It's different,
Grice's Dreaming Spires (meaning Oxford), because Oxford (unlike Harborne) is full of philosophers.
Oddly, Grice never owned a house in Oxford. St. John's provided him with an apartment on Woodstock Road, walking distance to the college.
So, you shouldn't be surprised by THE LOVE he grew for his beautiful 'colonial' house up in the hills of Berkeley, with a lovely view to the Bay -- always sprinkled with them lovely white sail boats --.
He would drive a Wolkswagen up and down the hills, and would often have a drink at the bar of the one-and-only 5-star hotel in Berkeley. When he was not dining in that odd little Italian restaurant in Oakland.
Ah, the good leisurable life of a philosopher!
J:
"I don't think he was exactly--mo' like a pragmatist of a sort, w-o the Rortyian hype."
Bayne, who runs a list on the history of analytic philosophy, likes Toulmin. I find Toulmin slightly boring. Indeed, his book on "Uses of Arguments" Toulmin was scandalised to learn was treated as a mere 'rhetorical' bookie in the New World.
"St. Witt. also supposedly well-read in Wm James." -- and TOULMIN.
I never liked that anecdote on Witters. Witters had been 'publishing' his views on reason and its place in ethics at his seminars at Cambridge. Toulmin attended. Eventually, Toulmin wrote his DPhil, "The place of reason in Ethics". Witters was OFFENDED. He thought Toulmin had stolen the ideas from him. As if philosophical ideas could be copyrighted like that...
In this respect, what they did WITH GRICE'S IDEAS we should explore in a different blog post, on a longer day. From Strawson's sending (unbeknownst to Grice) a copy of Grice's Meaning to "Philosophical Review" to Lakoff photocopying a thousand copies of the mimeo (not typed by Grice), on implicature.
In those days linguists were, 'like a vacuum cleaner', Partee recalls, drawing from Grice. Kaplan commented. "Odd that. Since it's usually _dust_ that a vacuum cleaner cares to collect."
Ah well.
Grice on reasoning
From Allott, online
"Similarly, Grice did not think that reasoning in general was always conscious and explicit. As noted, discussing reasoning in general, he wrote, “We have… a ‘hard way' of making inferential moves; [a] laborious, step-by-step procedure [which] consumes time and energy… .A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, … made possible by habituation and intention, is [also] available to us”. (Grice, 2001, p. 17)
"Similarly, Grice did not think that reasoning in general was always conscious and explicit. As noted, discussing reasoning in general, he wrote, “We have… a ‘hard way' of making inferential moves; [a] laborious, step-by-step procedure [which] consumes time and energy… .A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, … made possible by habituation and intention, is [also] available to us”. (Grice, 2001, p. 17)
Grice on reasoning
From Allott, online:
"See Sperber and Wilson’s discussion of reasoning with incomplete logical forms. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, pp. 72–73) Warrant is preserved by valid inferences on incomplete logical forms, as truth is preserved by valid inferences on complete ones."
"See Sperber and Wilson’s discussion of reasoning with incomplete logical forms. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, pp. 72–73) Warrant is preserved by valid inferences on incomplete logical forms, as truth is preserved by valid inferences on complete ones."
Sub-atomic particles of logic in Grice and Hare
Cfr.
"Smith be tactful", predication of tact (or thankfulness) on Smith. In indicative, imperative, and other versions.
---
Cfr. Wharton and JLS on 'quantum pragmatics'.
Cfr. Stainton on 'subsentential' assertion -- not 'genuine'.
"Smith be tactful", predication of tact (or thankfulness) on Smith. In indicative, imperative, and other versions.
---
Cfr. Wharton and JLS on 'quantum pragmatics'.
Cfr. Stainton on 'subsentential' assertion -- not 'genuine'.
"Logical form" in index to Strawson, "Introduction to Logical Theory" -- cited by Grice
-- check.
This was before Quine. When Quine got invited to Grice's and Strawson's joint seminars on logical form, Strawson started to get obsessed with criticising Quine, and he succeeded!
This was before Quine. When Quine got invited to Grice's and Strawson's joint seminars on logical form, Strawson started to get obsessed with criticising Quine, and he succeeded!
Grice reminisces -- on his joint seminars with Strawson on logical form
"Our efforts were partly directed
towards the giving of joint seminars;
we staged a number of them of these
on topics relted to the notions of meaning,
of categories, and of logical form"
(p. 48) Reply to Richards
towards the giving of joint seminars;
we staged a number of them of these
on topics relted to the notions of meaning,
of categories, and of logical form"
(p. 48) Reply to Richards
Grice and Strawson on logical form
Peter Frederick Strawson (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) - [ Traducir esta página ]16 Sep 2009 ... Within Oxford, Strawson contributed in a major way to the weakening of ..... Grice took an opposite view to Strawson and part of the point of his account ..... which accepted a notion of logical form for natural language ...
plato.stanford.edu/entries/strawson/ - Similar
plato.stanford.edu/entries/strawson/ - Similar
"pretty good guide"
Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends
Richard E. Grandy, Richard Warner - 1986 - 500 pages - Snippet view
... that grammar (the grammar of ordinary discourse) could be regarded as, in Russell's words, a pretty good guide to logical form, or to a suitable representation of logical form. This undertaking involved the construction, ...
books.google.com -
Richard E. Grandy, Richard Warner - 1986 - 500 pages - Snippet view
... that grammar (the grammar of ordinary discourse) could be regarded as, in Russell's words, a pretty good guide to logical form, or to a suitable representation of logical form. This undertaking involved the construction, ...
books.google.com -
Grice and Strawson on logical form and logical constants
The latter ('If and ⊃') had been written many years earlier as a riposte to Grice's ingenious and long unpublished ... The other article ('Logical Form and Logical Constants'), which aimed to give a general characterization of the ...
Grice and Strawson on logical form
Search ResultsThe philosophy of P.F. Strawson
Lewis Edwin Hahn - 1998 - 428 pages - Snippet view
The latter ('If and D') had been written many years earlier as a riposte to Grice's ingenious and long unpublished attempt to ... of misapplication such as it suffered, I argued, in this case. The other article ('Logical Form ...
books.google.com - More editions - Add to My Library▼
Lewis Edwin Hahn - 1998 - 428 pages - Snippet view
The latter ('If and D') had been written many years earlier as a riposte to Grice's ingenious and long unpublished attempt to ... of misapplication such as it suffered, I argued, in this case. The other article ('Logical Form ...
books.google.com - More editions - Add to My Library▼
Interesting exegesis of Grice on logical form
Developments in semantics
Alex Orenstein, Raphael Stern - 1983 - 397 pages - Snippet view
If Grice is right, the assignment of appropriate logical form is not made by the grammar. Even the fact that some sentence occurrences can be assigned correct logical forms directly is not strong evidence. ...
books.google.com
Alex Orenstein, Raphael Stern - 1983 - 397 pages - Snippet view
If Grice is right, the assignment of appropriate logical form is not made by the grammar. Even the fact that some sentence occurrences can be assigned correct logical forms directly is not strong evidence. ...
books.google.com
Hacker on Grice on logical form
Wittgenstein's place in twentieth-century analytic philosophy - Page 269
Peter Michael Stephan Hacker - 1996 - 346 pages - Preview
Quine invoked radical translation as a heuristic device to demonstrate that, pace Grice and Strawson, ... Logical form is the form of a sentence as represented, preferably in canonical notation, by depth grammar, which will make ...
books.google.com - More editions - Add to My Library▼
Peter Michael Stephan Hacker - 1996 - 346 pages - Preview
Quine invoked radical translation as a heuristic device to demonstrate that, pace Grice and Strawson, ... Logical form is the form of a sentence as represented, preferably in canonical notation, by depth grammar, which will make ...
books.google.com - More editions - Add to My Library▼
Labels:
---- Hacker,
Oxford,
philosophy tutor at St. John's
Harman on Grice on logical form
Semantic theory - Page 44
Ruth M. Kempson - 1977 - 216 pages - Preview
... is the most essential reading, but students should also read the Grice and Strawson reply 'In defence of a dogma'. ... See also in this connection Harman 'Logical form'. 3.4 For a representative discussion of the logicians' use of ...
Ruth M. Kempson - 1977 - 216 pages - Preview
... is the most essential reading, but students should also read the Grice and Strawson reply 'In defence of a dogma'. ... See also in this connection Harman 'Logical form'. 3.4 For a representative discussion of the logicians' use of ...
Stanley on Grice on logical form
"there is also no reason to think that Grice thought that every element of what is said must be the value of something in the logical form"
Early Griceian psycholinguistics
An Integrated theory of linguistic ability
Thomas G. Bever, Jerrold J. Katz, D. Terence Langendoen - 1976 - 432 pages - Snippet view
I), I presented the doctrine of logical form as a program committing one, at least in part, to representing those features of a ... I have held off publishing these thoughts on Grice until he released at least some of his own material. ...
Thomas G. Bever, Jerrold J. Katz, D. Terence Langendoen - 1976 - 432 pages - Snippet view
I), I presented the doctrine of logical form as a program committing one, at least in part, to representing those features of a ... I have held off publishing these thoughts on Grice until he released at least some of his own material. ...
"logical form" used in Grice, "Conception of Value"
The conception of value
H. Paul Grice - 1991 - 164 pages - Snippet view
(b) A less easily eliminable suggestion, yet one which would still interpret the notion of a "hypothetical imperative" in terms of that particular logical form to which the names "hypothetical" and "conditional" attach, ...
H. Paul Grice - 1991 - 164 pages - Snippet view
(b) A less easily eliminable suggestion, yet one which would still interpret the notion of a "hypothetical imperative" in terms of that particular logical form to which the names "hypothetical" and "conditional" attach, ...
Grice on "knowing_ the logical form of this or that
Pragmatic meaning and cognition - Page 25
Sophia S. A. Marmaridou - 2000 - 322 pages - Preview
Grice's theory of conversational implicature is a theory of such mechanisms. It is evident, even from this short reference ... Knowledge of the logical form of sentences (truth-conditions pertaining to sentences) is part of linguistic ...
books.google.com
Sophia S. A. Marmaridou - 2000 - 322 pages - Preview
Grice's theory of conversational implicature is a theory of such mechanisms. It is evident, even from this short reference ... Knowledge of the logical form of sentences (truth-conditions pertaining to sentences) is part of linguistic ...
books.google.com
Levinson on Grice on logical form -- cfr. Levinson's joint work with Atlas
Presumptive meanings: the theory of generalized conversational ... - Page 399
Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - 480 pages - Preview
Incidentally, the phrase "Grice's circle" is not meant to suggest that he had unwittingly tied himself in knots; ... way to hold fast to the position that the construction of logical form precedes all pragmatic processing seems to be to ...
Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - 480 pages - Preview
Incidentally, the phrase "Grice's circle" is not meant to suggest that he had unwittingly tied himself in knots; ... way to hold fast to the position that the construction of logical form precedes all pragmatic processing seems to be to ...
Grice on logical form (WoW:70)
"(1) We start with the supposition that a certain segment of ordinary discourse is, at least to all appearances, free from logical connectives and other logical particles; whatever
logical form
it may possess is discreetly concealed."
logical form
it may possess is discreetly concealed."
"A pretty good guide to logical form", Grice would say -- quoting from Russell
-- and he meant English.
- not
& and
v or
) if
x all
Ex some
ix the
--- "Formal devices".
- not
& and
v or
) if
x all
Ex some
ix the
--- "Formal devices".
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