The conversational implicatum
Grice embarks on a discursus about this or that "aspect" of the concept or concepts, i.e. this or that concept, behind "imply," of "implication" (philosophical Latin, 'implicatio,' translating some Grecian expression).
Grice embarks on an examination of this or that aspect of this or that concept underlying the use of "imply", "using some more or less well-worn examples."
From the philosophical literature, almost.
By using 'well-worn,' he means that he is NOT interested in 'implictaum' per se, but just in a more or less detailed examination.
He has detected a nuance, and he does not want to embark on an enterprise that will 'collide with the conversational facts.'
He has detected a nuance, but, before going to rush ahead and EXPLOIT it, he wants to clarify what kind of a nuance it is.
In this, he is following his usual trajectory.
Bring the distinction:
what an utterer means by uttering this or that expression.
what the expression may later and derivatively be said to 'mean.'
Surely an 'expression' does not 'intend,' so an expression does not 'mean.'
The project is meta-linguistic, as it were, or meta-philosophical, because now Grice is not, say, concerned with "I," or with "not," but, as he did when exploring Stevenson and Peirce, with "communicate."
Surely he wants to see 'imply' as falling under 'communicate.'
By uttering x, U means/implies/suggests/hints that p iff U communicates that p.
Grice entitles the exploration, "Implication."
This is interesting. In English, when he entitled his lecture for the Oxford philosophical society, he used 'meaning,' which is ambiguous between the noun (Philosophical Latin, "significatio") and the verb (Philosophical Latin, "significare,")
Here, the options are "Implying," versus "Implication."
But "Implying" had NOT made it into the range of keywords as used by philosophers, so he has to be careful, and opts for the more traditional label, 'implication.'
Surely he'll later revert to the Latinate "implicatum," as if to mark a distinction between the 'conversational implicature' (he finds 'implicature,' like 'utterance', has a 'conventient' act/object ambiguity) and other types of implication he is hardly interested in, in not dealing with conversation as rational co-operation.
Grice introduces four different examples and uses or applies upon them four different ideas or tests as catalysts.
Four and four, as it were.
1) PRESUPPOSITION
2) CONVERSATIONAL implicature, generalised.
3) CONVERSATIONAL implicature, particularised.
4) CONVENTIONAL implicature, or implicatum.
FOUR CATALYSTS:
1) CANCELLABILITY
2) VEHICLE
3) NON-DETACHABILITY
4) SATISFACTORINESS.
The four examples are all "cases in which in 'ordinary' parlance,"
if you are an Oxonian philosopher
"or at least in 'philosophical' parlance,"
which at Oxford, or in Oxonian parlance, means, in 'ordinary philosophical parlance,'
"something or other," strictly a proposition 'p,'
"might be said to be implied as distinct from being stated."
The explicitum-implicitum distinction.
The explicatum-implicatum distinction.
Note that he's using 'stating' as the ground-floor central speech act.
"Implying" is rather a 'higher-level' NON-CENTRAL speech act.
This is important.
Giving and receiving information (via stating) and influencing and being influenced by others (via ordering) can occur at the EXPLICIT level, and the principle of conversational helpfulness still applies.
But giving and receiving information (via implying) and influencing and being influenced by others (via implying) still operate under the governance of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
It might be argued that 'rationality' SHOWS more with the conversational implicatum than it shows with the conversational explicatum.
That is because Grice is operating with the idea that the explicatum is rather boringly 'conventional,' or arbitrary; whereas in figures of speech like 'suggestio falsi,' and such, the ratiocinative powers of the *addressee* (who is the one who does the CALCULATING) use the 'principle of conversational helpfulness' as one of the premises.
In the case of the utterer, the goal-directed behaviour is a reflection on the addressee's calculability. The utterer must plan his utterance so that what he implies will be 'recovered' by the addressee, and again using the principle of conversational helpfulness as one of the premises, now in the planning.
GRICE'S FIRST PAIR OF EXAMPLES of 'implying' as opposed to 'stating':
(l)
Smith has not left off beating his wife.
where
"what is implied is that Smith HAS been beating his wife."
But this is cancellable:
1b. Smith has not left off beating his wife, because he never did beat his wife.
Perhaps not 'ordinary' parlance, but surely 'philosophical' parlance!
GRICE'S SECOND EXAMPLE:
conventional implicatum
(2)
She was poor but she was honest
and her parents were the same
till she met a city feller
and she lost her honest name
'tis the same the whole world over
(Grice's father played it in C major).
Cf. Frege on 'aber' as "Farbung," neither "Sinn" nor "Bedeutung."
Grice's other examples: 'so,' 'therefore,' 'on the other hand.'
where
"what is implied is (very roughly) that there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty."
whoever _she_ was.
By expliciting the implicitum as "between poverty and honesty," he is referring to the REFRAIN of the ditty: the implicatum indeed refers to her parents, and the moral is that the poor get the blame for the rich's dishonesty.
Grice notes:
"The first example is a stock case of what is sometimes called "presupposition"."
Even by Occam. Occam's favourite example was:
"Have you stopped eating iron?"
Grice goes on:
"and it is often held that here the truth (1) of what is irnplied is a NECESSARY condition of the original statement's being either true (1) or false (0)."
"This might be disputed, but it is at least arguable that it IS so, and its being arguable might be enough to distinguish this type of case from others."
Note however the cancellation in the NEGATIVE version of the 'presupposition,' which makes it less arguable that this is a 'different' type of 'implying' from the conversational implicatum.
Grice:
"I shall however for convenience assume that the common view mentioned is correct."
Which also depends on a binary truth-value assignation ('two-valued' logic, as he'll put it in "Logic and Conversation"). Notably with the operator "not" and a non-bivalent logic, the implicatum becomes altogether a 'different animal'!
"This consideration [about 1s and 0s] clearly distinguishes (1) from (2)."
"Even IF the implied proposition is false (0), i.e., if there is no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement could still be false (0)."
""She was poor but she was honest" would be false (0) if for example she were rich and dishonest."
In fact, Maloney had this version:
"She was rich and quite dishonest,
and her parents were the same
till she met a poor good feller
and he gained a honest name."
"One might perhaps be less comfortable about assenting to its TRUTH (1) if the implied contrast did not in fact obtain."
But that's because one usually disregards levels in speech acts, or central versus non-central (peripheric) acts of communication.
"But the possibility of falsity (0) is enough for the immediate purpose."
Grice's next experiment on these two examples -- of alleged 'presupposition' or 'the prae-suppositum' and the alleged 'conventional implicatum' -- is to ask WHAT it is in each case which could properly be said to be the 'vehicle' of implication (to do the implying).
Is it the utterer? -- That is Grice's main implicature.
If it ain't, I'm not caring for it!
There are at least four candidates, not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Supposing someone to have uttered one or other of my sample sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be:
CANDIDATE I for vehicle of implying (what or who DOES the implying).
(a) what the utterer said (or asserted or stated or explicitly conveyed), or
CANDIDATE II for vehicle of implying (what or who does the implying):
(b) the utterer himself ("does he imply that ...'?) or
CANDIDATE III for vehicle of implying (what or who does the implying):
(c) the words or the expression E the utterer U used, or
CANDIDATE IV for vehicle of implying (what or who does the implying):
(d) the utterer's saying or explicitly conveying that (or again his saying that in this or that way); or possibly some plurality of these items.
As regards the first candidate, (a), what the utterer asserted, "I think (1) and (2) differ."
"I think it would be correct to say in the case of (l) that WHAT the utterer U says (or asserts of explicitly conveys) does imply that Smith had been beating this wife."
"Yet it would be incorrect to say in the case of (2) that WHAT the utterer U says (or asserts or explicitly conveys) implies that there is a contrast between e.g., honesty and poverty."
A test on which Grice would rely is the following.
A meta-if:
IF accepting that the implication (or implicatum) does hold involves the philosopher in accepting a proposition of the form, 'if p, q' where 'p' represents the original statement ("Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife," "She was poor but she was honest") and 'q' represents what is implied, the implicatum ("He had been beating her," "There is a contrast between honesty and poverty"), WHAT the utterer U says (or asserts or explicitly conveys) is the vehicle of implication, otherwise not."
So let's consider the 'otherwise not' for the case of 'but':
In "She was poor but she was honest"
the philosopher NEED NOT accept, and in fact refuse to accept the 'horseshoe' statement:
She was poor but she was honest
HORSESHOE
There is a contrast between honesty and poverty
To apply this rule to the given examples:
If the addressee accepts that Smith has been beating her wife, the addressee "should feel compelled" to accept
"If Smith hasn't left off beating his wife, he has been beating her."
It's stronger with the affirmative counterpart.
Whereas if the addressee accepts that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, the addressee
"should NOT feel compelled" to accept:
If she was poor but she was honest, there is some contrast between her poverty and her honesty.
The two other candidates (ONE OF WHICH IS KEY FOR GRICE the rationalist) can be dealt with more cursorily.
One should be inclined to say, with regard to both (l) and (2), that the UTTERER himself may be deemed to imply, or indeed IMPLIES whatever it is that is implied."
I.
By uttering "Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife," the UTTERER implies that Smith has been beating his wife, or it's the utterer who implies that Smith has been beating his wife, or the utterer HIMSELF implies that Smith has been beating his wife.
II
By uttering "She was poor but she was honest," the UTTERER implies that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, or it's the utterer who implies that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, or the utterer HIMSELF implies that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty.
In the case of "She was poor but she was honest" it seems fairly clear that the UTTERER's expression may be said or deemed to imply a contrast.
It is much less clear or obvious whether in the case of "Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife," the utterer's expression may be said or deemed to imply that Smith had been beating his wife.
In neither case would it be EVIDENTLY, or clearly or perspicuously APPROPRIATE to speak of the utterer's saying that, or of his saying that in this or that way, or in that PARTICULAR way, or in THAT way, as implying what is implied.
The third idea, catalyst, or test, with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication.
These terms will be explained, so do not worry.
Consider example (1):
Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife.
One cannot seem to find a form of expression which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence "Smith has left off beating his wife" might be used (by the utterer) to assert such that when this other or alternative form of expression is so used by the utterer the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just absent.
ANY possible way of asserting (using any possible expression, of philosophical interest or not) what is asserted in (1) involves, or attaches to, the implication in question.
I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the implication is not detachable from what is asserted (or, simpliciter, is not detachable).
But philosophers should be concerned with philosophically interesting concepts which ARE detached from this or that way of putting it.
We may be language botanists, but we love variety!
CANCELLATION:
Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words or an alternative expression for which both what is asserted (or explicitly conveyed) and what is implied by the utterer is the same as for (l), and THEN go on and add a further clause withholding "conversational," rational, commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the idea of annulling (or cancelling, or pre-empting, or voiding) the implication *without* annulling the assertion or statement or what the UTTERER has explicitly conveyed (to wit: that Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife").
One can intelligibly, i.e. conceptually intelligibly, utter:
"Smith hasn't left off beating his wife, but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her."
The problem is with the AFFIRMATIVE:
One CANNOT intelligibly, i.e., conceptually intelligibly, utter:
"Smith HAS left off beating his wife, but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her."
Grice expresses this fact by saying that in the case of (1), an affirmative sentence carrying a presupposition, as opposed to its negative counterpart, the implication is NOT cancellable (without thereby cancelling the assertion).
If we turn to (2), "She was poor but she was honest," we find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the implication IS detachable.
There seems quite a good case for maintaining that if, instead of saying "She was poor but she is was honest " I were to say "She was poor *and* she was honest", I would assert (state or explicitly convey -- but this is a trick) just what I would have asserted if I had used the original "but" sentence.
But there would now be no implication of a contrast between, e. g., poverty and honesty.
Other than perhaps, why state her honesty and her poverty in the first place?
An otiose state-of-affairs.
What Tommy would be singing,
"She was poor and she was honest"
?
But the question whether, in the case of "She was poor but she was honest," thc implication is cancellable by the utterer, a human agent, is slightly more complex.
There is a scenario in which I may say that it is non-cancellable, i.e. not cancellable.
The human agent, the utterer, cannot CANCEL "p," when the utterer implies that p.
If someone is to say
"She was poor but she was honest, though, of course, I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between poverty and honesty."
This would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said by a Tommy.
But though we should wish to quarrel with the utteerer, er, the Tommy, I personally do not think I should go so far as to say that the utterer's or the Tommy's utterance is unintelligible.
We should suppose that the utterer or the tommy has adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the news that she was poor and she was honest.
But perhaps there's a sub-cancellation:
"She was poor, but she was honest; I do not mean to imply that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, only between HER honesty and HER poverty."
Or:
"She was poor, but she was honest; I do not mean to imply that there is a contrast between her honesty and her poverty, only between honesty in general and poverty in general."
SATISFACTORINESS.
What's the implicatural matter?
The fourth and last test or catalyst or idea that I wish to impose or use or apply on my examples is to ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that the appropriate or alleged implication is present ("the utterer implies that p") as being a matter of the MEANING of some particular, specific expression, word or phrase, occurring in the sentence the utterer utters.
Speaking of 'meaning' here should be re-analysed:
The utterer implies that p.
The utterer means that p.
For simplicity's sake, if we have
p IMPLIES q
we'll have:
The utterer implies that q.
The utterer means that p.
And then we may play on the second claim, alla:
'p' MEANS that p.
And so on.
Where 'p' is what I refer above as the 'expression' (word or phrase) in the sentence token uttered by the utterer.
I am aware that this may not be always a very clear or easy question to answer, since, well, it involves A. J. Ayer's meaning!
And at this point one might want to consult "Meaning" in "The Philosophical Review" (originally a talk to the Oxford Philosophical Society, 1948, based on a seminar on Peirce on meaning).
Nevertheless, I will risk the assertion that we would be fairly happy to say that, as regards "She was poor but she was honest," the fact that the implication obtains is a matter of the (as it happens, as it is standardly the case, pretty arbitrary and conventional) MEANING of the expression or word 'but,' as it is generally used.
I am told that the Anglo-Saxons lacked this word, which is a contraction of "by-out"
"She was poor by-out she was honest."
but (adv., prep.)
Old English
butan,
buton
best rendered as "unless", "with the exception of," "without," or "outside."
"butan" or "buton" is from West Germanic hypothetical *be-utan -- i.e. a compound of *be-, i.e. by, + *utana "out, outside; from without," some typically Germanic amplification from ut "out," adv.
"butan" and "buton" is NOT used as a CONJUNCTION (dyadic truth-functor) until LATE Old English, "on the contrary."
Usages attested in later English include "however"
"yet"
"no more than."
As an introductory expression, early 13c.
As a noun, "an objection, an exception" ('no buts about it) from late 14c.
Som man preiseth his neighebore by a wikked entente, foralwey he maketh a 'but' at the laste ende, that is digne of moore blame than worth is al the preisynge. [Chaucer, "Parson's Tale"]
And at Clifton, we used to recite the 'alla' and the old Roman, too!
και:
Connective conjunction, resumptive adverb, "and."
Theoretically the adverbial use is the original.
Most often prepositive.
αλλα:
Adversative conjunction, resumptive adverb.
"But". Most often prepositive. Usually follows a negative clause or sentence.
μεν: resumptive or progressive adverb, untranslatable in most cases. Often paired with:
δε: connective or adversative conjunction used with sentences instead of individual phrases, often progressive. Often paired with men, to give the meaning "Men X, de Y."
"On the one hand X, on the other hand Y".
αρα: marking a consequent thought. progressive. Also, a confirmative.
γε: Either intensive or restrictive, "indeed", "at least".
Grice was taught at Clifton that "ge" is best translated by raising one eyebrow.
γαρ: confirmatory adverb and causative conjunction. Often used after a question as a confirmatory adverb.
δη: postpositive, marks an immediate thought or present statement, often obvious or naturally progressing.
η: adversative conjunction (disjunction). paired "e X, e Y", "Either X, or Y".
η: (with circumflex) asseverative. "In truth, verily".
νυν: "now", either with a causal or progressive sense, often inferential; rarely temporal.
μην: asseverative, emphasizing a whole statement or single word.
ουν: postpositive, confirmatory or inferential
τε: correlative conjunction; enclitic
cf. Cicero on 'sed' or 'set'
sĕd or sĕt ,
I.conj. [cf. Freund, Cic. Mil. p. 8 sq.; old and orig. form sedum, acc. to Charis. p. 87 P., and Mar. Vict. p. 2458 P.; but more prob. an ablative from root of the reflexive pron. so- for suo-, and orig. the same with the insep. prep. 2. sēd; prop., by itself, apart; hence, but, only, etc.; cf. Corss. Ausspr. 1, p. 200 sq.], a particle of limitation, exception, or correction (cf. at and autem init.).
I. In gen., but, yet: “ipsum regale genus civitatis reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum: sed ita, quoad statum suum retinet, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 2, 23, 43: “Neoptolemus apud Ennium Philosophari sibi ait necesse esse, sed paucis: nam omnino haud placere,” id. Tusc. 2, 1, 1; cf. id. Rep. 1, 18, 33: “C. Memmius perfectus litteris, sed Graecis,” id. Brut. 70, 247: “nactus es (me otiosum), sed mehercule otiosiorem operā quam animo,” id. Rep. 1, 9, 14: “quae observanda essent, multa constituit (Numa), sed ea sine impensa,” id. ib. 2, 14, 27; cf. id. ib. 1, 31, 47: “miser homo est, qui, etc....sed ille miserior qui, etc.,” Plaut. Capt. 3, 1, 2: “vera dico, sed nequicquam, quoniam non vis credere,” id. Am. 2, 2, 205: “video te testimoniis satis instructum: sed apud me argumenta plus quam testes valent,” Cic. Rep. 1, 38, 59: “(Platonis civitatem) praeclaram illam quidem fortasse, sed a vitā hominum abhorrentem et moribus,” id. ib. 2, 11, 21; cf. id. ib. 1, 40, 63: “sed id ubi jam penes sese habent, ex bonis pessumi sunt,” Plaut. Capt. 2, 1, 37: “nostri casus plus honoris habuerunt quam laboris, etc....Sed si aliter ut dixi accidisset: qui possem queri? etc.,” Cic. Rep. 1, 4, 7: “istos captivos sinito ambulare, si foris, si intus volent. Sed uti asserventur magnā diligentiā,” Plaut. Capt. 1, 2, 6: “non possum dicere...sed neque his contentus sum,” Cic. Rep. 1, 22, 36: nec sum in ullā re molestus civitatibus; “sed fortasse tibi, qui haec praedicem de me,” id. Att. 5, 21, 7: “non sum tantopere admiratus, sed posteaquam coepit rationem exponere,” id. Rep. 1, 14, 22: “non perfectum illud quidem, sed tolerabile est,” id. ib. 1, 26, 42: “sane bonum rei publicae genus, sed tamen inclinatum et quasi pronum ad perniciosissimum statum,” id. ib. 2, 26, 48: “scio tibi ita placere: sed tamen velim scire, etc.,” id. ib. 1, 30, 46; cf. Plaut. As. 2, 2, 72: “difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen,” Cic. Rep. 1, 43, 66: “in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa natura saepe rationem,” id. ib. 2, 33, 57: illa quidem tristis, nec adhuc interrita vultu: Sed regina tamen, sed opaci maxima mundi; “Sed tamen inferni pollens matrona tyranni,” Ov. M. 5, 507 sq.; cf. id. ib. 7, 718: “plerique patriae, sed omnes famā atque fortunis expertes,” Sall. C. 33, 1: “ipsum quidem regem assecutus non est, sed magnam partem agminis oppresserunt,” Liv. 36, 19: “plus aegri ex abitu viri quam ex adventu voluptatis cepi. Sed hoc me beat saltem, quod perduelles vicit,” Plaut. Am. 2, 2, 15: “apponam urnam jam ego hanc in mediā viā. Sed autem, quid si hanc hinc abstulerit quispiam?” but then, id. Rud. 2, 5, 15 (cf. in the foll. II. A. 2.): “statim Luculli ... eum domum suam receperunt. Sed enim hoc non solum ingenii ac litterarum, verum etiam naturae, etc.,” but indeed, Cic. Arch. 3, 5: “progeniem sed enim Trojano a sanguine duci Audierat,” Verg. A. 1, 19; 2, 164; 5, 395; “6, 28 et saep. (cf. also infra, II. A. 2.): sed enimvero, cum detestabilis altera res sit, quid ad deliberationem dubii superesse?” Liv. 45, 19, 14.—Very rarely with non (for nec tamen), introducing a qualification of a previous word: “Academici veteres beatum quidem esse etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum,” Sen. Ep. 71, 18.
II. In partic.
A. Interrupting the discourse by transition to another subject or by ending the speech.
1. In a transition to another subject: “tristis sit (servus), si eri sint tristes: hilarus sit, si gaudeant. Set age, responde: jam vos redistis in gratiam?” Plaut. Am. 3, 3, 7; cf. id. ib. 5, 1, 20; “5, 1, 26: non impedio, praesertim quoniam feriati sumus. Sed possumus audire aliquid, an serius venimus?” Cic. Rep. 1, 13, 20: “nunc reliquorum oratorum aetates et gradus persequamur. Curio fuit igitur ejusdem aetatis fere, etc. ... Scripsit etiam alia nonnulla, etc.... Sed ecce in manibus vir praestantissimo ingenio... C. Gracchus,” id. Brut. 33, 125; cf.: “sed eccum Amphitruonem, etc.,” Plaut. Am. 3, 4, 22; id. Aul. 2, 1, 55; 3, 5, 62; id. Capt. 5, 3, 20; 5, 4, 8 al.: “sed quid ego cesso?” id. As. 1, 1, 112: sed ista mox; “nunc audiamus Philum, quem, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 1, 13, 20 fin. et saep.—In recurring to a previous subject: “sed ad instituta redeamus,” Cic. Brut. 61, 220: “sed redeamus rursus ad Hortensium,” id. ib. 84, 291: “sed jam ad id, unde degressi sumus, revertamur,” id. ib. 88, 300: “sed perge de Caesare et redde quae restant,” id. ib. 74, 258 et saep.—Hence, after parenthetic clauses, but, now, I say, etc.: “equidem cum audio socrum meam Laeliam (facilius enim mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant, quod multorum sermonis expertes ea tenent semper quae prima didicerunt) sed eam sic audio, ut Plautum mihi aut Naevium videar audire,” Cic. de Or. 3, 12, 45: “qui (Pompeius) ut peroravit (nam in eo sane fortis fuit: non est deterritus: dixit omnia, atque interdum etiam silentio, cum auctoritate semper), sed ut peroravit, surrexit Clodius,” id. Q. Fr. 2, 3, 2.—
2. In breaking off, discontinuing speech: “sed satis verborum est: cura quae jussi atque abi,” Plaut. Capt. 1, 2, 16: “sed, si placet, in hunc diem hactenus,” Cic. Rep. 2, 44, 71: “sed haec hactenus,” id. Off. 1, 39, 140 al.: sed quid ego haec memoro? Enn. ap. Prisc. p. 724 P. (Ann. v. 318 Vahl.): “nec requievit enim, donec Calchante ministro—Sed quid ego haec autem nequicquam ingrata revolvo? Quidve moror?” Verg. A. 2, 101: sed enim, οἰκονομία (epistulae) si perturbatior est, tibi assignato: te enim sequor, σχεδιάζοντα, but indeed, Cic. Att. 6, 1, 11; so, “sed enim,” Verg. A. 1, 19.—
B. After negative clauses, to limit the negative statement, i. e. to indicate either that the assertion does not hold good at all, but something else does instead; or else that it is not exclusively true, but something else holds good in addition, but, on the contrary; and in an ascending signif., but also, but even, but in fact, etc.
1. In a simple opposition: non cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes, Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrique, Enn. ap. Cic. Off. 1, 12, 38 (Ann. v. 201 Vahl.); cf.: haud doctis dictis certantes, sed maledictis ...Non ex jure manu consertum sed magi' ferro Rem repetunt, id. ap. Gell. 20, 10 (Ann. v. 274 sq. Vahl.): “non ego erus tibi, sed servus sum,” Plaut. Capt. 2, 1, 44: “quae (hominum vestigia) ille (Aristippus) non ex agri consiturā, sed ex doctrinae indiciis interpretabatur,” Cic. Rep. 1, 17, 29: “nec leges imponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam, ut legem, praefert suis civibus,” id. ib. 1, 34, 52; “1, 13, 19: neque hac nos patria lege genuit, ut...sed ut, etc.,” id. ib. 1, 4, 8: “non quod...sed quod, etc.,” id. ib. 1, 18, 30.—With contra: “non liberis servitutem, sed contra servientibus libertatem afferre,” Liv. 4, 18 init.— “Several times repeated: non sibi se soli natum, sed patriae, sed suis,” Cic. Fin. 2, 14, 45 Madv. ad loc.: “quod non naturā exoriatur, sed judicio, sed opinione,” id. Tusc. 3, 34, 82: “sed publicam, sed ob frumentum decretam, sed a publicanis faenore acceptam,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 72, § 169; id. Planc. 10, 24: “non eros nec dominos appellat eos ...sed patriae custodes, sed patres et deos,” id. Rep. 1, 41, 64; Tib. 1, 7, 44 sq.: quam tibi non Perseus, verum si quaeris, ademit; “Sed grave Nereïdum numen, sed corniger Hammon, Sed quae visceribus veniebat belua ponti Exsaturanda meis,” Ov. M. 5, 17 sq.: “sed Pompeium, sed Lepidum,” Tac. A. 1, 10; Sen. Const. 13, 4; id. Ben. 1, 1, 6; 1, 7, 3: “non praefectum ab iis, sed Germanicum ducem, sed Tiberium imperatorem violari,” Tac. A. 1, 38 et saep.—
2. In a climax.
a.Non modo (solum, tantum, etc.)...sed or sed etiam (et, quoque), not only, not merely ...but, but also, but even, but indeed (sed, standing alone, isolates the ascending idea, while an appended etiam, et, or quoque places it in closer connection with the first statement, and thus permits them to be viewed together): “non modo falsum illud esse, sed hoc verissimum,” Cic. Rep. 2, 44, 71: “quod non modo singulis hominibus, sed potentissimis populis saepe contingit,” id. ib. 5, 8, 11; “3, 10, 17: id ei perpetuā oratione contigit, non modo ut acclamatione, sed ut convitio et maledictis impediretur,” id. Q. Fr. 2, 3, 2: “unius viri consilio non solum ortum novum populum, sed adultum jam et paene puberem,” id. Rep. 2, 11, 21; cf.: “nec vero corpori soli subveniendum est, sed menti atque animo multo magis,” id. Sen. 11, 36: “volo ut in scaenā, sic in foro non eos modo laudari, qui celeri motu utantur, sed eos etiam, quos statarios appellant,” id. Brut. 30, 116; id. Rep. 1, 8, 13: “omnia ejus non facta solum, sed etiam dicta meminisset,” id. ib. 6, 10, 10: “neque solum fictum, sed etiam imperite absurdeque fictum,” id. ib. 2, 15, 28; 1, 3, 4; “1, 34, 51: neque vero se populo solum, sed etiam senatui commisit, neque senatui modo, sed etiam publicis praesidiis et armis, neque his tantum, verum ejus potestati, cui, etc.,” id. Mil. 23, 61: “haec non delata solum, sed paene credita,” id. ib. 24, 64: “nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis,” id. Lael. 27, 102: “illum non modo favisse sed et tantam illi pecuniam dedisse honoris mei causā,” id. Att. 11, 9, 2: “omnes civiles dissensiones, neque solum eas, quas audistis, sed et has, quas vosmet ipsi meministis et vidistis,” id. Cat. 3, 10, 24: “multiplicatusque terror non infimis solum, sed primoribus patrum,” Liv. 3, 36, 5: “non responsum solum benigne legatis est, sed Philippi quoque filius Demetrius ad patrem reducendus legatis datus est,” id. 36, 35 fin.: “conciti per haec non modo Cherusci, sed conterminae gentes,” Tac. A. 1, 60; 3, 44: “via non angusta modo, sed plerumque praerupta,” Curt. 3, 4, 12; 5, 1, 20 Mützell ad loc.—
(β). Esp., in passing from the part to the whole, from the particular to the universal (usually followed by omnino, or by omnis, cunctus, totus, universus, etc.): “timebat non ea solum quae timenda erant, sed omnia,” Cic. Mil. 24, 66: “neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti,” id. Off. 1, 28, 99: “nec sibi tantum, sed universis singulisque consulere,” Sen. Ben. 2, 5, 4: “non consuli modo, sed omnibus civibus enitendum,” Plin. Pan. 2, 1: “non initio tantum, sed continuo totius temporis successu,” Just. 1, 8, 14: “non modo Italiā, sed toto orbe terrarum,” Flor. 1, 16, 3.—Etiam is rarely added: “quotiens non modo ductores nostri, sed universi etiam exercitus ad mortem concurrerunt,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 37, 89; Curt. 5, 1, 24.—
b. Non modo (solum) non...sed, sed etiam; sed ne... quidem, not only not...but, but even, but indeed, but not even, etc.: “ut non modo a mente non deserar, sed id ipsum doleam, me, etc.,” Cic. Att. 3, 15, 2; id. Rep. 2, 23, 43: “judicetur non verbo, sed re non modo non consul, sed etiam hostis Antonius,” id. Phil. 3, 6, 14: “hoc non modo non laudari, sed ne concedi quidem potest,” id. Mur. 3, 8: “iis non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto,” id. Off. 1, 21, 71: “non modo non oppugnator, sed etiam defensor,” id. Planc. 31, 76: “ego contra ostendo, non modo nihil eorum fecisse Sex. Roscium, sed ne potuisse quidem facere,” id. Rosc. Am. 29, 79.—Also, without the second non in the first clause, and with ne quidem, doubly negative (only when both clauses have the same verb; “v. Zumpt, Gram. § 724 b): quod mihi non modo irasci, sed ne dolere quidem impune licet,” Cic. Att. 11, 24, 1: “ea est ratio instructarum navium, ut non modo plures, sed ne singuli quidem possint accedere,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 51, § 133: “non modo aeternam, sed ne diuturnam quidem gloriam assequi possumus,” id. Rep. 6, 21, 23: “ea sunt demum non ferenda in mendacio, quae non solum facta esse, sed ne fieri quidem potuisse cernimus,” id. ib. 2, 15, 28: “quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est,” id. Lael. 24, 89: non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam audebit, id. Off. 2, 19, 77; cf. with vix: “verum haec genera virtutum non solum in moribus nostris, sed vix jam in libris reperiuntur,” id. Cael. 17, 40: “non modo ad expeditiones, sed vix ad quietas stationes viribus sufficiebant,” Liv. 3, 6.—After quisquam with ellipsis of non: “ut non modo praedandi causā quisquam ex agro Romano exiret, sed ultro Fidenates descenderent, etc.,” Liv. 4, 21, 6 (where Weissenb. supplies non in brackets before exiret); cf.: “antiqui non solum erant urbes contenti cingere muris, verum etiam loca aspera et confragosa saxis eligebant,” Hyg. Grom. Limit. p. 197.—
C. As sed, after non modo, acquires an idea of ascent or climax, from the fact that non modo represents a thing as existing (only not existing alone), and thus includes an affirmation, so, too, after purely affirmative clauses, sed sometimes serves as an ascending adjunct, but, but in fact, but also: “ego te hodie reddam madidum, sed vino, probe,” Plaut. Aul. 3, 6, 37: “odore canibus anum, sed multo, replent,” Phaedr. 4, 17, 19: Dae. Curriculo affer Duas clavas. La. Clavas? Dae. Sed probas: “propera cito,” Plaut. Rud. 3, 5, 19.—In good prose usually joined with etiam (or et): “hic mihi primum meum consilium defuit, sed etiam obfuit,” Cic. Att. 3, 15, 5; cf. id. ib. 4, 16, c, 10; “10, 16, 6: Q. Volusium, certum hominem, sed mirifice etiam abstinentem, misi in Cyprum,” id. ib. 5, 21, 6: “hoc in genere si eum adjuveris, apud ipsum praeclarissime posueris, sed mihi etiam gratissimum feceris,” id. Fam. 13, 64, 2: “ex testamento Tiberii, sed et Liviae Augustae,” Suet. Calig. 16; 20.
So far as "Smith hasn't left off beating his wife" is concerned, I should have at least some inclination to say that the presence of the implication IS a matter of the MEANING of SOME of the words in the sentence, but we should be in some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this word, or words are, of which this is true."
I would suggest, as a first shot, "leave off,' which seems otiose.
Also it's trickier in the affirmative:
"Smith has stopped beating his wife."
"Stop"?
The verb Occcam used was "cessare," to cease:
As in
Smith hasn't ceased from beating his wife.
TU NON CESSAS COMEDERE FERRUM
cesso , āvi, ātum, 1,
I.v. freq. n. and a. [1. cedo]; lit., to stand back very much; hence, to be remiss in any thing, to delay, loiter, or, in gen., to cease from, stop, give over (indicating a blamable remissness; while desinere, intermittere, requiescere do not include that idea: cessat desidiosus, requiescit fessus, Don. ad Ter. Eun. 3, 1, 15. Diff. from cunctari in this, that the latter designates inaction arising from want of resolution, but cessare that which is the result of slothfulness; cf. Doed. Syn. 3, p. 300 sq.; “class. in prose and poetry): paulum si cessassem,” Ter. Eun. 4, 4, 5; 4, 6, 16; id. Ad. 4, 2, 49: “si tabellarii non cessarint,” Cic. Prov. Cons. 7, 15: “in suo studio atque opere,” id. Sen. 5, 13: “ne quis in eo, quod me viderit facientem, cesset,” Liv. 35, 35, 16; cf. id. 35, 18, 8: “ab apparatu operum ac munitionum nihil cessatum,” id. 21, 8, 1; 34, 16, 3; 31, 12, 2; Tac. A. 3, 28: “quidquid apud durae cessatum est moenia Trojae,” whatever delay there was, Verg. A. 11, 288: “audaciā,” to be deficient in spirit, Liv. 1, 46, 6; cf.: “nullo umquam officio,” id. 42, 6, 8: “ad arma cessantes Concitet,” Hor. C. 1, 35, 15 et saep.—So in admonitions: “quid cessas?” Ter. And. 5, 6, 15; Tib. 2, 2, 10: “quid cessatis?” Curt. 4, 16, 5: “quor cessas?” Ter. Ad. 4, 5, 69; cf.: cessas in vota precesque (poet. for cessas facere vota), Tros, ait, Aenea? cessas? Verg. A. 6, 51 sq.; Tib. 3, 6, 57.— With dat. incommodi: it dies; “ego mihi cesso,” i. e. to my own injury, Plaut. Ps. 1, 3, 12 Lorenz ad loc.; id. Ep. 3, 2, 8: “sed ego nunc mihi cesso, qui non umerum hunc onero pallio,” Ter. Phorm. 5, 6, 4.—
b. With inf.: “ego hinc migrare cesso,” Plaut. Ep. 3, 2, 6 sq.: “numquid principio cessavit verbum docte dicere?” id. Pers. 4, 4, 3; so, “alloqui,” Ter. And. 2, 2, 6; 5, 2, 4: “adoriri,” id. Heaut. 4, 5, 9: “pultare ostium,” id. ib. 3, 1, 1; id. Phorm. 2, 3, 30: “introrumpere,” id. Eun. 5, 5, 26: “detrahere de nobis,” Cic. Att. 11, 11, 2: “mori,” Hor. C. 3, 27, 58 et saep.—
II. In gen.
A. To be inactive, idle, at leisure, to do nothing: “cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit?” Cic. N. D. 3, 39, 93; cf. id. ib. 1, 9, 22; id. Off. 3, 1, 1: nisi forte ego vobis cessare nunc videor; “cum bella non gero,” id. de Sen. 6, 18: “et si quid cessare potes, requiesce sub umbrā,” Verg. E. 7, 10: “cessabimus una,” Prop. 3 (4), 23, 15. Ov. M. 4, 37: “cur alter fratrum cessare et ludere et ungi praeferat, etc.,” Hor. Ep. 2, 2, 183 (cessare otiari et jucunde vivere, Schol. Crucq.); so id. ib. 1, 7, 57: “per hibernorum tempus,” Liv. 36, 5, 1: “cessatum usque adhuc est: nunc porro expergiscere,” Ter. Ad. 4, 4, 23: “cessatum ducere curam,” put to rest, Hor. Ep. 1, 2, 31: “non timido, non ignavo cessare tum licuit,” Curt. 3, 11, 5.—
b. Of things, to be at rest, to rest, be still, inactive, unemployed, or unused, etc.: “si cessare putas rerum primordia posse, Cessandoque novos rerum progignere motus,” Lucr. 2, 80 sq.: “quid ita cessarunt pedes?” Phaedr. 1, 9, 5: “et grave suspenso vomere cesset opus,” Tib. 2, 1, 6; Ov. F. 6, 348: “Achilles cessare in Teucros pertulit arma sua,” Prop. 2, 8, 30: “cur Berecyntiae Cessant flamina tibiae,” Hor. C. 3, 19, 19: “cessat voluntas?” id. ib. 1, 27, 13: “cessat ira deae,” Liv. 29, 18, 10: “solas sine ture relictas Praeteritae cessasse ferunt Letoïdos aras,” i. e. remained unsought, unapproached, Ov. M. 8, 278; cf.: “at nunc desertis cessant sacraria lucis,” Prop. 3 (4), 13, 47. and: “cessaturae casae,” Ov. F. 4, 804: “cessans honor,” a vacant office, Suet. Caes. 76.—
(β). Of land, to lie uncultivated, fallow (cf. cessatio): “alternis idem tonsas cessare novales,” Verg. G. 1, 71; Plin. 18, 23, 52, § 191; cf. Suet. Aug. 42.—Pass.: “cessata arva,” Ov. F. 4, 617.—Trop., of a barren woman, Paul. Nol. Carm. 6, 48.—
c. Sometimes cessare alicui rei, like vacare alicui rei, to have leisure for something, i.e. to attend to, apply one's self to: “amori,” Prop. 1, 6, 21.—
B. Rarely (prob. not ante-Aug.), not to be at hand or present, to be wanting: “cessat voluntas? non aliā bibam Mercede,” Hor. C. 1, 27, 13: “augendum addendumque quod cessat,” Quint. 2, 8, 10.—Hence,
2. Judic. t. t.
a. Of persons, not to appear before a tribunal, to make default: “culpāne quis an aliquā necessitate cessasset,” Suet. Claud. 15 (where, just before, absentibus; cf. “absum, 8.): quoties delator adesse jussus cessat,” Dig. 49, 14, 2, § 4; so ib. 47, 10, 17, § 20.—
b. Of things (a process, verdict), to be invalid, null, void: “cessat injuriarum actio,” Dig. 47, 10, 17, § 1: “revocatio,” ib. 42, 8, 10, § 1: “edictum,” ib. 39, 1, 1: “senatus consultum,” ib. 14, 6, 12 et saep.—
C. Also rare, in a moral view, to depart from a right way, i.e. to mistake, err: “ut scriptor si peccat... Sic qui multum cessat,” Hor. A. P. 357: “oratoris perfecti illius, ex nullā parte cessantis,” Quint. 1, 10, 4.
I may now deal more briefly with my remaining two examples.
The first in this group is one of a PARTICULARISED conversational implicatum relying on something like a principle of conversational appositeness.
The second in this group is a generalisatio of the former, i.e. a GENERALISED (if there are such things -- Witters denies it!) conversational implicatum.
(3)
A don is reporting on his tutee at Collections.
All the don utters is
Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical.
We might perhaps agree that there is here [hic], i.e. under the Collections scenario only, a strong, even overwhelming, implication that Smith is no good at philosophy.
It is plain that there is no case at all for even regarding the truth (1) of what is implied here as a necessary pre-condition of the truth (1) or falsity (0) of what I have asserted.
A denial of the truth of what is implied would have no bearing at all on whether what I have asserted is true (1) or false (0).
So "Smith has beautiful handwriting" is much closer to "She was poor but she was honest" than "Smith has not ceased from beating his wife" in this respect.
Next, the human agent, the don, the utterer (and NONE but the utterer) could certainly be said to have implied that Smith is hopeless (provided that this is what I intended to get across) and my saying that (at any rate my saying /s/ that and no more) is also certainly a vehicle of implication.
On the other hand my words and what I say (assert) are, I think, not here vehicles of implication. (3) thus differs from both (1) and (2). The implication is cancellable but not detachable; if I add o'I do not of course mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy " my whole utterance is intelligible and linguistically impeccable, even though it may be extraordinary tutorial behaviour; and I can no longer be said to have implied that he was no good, even though perhaps that is what my colleagues might conclude to be the case if I had nothing else to say. The implication is not however, detachable; any other way of making, in the same context of utterance, just the assertion I have made would involve the same implication. Finally, the fact that the implication holds is not a matter of any particular word or phrase within the sentence which I have uttered; so in this respect (3) is certainly different from (2) and, possibly different from (1). One obvious fact should be mentioned before I pass to the last example. This case of implication is unlike the others in that the utterance of the sentence " Jones has beautiful handwriting etc." does not standardly involve the implication here attributed to it; it requires a special context (that it should be uttered at Collections) to attach the implication to its uttgrance. (4) If someone says " My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom " it would normally be implied that he did not know in which of the two rooms she was. This example might well be held to be very similar to the case under dispute, that if such statements as " This looks red to me " so I must be careful not to prejudge any issues to my objector's disadvantage. I think, however, that in the case of (a) I can produce a strong argument in favour of holding that the fulfllment of the THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION implication of the speaker's ignorance is not a precaution of the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. Suppose (c) that the speaker knows that his wife is in the kitchen, (b) that the house has only two rooms (and no passages etc.) Even though (a) is the casc, thc spcaker can certainly say truly " My wife is in the housc "; he is merely not being as informative as he could bc if nccd arose. But the true proposition that his wife is in thc housc together with the true proposition that the house consists entirely of a kitchen and a bedroom, entail the proposition that his wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom. But il to cxpress the proposition p in certain circumstances would bc to spcak truly, and p, togelher with another true proposition, crrtails q, then surely to express 4 in the same circvmstances must be to speak truly. So I shall take it that the disjunctive statement in (4) does not fail to be true or false if the implied ignorance is in fact not realized. Secondly, I think it is fairly clear that in this case, as in the case of (3), we could say that the speaker had irnplied that he did not know, and also that his saying that (or his saying that rather than something else, v2., in which room she was) implied that he did not know. Thirdly, the irnplication is in a sense non-detachable, in that if in a given context the utterance of the disjunctive sentence would involve the implication that the speaker did not know in which room his his wife was, this implication would also be involved in the utterance of any other form of words which would make the same assertion(e.g., "The alternatives are (1) . . . .(2) .. . ." or " One of the following things is the case: (a) . . . . (r) . . . . "). ln another possible sense, however, the implication could perhaps bc said to be detachable: for there will be some contexls of ruttcrance in Which the normal implication will not hold; e.g., thc spokesman who announces, " The next conference will be cither in Geneva or in New York " perhaps does not imply that lrc does not know which; for he may well be just not saying which. This points to the fact that the implication is cancellablg; :r nrarl could say, " My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bctlroorn " in circumstances in which the implication would rrornrally be present, and then go on, " Mind you, I'm not saying tlrrrt I don't know which"; this might be unfriendly (and grcr'lrrps ungrammatical) but would be perfectly intelligible, I2 131 132 H. P. GRICB Finally, the fact that the utterance of the disjunctive sentence normally involves the implication of the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be explained by reference to a general principle governing the use of language. Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, but L first sftol would be the following: "One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing." This is certainly not an adequate formulation but will perhaps be good enough for my present purpose. On the assumption that such a principle as this is of general application, one can draw the conclusion that the utterance of a disjunctive sentence would imply the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts, given that (a) the obvious reason for not making a statemcnt which there is some call on one to make is that one is not in a position to make it, and given (6) the logical fact that each disjunct entails the disjunctive, but not vice versa; which being so, the disjuncts are stronger than the disjunctive. lf the outline just given js on the right lines, then I would wish to say, we have a reason for refusing in the case of (4) to regard the implication of the speaker's ignorance as being part of the meaning of the word'or'; someone who knows about the logical relation between a disjunction and its disjuncts, and who also knew about the alleged general principle governing discourse, could work out for hirnself that disjunctive utterances would involve the implication which they do in fact involve. I must insist, however, that my aim in discussing this last point has been merelyto indicate the position I would wish to take up, and not to argue scriously in favour of it. My main purpose in this sub-section has been to introduce four ideas of which l intend to make some use; and to provide some conception of tlre ways in which they apply or fail to apply to various types of implication. I do not claim to have presented a systematic theory of implication; that would be a very large undertaking and one for another occasion.
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