H. P. Grice's Conversational Functionalism

functionalism Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind A term for any theory that takes the notion of function as the first explanatory principle. In the philosophy of mind, it is currently a widely supported theory of the mind–body relationship. This theory was developed as a result of the recognition of the defects of the identity theory of mind. Its chief characteristic is that it asks what makes a mental state a mental state rather than asking about the intrinsic property of a mental state. According to functionalism, a mental state or event should be explained by its functional role, that is, its causal relationship with other mental states, with sensory inputs and the consequential output behavior of a subject. Unlike the identity theory of the mind, it does not claim that mental states are directly per se neural states, but sees mental states in terms of something more abstract, that is, the causal or functional roles some neural states possess. The theory can be traced to the later Wittgenstein and his account of use, and its major representatives include Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor. Functionalism is closely associated with cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the computer model of the mind. There are various versions of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Ned Block distinguishes between psycho-functionalism and conceptual functionalism. Psycho-functionalism views mental states not from the biological point of view, but from the organizational point of view. Mental states are analogous to the functional states of a computer, and the mind is a program that can be multiply realized, that is, shared by various physiochemical systems. Conceptual functionalism is a development of analytical behaviorism and considers a mental state to be a contribution to a disposition to behave. Another distinction is between machine functionalism, which understands function in terms of the operation of the whole organism, and teleological functionalism, which understands function as what the thing is for. Homuncular functionalism is one version of teleological functionalism. The main objections faced by functionalist accounts of the mind are that it cannot account for qualia, that is, what it is like to feel a sensation, and for intentionality. “According to functionalism, the behaviour of, say, a computing machine is not explained by the physics and chemistry of the computing machine. It is explained by the machine’s program.” Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality