Grice's D

desirability: This Grice calls the Jeffrey operator. If Urmson likes ‘probably,’ Grice likes ‘desirably.’ This theorem is a corollary of the desirability axiom by Jeffrey, which is: "If prob XY = 0, for a prima facie  PF(A V B) A (x E w)] = PFA A (x E w)] + PfB A (x El+ w)]. This is the account by Grice of the adaptability of a pirot to its changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of probability (henceforth, “pr”) from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion. Grice abbreviates probability by Pr. and compares it to a buletic operator ‘pf,’ ‘for prima facie,’ attached to ‘De’ for desirability. A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by d: probability in degree d; probability in degree d. The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction (Pology.): life as continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with life (Aristotle, bios) because bios is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by genus) of psyche. The steps are as follows. Pf(p ⊃!q)/Pr(p ⊃ q); pf((p1 ^  p2) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^  p2 ⊃q); pf((p1 ^ p2 ^  p3) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^  p2 ^  p3 ^  p4 ⊃q); pf (all things before me ⊃!q)/pr (all things before me ⊃ q); pf (all things considered ⊃ !q)/pr(all things considered ⊃ q); !q/|- q; G wills !q/G judges q. Strictly, Grice avoids using the noun probability (other than for the title of this or that lecture). One has to use the sentence-modifier ‘probably,’ and ‘desirably.’ So the specific correlative to the buletic prima facie ‘desirably’ is the doxastic ‘probably.’ Grice liked the Roman sound to ‘prima facie,’ ‘at first sight’:  “exceptio, quae prima facie justa videatur.” Refs.: The two main sources are “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” c. 2-f. 11, and “Modality, desirability and probability,” c. 8-ff. 14-15. But most of the material is collected in “Aspects,” especially in the third and fourth lectures. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

deutero-esperanto: Grice genially opposed to the idea of a convention. He hated a convention. A language is not conventional. Meaning is not conventional. Communication is not conventional. He was even unhappy with the account of convention by Lewis in terms of an arbitrary co-ordination. While the co-ordination bit passes rational muster, the arbitrary element is deemed a necessary condition, and Grice hated that. For Grice there is natural, and iconic. When a representation ceases to be iconic and becomes, for lack of a better expression, non-iconic, things get, we may assume conventional. One form of correlation in his last definition of meaing allows for a conventional correlation. “Pain!,” the P cries. There is nothing in /pein/ that minimally resembles the pain the P is suffering. So from his involuntary “Ouch” to his simulated “Ouch,” he thinks he can say “Pain.” Bennett explored the stages after that. The dog is shaggy is Grices example. All sorts of resultant procedures are needed for reference and predication, which may be deemed conventional. One may refer nonconventionally, by ostension. It seems more difficult to predicate non-conventionally. But there may be iconic predication. Urquhart promises twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath, Grice designed deutero-esperanto. The obble is fang may be current only for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that philosophers practice to utter The obble is fang in such-and-such circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in which The obble is fang is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be deemed current at all, but the utterance of The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances is part of some system of communication which the utterer U (Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or resultant procedure for the obble is feng in an attenuated but philosophically legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a convention in this usage. Surely Grice can as he indeed did, invent a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody at Oxford ever uses to communicat. That makes Grice the authority - cf. arkhe, authority, government (in plural), "authorities" - and Grice can lay down, while lying in the tub, no doubt - what is proper. A P can be said to potch of some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o as being fid to one another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Ox ^ cotch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oz ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, fid(y,z)). Let’s say that Ps (as Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives. Fid is a possible relation between obbles. Grice provides a symbolisation for content internalisation.  The perceiver or cognitive Subjects perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a relation of some type.  There is a higher level that Ps can reach when the object of their potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs.  Its then that the truth-functional operators will be brought to existence “^”: cotch(p ^ q) “V”:  cotch(p v q) “)”: )-cotch(p ) q)  A P will be able to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. Cotch(~p). When P1 perceives P2, the reciprocals get more complicated.  P2 cotches that P1!-judges that p.  Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2 for cotching. If P2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Ps Immanuel," P2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partners goal by adopting temporarily his partners goal potch(x (portch(y, !p)) ⊃ potch(x, !p). But by then, its hardly simpler ways. Especially when the Ps outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians. The details are under “eschatology,” but the expressions are here “α izzes α.” This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. P1 applies it war, and utters War is war which yields a most peculiar implicature. “if α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ, α izz γ.” This is transitivity, which is crucial for Ps to overcome Berkeley’s counterexample to Locke, and define their identity over time. “if α hazzes β, α izzes β.” Or, what is accidental is not essential. A P may allow that what is essential is accidental while misleading, is boringly true. “α hazzes β iff α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β.” “If β is a katholou or universalium, β is an eidos or forma.” For surely Ps need not be stupid to fail to see squarrelhood. “if α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular, γ≠α ∧ α izz β.” “α izzes predicable of β iff ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α  α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). α = β iff α izzes β ∧ β izzes α. “α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β). “α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)). α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α). α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium); α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “ α izzes essentially predicable of α  α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β.  ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β. α izzes an kathekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum; α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α). ~(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma)  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α). x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β); α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazzes α);  α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A); (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α). (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing).  (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing). α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α). (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β.   Grice is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain ideologies.  It is considered a type of engineered language.  Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language.  The term “ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an exalted claim of perfection.  It may be known as a language of pure ideology.  The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from commonly spoken languages today.  In most older philosophical languages, and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical language" is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic language", though more recently there have been several conlangs constructed on philosophical principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies of oligo-synthetic communication-systems are made of compound expressions, which are coined from a small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes; oligo-isolating communication-systems, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a limited set of root words but produce phrases which remain s. of distinct words.  Toki Pona is based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating elements of Taoism. Láadan is designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the concepts and distinctions important to women, based on muted group theory.  A priori languages are constructed languages where the vocabulary is invented directly, rather than being derived from other existing languages (as with Esperanto, or Grices Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). Philosophical languages are almost all a priori languages, but most a priori languages are not philosophical languages. For example, Quenya, Sindarin, and Klingon are all a priori but not philosophical languages: they are meant to seem like natural languages, even though they have no genetic relation to any natural languages.  Work on a philosophical language was pioneered by Francis Lodwick (A common writing, the groundwork or foundation laid (or so intended) for the framing of a new perfect language and a universal common writing), Sir Thomas Urquhart (Logopandecteision, in six parts: Neaudethaumata, Chrestasebeia, Cleronomaporia, Chryseomysters, Neleodicastes, and Philoponauxesis), George Dalgarno (Ars signorum), and John Wilkins (An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language). Those were systems of hierarchical classification that were intended to result in both spoken and written expression. George Edmonds modified Wilkins system, leaving its taxonomy intact, but changing the grammar of the language in an effort to make it easier. Gottfried Leibniz created lingua generalis (or lingua universalis), aiming to create a lexicon of characters upon which the user might perform calculations that would yield true propositions automatically; as a side effect he developed binary calculus. These projects aimed not only to reduce or model grammar, but also to arrange all human knowledge into "characters" or hierarchies. This idea ultimately led to the Encyclopédie, in the Age of Enlightenment. Under the entry Charactère, DAlembert critically reviewed the projects of philosophical languages of the preceding century.  After the Encyclopédie, projects for a priori languages moved more and more to the fringe. Individual authors, typically unaware of the history of the idea, continued to propose taxonomic philosophical languages until the early 20th century (for example, Ro). More recent philosophical languages have usually moved away from taxonomic schemata, such as Ithkuil. V. engineered language Linguistic philosophy Natural semantic metalanguage. Refs: Edmonds, A universal alphabet, grammar, and language, Richard Griffin and Company, London and Glasgow, 1history-computer.com. Cf.  Eco, The search for the perfect language. Libert, A priori artificial languages. cf. International auxiliary language Language meant for communication between people from different nations who do not share a common first language; engineered language constructed languages devised to test or prove how languages work. Cf. Grices Deutero-Esperanto. It all starts when Carnap claims to know that pritos karulise elatically. Grice as engineer.  Pirotese is the philosophers engaging in Pology. Actually, Pirotese is the lingo the Ps parrot. Ps karulise elatically. But not all of them. Grice finds that the Pological talk allows to start from zero.  He is constructing a language, (basic) Pirotese, and the philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent or denote.  An obble is a Ps object. Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a P does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a P can further do with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive.  Pirotese would not be the first language invented by a philosopher. Refs.: While the reference to “Deutero-Esperanto’ comes from “Meaning revisited,” other keywords are useful, notably “Pirotese” and “Symbolo.” Also keywords like “obble,” and “pirot.” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

diagoge: Grice contrasted epagoge with diagoge. But epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability and how it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a social animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f.  4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keyness notion of a generator property, which he found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s Induction, induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s method of difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive probability, or probable, attaches to the doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably, or desirability.  Jeffreys notion of desirability is partition-invariant in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb (Bi ∣∣ A). Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A Prob (Ci ∣∣ A). Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule of desirability maximization will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how the decision problem is framed, while an alternative theory may recommend different courses of action, depending on how the decision problem is formulated.  Here, then, is the analogue of Jeffreys desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences rather than propositions: (D) (prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "# 0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t =-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain. Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων” Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id. Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN 1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management, τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν, διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on ‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

disgrice: In PGRICE, Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as the opposite of gricing. The first way to disgrice Kemmerling calls ‘strawsonising.’ I wish to acknowledge my great indebtedness to my Oxford colleague, H. P. Grice, from whom I have never ceased to learn about logic since he was my tutor at St. John's in the subject, and from whose discussions of the topics of this essay I have profited, saving me from many inelegancies and mistakes. Strawson searches for an interpretation for The Square of Opposition -- the A, E, I, and O forms -- for which all the laws of the traditional Aristotelian system hold good together, A-E-I-O, affirmo, nego. Strawson argues that there are, at least, two distinct, though related, methods by which this can be done. One method illuminates some general features of conversation. A second method has only a limited and formalistic interest. But though the two methods are very different in certain respects, the ways in which the two methods operate to save the consistency of the system are closely related. Strawson presents the formalistic method first, partly for the sake of completeness and partly for the light it casts on the other realistic method. One method consists simply in a tweak on the kind of interpretation in class or quantificational terms. It is a kind of "ad hoc" patching up of the Aristotle's old system in order to represent it, in its entirety, as a fragment of the new which we may call neo-traditionalism. The method is to encounter every breakdown in a traditional law by amending the class or predicative interpretation suggested in such a way as to secure its validity. E. g. one attempt at providing a translation in terms of positively and negatively existential formulae leaves one with at least *three* laws of the Square of Opposition invalid. So Strawson introduces an ad hoc prevention of these breakdowns. Thus Strawson makes A and O contradictories. A is ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx) and (Ex)(Ay) whereas O is ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). The contradictory of an expression of the form “~p . q” is the corresponding expression of the form p v ~q. Strawson accordingly decides to make O of this form by re-interpreting it as “(3x)(fx . ~gx) v ~(3x)(fx). Strawson turns A and O are contradictories. Similarly, Strawson re-interprets I as  so that it is the contradictory of E. Strawson thinks he has, by his neo-traditionalist manoeuvre, saved the law that I and O are subcontraries (i.e., that corresponding statements of these forms cannot both be false). This law for Strawson breaks down for the un-strawsonised interpretations because corresponding statements of these forms could both be false, in the case where the corresponding statement of the form ~(3x)(fx) is true. But on Strawson's neo-traditionalist interpretation, the truth of this statement is a sufficient condition of the truth of both I and statements, since ' q Dp v q is analytic. Nor do we sacrifice any of the OTHER laws of the Square of Opposition in saving these three 'laws.' A and E have not been altered, so they remain contraries. The laws A D I and 'EDO' remain valid. For the old form ofI entails the strawsonised form of I, and A entails the old form of I.Hence A entails the new form of I. Similarly, E entails the strawsonised O.Further amendments, however, are required. Although Strawson thinks he has saved all the laws of the Square of Opposition, he has not altered E.So the simple conversion of E remains invalid. Moreover, Strawson's amendments so far made render invalid the simple conversion of. I. If we transpose the terms (i.e., the predicative variables) in the formula (3x)(fa .gx) v ~(~ix)(fx) we obtain (3aO(gff./aO v ~(3aOfeaO And these formulae are by no means equivalent. For  ~(3a?)(/k)(3x)(gx) entails the first and is inconsistent with the second. The reason for the breakdown of the conversion of E was that 4 ~(3)(#&) ' [or ' p = '] is consistent with ~(3a)(#) (3)(/ar) [or P = O.a*0] but not with its simple converse ~(3x)(gx .fa) . (3x)(gx) [or p* = O . (B * O]. The term-symmetry of E can obviously be restored, Strawson thinks, and the breakdown prevented, by adopting the interpretation ~(3)(/ **) (3*0(/aO . (3*)fea?) [or ap = . a 4= O . p 4= O] Similarly, the term-symmetry of I can be restored by re-interpreting it as (3x)(fx.gx) v ~(3aO(/fc) v ~0a0tor) which also maintains its status as the contradictory of E. Adopting these readings for E and I will obviously force us to make further alterations in the other forms in order to preserve their logical relations. Since, by the rule of obversion, ' xAy ' is equivalent to ' x&y' we can obtain the appropriate interpretation for A simply by negating the second term (e. g. ' or 4 P ') throughout the latest form of E; which gives us or ap =a 4= O.p 4= O. Finally, O, as the contradictory of A, must be re-interpreted as PT.So we have, as our final interpretation : A ~(3*)(/ ~) (3)(/*) - (3)(~#r) E ~(3*)(3)(/ff)'. (3*)te) I (3a?)(/aj .#*) v ~(3a>)(/0) v ~(3)fe) O (3o?)(/ . ~#r) v ~(3*)(/*0 v ~(3*)(~*}. For this interpretation, all the laws of the traditional Aristotelian logic hold good together; and they hold good within the logic of classes or quantified formulae ; as a part of that logic. So the consistency of the system can be secured in this way. But the price paid for consistency will seem a high one, if we are at all anxious that three constants or formal devices, a truth-functor and two quantifiers of the system -- "~" (Ax) and (Ex) should faithfully reflect the typical modernist logical behaviour of "not" (and "no," as in "no king"), "all," and "some (at least one)." It is quite unplausible to suggest that if an utterer utters ‘Some students of English will get Firsts this year,’ the proposition expressed by ‘No one at all should get a First’ is a sufficient condition for the utterer's having made a true statement. But this, Strawson thinks, is a consequence of accepting the palaeo-traditionalist interpretation for I. The dropping of the implicatum of plurality (cf. Warnock, 'Metaphysics in logic') in "some" and have it, as Grice suggests as "some (at least one)" makes only a minor contribution to the unplausibility of assuming "I" to be the logical form of "Some students of English will get Firsts this year." We should think the above suggestion no more convincing in the case of an utterer who utters ‘At least one student of English will get a First this year.’ Strawson's neo-traditionalist proposal, then, does, if anything, less than the modernist proposal to remove our feeling of separation from the vernacular. Suppose an utterer utters ‘All Smith's children are asleep,’ or ‘Every child sleeps.’ Obviously an utterer will not normally, or properly, utter (iii), unless he believes that Smith has children, who are asleep. But suppose the utterer is mistaken. Suppose Smith has no children.If Smith has no children, is (iii) true or false? "It is true" or "It is false" would seem to Strawson to be misleading. Strawson thinks he is not compelled to give either answer, in spite of what Aristotle says about the Tertium Exclusum. Suppose the utterer utters, ‘The proposition is neither true nor false -- since, since John has no children,, the question whether the proposition is either true or false, does not arise, or rather it's a meaningless question.’ If the logical form of the statement is the modernist one. ~(x)(fx.~gx), the correct answer to the question, whether it is true, would be "Yes," for " ~ (3tf)(/#)" is a sufficient condition of the truth of  ~(3. And, if the form of the statement is  ~(3XA ~&))(/) t or  ~ (3x)(fx . ~gx) .(3x)(fx) . (3x)(~gx). Then the correct answer to the question would be "false," for  ~(3ff)(/#) is inconsistent with both these formulae. Strawson feels one does not happily give either answer simply on the ground that the subject class is empty or vacuous. Strawson feels one might say, rather, that the question is a meaningless question, even if Aristotelian, or that the alleged 'question' regarding the truth or falsity of the statement simply does not arise. Here comes Austin, doing erotetics. One of the conditions (or presuppositions, to echo Collingwood), Strawson thinks, for answering the question one way or the other is not fulfilled.  The adoption of any of the explicitly existential analyses, whether it be a negatively existential one or a conjunction of negatively and positively existential components forces us to conclude that the lack of existence of any children of Smith's is sufficient to determine the truth or falsity of the general statement. A modernist proposal makes it true for the first sub-analysis, false for the two sub-sub-analyses. A more realistic view seems to Strawson to be that the existence of children of Smith's is a necessary pre-condition (or presupposition, to use Collingwood -- cfr. Kneale on 'suppositio' in his Oxford seminar on "The Growth of Logic" -- not merely of the communicatum or explicatum being true, but of its being true or false. And this suggests to Strawson the possibility of interpreting all the four Aristotelian forms -- A, E, I, O -- on these lines; i. e. as forms such that the Collingwoodian question of whether statements exemplifying them are true or false is one that is meaningless or does not arise unless both who makes the question and who is prepared to give an answer believe that the subject class has members, and is not vacuous. It is important to understand why philosophers, Occam included, have hesitated to adopt such a view of at least some specimens of a 'general' (or 'universal') statement.  Strawson thinks that it is probably the operation of the false trichotomy 'either true or false or meaningless ', as applied to statements, which is to blame.  For this false trichotomy -- 'p' is either true or false or meaningless -- contains a confusion, viz. the confusion between and statement -- the communicatum or the explicatum -- and a sentence -- the 'utteratum,' as Austin jocularly calls it -- the 'expressum,' or Grice the 'explicitum.' Of course, the sentence qua expression, ‘All John's children are asleep,’ is not 'meaningless.'  It is perfectly significant, or 'meaningful.’ 'All Smith's children are asleep' 'means' that all Smith's children are asleep, iff, by uttering 'All Smith's children are asleep,' U means that all Smith's children are asleep. But it is senseless to ask, of the sentence, whether it is true or false.  One must distinguish between what can be said about the sentence, and what can be said about the statements made, on different occasions, by the use of the sentence. It is about statements only that the question of truth or falsity can arise; and about these it can sometimes fail to arise.  But to say that the man who uses the sentence in our imagined case fails to say anything either true or false, is not to say that the sentence he pronounces is meaningless. Nor is it to deny that he makes a mistake. Of course, it is incorrect (or deceitful) for him to use this sentence unless he thinks that he is referring to Smith's children, and that he is truthfully predicating 'being asleep' to them.  In Strawson's parlance, borrowed from but never returned to Quine, by using the utterance, the utterer 'commits' himself to the existence of children of John's. Cf. Grice: An utterer is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of his utterance must be capable of referring in order that the utterance be true. It would prima facie be a kind of absurdity to say ‘All John's children are asleep ; but John has no children.’ Cf. 'The king of France is not bald, since France is a republic.' Grice agrees that uttering 'The king of France is bald' if France is a republic is uttering something false. 'The king of France is bald and France is a republic' is not a valid cancellation because the existence is ENTAILED, not IMPLICATED, in the affirmative case. And we may be tempted to think of this kind of absurdity as a straightforward self-contradiction ; and hence be led once more towards a neo-traditionalist analysis; and hence to the conclusion that the man who says, in the affirmative, All John's children are asleep ', when John has no children, makes a false statement. The modernist will say he makes a TRUE statement, because 'all' (Ax) involves 'if' "Every S is P" "(x) If Sx, Px,” where the 'if' is taken as the horse-shoe. But Strawson claims that there is no need to be led, by noticing this kind of absurdity, towards this conclusion.  For, Strawson claims that, if, with Collingwood, we say that a statement S 'pre-supposes' ('supponit,' alla Kneale, 'implicates,' alla Grice) a statement S' in that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth-orfalsity of S, of course there will be a kind of absurdity in conjoining S with the denial of S'. This is precisely the relation, in our imagined case, between the statements ‘All Smith's children are asleep’ and ‘Smith has children; there exist children of John's.’ But we must distinguish this kind of absurdity from straightforward self-contradiction. It is self-contradictory to conjoin the first statement with the denial of the second statement if the second statement is a necessary condition of the truth, simply, of the first statement. It is a different kind of absurdity to conjoin the first statement with the denial of the second statement if the second statement is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the first statement. The relation in the first case is such that the first statement ‘entails’ the second statement. We need a different expression for the relation between S and S' in the second case. Let us say, as above, with Collingwood, -- cf. Kneale on 'supponit' -- that the first statement pre-supposes the second statement. Cf. Grice, ‘S implicates S’.’ Underlying the failure to distinguish sentence and statement, and the bogus trichotomy of 'true, false, or meaningless,' we may detect a further logical prejudice which helps to blind us, Starwson thinks, to the facts of 'ordinary' language.  We may describe this as the belief or, perhaps better, as the wish, that if the uttering of a sentence by one person, at one time, at one place, results in a true statement, the uttering of that sentence by any other person, at any other time, at any other place, results in a true statement. It is, of course, incredible that any formal logician should soberly believe this (cf. Russell's egocentricity). It is, however, very natural that they should wish it were so; and hence talk as if it were so. And to those tempted to talk as if it were so, the distinction Strawson insists upon between sentence and statement will not occur or will seem unimportant. Why this wish-belief should be natural, in principle, only to an "'ideal'-language" philosopher -- unless you are such an "'extra-ordinary' language" philosopher as Grice is! What Strawson is proposing, then, is this. There are many ordinary sentences beginning with such phrases as: UNIVERSAL: "all,” "all the,” "no,” "none of the" and EXISTENTIAL -- "some (at least one),” "some (at least one) of the" -- which exhibit, in their standard employment, parallel characteristics to those Strawson describes in the case of a representative ' All . . .' sentence, i. e., the existence of members of the subject-class is to be regarded as presupposed (in the special usage Strawson describes) by statements made by the use of these sentences; to be regarded as a necessary condition, not of the truth simply, but of the truth or falsity, of such statements. Strawson is proposing that the four Aristotelian forms should be interpreted as forms of statement of this kind. Will the adoption of this proposal protect the system from the charge of being inconsistent when interpreted? Obviously it will. For every case of invalidity, of breakdown in the laws, arises from the non-existence of members of some subject-class being compatible with the truth, or with the falsity, of some statement of one of the four forms. So Strawson's neo-traditionalist proposal, which makes the non-existence of members of the subject-class incompatible with either the truth or the falsity of any statement of these forms, will cure all these troubles at one stroke. We are to imagine that every logical rule of the system, when expressed in terms of truth and falsity, is preceded by the phrase c. Assuming that the statements concerned are either true or false, then . . .'  Thus the rule that A is the contradictory of O states that, if corresponding statements of the A and forms both have truth-values, tthey must have opposite truth-values. The rule that A entails I states that, if corresponding statements of these forms have truth-values, if the statement of the A form is true, the statement of the I form must be true, and so on. The suggestion that entailment-rules should be understood in this way is not peculiar to the present case  (Compare Strawson’s discussion of the truth-functional system, pp. 68-69. What is peculiar to the present case is the requirement that, in order for any statement of one of the four forms to have a truth-value, to be true or false, it is necessary that the subject class should have members. That the adoption of this suggestion will save the rules of the traditional Aristotelian system from breakdown is obvious enough for all the rules except, perhaps, those permitting, or involving the validity of, the simple conversion of E and of I. That the subject class referred to in a statement of either of these forms must be non-empty in order for the statement to be true or false does not guarantee, in the case of the truth of an E statement or the falsity of an I statement, the non-emptiness of the predicate class. This is the reason why the interpretations requires three components for each form instead of two.  But, whilst this is true, it does not constitute an objection, nor lead to the breakdown of the rules as we are now to understand them. Thus perhaps a statement of the logical form * xEy ' might be true while the corresponding statement of the logical form *Eo? ' was neither true nor false. But all that we require is that so long as corresponding statements of the logical forms  'xl& ' and fc yE*x r are both either true or false, they must either be both true or both false. This is secured to us by interpreting * x&y ' as the logical form of hosts of ordinary statements, beginning with ‘No …’ or ‘None of the …',  of the kind described in this section. Similar considerations hold for I. Mention of "I" reminds us of one not unimportant reservation we must make, before simply concluding that the constants "not" (or "no") and the quantifiers, "all" and "some (at least one") of the traditional system can be understood, without danger to any of the rules, as having just the SENSE which 'not,' 'no,' 'all' and 'some (at least one), have in the hosts of ordinary statements of the kind we are discussing. And this is a point already made (by Warnock, "Metaphysics in Logic,") viz., that 'some (at least one)', in its most common employment as a separate word, carries an implicature of plurality which is inconsistent with the requirement that should be the strict contradictory of A, and I of E. So 'some (at least one),' occurring as a constant of the system, is to be interpreted as 'some (at least one'), or 'some (at least one) of the ...', while * all ' and * no ', so occurring, can be read as themselves. Strawson feels that the neo-traditionalist interpretation for the traditional forms has, then a few merits. Strawson thinks the neo-traditionalist reading enables the whole body of the laws of the system to be accepted without inconsistency. With the reservation noted above, it gives the constants of the system: 'not,' 'no,' and the quantifiers 'all' and 'some (at least one)' just the SENSE which these devices have in a vast group of statements of ordinary speech. And it emphasizes an important general feature of statements of that group, viz., that while the existence of members of their subject-classes is not a part of what is asserted -- EXPRESSUM, EXPLICITUM -- in such statement, it is, in the sense we have examined, alla Collingwood, presupposed -- OR CONVENTIONALLY, or CONVERSATIONALLY (in the case of the negative) IMPLICATED -- by them. It is this last feature which makes it unplausible to regard an assertion of existence as either the whole, or conjunctive or disjunctive parts, of the SENSE of such ordinary statements as ‘All the men at work on the scaffolding have gone home’or ‘Some of the men are still at work.’ This was the reason why Strawson is unhappy about regarding such expressions as ' (x)(fxDgx) '  as giving the logical form of these sentences ; and why Strawson's uneasiness is not to be removed by the simple addition of positively or negatively existential formulae. ENTER GRICE. Even the resemblance (for Grice, equivalence in terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an syntactically structured non-complete expression) between (G) There is not a single volume in my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and the negatively existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is deceptive, ‘It is not the case that there exists an x  such that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s library and x is written by an Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a single volume in uncle’s library which is not by an English author' -- as normally used, carries the presupposition -- or entails, for Grice --  (G2) Some (at least one) book is in Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There is not a single volume in Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’ is far from being 'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that there is some (at least one) book in my room. If we give ‘There not a single book in my room which is not by an English author’ the modernist logical form ‘~ (Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see that this is ENTAILED by the briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we have not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense, crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage; insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.), earlier oltrage (11c.), From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’ excess," from Latin ultra, beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings, principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen, "to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old French oultrager. From 1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage.” When Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of course it is not the case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that there there is some (at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said anything false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an utterance which is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice gives Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that Grice thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicature, Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e. it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling, opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from Latin nubes "a cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of Avestan snaoda "clouds,"  Latin obnubere "to veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in English --  'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's library is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a fine point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicatum', the result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s seminar on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of ‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicatum, Grice would say, bringing forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point; logical/pragmatic inference; entailment/implicatum; conveying explicitly/conveying implicitly; stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what an utterer means/what the expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left Oxford after being overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of etiquette inform the rules of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in "Ethics," 1955. If to call such a point, as Grice does, as "irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in that it may be interpreted as saying that that such a fine foggy point is not considered in a modernist formal system of first-order predicate calculus with identity, this Strawson wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his battle cry! But to 'logic' as concerned with this or that relation between this or that general class of statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending general condition under which this or that statement is correctly called 'true' or 'false,' this fine foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S FORMALIST (MODERNIST) INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or assumption, or expectation, a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies and in fact 'explains' the implicatum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the ‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...')  just that kind of an implicatum which Strawson identifies.  But having detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as rushing ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of a nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds," and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare (on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if -- just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening.  The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’ language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ... x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies, as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the ‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of the corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative opening phrase There is not …'.  To avoid misunderstanding one may add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place, results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other time, at any other place.  How far the account by the neo-traditionalist of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of Appuleius,” BANC.

disimplicatum: the target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s Henriette Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under ‘in-tendo,’ which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn ones attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as “intend”! “pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27 Grices tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont intend. In the James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The tie is red in this light), and see to mean hallucinate. The reductive analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicature). Same now with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth, “Uncertainty”): Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices notion of conversational implicature in Davidsons analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicatum here is out of the question ‒ disimplicatum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicatum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicatum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a minimalist approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as the same mistake again of building certainty into the concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicatum at this point is too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational disimplicatum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the agents part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agents belief in the probability of the object of the agents intention was a mere conversational implicatum on the utterers part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of intend, even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational disimplicatum, it can be dropped.  The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicature, disimplicature. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim to fame is implicature, he finds disimplicature an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of intending (without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of see in Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my coffee being an utterance where the disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. Disimplicature does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes, an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire, would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of  appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout, wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply the conversational implicatum to intend! Genial Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.: The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

ditto Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto theory in Analysis of ‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the month of the same name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month or year)," literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to say," from Latin dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik- "to show," also "pronounce solemnly").  Italian used the word to avoid repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this sense it was picked up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the aforesaid, the same thing, same as above" is attested in English by 1670s. In early 19c. a suit of men's clothes of the same color and material through was ditto or dittoes (1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S. radio personality Rush Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.

disjunction: Grice lists ‘or’ as the second binary functor in his response to Strawson. The relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between “D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p, then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or” to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,” we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John, so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John. So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition (that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p, then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either, it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the truth-functional system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)” (exclusive sense) and “p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to say that the expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as ‘or.' While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy to find remarks about disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of disjunction can be traced along Griceian lines. Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the ‘implication’ excursus in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes from WoW, especially essay 4.

dossier: Grice’s favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an essay commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell, Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope. The device in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone isnt attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object.  Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice introduces a subscript device to account for implicata of utterances like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicata of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition and conversational implicature. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two uses of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived, non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed. Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude.  Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude: wanting, which he symbolizes as W.  Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him.Grice notes that there are clearly at least two possible readings of an utterance like our (i): a first reading in which, as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii). A second reading is one in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv). Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. Ja wants that p becomes W^jap where ja stands for the individual constant Jack as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jacks psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent, respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as (Ǝx)W^jaFxja and W^ja(Ǝx)Fxja. Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an intentio seconda.Grice notes: But suppose that Jack wants a specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been deceived into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child. The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent. Let us recall that Grices main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, emptiness! In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading (vii), where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb, but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with Jill being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, since [well,] Jill does not really exist, except as a figment of Jacks imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as purely intentionalist, and thus favouring by far Suppess over Chomskys characterisation of Grice as a mere behaviourist, Grice hopes that we should be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him and Jack wants Jill to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first formulation represents the internal reading (where ji stands for Jill): W₂^ja4F₁ji₃ja₄ and W₃^ja4F₂ji₁ja_4. Note that in the second formulation, the individual constant for Jill, ji, is introduced prior to want, – jis sub-script is 1, while Ws sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. Grice notes: Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading can be true, or alethically satisfactory. Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by wanting with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. He is willing to allow for existential phrases in cases of vacuous designata, provided they occur within opaque psychological-state or attitude verbs, and he thinks that by doing this, he is being faithful to the richness and exuberance of ordinary discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs), as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality! Jill now becomes x. W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5, Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3, Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4. As Grice notes, since in (xii) the individual variable x (ranging over Jill) does not dominate the segment following the (Ǝx) quantifier, the formulation does not display any existential or de re, force, and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully represent ordinary discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist. At least Grice does not write, really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended) that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ, viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles (conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical psychology  ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,” in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.