The Grice Club

Welcome

The Grice Club

The club for all those whose members have no (other) club.

Is Grice the greatest philosopher that ever lived?

Search This Blog

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Stainton on Grice

[PDF] Words and Thoughts: Subsentences, Ellipsis, and the Philosophy of ... - [ PDF/Adobe Acrobat - seems to have implications for subsentential utterances, and in still other cases ... opposed to Grice's implicature), speakers often use sentences to make ...
userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/Bach.StaintonReview.pdf - Similar

Grice on "animal" "thought"

Language, philosophy of : Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online - H.P. Grice, while critical of some of Austin's methods, shared the aim of distilling ... Animal language and thought; Animal thought, recent work on). ...
www.rep.routledge.com/article/U017 - Similar

Back to where he belongs? Don't think so

[PDF] What is human language? How might it have evolved? - PDF/Adobe Acrobat - the left of') combined with some of Grice's ideas about linguistic communication, .... internal g-languages are used by pre-linguistic human children ..... Compositional semantics needs to be re-construed as allowing the non-linguistic ...
www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/.../presentations/sloman-evolang.pdf

Grice was born in Birmingham (well, Harborne). So, it is very appropriate that research along his lines is conducted in the "Heart of England".

Pre-Linguistic Griceians -- and how they survive

[PDF] On the Origin of Conventional Meaning: A Pragmatist Alternative to ... - PDF/Adobe Acrobat - pre-linguistic awareness of others' mental states is to subscribe to a ... Following Grice, I will presume that some non-linguistic creatures are capable of ...
faculty.unlv.edu/beiseckd/Research/IS-Mind&Language.pdf

Of Grice's appeal beyond philosophy of 'language'

Defining Depiction — Brit J Aesthetics - I defend common sense from this attack by using Grice's analysis of meaning ..... meanings of non-linguistic modes of communication such as gesturing or depiction. ... ↵23 See Peacocke, 'Depiction', p. 385 for this example. ↵24 Grice ...
bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/49/2/143.full

Grice, a reductivist -- never a reductionist

New Books - [ Peacocke, in an appendix on its semantics). Both the authors show how a sensitiv- ... he does not believe that a reduction of linguistic concepts to non-linguistic concepts, such as H. P. Grice has proposed, is possible. ...
www.jstor.org/stable/3749908

Grice on "non-linguistic": a close look

[PDF] Does the Gricean distinction between natural and non-natural ... - PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Tough the definition that Grice proposed for non natural meaning (henceafter ... cannot self report such as non linguistic animals and pre linguistic ...
l2c2.isc.cnrs.fr/publications/files/PandC.pdf

Grice and Peacocke on non-linguisticism (with a pinch of salt)

[PDF] The Theory of PDF/Adobe Acrobat
4.3.1 Davidson and Peacocke and Intentional Relations to CTTs .... language or communication at all: Grice called one such non-linguistic, non- ...
https://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/theoryofmeaning.pdf

Grice and Meinong on the irreal

[PDF] Lectures 9-10 The Semantics/Pragmatics Boundary Disputes I. Paul ... - [ : PDF/Adobe Acrobat - (replaces Grice's Relation ('Be relevant'), Quantity 2 ('Do not be too informative'), .... There is no psychologically real level of logical form. ...
www.mml.cam.ac.uk/ling/resources/Boundary.H.10-11.pdf

Margolis takes up the jargon: psychologically real, Gricean style

Culture and Cultural Entities - Toward a New Unity of Science - Books
Joseph Margolis - 2009 - Philosophy - 155 pages
The adequacy of Grice's formulation need not concern us; ... in a psychologically real sense, a certain complex intention, grasping which the hearer may ...
books.google.com./books?isbn=9048125537...

How real can psychological reality (Gricean style) be?

[PPT] Psychological Explanations in Gricean Pragmatics: An Argument from ... - Microsoft Powerpoint - 'What is said and psychological reality; Grice's project and relevance theorists' criticisms'. Linguistics and Philosophy 25. 347-372. ...
people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/.../Psychological%20Explanations%20in%20Gricean%20Pragmatics.pp... - Similar

Keyword: psychological reality, Gricean style -- as seen by Saul

What Is Said And Psychological Reality; Grice's Project And ... - 19:46 - CARSTON, PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY, AND GRICE. The difference in goals between Grice and the relevance theorists, and the confusion this gives rise to, ...
www.springerlink.com/index/y3flnbt4g94mrqah.pdf

Keyword: Psychological reality, Gricean style

Noveck.Cognition - [ That is, Grice can explain why such conversational inferences are accepted as ...... aimed to establish the anticipated psychological reality of Gricean implicatures by ..... Pragmatics: Implicatures, Presupposition and Logical Form. ...
www.isc.cnrs.fr/.../Noveck_Cognition.htm

Mrs. Grice's maiden name is Watson

Representation and Reality - In this view of things the logical form belongs to a sentence in a language. ..... complex formulation like that has some sort of psychological reality? ...
stevewatson.info/courses/.../Grice.htm -

-- Steve Watson.

Keyword, to some, being "psychological reality", Gricean style

Defaults in Semantics and Pragmatics (Stanford Encyclopedia of ... - 30 Jun 2006 ... Some post-Griceans stay close to Grice's spirit and propose that there are ... logical form and that function independently from the content of the .... the psychological reality of Gricean intention-based explanations. ...
plato.stanford.edu/entries/defaults-semantics-pragmatics/ - Similar

KEYWORD, to some: "psychological reality"

What Is Said And Psychological Reality; Grice's Project And ... - Grice based on a requirement of psychological reality will fail. ..... First, he [Grice] does not invisage the kind of enrichment of logical form involved, ...
www.springerlink.com/index/y3flnbt4g94mrqah.pdf

Alison Hall on Grice

• Hall, A. (2007) "Subsentential utterances, ellipsis and pragmatic enrichment." UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 19: 235-259. Available here (Adobe Acrobat format). [ref. added 3-12-2007]

Further, in notes to her seminars, and reading group, we find questions like:

"What would Grice have said about ..., say, subsententials". Worth checking.

Polish Grice

• Zajac, M. (2004) "Polish quantified sentences -From logical form to explicature: An analysis of selected examples from a corpus of young Poles' everyday conversation". In: Relevance Studies in Poland. Vol. 1

Ruth Kempson as a Gricean

• Kempson, R. (1988b) "Logical form: The grammar-cognition interface." Journal of Linguistics 24: 393-431.

ANYONE studying the origin of Gricean Studies in England should focus on Prof. Wilson and Prof. Kempson. They completed their respective PhDs almost at the same time, and both on "non-truth-conditional" aspects of things.

Kempson quoted Grice a lot in her PhD, which was published as a book with Cambridge University Press.

While Wilson, after her American sojourn, settled in UCL (she had studied at Nuffield as an undergraduate), Kempson settled in a different district of the same university. (King's). This led Laurence Horn to speak of the "London School" of Griceanism.

Etc.

Grice on logical form -- and why it mattered

• Kisielewska, M. (2004) "From logical form to explicature -The case of Polish non-inflected verbs". In: Relevance Studies in Poland. Vol. 1. Ed. E. Mioduszewska. Warszawa: The Institute of English Studies, University of Warsaw, 29-46. [ref. added 7-1-2008]

Implicature and logical form

• Recanati, F. (2010) "Pragmatics and logical form." In: Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston's Pragmatics. Eds. B. Soria and E. Romero. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. Available here (Adobe Acrobat format). [ref. added 6-2-2009]

Cumberland Lodge Conference on Logical Form

• Blakemore, D. (1985b). "So" as a constraint on relevance. Paper presented at the Cumberland Lodge Conference on Logical Form. [ref. added 20-8-2003]

Carston on Grice on indeterminacy and underdeterminacy

Thoughts and utterances: the pragmatics of explicit communication - Robyn Carston - 2002 - Computers - 418 páginas
This may be why Grice does not consider the conversational implicature account of ... it will clearly lose its force once the radical underdeterminacy of ...
books.google.com/books?isbn=0631214887...

How Determinate Was Grice About Indeterminacy?

Jay David Atlas, Logic, meaning, and conversation: semantical ... -

In chapter 1, 'Semantical underdeterminacy', the notion of semantical ... critical evaluation of Grice's views. According to Atlas, Grice's theory re- ...

journals.cambridge.org/article_S0022226706264387

Grice on quasi-demonstratives

-- a footnote to "South of France".

Carston considers:

"On the top shelf"

as short for:

"In case you are so hungry, and indeed looking for that jar of marmelade, you should be informed that it (i.e. the jar of marmelade) is situated on the top shelf of the cupboard you are making a mess of".

Grice considers:

"the top shelf"

----

and similar expressions as involving a misleading "the".

"Surely there are many top shelves involved," he would say. What we need is a quasi-demonstration, so that we introduce the relevant feature

phi

such that

phi

works as a quasi-demonstrative,

rendering the logical form of "The jar of marmelade is on the top shelf" as slightly more explicit, even if more boringly so.

(Grice, "Presupposition and conversational implicature," WoW. This was way before Kaplan was modernising talk on demonstration, with his dthis and dthat).

Grice's offspring

From:

EPISTEME - Contextualism and semanticism: An open debate ...

Grice is the father of two contemporary positions in the philosophy of language: Contextualism (Bach, Perry, Recanati) and Semanticism (Stanley, Szabó, ...

www.scielo.org.ve/scielo.php?... -

Stanley on scalar implicatures

Stanley studied with Griceian author, R. C. Stalnaker, a charming gentleman who resides in Massachusets, the state in USA which first recognised Grice's talents.

Jason Stanley - Language in Context: Selected Essays - Reviewed by ... - 25 May 2008 ... Jason Stanley, Language in Context: Selected Essays, ..... Very roughly, a scalar implicature occurs when the choice of a given word in a ...

Jason Stanley said that 27.

i.e. that "27" is the number of his publications, as per his site, accessed.

Some running commentaries:

27. Singular Thoughts and SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS. Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies (with Joshua Armstrong)

26. "Knowing (How)", forthcoming in Nous. Stanley has a book on "Know how".

25.“’Assertion’ and Intentionality”, Philosophical Studies 151.1, 2010: 87-113. Grice was obsessed with that. After all, most Oxonian philosophers were. But Grice is reminiscent of this in his "Retrospective Epilogue" to WoW, where he lists "assertion" as the first topic of his philosophical interest.

24. "On 'Average'", Mind 118, 2009: 583-646 (with Christopher Kennedy)

23. "Knowledge and Action", The Journal of Philosophy 105.10, 2008: 571-590. (with John Hawthorne)

22. "Knowledge and Certainty", Philosophical Issues 18, 2008: 33-55. Grice was concerned with, er, UNcertainty, as in "Intention and Uncertainty". We are certain that some intentions are uncertain.

21. "Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century", in Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy (London: Routledge Press, 2008): 382-437.
-selection reprinted as "Frege, Russell, and Tarski" in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Delia Fara and Gillian Russell (London: Routledge Press, 2011)

----- A good thing about Grice, unlike Witters, is that Grice's life span belongs to the 20th century, so-called. Born in 1913, died in 1988. In this, he contrasts with Strawson who while born in the 20th century (1919) died in the 21st century, complicating matters.

20. "Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume (2005): 131-45.

--- Hornsby (a female) studied at Oxford with J. O. Urmson. She is a lovely philosopher.

19. "Semantics in Context", Contextualism, G. Peters and G. Preyer, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 221-53. Repr.

18. "Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions", Analysis 65.2, 2005: 126-31.

17. "Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Role of Semantic Content", in Semantics vs. Pragmatics, Z. Szabo, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) (with Jeffrey C. King)

16. "On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism", Philosophical Studies, 119, 2004: 119-146.
--- As opposed to ... the WHAT other basis? Epistemic. Ontologic. Whatever. Lovely essay.

15. "Context, Interest-Relativity, and the Sorites", in Analysis 63, 2003: 269-280.

14. "Modality and What is Said", in Philosophical Perspectives 16, J. Tomberlin, ed. (Blackwell Press, 2002): 321-344.
----- Hare would have loved this. Hare wrote an essay for Urmson, "Subatomic particles of logic". It was rejected because he used too many obscure symbols. He published it, instead, in _Mind_, and repr. in Universal Prescriptions.

For Hare, the what-is-said is the 'phrastic'. A better term, actually. Classier.

13. "Nominal Restriction", in LOGICAL FORM and Language, G. Peters and G. Preyer, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 365-388.

12. "Making it Articulated", Mind and Language 17 1 & 2, 2002: 149-168.

11. "Hermeneutic Fictionalism", in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25: Figurative Language, H. Wettstein and P. French, ed. (Blackwell Press, 2001): 36-71.

10. "Knowing How", Journal of Philosophy 98, 2001: 411-444 (with Timothy Williamson)
-reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual XXIV. P. Grim, P. Ludlow, and G. Mar (ed.), Stanford, CSLI: 237-272.
(Williamson was born in Stockholm, of Brit parents).

9. "Context and LOGICAL FORM", Lingustics and Philosophy 23.4, 2000: 391-434.
- reprinted in Pragmatics: Critical Concepts II, edited by Asa Kasher (Routledge, 2010)

8. "On Quantifier Domain Restriction", Mind and Language 15 2 & 3, 2000: 219-261. (with Zoltan Gendler Szabo)

7. "Understanding, Context-Relativity, and the Description Theory", Analysis 59, 1999: 14-18. Cfr. Grice on "Definite descriptions in Russell and in the vernacular"

6. "Persons and their Properties", The Philosophical Quarterly 48, 1998: 159-175.

5. "Names and Rigid Designation", A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Hale and Wright, ed. (Oxford, Blackwell Press, 1997): 555-585.

4. "Rigidity and Content", in Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honor of Michael Dummett, R. Heck, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 131-56.
--- Grice would recount that Dummett was never invited to Austin's playgroup. Perhaps because he was a Catholic?

3. "Truth and Metatheory in Frege", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, 1996: 45-70.
-reprinted in Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers,
M. Beaney and E. Reck (eds.) Routledge, 2005: 109-35.

2. "Quantifiers and Context-Dependence", Analysis 55, 1995: 291-5 (with Timothy Williamson)

1. "Frege and Second-Order Logic", Journal of Philosophy, 90, 1993: 416-424 (with Richard Heck)

Etc.

Jason Stanley and Oxford philosophy of language, Grice-style

From wiki:

"After receiving his doctorate, Stanley accepted a position at University College, Oxford as a stipendiary lecturer."

Jason Stanley Quotes Grice

-- And why shouldn't he? Just because he is Contextualism's new wonder? Just teasing.

"Implicatures Happen"

--- by J. L. S.

Stephen Yablo used to say. Echoing, in some way, J. D. Atlas. Atlas is very pessimistic about this. He says that Grice possibly had NIGHTMARES about this.

We take "p" and we are never sure what we mean by it.

Plus, implicatures happen, and by uttering "p" one may implicate "q" or not. Grice is always careful in noting the disjunctional indeterminacy of it all.

Recent theorists have talked of underdetermination. Notably Atlas. Enough to want to become a rocket scientist, instead.

Or not.

Grice and Strawson on logical form

--- We know about GRICE. But we should not dismiss his joint work with Strawson on this, or Strawson´s own independent work.

Logical form can be a fascinating topic for an Oxford seminar. Just imagine Grice and Strawson lecturing Quine (they had the courtesy to invite!) back in the Oxford of their day (1956 -- just before "In defense of a dogma").

Atlas has given seminars on

"Implicature and logical form"

and indeed, that´s part of the subtitle of G. M. J. Gazdar´s one and only book on the topic, Formal pragmatics.

In general, it is best to stick with "implicatum". How much of the Implicatum is NOT a matter of the logical form of what is NOT "implicatum". Cicero should let us know!

----

"Logical form" was a term of art in the logic of Grice´s day, and he was always willing to say he was no logician, "only a PHILOSOPHICAL logician", or "philosopher of logic" at worst. Note that his "Logic and Conversation" starts with a quip on "philosophical logic", a "common place" therein.

Yet, people need to be reminded, and it was a good idea of M. Sainsbury, whom I have corresponded with on this or that, to have his

book

on "Philosophy of logic" (or is it "philosophical logic") super-entitled, "Logical forms"!

------

In general, it´s best to identify, indeed, the logical form with the truth-conditional aspects.

"She is in the garden or in the kitchen"

(Grice´s third example in "Causal theory of perception"), implicating, "God knows where of the two places she actually finds herself in".

So, the logical form

is

p v q

---- The implicature, that there is NO TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL evidence

for "p v q" that does NOT proceed, as per the introduction of "v", via either p or q, is "convesational".

Grice is cautious to stick with an entailment-view of "strength" at this point.

To utter

"p v q"

is LESS STRONG

than to utter "p" (in specific terms of material implication and entailment, rather). But most cases, he allowed, provided further puzzles.

After all,

The pillar box SEEMING red has nothing to do (in terms of entailment) with the pillar box BEING red, so one can´t really say that one utterance is stronger than the other. Or weaker, for the matter.

How subsentential can premisses be?

This is yet a different sub-thread from "Subsentential Grice", but it dwells on A. Hall´s remarks about subpropositional (logical) forms hardly having the power to feature explicitly or not as premisses in one´s piece of reasoning.

But then -- who said they should?

Most theorists agree on the inferential basis of most communication. Yet, this does not mean that the "model" entertained by a given expression should be isomorphic with a full propositional premise in one´s piece of reasoning. Or not.

"Beautiful handwriting"

--- by J. L. Speranza
------- for the Grice Club, etc.

THERE WAS A RECENT POLEMIC, elsewhere, between M. J. Murphy, a long-time ´discussing´ friend of mine, and others. Regarding stuff like:


"He has some beautiful handwriting -- I tell you"

and its attendant implicature:

"As a philosopher, he does not precisely excel ((supply your dysphemism)) -- or more politely leaves some to be desired"

The point was raised as to the degree of "freedom" between "p" and "q" we should allow.

p: He is not a good philosopher.
q: He has beautiful handwriting.

The discussion ensues.

Grice was fascinated by the arbitrariness or lack thereof of our communication practices. In WoW:Part II he considers himself telling a tuttee:

"Bring me a paper tomorrow"

Not a newspaper, but a philosophy paper. He adds, words to the effect, "It would be strange, though not impossible, that by uttering, ¨Bring me a paper¨ I mean that it was raining."

So one has to be careful.

In general, Grice delayed analysis of "sentence meaning", to the point that it was left to his successors to supply the work:

Peacocke, in Evans/McDowell, provides one such analysis.

A perhaps more complex one, and one on which Peacocke relies, is B. F. Loar

"Sentence meaning".

This was Loar´s DPhil under Warnock. It was the heyday of Rhodes Scholars at Oxford, and Schiffer was bringing much of the same matters to HIS D.Phil on meaning.

Grice would eventually reject all "convention" or arbitrariness-based accounts of "expression" meaning, favouring a more naturalistic one in terms of "optimality". I expanded on this elsewhere:

¨How did you find Rome?¨

¨I haven´t been mugged yet"

It may be argued that this means, "Rome is potentially dangerous", but then, so is the moon.

---

Grice may want to say that:

"I haven´t been robbed yet" means, optimally, that the Utterer (U) hasn´t been robbed yet.

Ditto, mutatis mutandis,

"Jones has beautiful handwriting"

(This is NOT R. B. Jones -- who, incidentally, ALSO has beautiful handwriting).

"His philosophical skills remain to be seen"

is the optimal way to communicate that his philosophical skills remain to be seen.

Damn by faint praise should in fact be made _illegal_.

----

Grice wants to say that, for an expression E, what E optimally means is its "expression meaning". This does NOT rely on the idea of a ´convention´ within a population, to mean this or that by uttering this or that.

Schiffer recalls that Grice told him that, in Oxford,

"We should get together for lunch sometime"

means

"Get lost"

--- Not as per "implicatura", Schiffer resented, but as a matter of "expression meaning".

So perhaps, qua population, we should make an exception with _Oxford_. Or not.

Etc.

Grice on second-order set theory -- and why we need it

By J. L. Speranza
---- dedicated to R. B. Jones
------- for the Grice Club, etc.

I WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSING some of Grice`s points re: the analysis, or subanalysis, rather, of propositions (or propositional complexes, out of simplexes). Grice relies, explicitly on second-orde set theory:


"[W]e associate with the subject-expression of a canonically
formulated sentence [expressing a proposition, bearer of truth] a set of

at least second order."

--- He considers three cases:

First case: singular entities (as in "France", or "South of France")

"[1] If the subject-expression is a singular name, its ontological
correlate will be the singleton of the singleton of the entity which bears
that name. ..."

Second case: indefinite phrases (like "Somewhere in the South of France").

"[2] If the subject-expression is an indefinite quantificational phrase ..., its ontological correlate will be the set of all singletons whose sole element if an item belonging to the extension of the predicate to which the indefinite modifier is attached." ...

Third case: universal quantification (as in "All of France")

"[3] If the subject-expression is a universal quantificational [all-together, rather than one-at-a-time] phrase, ... its ontological correlate will be the singleton whose sole element is the set which forms the extension of the predicate to which
the universal quantifier is attached."
(Reply to Richards, p. 77ff).

The essay is not easily distributed, since it is in a festschrift, and who buys festscrhifts, but hey.

R. B. Jones may wonder about the technicality here of a second-order set theory.

In any case, it struck me as an intersesting case of Grice relying on some useful formalism (as per the philosophy or theory of mathematics and computer science) to deal with, er, the vernacular.

I suppose second-order set entities are no mystery to most, but it may do to revisit Grice´s motivations in so doing. On a longer day, though!

"South of France": How Subsentential Can Grice Get?

--- by J. L. Speranza, Esq.
------ for the Grice Club, etc.

When K. M. Jaszczolt, elsewhere, and recently, refers to the "later Wittgenstein" -- vis-à-vis some recent developments in semantics/pragmatics, and Noel Burton-Roberts's points remind one of Strawsonian attempts to see things, I wonder if it’s not the time for our little Gricean interlude -- on stuff.

First, an area of ‘crosslinguistic’ examples, recently brought to the linguistic forum by Jason Merchant, Hall, Gutt, and others, and which are often cited with reference to Grice´s attempts to elucidate "what is said" -- a pretty non-euphonic term, if you ask me -- in terms of an alleged "sentence primacy". Thus, in a message elsewhere Gutt retreats to his 'native' language (as Chomsky would have it) and provides an example:

(1)

A: Wem hast du von diesem Brief erzählt?
B: Meinen Eltern.

"Whom did you mention the letter?", "My parents" (in the accusative). What B said: "My parents". What he meant/implied: I mentioned the letter to my parents. Things you always wanted to ask a linguist but were ashamed to.

Gutt is dubious about the role "logical form" (never mind "explicature") should play there -- in the recovery of 'what was meant'.

Gutt writes: "[T]he fact that [B] chose a case-marked phrase (hence the choice of German for this example [but cfr. below my case with "Her" versus "She" in 'native' English. JLS]), and furthermore assuming that case is assigned here by grammatical structure, this would be a strong incentive to the [addressee] to build up a well-formed grammatical structure of which this phrase would be a constituent, and so the specific assumption [U] _told his parents about the letter_ would be quite strongly communicated. In fact, if the response had not been appropriately case marked, e.g. 'Meine Eltern', it would have been felt unfelicitous. Whether this process necessitates the theoretical recognition of concepts like 'logical form'
... seems unclear [to me]"

In a way, Gutt's example relates to the two examples provided by A. Hall (the second apres Merchant) at

www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/alison/Fragments_Oct08.pdf.

-- in work elsewhere referred to by N. Allott. One example in the body of her essay. "[I]n German, to order a coffee, you can utter the apparent subsentence ..."

(2)

A: Can I help you?
B (in his best German): Einen Kaffee, bitte.

Hall comments: “Einen Kaffee” (a-ACC coffee). Accusative case on the object is obligatory, as it would be if the fragment were embedded in a full overt sentence: “Ein ...". NB: When in doubt, I make a _point_ when in Germany of _allways_ [sic] just explicate "Coffee", since, for one, I would be displeased if they do not refill my cup. It simplifies things so). Hall's other example is in a footnote she deals with similar example (involving the dative rather than the accusative case, though – and relying on Merchant’s cross-linguistic evidence in “The syntax of silence”): Her other example concerns case, and I have provided below a case with "She" and "Her" which seems to do the job just as well -- without a need for 'native'-language-switch.

(3)

A: Wem sieht er ähnlich?
B: Seinem Vater.

Here it may pay to take a look at Hall´s paraphrase. She writes, counterfactually (?): "If B's reply were not a case of syntactic ellipsis, it would be a mystery why dative case is mandatory [for a 'felicitous' move, as it were -- cfr. Gutt above] while nominative case, *which would be expected if the fragment were subsentential*, is judged ungrammatical".

I'm not sure about the asterisked bit, "which would be expected if the fragment were subsentential", though, but perhaps A.-E. Gutt is!

Consider some neo-Gricean variants, and a palaeo-Gricean one:

(4)

A (early in the morning, in the kitchen) I’m so hungry! (as he searches around in the cubboard).
B: (a) The jar of marmelade is on the top shelf.

On the top shelf [+> that’s where the jar of marmalade is, if you are
looking for it -- cfr. Austin's own cupboard conditional]

Compare with:

(4b) On the top shelf.
(4c) The top shelf.
(4d) Top shelf.
(4e) Top.

Grice's own casual example (illustrating the category of "Quantity" or informativeness):

(5)

A: Where does C(hris) live?
B: (5a) C(hris) lives somewhere in the South of France.
---(5b) He lives somewhere in the South of France.
Or:
---(5b´) She lives somewhere in the South of France.

as the case might be. Note the variance in the specification of the location phrase:

(5c) Somewhere in the South of France (Grice´s own variant: WoW: 32)
(5d) The South of France.
(5e) South of France. (The latter would yield an ambiguous reply in that it may be interpreted: "C lives south of France", i.e. in Africa, say.

Bringing Merchant home?

Stainton has noted that it may do to follow Kenyon in considering 'nonsentences' as sort of 'implicata'. To ask about "the" proposition expressed or implicated by this or that, is, to follow Stainton, the wrong question. Grice was delightfully obsessed, as Stainton notes, with "disjunctional" indeterminacy (or underdeterminacy in the modern jargon). It's more than just "one" "p" that may be implicated (Stainton, intro to Stainton et al).

I see no need to retreat to German while we can stay in the home base with English (of sorts):

(6)

A: Who does he resemble? (après Hall, but sticking with English)
B: (a) Her.
---(b)?She.

(and cfr. Grice on "He is shaggy". "Who is shaggy?". "Him" (WoW:VI -- on Jones's dog, a he, being shaggy).

A Latin transliteration of Grice’s example should provide some evidence
why Sidonius was the first to have used "implicatura", if only in Latin --
vide Short/Lewis, "A Latin Dictionary", 'implicatura: entanglement").

(7)

A: Where does C(hris) live?
Ubi habitat Christophorus/Christophora/Christina?)
B (a): Pars Provinciae. (“The part of Province” – as answer to the question, “Where does C live?”). Or:
-- (b) Una pars Provinciae.
"One part of Provence". Ungrammatical. It should be, in the appropriate case:
-- (c) Parte Provinciae.

In an inflected language like Latin, “Somewhere in the South of France”/"Somewhere in Provence") should not be understood as being in the nominative case. (I'm simplifying things and taking Provence as the epitome, as it should, of the South of
France _that counts_)(But yet, in my reading of Hall above, about the
'nominative' case, it seems like we are forgetting that the nominative case is
just an inflected case as any of the others. No primacy should be given to it?
-- but cfr. Grice for 'ontological correlates' below).

The philosophical background, or why Grice is not Wittgenstein.

In a message elsewhere N. Allott had provided the full context from R. Carston, in Mind & Language, vol. 17, p. 130:

Carston writes about the context for the elliptical "On the top shelf":

“Consider the following very ordinary situation: it’s
breakfast time and, coming into the kitchen, I see
my companion searching around in the lower
reaches of a cupboard; knowing his breakfast habits, I
guess that he’s looking for a jar of marmalade and
I utter: … (4) above. … Although the proposition I
have expressed here is something like,

(a) The jar of marmalade is on the top shelf.

the linguistic semantic input to the pragmatic
processor is, arguably, just whatever meaning
the language confers on that prepositional phrase,
that is, a far from fully propositional logical form,
one which consists of just a location
constituent (which denotes a property).”

Now, I don’t know about the later Wittgenstein, but since Carston has
expanded on this in her (as Noel Burton-Roberts has it, aptly named "Thoughts
and Utterances"), and, interestingly quoting from Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: communication and cognition 1986/1995 - vide Sperber/Wilson 1977 for their first explicit attack on Grice) on 'subpropositional logical form', etc., AND noting that, in her view, Grice's interests in this area (of subsententials) were at best 'peripheral' (No 8b, but the full proposition 8a):

Grice, Causal theory of perception
(8)
(a) The pillar-box seems red to me.
(b) A red-pillar box.

etc. and cfr. Stainton on "sentence primacy" (section in his book -- cfr. Suppes, "Primacy of Utterer's meaning", in PGRICE. -- vide below Grice on 'sense data'), I would like to bring, explicitly, some material on what Grice regarded as involving some 'metaphysical complications' of any account of 'subpropositional' constituents worth their philosophical price. First, metaphysical, as it should (rather than epistemic or linguistic):

Oddly, Grice and Witters (as he called Wittgenstein; we have no clue how Witters referred to Grice) relied on the same obscure simile to refer to some subpropositional aspects of things. They used the term, "radix". For Wittgenstein, a "radical" had to do with chemistry (he was an ingeneer at heart). For Grice, a Platonist at heart, a ´radix´ was the square root of things. //- This little piggy went to market.

Towards an ontological correlates of subpropositional constituents.

Grice's WoW:VI -- subsentential structures -- is all about correlation. He distinguishes two types of ontological correlations, which should be first and foremost 'explicit', even if they can be turned 'implicit' by practice: R-correlation is purely referential, in the manner of direct-reference theories alla Kaplan. But there's D-correlation, or denotational correlation, which applies to adjectival types ("Fido is _shaggy_").

In WoW:VI Grice refers variously to the ontological correlates as being 'things', 'objects', or 'items', featuring this or that 'feature' or 'property' (understood extensionally -- 'shaggy': the class of long-haired things.

Stainton, our expert in nonsentences, has nearly not touched on an important topic: the alleged ontological complications that a subsentential ontology should involve. After all, philosophers are _so comfy_ with extensional propositions being the bearers of truth, that one wonders...

Someone should, before the Apocalypse, re-edit Grice´s ¨Vacuous Names¨ into a manegeable anthology. It contains all you wanted to know about subsentential Grice. A pity he focuses on _empty_ names, but hey, you can´t have everything.

Grice´s thoughts on this evolved.

When Searle thought of reprinting Grice's WoW:VI in his influential "Philosophy of Language" (Oxford readings in philosophy, ed. Warnock, 1971), he hasted to add a preliminary note with a caveat to readers that things should not always be so 'behaviouristic' as Grice implies.

And, indeed, Grice's views on propositional constituents and their ontological correlates did vary.

Consider, for example, this rather convoluted (in the best Griceian way) analysis of quantifers -- an element in the _first_ constituent of a 'propositional complex', according to Grice, "Reply to Richards”. This is a rather longish reply to Richard Grandy and Richard Warner. In the particular bit I’m quoting from, Grice is addressing the alleged primacy (undefined, though) of the ‘proposition’. Grice provides a reply which aims at analyzing what we mean by a proposition (or ‘propositional complex’ as he prefers) in terms of its (sub)constituents, and spends some time in their ‘ontological correlates’ (and keep in mind Carston above, 'going ontological': “a location constituent (which denotes a [B(beta)-type] property”)).

In particular Grice explores a second-order set theory to account for
various quantificational phrases. And he is NOT having in view things like:

(9) The king of France is bald.
(a)The King of France.
(b)Is Bald (or "Bald").

(cfr. A. Hall,

(10) (a) What have I done with the baby?
--- (b) The baby! (+> (a)
-- uttered by worried mother))

Grice is exploring neo-traditionalist tendencies in logic as associated
with his joint work with Peter Strawson, and is fascinated by the fact that
in this view even singular phrases tend to bear a 'universalist' analysis.
Note, too, that while this is just a reposte to Grandy/Warner, Grice takes
his time to provide sub-divisions for different subpropositional
quantificational phrases, which should be evidence of the primacy he regarded the
topic showed.

As with WoW:VI, cited below, Grice provides extensionalist (in
set-theoretic terms) while leaving room for an alternative intensionalist account (in terms of 'properties').

Grice writes, then, of how second-order set theory is involved in analysing a sub-sentence, as it were (or a sub-sentential component of a canonical sentence):

Proposition: "S is P". . :

"[W]e associate with the subject-expression of a canonically
formulated sentence [expressing a proposition, bearer of truth] a set of at least
second order."

First case: singular entities (as in "France", or "South of France"). Or, after Grice's WoW:VI: "Fido" (proper name) being "Jones's dog" (definite description), or "Whiskers" being "Smith's cat".

"[1] If the subject-expression is a singular name, its ontological
correlate will be the singleton of the singleton of the entity which bears
that name. ..."

Second case: indefinite phrases (like "Somewhere in the South of France") ("Some dogs are shaggy").

"[2] If the subject-expression is an indefinite quantificational phrase ..., its ontological correlate will be the set of all singletons whose sole element if an item belonging to the extension of the predicate to which the indefinite modifier is attached." ...

Third case: universal quantification (as in "All of France"). All shaggy things are hairy-coated.

"[3] If the subject-expression is a universal quantificational [all-together, rather than one-at-a-time] phrase, ... its ontological correlate will be the singleton whose sole element is the set which forms the extension of the predicate to which
the universal quantifier is attached."
(Grice, Reply to Richards, p. 77ff, in Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986).

***************************
INTERLUDE: second-order set theory.
Jones has provided a commentary publicly accessible at the Grice Club, elsewhere, which I comment on here.
R. B. Jones writes that he feels to comment on this one. He first notes a little terminological trivia. The first-order/second-order/higher-order terminology is thoroughly confusing, he notes, because of first-order set theory. "One naturally thinks sets as having orders, which correspond to another term, the "rank" of a set", Jones explains. "One thinks of individuals as having order zero, of sets of individuals as having order 1 and sets of sets of individuals as having order 2.
This is the usage which Grice is working with in the matters discussed here."

"However, when we move from talking of the order of particular sets," Jones notes, "to talking about set theories, there is a completely different terminology (though coming from the same origins). This difference arises because modern set theory is usually formalised in first order logic, and is called in its entirety "first-order set theory" even though the objects in the domain of discourse have every conceivable order, from 0 up to orders which noone but professional set theorists can comprehend (objects of these orders are the subject of "large cardinal axioms"). Though most set theorists work with first-order set theories, and most mathematicians work in first-order set theory (if informally), there is also second set theory. This is what you get when you axiomatise set theory in second-order logic. It doesn't actually give you higher orders of sets, instead it allows you to quantify over things that most would call classes, which in a first-order set theory don't exist, such as the class of all sets."

As to Grice's correspondences, Jones notes: "I don't recall the context for this. One would expect such an account to be a part of a general account of the semantics of some language, and it would then be judged according to whether the whole account fitted together and correctly expressed the semantics of the language in question."

He goes on: "The issues at stake seem all such as could be addressed in a simple type theory such as Church's (essentially the same as the Higher Order Logic supported by ProofPower), which contains (or in which can be defined) definite and indefinite description operators. Grice's use of second-order sets in this context seems a little anomalous to me, though it is plausible that it could be made to work."

How? Well,

"Most logics are given a semantics in terms of interpretations, i.e. the truth conditions of sentences are given relative to some interpretation of the language. In Higher Order Logics such an interpretation would include a value for the indefinite description operator which assigned a single individual to each set to which the operator could be applied."

"In such a treatment, the collection of possible values obtained for a description would not appear as the denotation (which is the same kind of thing as Grice's correlates) of the description under any interpretation. You would get just one of them in each interpretation, and to find all the possibilities you would have to look at all possible interpretations. The effect of this is that you get away with objects of a lower order. Even if you are being (as Grice here seems to be) rather Aristotelian in having the same kind of correlate for individuals and universals (held by some, e.g. Russell, to be simply a cock-up in traditional logic) then you still only need first-order sets as their correlates, a singleton for a particular and possibly larger set for a universal."

Jones adds: "I am ... more familiar with Grice's talk about correlates in his "vacuous names"" ... "which I ... scrutinised formally with ProofPower. The result was:

rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t037.pdf"

******************

It would not be much of a stretch to apply that 'constructivist' account
to 'propositions' (qua families of 'propositional complexes' in Grice's
jargon) to "On the top shelf"--- or as I prefer,



with Grice's 'alpha' construction being 'the cat', or "Whiskers", and Grice's 'beta' construction (adjectival) being, almost, 'on the mat'.

(11) (a) The cat is on the mat
--- (b) The cat.
--- (c) [Is] On the mat.

or ¨Fido is shaggy¨ (see below).

I am fascinated by the Longman Dictionary of English that
lists, ‘on the mat’ to mean, ‘being punished’, with ‘cat’ meaning ‘nasty
woman’. Some title for a wicked novel. Back to Grice’s very own
subsentential "Provence" example cited above:

“What he said”: “Somewhere in the South of France”.
ODD implicature:

(5)

(c) Utterer doesn't know WHERE _in the South of France_ C(hris) lives.

Note, incidentally, that while this would be a simple case of syntactic
ellipsis (rather than semantic or pragmatic ellipsis, in Merchant’s view --
but "Do not multiply ellipses beyond necessity"), Grice, as we've seen, can
go unashamedly subpropositional (subsentential), providing the ‘idiomatic’, (5c) "Somewhere in the South of France" rather than the clumsier
[over-informative],

(5)
(a) Chris lives somewhere in the South of France.

Surely the pronominal version,

(b)_He_ [or 'she' -- but not ??both] lives in the South of France.

is still a different animal). Cfr. Grice on "He (Jones's dog, Fido) is shaggy". He (Grice, rather than the South-of-France dweller) didn’t seem to have made much of the alleged complication this involves.

AN OTIOSE DIALOGUE, or how to disrespect a palaeo-Griceian.

Neo-Gricean:

He said _that_ C lived in the South of France.

Palaeo-Gricean:

He did not! He said, “Somewhere in the South of France”, at most.

Neo-Gricean:

Surely he explicated ‘he lived’”.

Palaeo-Gricean:

Surely not – not the type of explicature he was up to!

(And you see why Stainton notes that nonsentences are a bit like implicatures, only worse).

And so on, which I will lead to neo-Griceians vs. post-Griceians, while I stick with the palaeo (relentless literalism being a sign of class back then).

In a similar fashion (I was amused by S. Lucas’s reference to it being
natural that ‘relevance theorists’ will disagree on this and that) A. Hall
(in the work referred to by N. Allott, and elsewhere – A. Hall is currently
researching the compositionality principle at the Nicod) has also explored
this ‘subpropositional logical forms’ (Sperber’s and Wilson’s term) in
terms of subpropositional constituents. Incidentally, I prefer, as I’m sure
you should, too, to use 'sub', as in 'subsentential' -- "On the top
shelf" -- rather than, as per subject of this thread, "non-sentential", which
seems to be different in scope -- cf. Guijarro: a totally out-of-the-blue
utterance of "Between if": nonsentential but NOT subpropositional).

Grice's own shaggy-dog story, or how to make sense of Frege's fragmentated senses and references.

Grice enjoyed, on occasion, to make a story _long_. Notably at Harvard.

For the record, one sees that Grice uses 'subsentential' in at least two
places of WoW: V (p. 89 – “an “incomplete” utterance-type (which may be a
nonsentential word or phrase…)” and VI (p. 119: “in case X is a
nonsentential utterance-type, claims of the form “X means ‘…,’” where the
locution is completed by a nonsentential expression”.

A NOTE ON GRICE'S FORMALISM FOR THIS.

Grice also uses the expression "with" (symbolised "(...)", and adding a subscript, typically, for sigma (s), with which he formalises 'sentence'.

This yields

S1(S2)

to read subsentence S1 of sentence S2. And allowing he notes, "any sentence to be its own subsentence").

He works with more complex collocations, too:

S2(S3((S1))

---- So, this to show that he elaborated on 'nonsentential' AND 'subsentential'. Note that, charmingly, he refers to a word (or a hand signal) as an unstructured bit. He seems to have omitted the reference to adjectival of the -y in "shaggy". Thus, he refers to the waving of a hand as a "sentence-like" utterance. All this is VERY important from the perspective of Grice's programme, which uses 'sentence' arbitrarily, possibly influenced by Chomsky -- they did read Chomsky's "Syntactic Structures" at those Saturday mornings, with the Play Group -- and cfr. Grice's later thoughts on 'sentence' (like 'reasoning') being a "value-oriented" concept! (Surely, "Between if" is NOT a sentence. "wff" on the other hand, as used by logicians, is NOT otiose. Some formulae can be NOT well-formed. But a sentence is a sentence is a sentence. Or not.

In particular, it would be good to play around, philosophically, with what I have elsewhere called Grice's shaggy-dog story.

This had some philosophical bearing for Grice. Note that in

(12) Jones's dog (Fido)
is shaggy, i.e. hairy-coated.

whereas Smith's cat (Whiskers)
is not.

Grice is obsessed with getting further _onto_ the subpropositional
constituents of a simple act of meaning. NOT: "By uttering "Jones's dog is
shaggy", Utterer meant that p or q", but rather

(a)

Vis-a-vis “alpha” (α) type ‘subject-expressions’: (WoW: 131 for Grice’s
use of ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’)

(13) By uttering, "Jones's dog"
U referred to Fido.

Or, by uttering "Fido", U referred to Jones's dog.

-- expanded by Schiffer in early work on a Gricean theory of reference in
the pages of Synthese.

(b)

Vis-à-vis “beta” (β) type ‘predicate-expressions’:

(14)
By uttering "Shaggy"
U predicated hairy-coatedness (-- cfr. Carston, 'denotes a property') of
Fido.

-- Grice provides a non-resultant (basic) procedure in terms of ostension at this point: to utter 'shaggy' as U ostends this or that object (Jones's dog).

At this point, a quote from Grice WoW with his typical complications, as
per his footnote will just serve as an example of his ‘
analytical-philosophical’ skills.

Grice thus treated his Harvard audience in the first (Spring) term of 1967 with the following qualification to his analysans in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Grice is concerned with the intrinsic intentionality of the basic (i.e. non resultant) correlations involved. While a behaviourist bell may ring to some, I follow Chapman and others (e.g. Suppes) in regarding Grice thus as an 'intentionalist', rather than a behaviourist at heart. (Suppes in PGRICE).

Grice writes:

"To have explicitly correlated "X" [nonsentential
item] with each member [item] of a set K, not only
must (a) [the utterer] have intentionally effected
that a particular relation R holds between
"X" and all those (and only those) items
which belong to K, but also (b) [U's]
purpose or end in setting up this
relationship R must have been to perform an
act as a result of which there will be
some relation R' or other which holds
between "X" and all those (and only those)
things which belong to K. To the definiens,
then, we should add, within the scope of
the initial quantifier, the following
clause: "& U's purpose in effect that
∀x (......) is that (ÆŽR')(∀z)(R''shaggy' z≡z ϵ y
(y is hairy-coated))."

(Grice, Utterer´s meaning, sentence meaning, and word meaning. WoW:133n -- originally in Foundations of Language, 1968.

So much for Grice's alleged 'sentence primacy'! (in Stainton's words). As a note of historical interest, it should be noted that the reference/predication complications instilled on much of Searle's own DPhil for Oxford, under Grice's own tuttee: P. F. Strawson.

Now, translate that to

(4a) On the top shelf.

and the 'property' it is denoted, and imagine if we, alla Gibbs (I admire him!) we were to think of a lab protocol to _test_ just that!

GRICEANS, PHENOMENOLOGISTS AT HEART, never behaviourist.

Stainton, who has studied nonsententials philosophically, makes a point about philosophers, like Grice, being comfy with sentences. They provide the right sort of evidence.

In general, Griceans, when relying on their intuitions, are thinking they are being _experimental_. It was a prejudice in the history of psychology, they claim, that intution and introspection should not, by Wundt, be seen as proper evidence in psychological research.

An example:

On this point, Grice's excellent reliance on Hans Sluga [He came out as "Shuga",
unfortunately, in the Academic-Press reprint, and Grice omitted the name of Sluga
altogether in WoW:271 -- vis-a-vis:

(15) The king of France is bald.

(15b) (ɩx.Fx)Gx

vs.

(15c) G(ɩx.Fx)

as providing the subpropositional 'logical form' regarding the particular "iota operator" (É©) allegedly involved in an utterance of 'The king of France
is bald' "the iota-operator ... treated as being syntactically analogous
to a quantifier" vs. it being treated as "a device for forming a term".
Grice explicitly acknowledges Sluga's participation in the Berkeley
seminars, and notes that it is Grice's "intuitions" regarding _negation_ which
have him opting for (b)).

And why would a philosopher be so concerned about "É©" if he were not to think that much of the alleged "sentence primacy" relies on more basic, nonresultant procedures, which, as Grice suggests -- WoW:VI -- are those "from which those resultant procedures indeed descend" (or words to that effect).

(Grice makes a further point, which relates to Carston's above, "on the top shelf +> of THIS cupboard" -- about 'the' involving or implicating a 'hidden indexical', or as he prefers to say, "quasi-demonstrative". I have discussed that elsewhere. The symbol that Grice here uses for the quasi-demonstrative being the predicate phi).

Why Wundt is wrong. “What Grice would have said” – but merely “implicated”

In general, from what I browsed from the linguistics (rather than
philosophy) literature on this, the attitude towards an exegesis of Grice
remains patronising (most notably in this author who keeps referring to 'the
purportedly Gricean interpretation' of this -- not caring to explore on
Grice's many publications and unpublications on the subject!). In this respect,
it is a GREAT thing that Grice cared to keep ALL the seminar material he
shared with Sir Peter Strawson when giving courses on 'logical form' and
'categories' (substantials/non-substantials) at Oxford. (They are listed
by Chapman in her book on _Grice_, Palgrave).

HOW PROPOSITIONAL can children and (some) animals (not parrots, etc.) be? Grice's Kantotelian reflections

What would Grice then say about 'animal' (so-called) 'thought' (so-called)? Possibly something along these lines: so-called.

There is a related area of interest, which is explored by M. Green and
collaborator Bar-On (and Bar-On below) It refers to something like an
obsession with Grice: squarrels. They are like squirrels, but allow for closer
ethological inspection. You possibly have noted that the first utterances
babies (miscalled ‘infants’) utter are 'subpropositional' at best (or
'pre-propositional' in some cases). A. Hall makes a very good point about this. We
should call them 'pre-propositional' because they cannot feature as
'premises' in explicit pieces of reasoning. They are'pre-rational' in this
technical sense. They need an expansion before they can count as steps in a
reasoning chain. Green and Bar-On (in their joint "Lionspeak", available online)
consider this area of interest (also explored by T. Wharton in his book on
the pragmatics of 'gestures'). Their example I adapt by using Lewis
Carroll:

Phylogenesis: the case of non-human animals:

(16) DOVE (hatching eggs, as she perceives long-necked Alice): Serpent!
ALICE: I'm not a serpent. I'm a little girl. ---- (as the conversation
develops). It's true I do I eat eggs -- at breakfast.
DOVE: SERPENT!
(Discussed by Sutherland, "Language and Lewis Carroll", Mouton).

Bar-On and Green focus on pre- (rather than sub-) propositional)
'utterances' like a bird's cry of alarm above (“Serpent!”). It would be pedantic
to refer to the _content_ of this 'psychological' attitude on the part of
the dove as involving a full proposition, complete with logical form.
Doves do not need to be Aristotelian, in this sense. The point would be then
to explore the role of pre-propositional 'content' in the,
say, phylogenesis and ontogenesis of ... meaning. A topic which while
peripheral in terms of Grice's central concerns was at the root of his
long-time interest in providing "philosophical grounds of rationality:
intentions, categories, ends" (P.G.R.I.C.E., for short).

Relation was for Grice, notably, a category -- used by Kant, to supersede
on Aristotle. If Grice stuck with 'relevance' ('be relevant') as a
paraphrase of this rather abstract 'category of thought' (and turn it into a
'conversational category' as he was wont of saying) this should not
preclude us from always keeping in mind the central role of the original
category in our 'system of thought'.

Ontogenesis: nonsentences in HUMAN children.

Children are of course different. When Morley-Bunker wanted to test,
empirically, some claims about analytic/synthetic propositions (cited by
Sampson, "Making sense"), "he explicitly excluded philosophers or philosophy
students; they are corrupted already"). Similarly, Chapman recalls how Grice
would _test_ some of his claims not with his children, but with his children's playmates ("Can a thing be red and green all over? No spots allowed"). When is the first level of _propositional_ reasoning shown in children? (Cfr. Why is
it that _quantificational_ (or predicate logic) is deemed prior to
_propositional_ or sentential logic, though?) (Piaget was obsessed with this and there is a French-language philosopher, Grize, who wrote almost the same as Grice did, but in French).

Grice´s favourite critter was the ´pirot´. It is like a parrot, but can talk _intelligently_. In my "Pirot talk", with R. B. Jones, I elaborate on the sort of implicatures one can expect from one´s parrot-pirot, as they karulise elatically.

The cock´s tail. MEANING AND BEYOND: Grice and Peacocke on the ‘sense’ of our ‘sense data’

Incidentally, Carston's types of examples, "A red pillar-box" -- cfr. her
"On the top shelf"), versus the fully propositional “That pillar-box seems
_red_ to me” is a rather complex one. (She compares it with G. E. Moore
uttering "My hand!" rather than what he did utter at Harvard, "This is _my_
hand"). For one, and taking into account H. Beck's point about 'making
sense' in his latest (echoing, as it were, Geoffrey Sampson's book by that
title, "Making sense", Oxford: Clarendon), it should *not* be much of a
stretch to introduce a philosophical notion of 'sense' involved here.

Note that the FIRST strand in Grice's retrospective epilogue to WoW is
all about that philosophical term of art, if ever there was one,
"sense-datum". For Russell, sense data were notably _not_ propositional in nature --
"This" was the paradigm of a sense-datum if I recall his stuff – cfr. ‘
logical proper name’). This line of analysis is best explored within the
Oxonian tradition by C. A. B. Peacocke (who, with Schiffer -- "Things we
mean" -- would expand on his views at seminars at Oxford and elsewhere),
and for one, succeeded Sir Peter Strawson as professor of metaphysics at
Oxford (his inaugural lecture was a 'transcendental' justification of
'content'!). This view would emphasise the non-propositional, subpropositional
(or what have you) _content_ of our 'sense' experiences (and note that
Grice was first and foremost, historically speaking, a 'philosopher of perception'
-- vide his early "Some remarks about the senses", and that's how he was
regarded at Oxford for a time). In a way, it's a bit like a full circle
(Cfr. Paul, Is there a problem about sense data?).

As an application. Consider, again, the two constituents of the 'propositional complex', The cat is on the mat (* Grice is explicit that he wants to restrict 'what is said' to a rather 'abstract' notion -- "Wilson is a brave man" and "the current British prime minister is a brave man" may be said, on occasion, to _say_ the same (thing). With that pretty 'loose' appreciation of 'what is said', which I, on weekdays, share, it's no wonder nonsentences he should feel he can cope with in a similar fashion. (And again, cfr. Stainton on Kenyon on the analogy of the propositional underdeterminacy of an implicatum and a non-sentence)

(13) On the mat.
(14) The cat.

as appropriate sub-sentential replies to appropriate questions. What is it involved in having a 'psychological' attitude (as Grice has it) towards that
propositional complex, ''. How many subdoxastic or
sub-propositional constituents does it involve? How do we expand them, unless in
terms of any 'behavioural' response on the part of alleged 'holder' of
such a psychological attitude' -- cfr. Grice and Strawson, "In defense of a
dogma").

So, for the predicates, "F" (cat) and "G" (mat) (and cfr. above about alpha and beta constituents -- we have to provide _perceptual content_ for each. ¨What you mean "mat"? That´s a _rug_!". ¨What d´you mean "cat". That´s a tiger." And so on. Never mind "on" (as in "on the mat"). "It would be otiose to focus to much on the meaning of "on"" -- apres Grice WoW:III on the meaning of "to").

A. Hall dwells with a further complication: subsentential
(subpropositional) items can _hardly_ be said to play a role in 'reasoning'. How are we to modify something like Grice's "Principle of Economy of Rational Effort"
to allow that, on occasion, reasoners DO rely on subpropositional items
for calculating what follows from a given set of premisses? (Allott's PhD
work on rationality and pragmatics seems relevant to this).

Grice did not want to regard 'propositions' as primitive items in his
vocabulary, and his constructivist approach to them was in agreement with the
pragmatist tenor of a remark by his once collaborator G. Myro (cited by
Grice in "Reply to Richards"). In a pragmatist vein, 'propositions' rely on
different justifications: not just as 'pegs' on which to hang our logical
(or rational) laws, but, more humanistically, as contents of our, er,
'propositional' attitudes!

I won't burden this blog post with further Griceana _on this_, I hope, but
listers know where to go for some quick references, then!

References

Allott, N. PhD Rationality and pragmatics. Available online. He cites from Grice 1975a.
Bar-On, D. Grice and the naturalisation of semantics. Pacific Philosophical
-- Quarterly, vol. 76.
Carston, R. 'Linguistic meaning, communicated meaning and cognitive pragmatics' Mind & Language 17.
Carston, Thoughts and utterances. Macmillan. (Based on her PhD for UCL).
Chapman, Grice. Palgrave.
Grice, H. P. – and Strawson. Seminar material on “Logical Form”. Oxford.
--- Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre. Repr. in Conception of Value.
--- Aspects of reason. Oxford: Clarendon.
---. Reply to Richards’, in P. G. R. I. C. E. (Oxford, Clarendon), ed. by R. Grandy and R. Warner -- Grice´s multiple personality: Richards.
Grice, WoW. Way of Words. Harvard, 1989.
--- Presupposition and conversational implicature. On 'quasi-demonstratives'.
Hall, A. Working Papers in Linguistics.
--- PhD, UCL. Department of Linguistics.
Jones, R. B. Grice on Vacuous Names. At rbjones.com/rbjpub/pp/doc/t037.pdf
Kant, I. on "Relation" ("Table of Categories"), Critique of Pure Reason.
Paul, Is there a problem about sense data? Aristotelian Society
Peacocke, C. A. B.
--- Inaugural lecture as Prof. of Metaphysical Philosophy, Oxford.
--- Sense and content. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schiffer, S. R. On referring. Synthese.
Speranza, J. L. This and that. For the Grice Circle, etc. At the Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Speranza, Bordighera.
Sperber, D. & Deirdre Susan Moir Wilson. 1977 On Grice´s theory of conversation. Pragmatics microfiches. Repr. in Werth.
--- Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Blackwell.
Stainton. Subsentences and the philosophy of language.
--- Grice, in "Modern American Philosophers"
--- Introduction to "Nonsentential speech". Comments on Kenyon
Stanley, J. Papers. Oxford: Clarendon.
Wharton, T. Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

This and That

In "Reply to Richards", p. 77ff, Grice offers a rather subtle analysis of the subpropositional constituents of a 'complex':


"[W]e associate with the subject-expression of a canonically formulated sentence a
set of at least second order. If the subject-expression is a singular name,
its ontological correlate will be the singleton of the singleton of the entity which bears that name. ...
If the subject-expression is an indefinite quantificational phrase ..., its
ontological correlate will be
the set of all singletons whose sole element if an item belonging to the
extension of the predicate to
which the indefinite modifier is attached. ... If the subject-expression is
a universal quantificational phrase,
... its ontological correlate will be the singleton whose sole element is
the set which forms
the extension of the predicate to which the universal quantifier is
attached."

It would not be much of a stretch to apply that 'constructivist' account to
'propositions' (qua families of 'propositional complexes' in Grice's
jargon) to

"On the mat".

(As per 'The cat is on the mat'). [Note, incidentally, that J. Stanley would make MUCH of a harmless case of _syntactic ellipsis_ which Grice invokes:

A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.

rather than the clumsy, "C lives somewhere in the South of France" --
WoW:II].

I see that Grice uses 'subsentential' in at least two places of WoW: V
and VI. In particular, it would be good to play around, philosophically,
with what I have elsewhere called Grice's shaggy-dog story. Note that in

"Jones's dog (Fido) is shaggy, i.e. hairy-coated",

Grice is obsessed with getting further _onto_ the subpropositional
constituents of a simple act of meaning. NOT: "By uttering "Jones's dog is
shaggy", Utterer meant that p or q", but rather

(a) By uttering,
"Jones's dog"
U referred to Fido.

and

(b) By uttering
"Shaggy!"
U predicated hairy-coatedness (-- cfr. Carston, 'denotes a property') of
Fido. (Grice, WoW, and his typical complications, as per footnote to p. 133:

"To have explicited correlated X with each member of a set K, not only must
I have intentionally effected that a particular relation R holds between X
and all those (and only those) items which belong to K, but also my
purpose or end in setting up this relationship must have been to perform an act
as a restult of which there will be some relation or other which holds
between X and all those (and only those) things which belong to K. To the
definiens, then, we should add, within the scope of the initial quantier, the
following clause: "& U's purpose in effect that Ax (......) is that (ER')
(Az)(R' 'shaggy' z=zEy (y is hairy-coated))."

In general, from what I browsed from the linguistics (rather than
philosophy) literature on this, the attitude towards an exegesis of Grice remains
patronising (most notably in this author who keeps referring to 'the
purportedly Gricean interpretation' of this -- not caring to explore on Grice's
many publications and unpublications on the subject!). In this respect, it is
a GREAT thing that Grice cared to keep ALL the seminar material he shared
with Sir Peter Strawson when giving courses on 'logical form' and
'categories' (substantials/non-substantials) at Oxford.

There is a related area of interest, which is explored by M. Green and
collaborator Bar-On. It refers to something like an obsession with Grice:
squarrels (they are like squirrels, but allow for closer ethological
inspection). You possibly have noted that the first utterances babies utter are
'subpropositional' (or 'pre-propositional' in some cases). A. Hall makes a very
good point about this: we should call them 'pre-propositional' because they
cannot feature as 'premises' in pieces of reasoning. They are
'pre-rational'. Vide:

Bar-On, D. Grice and the naturalisation of semantics. Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 76.

Green and Bar-On (elsewhere, "Lionspeak", available online) consider this
area of interest (also explored by T. Wharton in his book on the pragmatics
of 'gestures'). Their example I adapt by using Lewis Carroll:

DOVE (hutching eggs, as she perceives long-necked Alice): Serpent!
Alice: I'm not a serpent. I'm a little girl.
---- (as the conversation develops). It's true I do I eat eggs -- at
breakfast.
DOVE: SERPENT!

(Discussed by Sutherland, "Language and Lewis Carroll", Mouton).

Bar-On and Green focus on pre- (rather than sub-) propositional)
'utterances' like a bird's cry of alarm above

It would be pedantic to refer to the _content_ of this 'psychological'
attitude on the part of the dove as involving a full proposition, complete with
logical form. Doves do not need to be Aristotelian, in this sense. The
point would be then to explore the role of pre-propositional 'content' in the,
say, phylogenesis and ontogenesis of ... meaning. A topic which while
peripheral in terms of Grice's central concerns was at the root of his
long-time interest in providing "philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions,
categories, ends" (P.G.R.I.C.E., for short).



1. "A red pillar-box" --

versus the fully propositional

2. That pillar-box seems _red_ to me.

--- is a complex one. (Compare it with E. Moore uttering "My hand!"
rather than what he did utter at Harvard, "This is _my_ hand").

For one, and taking into account a point about 'making sense' in
his latest (echoing, as it were, Geoffrey Sampson's book by that title,
"Making sense", Oxford: Clarendon), it should *not* be much of a stretch to
introduce a philosophical notion of 'sense' involved here.

Note that the FIRST strand in Grice's retrospective epilogue to WoW is all
about that philosophical term of art, if ever there was one, "sense-datum".
(For Russell, sense data were notably _not_ propositional in nature --
"This" was the paradigm of a sense-datum if I recall his stuff). This line of
analysis is best explored within the Oxonian tradition by C. A. B. Peacocke
(who, with Schiffer -- "Things we mean" -- would expand on his views at
seminars at Oxford and elsewhere), and for one, succeeded Sir Peter Strawson
as professor of metaphysics at Oxford (his inaugural lecture was a
'transcendental' justification of 'content'!). This view would emphasise the
non-propositional, subpropositional (or what have you) _content_ of our 'sense'
experiences (and note that Grice was first and foremost, historically
speaking, a 'philosopher of perception' -- vide his early "Some remarks about the
senses", and that's how he was regarded at Oxford for a time). In a way,
it's a bit like a full circle.

Grice did not want to regard 'propositions' as primitive items in his
vocabulary, and his constructivist approach to them was in agreement with the
pragmatist tenor of a remark by his once collaborator G. Myro (cited by Grice
in "Reply to Richards"). In a pragmatist vein, 'propositions' rely on
different justifications: not just as 'pegs' on which to hang our logical (or
rational) laws, but, more humanistically, as contents of our, er,
'propositional' attitudes!Or not!

Grice and Peacocke: the nature of content

---- by J. L. Speranza, Esq.
---------- for the Grice Club

IT IS VERY EASY to fall onto some sort of 'cottage industry', with new gimmicks, technologies, and jargons, to explain something that may eventually bear no philosophical weight!

While Grice's better-known work develops at the level of 'the propositional primacy' (although there are at least two references in WoW:V and WoW:6 on 'subsentential' or nonsentential expressions), he was a philosopher of perception, first and foremost.

In this respect, it is best to consider Peacocke (who succeeded Strawson as Chair to Metaphysical Philosophy in Oxford) and his various manifestos vis-a-vis propositional content (of 'representations' and psychological attitudes.

Like Grice, but unlike many authors dealing with Gricean matters without the level of philosophical subtlety that characterised Grice, Peacocke takes his time to analyse subpropositional, nonpropositional, perceptual, non-representational (even) content of sense-data, and succeeds!

Grice: simplex and complex

--- by J. L. Speranza, Esq.
------- for the Grice Club.


ANYONE FAMILIAR with Grice's erudite "Reply to Richards" is aware of his excellent manifesto vis-a-vis 'propositions' and 'propositional complexes'. ("A proposition is a family of propositional complexes"). Few have considered Grice's views on 'simplexes', though!

Grice is very technical in this section, as it deals with ontological correlates to 'subpropositional' or nonpropositional constituents of, er, propositional complexes ('a singleton of a singleton', and so on).

In general, as an empiricist and philosopher of perception (foremost), Grice was very concerned about the subpropositional (perceptual) nature of most of our representations. If, in his better known work, he focused on propositions, or propositional complexes, this is yet another proof of his philosophical subtleties that have escaped many!

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Uragnosia

From today's World Wide Words, ed. M. Quinion:

"LOST SENSES The Feedback column in New Scientist has introduced me
to a newly coined word: URAGNOSIA. It was created by Andrew Ross,
who was responding to a query by another reader, Alastair Beaven.
The latter wanted a term for a person who knows a word only in a
novel sense and not its original. The example he gave was of an
interpreter in Afghanistan who knew about viruses in computers, but
not about biological viruses. Andrew Ross generated his word from
"ur-", origin, plus Greek "agnosia", ignorance (from "gnosis", as I
noted in connection with "prognosticate", above). So "uragnosia"
means ignorance of origin."

Griceian analysis in terms of 'metaphor'

"He knew of 'leg of a table', but hardly the original collocation" (after Tapper). "For which he used 'limb'").

Friday, January 28, 2011

Robbing Paul to Pay Peter

Re: this current discussion in Baynes's "Hist-Analytic", I append below this review. I should provide commentary. From an online site:

Strawson and Kant
Glock, H-J. (ed), Strawson and Kant, Oxford, 2003, 260pp, $49.95 (hbk), ISBN 0199252823
Reviewed by Andrew Chignell, Cornell University

"This book collects the proceedings of a 1999 UK Kant Society conference held in honor of Sir Peter Strawson, who is heralded by the editor (not implausibly) as “the leading proponent of analytic Kantianism.” Like most Festschriften, the book is a smorgasbord: while each of the papers has something to do with either Strawson or Kant, there are some—such as Robert Stern’s paper on Strawson’s naturalism or John Hyman’s on the causal theory of perception—that don’t attempt to be about both. A less wieldy but more accurate title for the book would be Strawson and/or Kant."

"Still, many of the contributions hang together nicely, and two in particular (by H-J. Glock and P.M.S. Hacker) offer illuminating accounts of Strawson’s place in the history of Kant interpretation and analytic philosophy in general. I will discuss those essays in more detail below. There are also two essays (by Eckart Förster and Henry Allison) on the third Critique, and two (by Tobias Rosefeldt and Maximilian de Gaynesford) on the Kantian view of the self. Another pair (by Graham Bird and Barry Stroud) compare the merits of Strawson’s “descriptive metaphysics” to those of traditional “revisionary” metaphysics, taking as a focus Strawson’s account of the synthetic . priori."

"Strawson’s own “A Bit of Intellectual Autobiography” picks up where he left off in the Library of Living Philosophers volume (Hahn 1998), although in this essay he focuses more on his relationship to Kant. The method in The Bounds of Sense, he writes, was “to preserve and present systematically what I took to be the major insights of Kant’s work, while detaching them from those parts of the total doctrine that, if they had any substantial import at all, I took to be at best false, at worse mysterious to the point of being barely comprehensible” (8-9). Strawson thus happily accepts the charge, often leveled by more serious historians of philosophy, that his rational reconstructions have as much to do with twentieth-century Oxford as they do with eighteenth-century Königsberg."

"The rest of Strawson’s contribution is a pastiche (as its title suggests), ranging over his own personal history, a short critique of Rae Langton’s recent book on the first Critique, and a discussion of his relationship to Wittgenstein. He includes a strikingly non-Wittgensteinian brief on behalf of both the existence of “abstract intensional objects” (like propositions) and “the reality of subjective experience in all its richness and complexity,” concluding with a provocative embrace of the “Platonism and Cartesianism” that these doctrines involve."

"Like Strawson, some of the other contributors take a position on the issue of appropriate methodology in Kant interpretation. Kenneth Westphal, for instance, begins by explicitly rejecting Strawson’s approach, described as the “somewhat ahistorical attempt to recruit Kant to the ranks of the analytical metaphysicians, while discarding those metaphysical elements that refused any such absorption” (9). Westphal retorts that Kant’s philosophy will only seem plausible if, “instead of incorporating Kant’s transcendental proofs into present-day philosophical attitudes…[we] reconsider some of our current philosophical attitudes in order to understand and benefit from Kant’s transcendental proofs” (127)."

"In this spirit, Westphal argues that the Refutation of Idealism can succeed as an argument against external-world skepticism, but only if we first accept Kant’s “non-Cartesian” picture of the mind. This requires granting that any self-conscious experience involves both receptivity to external objects on the part of sensibility and active synthesis on the part of understanding. One wonders, of course, whether presuming this substantive thesis about our cognitive psychology doesn’t beg important questions against the skeptic and against empiricists generally. But Westphal provides some illuminating thought-experiments designed to give the thesis independent, intuitive support."

"Quassim Cassam’s essay, by contrast, is classic Strawsonian (and thus revisionist) Kantianism. His stated goal is to salvage an important insight in Kant—that we can justify some synthetic claims involving the categories without appeal to experience—for the purposes of contemporary consumption. But in doing so he rejects as hopeless many of Kant’s own ideas about the . priori, including the anti-empiricist claim that the categories are not derived from experience. My sense is that most of the contributors would side with Cassam over Westphal in preferring the Strawsonian methodology—naturally enough in a volume honoring Strawson’s work."

"Although Stroud does not continue his famous controversy with Strawson over the efficacy and scope of transcendental arguments (Stroud 1968), Thomas Grundmann and Catrin Misselhorn do. In their co-written contribution, they argue (pace Stroud) that some transcendental arguments do have the capacity to prove something about mind-independent reality, rather than merely proving something about how we must conceive of it. This claim is Strawsonian in spirit, even though Strawson himself has now accepted Stroud’s criticisms and adopted a Humean-style naturalism as the metaphysical realist’s only viable response to skepticism (Strawson 1985). Grundmann and Misselhorn’s argument is flawed, however, by its reliance on the extraordinary premise that, “necessarily, our perceptual beliefs about the external world are largely true” (207). Later I will suggest that their defense of this premise—via an externalism about content plus some overly strict rules about what it would be for a skeptical scenario to count as worrisome—raises far more questions than it answers."

"As anyone familiar with these names will recognize, Glock has done a nice job of bringing together authors hailing from the three main regions of contemporary Kant scholarship (the UK, North America, and Germany), and ranging in experience from the up-and-coming to the world-famous. It is particularly significant that there are so many Germans involved, since it is often assumed that the more philologically and historically oriented scholars on the Continent turn up their collective noses at the perceived crudities of Strawson-style Kantianism. The fourteen essays together comprise a manageable 250-page volume which should be of interest to Kantians, Strawsonians, and many historians of analytic philosophy as well. In what follows, I will discuss the essays by Glock, Hacker, and Grundmann/Misselhorn in more detail."

"Glock’s and Hacker’s essays recount the well-known story of the emergence of analytic philosophy in Britain in the 20th-century, but are unique in that they highlight that tradition’s complex and often contested relationship to Kant. The story starts with the rejection of neo-Kantianism and the Hegelianism that was its heir in Britain, a rejection that (allegedly) drove analytic philosophy to its anti-metaphysical extremes in the 20s and 30s. It culminates with the collapse of the positivist program and the return to a chastened form of speculation in the 50s and 60s, aided at least in part by Strawson’s defense of descriptive metaphysics and his appeal to Kant as its primary forebear."

"Glock also releases a salvo on Strawson’s behalf in the ongoing battle between idealist and non-idealist interpreters of Kant. The former think Kant is committed to the claim that the existence of external objects consists, at bottom, in facts about perceivers, and they appeal in support of this thought to passages in which Kant enjoins us to regard appearances “as being, one and all, mere representations” (A369). Strawson often sounds like such an idealist interpreter, although he thinks of this as the “dark side” of the critical philosophy, and rejects it as unworkable."

"On the other side are the non-idealist readers (Glock calls their view “platitudinous”) who insist that Kant is merely saying something about the “epistemic conditions” under which subjects with faculties like ours can know something about mind-independent objects (29). We have to cognize such objects, if we are to cognize them at all, as being in spatio-temporal and causal relations, but they can also be thought or considered in abstraction from such conditions. These “double-aspect” interpreters include many of Strawson’s critics, early and late—most notably Gerold Prauss and Henry Allison."

"Glock’s taxonomy here is rather simplistic, since there are any number of middle positions and hybrids on the market (Langton’s non-Praussian but still non-idealist interpretation is a case in point). The taxonomy aids Glock dialectically, however, since he can then suggest that Strawson has come to the rescue with a third position which is more attractive than either of its alternatives. The “analytic interpretation” is supposed to provide a way of thinking about Kant, and especially about Kant’s claims regarding the synthetic . priori, that is both historically respectable and philosophically superior."

"This claim is complicated, however, by the fact that “analytic Kantianism” is used somewhat loosely in this collection. Sometimes it refers broadly to the work of those like Strawson and Bennett who seek not so much to be historical scholars but rather (in Bennett’s words) to “fight Kant ’tooth and nail’“ as though Kant were a contemporary analytic philosopher sitting with us at the seminar-room table (19). At other times “analytic Kantianism” is used more narrowly as a rubric covering those in the Kant industry who take Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics to be a good model of what Kant was up to (at his best), and reconstruct his philosophy accordingly. The latter is clearly what Glock means to offer as a viable third way between idealism and platitudes."

"But that leads, of course, to the question of what descriptive metaphysics actually is. Strawson himself, in Individuals, says this: “Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure” (9). Precisely what to make of this distinction is widely-discussed in the Strawsonian tradition, and Glock, Hacker, and Bird provide detailed accounts in their respective essays. They agree, very broadly, that descriptive metaphysics involves the attempt to describe “the most general and pervasive features of human thought about the world” by inquiring into our “conceptual scheme, the connections between the fundamental concepts we use to think about and describe the world” (18)."

"If that is a fair characterization, then descriptive metaphysics is not much different from classic conceptual analysis, except that the concepts analyzed are, in Hacker’s words, “highly general, irreducible, basic, and, in a special sense, non-contingent” (49). Examples include “experience,” “self-consciousness,” “objectivity,” “space,” “time,” and “causation,” and Kant’s identification of them as essential to our mode of cognition is praised by Glock as “the central insight of the Critique” (20). It is also noted here that most analytic Kantians agree that the way to exploit this insight is not to follow Kant over to the “dark side” of genuine idealism."

"This last point raises the concern, however, that despite the calls in this book to renew the enterprise of descriptive metaphysics, the old Stroudian worry has not yet been put to rest. The worry is simply that realism and descriptive metaphysics make excellent bedfellows with the skeptic. For without a commitment to idealism, what grounds are there for assuming that the empirical world conforms to the fundamental categories that the descriptive metaphysicians describe? Again, even if a transcendental argument shows that we must conceive of the empirical world in a certain way, it seems that there will always be room for the skeptic to drive a wedge of doubt between that conception of the world, and the world as it really is."

"As I noted earlier, Grundmann and Misselhorn address that problem in their essay by suggesting that we can justifiably ignore the skeptic because the scenarios he appeals to are not genuinely conceivable and thus not demonstrably possible. This is a highly controversial claim, and it rests on the assumption that for the world of a skeptical scenario to be conceivable, it must be “explanatorily coherent.” A scenario fails that test if it appeals to “properties that are unintelligible, mysterious, or unexplainable within this world” (212)."

"But, first, why think it obvious that this constraint on conceivability holds? Can’t a world that is conceivable in the relevant sense contain some properties that are mysterious to us? Surely we can conceive of a world in which telepathy occurs, even though the relational properties between the minds involved would be quite mysterious."

"There is a large debate in the background here, and no consensus on the precise sort of conceivability that is a good guide to metaphysical possibility (cf. Yablo 1993 and Gendler & Hawthorne 2002). But let’s set that aside and suppose that we accept this constraint on the relevant sort of conceivability. It still isn’t clear why an appeal to a Cartesian dreaming scenario or Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat scenario fails the test. Grundmann and Misselhorn say that “explanations within other [conceivable] worlds need not follow the laws of our actual world, but there must be some laws that do the explanatory work within these worlds” (212). But in some of the nearby worlds in which we are dreaming or envatted, surely there are such laws. In fact, in some of those worlds the laws are presumably the same as the laws in this world (the evil scientists in the nearest vat-worlds are simply much more advanced than we are in their understanding of neurobiology). There is thus no obvious reason to think that these worlds lack explanatory coherence."

"A third, related point: it is unclear why Grundmann and Misselhorn think the skeptic has to accept the burden of showing that his scenarios are metaphysically possible by showing that they are conceivable in the relevant sense. His arguments will still have traction if he remains neutral about that, and simply highlights the epistemic possibility that, for all we know, the world of a skeptical scenario is both metaphysically possible and actual."

"Let me emphasize that the main worry here is not about whether we can have justified beliefs on the basis of what descriptive metaphysicians tell us. For if they can show that we must conceptualize the world in a certain way, then no doubt we are justified in doing so on at least some conceptions of justification. The worry is rather about whether these inevitable, permissible, and in some sense justified beliefs adequately track reality. A merely descriptive analysis of fundamental categories cannot give us any assurance that they do. Kant puts the point this way:"

"If [the mind] has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them . priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty…, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. (Bxvii)"

"In sum: analytic Kantians (in the narrow sense) offer us nothing to put in the place of what many readers take to be Kant’s own bona fide idealism, and so despite the ambitions of their transcendental arguments, they remain vulnerable to the skeptic. On this score, I think Strawson himself has done a better job at seeing the deficiencies of his early view than some of his followers."

"As should be clear from this discussion, there is much that is of interest in this well-executed collection. The contributions are of a very high standard, although their content is somewhat disparate. Strawson and Kant is a fitting tribute to the man who has contributed more than anyone else to the rehabilitation of Kant studies in Anglophone philosophy."

References

Bennett, J. (1966) Kant’s Analytic. New York: Cambridge.

Gendler, T. S. & Hawthorne, J. eds. (2002) Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford.

Hahn, L.E., ed. (1998) The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, The Library of Living Philosophers, xxvi. Peru, Ill.: Open Court.

Kant, I. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, trans Guyer, P. and Wood, A. New York: Cambridge.

Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals. London: Methuen.

--. (1966) Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.
--. (1985) Skepticism and Naturalism. London: Methuen.
Stroud, B. (1968) “Transcendental Arguments,” Journal of Philosophy, 65.

Yablo, S. (1993) “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53.

Saturday, January 15, 2011

True alarms

The other day we were having coffee in a sidewalk cafe, and there was a signal of a storm. It came to nothing. "A false alarm," I said to my friend. "Gricean analysis needed" I thought to myself. It seems people misuse the expression, 'true alarm'. Indeed, they hardly use it, but if they would, they would misuse it.

For Grice, 'mean' can be 'natural', as in:

------ Those black clouds mean rain.

or 'non-natural', as in:

------ Her crocodile tears.


------ Similarly, alarms, I hold, alla Peirce, can be _false_ (the well-known ones) or 'true'. The first use of 'sema' (Greek for 'sign') in Herodotus relates to that.

I would say that if black clouds MEAN-n (or indicate) rain, YET there is no rain, a true alarm was a mere implicature.

In Grice's idiolect,

------ Those clouds meant rain, but there was no rain.

is a contradiction. To me, it is what I call a Griceo-contradiction, via implicature, not entailment. Cheers. Speranza, Bordighera, etc.

Monday, November 22, 2010

Griceian Anatomy of a Solecism

by JLS

I was reading the NYT the other day -- a sort of 'preview' of "Don Carlo" as it opens tonight at the Met (NY). The writer -- the title of the feature was something like "A new "Don Carlo" the ever-changing opera", and I would need to revise the context. It is p. 25, of Arts and Leisure section, and it reads (Nov. 21) (as written by M. G.:

"No sooner has Carlo made himself known to her then the news break that their fathers have changed their minds."

where "her" = Elisabetta (for the record).


-----

"No sooner has Carlo made himself known to her then the news break that their fathers have changed their minds."

---- Now: consider the 'then'. A 'solecism', so called. It should be 'than'. But, I would claim, and I'll have to be brief as I'm in a sort of hurry, that the Griceian has an answer to the solecism.

I haven't CHECKED or double checked this, but I would claim or think that 'then' and 'than' derive from the same Indo-European root. One root, one meaning. Hence, 'then' and 'than' ARE interchangeably.

One hears people say:

"Mary was more beautiful then Susan".

or

"Tom was more intelligent then Jerry".

-----

Mutatis mutandis:

"No sooner has Carlo made himself known to her then the news break that their fathers have changed their minds."

Etc.

Saturday, November 20, 2010

Grice at the opera

"Bing was ... uneasy about the _proximity_ of the New York
City Opera,"

Briggs tells us in his history of the Met,

"whose performances would be taking place only _a few yards_ from
the Metropolitan's. "Suppose someone says,

'I heard a lousy opera at Lincoln Center last night,'

" Bing suggested. 'Maybe it was the _other_ house's opera, _or maybe it was ours. Under the *umbrella* of Lincoln Center, each of the two houses is _bound_ to be deprived of its individual image, and that is the most important asset an opera
house can have."

Briggs, "Requiem for a yellow-brick brewery" (p. 326).

Friday, November 5, 2010

Tyrannosaurus griceanus

To analyse clearly. By courtesy of T. and L. J.

http://www.qwantz.com/index.php?comic=1271
http://www.qwantz.com/index.php?comic=1272

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Implicature OK

Re:
Metcalf's "OK: America's greatest word". Oxford University Press.

From wiki:

---- the implicature of 'OK':

""Okay" can fulfill functions at many level of discourse."

"At the ideational level it functions as an adjective or adverb (Bangerter and Clark, 2003), it signifies approval, acceptance and confirmation by the speaker (Condon, 1986; Merritt, 1984), and affirmatively responds to a question (Guthrie, 1997; Heisler, 1996)."

From the OED

OED:

adj
All correct, all right; satisfactory, good; well, in good health or order. In early use, occas. more intensively: outstanding, excellent. Now freq. in somewhat weakened sense: adequate, acceptable. OK by (someone): fine by (a person), acceptable to (a person). Chiefly predicative.
Fashionable, modish; prestigious, high-class.
Of a person: decent, trustworthy; congenial.
Appropriate, suitable; permissible, allowed. Freq. with for.
Of a person: comfortable, at ease, content, satisfied; reasonable, understanding. Usu. with about, with.
int
Expressing assent, concession, or approval, esp. with regard to a previous statement or question: yes, all right.
a. Appended as an interrogative to a clause, phrase, etc., in expectation of agreement or approval.
b. Brit. ——rules OK!: asserting the pre-eminence of a specified person or thing.
Introducing an utterance or as a conversational filler, typically without affirmative or concessive force, but rather as a means of drawing attention to what the speaker is about to say: well, so, right.
n
An indication of approval; an endorsement, authorization. Freq. in to give the OK (to).In early use chiefly with reference to the marking of a document, etc., with the letters ‘OK’.
adv
Satisfactorily, acceptably.
v
trans. To endorse, esp. by marking with the letters ‘OK’; to approve, agree to, sanction, or pass. Freq. in pa. pple.

"In this function it is frequently discussed as a third turn receipt by a current speaker (Bangerter and Clark, 2003; Guthrie, 1997; Beach, 1993)."

""Okay" has also been described as serving a variety of text-structural functions as a marker of information-state transitions."

"Several studies describe this function of okay, frequently, however, labeling the phenomenon differently (Levin and Gray, 1983; Merritt, 1984; Condon, 1986; Heisler, 1996; Rendle-Short, 2000; Swales and Malczewski, 2001; Bangerter and Clark, 2003)."

"Several studies subdivide this structural type of okay, usually, however, these subdivisions refer to the place where structural okay occurs or to the type of new section it opens up."

""Okay" functions as a pre-closing device (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973; Bangerter and Clark, 2003), it marks a return from a digression (Bangerter and Clark, 2003), functions as a text bracketing device (Rendle-Short, 2000), occurs in introductory or conclusion position (Levin and Gray, 1983), or as an attention getter at the beginning of an interaction (Heisler, 1996)."

"Finally "okay" and "alright" are frequently mentioned in their function of backchannel signal (Heisler, 1996; Swales and Malczewski, 2001)."[173]"

"The 1977 Tenerife airport disaster, in which 583 people were killed, was blamed in part on a misunderstranding between pilot and air traffic control over the intended sense of the word "OK". While the controller meant "understood, stand by", the pilot may have interpreted it as "approved, proceed". Standard control terminology excludes "OK" precisely to avoid such ambiguities."

-----

Etc.