Wednesday, April 22, 2020

H. P. Grice on P. F. Strawson on "or"

The relations between * v ' and * or ' (or * either ... or . . .*) are, on the whole, less intimate than those between * . ? and * and *, but less distant than those between * D ' and 'if. Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by * or ' as an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second aUernatesof such a statement, on analogywith our talk of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say : * Either we catch this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home '. He might equally well have said ' If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home *. It will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient condition of the ' truth ' of either statement ; if it turns out that the bus we caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference between at least one standard use of * or ' and the meaning given to * v '. Now in all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the form ' p or q ', we are also prepared to say something
of the form 4 if not-p, then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between 4 v ' and * or \ to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate Is not a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If someone says ; 4 Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which * , we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that * It was John ' entails the former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that It was John entails the statement that It was either John or Robert in the sense thai it confirms it ; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step * It was John, so It was either John or Robert * is a logically proper step (unless the person saying this means by It simply that the alternative statement made previously was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '). For the alternative statement carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John. So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less happy about saying that the hypo- 2 TRUTH-FUNCTIONS [CH. 3 thetical statement is confirmed by the discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition (that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p, then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms * either p or q ' and * either q or p '. This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not p, then q ' and * if not q, then p ', are logically equivalent/ for this rule regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and 4 or ' sentences that whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no * or ' sentence which would serve as a paraphrase of 4 If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war \ as this sentence would most commonly be used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to Oxford or that road does * ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, 4 either . . . or . . .' plainly carries the implication * and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and inclusive senses of * or ' ; and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v * with either, it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the ordinary use of 4 or ' is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily be accommodated 1 Cf. footnote to p. 86. FT. in] TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL CONSTANTS 3 In the symbolism of the truth-functional system : It is the difference between * (p y q) . ~ (p . q) * (exclusive sense) and 6 p v q ' (inclusive sense). * Or *, like * and \ is commonly used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties ? attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? . (This is not to say that the expansion can always correctly be made.) We may call 4 v * the disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as * or.'

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