The conversational implicatum
Grice embarks on a discursus about this or that "aspect" of the concept or concepts, i.e. this or that concept, behind "imply," of "implication" (philosophical Latin, 'implicatio,' translating some Grecian expression).
the utterer, and none but the utterer
Oath:
- I swear by [substitute Almighty God/Name of God (such as Jehovah) or the name of the holy scripture] that[7] the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.[8]
Affirmation:
- I do solemnly and sincerely and truly declare and affirm[9] that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.[8]
Promise:
- I promise before Almighty God[10] that the evidence which I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.[8]
In the UK, a person may give testimony at any age, but will not be sworn in unless 14 years old or over.[11]
Grice embarks on an examination of this or that aspect of this or that concept underlying the use of "imply", "using some more or less well-worn examples."
From the philosophical literature, almost.
By using 'well-worn,' he means that he is NOT interested in 'implictaum' per se, but just in a more or less detailed examination.
He has detected a nuance, and he does not want to embark on an enterprise that will 'collide with the conversational facts.'
He has detected a nuance, but, before going to rush ahead and EXPLOIT it, he wants to clarify what kind of a nuance it is.
In this, he is following his usual trajectory.
Bring the distinction:
what an utterer means by uttering this or that expression.
what the expression may later and derivatively be said to 'mean.'
Surely an 'expression' does not 'intend,' so an expression does not 'mean.'
The project is meta-linguistic, as it were, or meta-philosophical, because now Grice is not, say, concerned with "I," or with "not," but, as he did when exploring Stevenson and Peirce, with "communicate."
Surely he wants to see 'imply' as falling under 'communicate.'
By uttering x, U means/implies/suggests/hints that p iff U communicates that p.
Grice entitles the exploration, "Implication."
This is interesting. In English, when he entitled his lecture for the Oxford philosophical society, he used 'meaning,' which is ambiguous between the noun (Philosophical Latin, "significatio") and the verb (Philosophical Latin, "significare,")
Here, the options are "Implying," versus "Implication."
But "Implying" had NOT made it into the range of keywords as used by philosophers, so he has to be careful, and opts for the more traditional label, 'implication.'
Surely he'll later revert to the Latinate "implicatum," as if to mark a distinction between the 'conversational implicature' (he finds 'implicature,' like 'utterance', has a 'conventient' act/object ambiguity) and other types of implication he is hardly interested in, in not dealing with conversation as rational co-operation.
Grice introduces four different examples and uses or applies upon them four different ideas or tests as catalysts.
Four and four, as it were.
1) PRESUPPOSITION
2) CONVERSATIONAL implicature, generalised.
3) CONVERSATIONAL implicature, particularised.
4) CONVENTIONAL implicature, or implicatum.
FOUR CATALYSTS:
1) CANCELLABILITY
2) VEHICLE
3) NON-DETACHABILITY
4) SATISFACTORINESS.
The four examples are all "cases in which in 'ordinary' parlance,"
if you are an Oxonian philosopher
"or at least in 'philosophical' parlance,"
which at Oxford, or in Oxonian parlance, means, in 'ordinary philosophical parlance,'
"something or other," strictly a proposition 'p,'
"might be said to be implied as distinct from being stated."
The explicitum-implicitum distinction.
The explicatum-implicatum distinction.
Note that he's using 'stating' as the ground-floor central speech act.
"Implying" is rather a 'higher-level' NON-CENTRAL speech act.
This is important.
Giving and receiving information (via stating) and influencing and being influenced by others (via ordering) can occur at the EXPLICIT level, and the principle of conversational helpfulness still applies.
But giving and receiving information (via implying) and influencing and being influenced by others (via implying) still operate under the governance of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
It might be argued that 'rationality' SHOWS more with the conversational implicatum than it shows with the conversational explicatum.
That is because Grice is operating with the idea that the explicatum is rather boringly 'conventional,' or arbitrary; whereas in figures of speech like 'suggestio falsi,' and such, the ratiocinative powers of the *addressee* (who is the one who does the CALCULATING) use the 'principle of conversational helpfulness' as one of the premises.
In the case of the utterer, the goal-directed behaviour is a reflection on the addressee's calculability. The utterer must plan his utterance so that what he implies will be 'recovered' by the addressee, and again using the principle of conversational helpfulness as one of the premises, now in the planning.
GRICE'S FIRST PAIR OF EXAMPLES of 'implying' as opposed to 'stating':
(l)
Smith has not left off beating his wife.
where
"what is implied is that Smith HAS been beating his wife."
But this is cancellable:
1b. Smith has not left off beating his wife, because he never did beat his wife.
Perhaps not 'ordinary' parlance, but surely 'philosophical' parlance!
GRICE'S SECOND EXAMPLE:
conventional implicatum
(2)
She was poor but she was honest
and her parents were the same
till she met a city feller
and she lost her honest name
'tis the same the whole world over
(Grice's father played it in C major).
Cf. Frege on 'aber' as "Farbung," neither "Sinn" nor "Bedeutung."
Grice's other examples: 'so,' 'therefore,' 'on the other hand.'
where
"what is implied is (very roughly) that there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty."
whoever _she_ was.
By expliciting the implicitum as "between poverty and honesty," he is referring to the REFRAIN of the ditty: the implicatum indeed refers to her parents, and the moral is that the poor get the blame for the rich's dishonesty.
Grice notes:
"The first example is a stock case of what is sometimes called "presupposition"."
Even by Occam. Occam's favourite example was:
"Have you stopped eating iron?"
Grice goes on:
"and it is often held that here the truth (1) of what is irnplied is a NECESSARY condition of the original statement's being either true (1) or false (0)."
"This might be disputed, but it is at least arguable that it IS so, and its being arguable might be enough to distinguish this type of case from others."
Note however the cancellation in the NEGATIVE version of the 'presupposition,' which makes it less arguable that this is a 'different' type of 'implying' from the conversational implicatum.
Grice:
"I shall however for convenience assume that the common view mentioned is correct."
Which also depends on a binary truth-value assignation ('two-valued' logic, as he'll put it in "Logic and Conversation"). Notably with the operator "not" and a non-bivalent logic, the implicatum becomes altogether a 'different animal'!
"This consideration [about 1s and 0s] clearly distinguishes (1) from (2)."
"Even IF the implied proposition is false (0), i.e., if there is no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement could still be false (0)."
""She was poor but she was honest" would be false (0) if for example she were rich and dishonest."
In fact, Maloney had this version:
"She was rich and quite dishonest,
and her parents were the same
till she met a poor good feller
and he gained a honest name."
"One might perhaps be less comfortable about assenting to its TRUTH (1) if the implied contrast did not in fact obtain."
But that's because one usually disregards levels in speech acts, or central versus non-central (peripheric) acts of communication.
"But the possibility of falsity (0) is enough for the immediate purpose."
Grice's next experiment on these two examples -- of alleged 'presupposition' or 'the prae-suppositum' and the alleged 'conventional implicatum' -- is to ask WHAT it is in each case which could properly be said to be the 'vehicle' of implication (to do the implying).
Is it the utterer? -- That is Grice's main implicature.
If it ain't, I'm not caring for it!
There are at least four candidates, not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Supposing someone to have uttered one or other of my sample sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be:
CANDIDATE I for vehicle of implying (what or who DOES the implying).
(a) what the utterer said (or asserted or stated or explicitly conveyed), or
CANDIDATE II for vehicle of implying (what or who does the implying):
(b) the utterer himself ("does he imply that ...'?) or
CANDIDATE III for vehicle of implying (what or who does the implying):
(c) the words or the expression E the utterer U used, or
CANDIDATE IV for vehicle of implying (what or who does the implying):
(d) the utterer's saying or explicitly conveying that (or again his saying that in this or that way); or possibly some plurality of these items.
As regards the first candidate, (a), what the utterer asserted, "I think (1) and (2) differ."
"I think it would be correct to say in the case of (l) that WHAT the utterer U says (or asserts of explicitly conveys) does imply that Smith had been beating this wife."
"Yet it would be incorrect to say in the case of (2) that WHAT the utterer U says (or asserts or explicitly conveys) implies that there is a contrast between e.g., honesty and poverty."
A test on which Grice would rely is the following.
A meta-if:
IF accepting that the implication (or implicatum) does hold involves the philosopher in accepting a proposition of the form, 'if p, q' where 'p' represents the original statement ("Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife," "She was poor but she was honest") and 'q' represents what is implied, the implicatum ("He had been beating her," "There is a contrast between honesty and poverty"), WHAT the utterer U says (or asserts or explicitly conveys) is the vehicle of implication, otherwise not."
So let's consider the 'otherwise not' for the case of 'but':
In "She was poor but she was honest"
the philosopher NEED NOT accept, and in fact refuse to accept the 'horseshoe' statement:
She was poor but she was honest
HORSESHOE
There is a contrast between honesty and poverty
To apply this rule to the given examples:
If the addressee accepts that Smith has been beating her wife, the addressee "should feel compelled" to accept
"If Smith hasn't left off beating his wife, he has been beating her."
It's stronger with the affirmative counterpart.
Whereas if the addressee accepts that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, the addressee
"should NOT feel compelled" to accept:
If she was poor but she was honest, there is some contrast between her poverty and her honesty.
The two other candidates (ONE OF WHICH IS KEY FOR GRICE the rationalist) can be dealt with more cursorily.
One should be inclined to say, with regard to both (l) and (2), that the UTTERER himself may be deemed to imply, or indeed IMPLIES whatever it is that is implied."
I.
By uttering "Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife," the UTTERER implies that Smith has been beating his wife, or it's the utterer who implies that Smith has been beating his wife, or the utterer HIMSELF implies that Smith has been beating his wife.
II
By uttering "She was poor but she was honest," the UTTERER implies that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, or it's the utterer who implies that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, or the utterer HIMSELF implies that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty.
In the case of "She was poor but she was honest" it seems fairly clear that the UTTERER's expression may be said or deemed to imply a contrast.
It is much less clear or obvious whether in the case of "Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife," the utterer's expression may be said or deemed to imply that Smith had been beating his wife.
In neither case would it be EVIDENTLY, or clearly or perspicuously APPROPRIATE to speak of the utterer's saying that, or of his saying that in this or that way, or in that PARTICULAR way, or in THAT way, as implying what is implied.
The third idea, catalyst, or test, with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication.
These terms will be explained, so do not worry.
Consider example (1):
Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife.
One cannot seem to find a form of expression which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence "Smith has left off beating his wife" might be used (by the utterer) to assert such that when this other or alternative form of expression is so used by the utterer the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just absent.
ANY possible way of asserting (using any possible expression, of philosophical interest or not) what is asserted in (1) involves, or attaches to, the implication in question.
I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the implication is not detachable from what is asserted (or, simpliciter, is not detachable).
But philosophers should be concerned with philosophically interesting concepts which ARE detached from this or that way of putting it.
We may be language botanists, but we love variety!
CANCELLATION:
Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words or an alternative expression for which both what is asserted (or explicitly conveyed) and what is implied by the utterer is the same as for (l), and THEN go on and add a further clause withholding "conversational," rational, commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the idea of annulling (or cancelling, or pre-empting, or voiding) the implication *without* annulling the assertion or statement or what the UTTERER has explicitly conveyed (to wit: that Smith hasn't stopped beating his wife").
One can intelligibly, i.e. conceptually intelligibly, utter:
"Smith hasn't left off beating his wife, but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her."
The problem is with the AFFIRMATIVE:
One CANNOT intelligibly, i.e., conceptually intelligibly, utter:
"Smith HAS left off beating his wife, but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her."
Grice expresses this fact by saying that in the case of (1), an affirmative sentence carrying a presupposition, as opposed to its negative counterpart, the implication is NOT cancellable (without thereby cancelling the assertion).
If we turn to (2), "She was poor but she was honest," we find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the implication IS detachable.
There seems quite a good case for maintaining that if, instead of saying "She was poor but she is was honest " I were to say "She was poor *and* she was honest", I would assert (state or explicitly convey -- but this is a trick) just what I would have asserted if I had used the original "but" sentence.
But there would now be no implication of a contrast between, e. g., poverty and honesty.
Other than perhaps, why state her honesty and her poverty in the first place?
An otiose state-of-affairs.
What Tommy would be singing,
"She was poor and she was honest"
?
But the question whether, in the case of "She was poor but she was honest," thc implication is cancellable by the utterer, a human agent, is slightly more complex.
There is a scenario in which I may say that it is non-cancellable, i.e. not cancellable.
The human agent, the utterer, cannot CANCEL "p," when the utterer implies that p.
If someone is to say
"She was poor but she was honest, though, of course, I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between poverty and honesty."
This would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said by a Tommy.
But though we should wish to quarrel with the utteerer, er, the Tommy, I personally do not think I should go so far as to say that the utterer's or the Tommy's utterance is unintelligible.
We should suppose that the utterer or the tommy has adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the news that she was poor and she was honest.
But perhaps there's a sub-cancellation:
"She was poor, but she was honest; I do not mean to imply that there is a contrast between honesty and poverty, only between HER honesty and HER poverty."
Or:
"She was poor, but she was honest; I do not mean to imply that there is a contrast between her honesty and her poverty, only between honesty in general and poverty in general."
SATISFACTORINESS.
What's the implicatural matter?
The fourth and last test or catalyst or idea that I wish to impose or use or apply on my examples is to ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that the appropriate or alleged implication is present ("the utterer implies that p") as being a matter of the MEANING of some particular, specific expression, word or phrase, occurring in the sentence the utterer utters.
Speaking of 'meaning' here should be re-analysed:
The utterer implies that p.
The utterer means that p.
For simplicity's sake, if we have
p IMPLIES q
we'll have:
The utterer implies that q.
The utterer means that p.
And then we may play on the second claim, alla:
'p' MEANS that p.
And so on.
Where 'p' is what I refer above as the 'expression' (word or phrase) in the sentence token uttered by the utterer.
I am aware that this may not be always a very clear or easy question to answer, since, well, it involves A. J. Ayer's meaning!
And at this point one might want to consult "Meaning" in "The Philosophical Review" (originally a talk to the Oxford Philosophical Society, 1948, based on a seminar on Peirce on meaning).
Nevertheless, I will risk the assertion that we would be fairly happy to say that, as regards "She was poor but she was honest," the fact that the implication obtains is a matter of the (as it happens, as it is standardly the case, pretty arbitrary and conventional) MEANING of the expression or word 'but,' as it is generally used.
I am told that the Anglo-Saxons lacked this word, which is a contraction of "by-out"
"She was poor by-out she was honest."
but (adv., prep.)
Old English
butan,
buton
best rendered as "unless", "with the exception of," "without," or "outside."
"butan" or "buton" is from West Germanic hypothetical *be-utan -- i.e. a compound of *be-, i.e. by, + *utana "out, outside; from without," some typically Germanic amplification from ut "out," adv.
"butan" and "buton" is NOT used as a CONJUNCTION (dyadic truth-functor) until LATE Old English, "on the contrary."
Usages attested in later English include "however"
"yet"
"no more than."
As an introductory expression, early 13c.
As a noun, "an objection, an exception" ('no buts about it) from late 14c.
Som man preiseth his neighebore by a wikked entente, foralwey he maketh a 'but' at the laste ende, that is digne of moore blame than worth is al the preisynge. [Chaucer, "Parson's Tale"]
And at Clifton, we used to recite the 'alla' and the old Roman, too!
και:
Connective conjunction, resumptive adverb, "and."
Theoretically the adverbial use is the original.
Most often prepositive.
αλλα:
Adversative conjunction, resumptive adverb.
"But". Most often prepositive. Usually follows a negative clause or sentence.
μεν: resumptive or progressive adverb, untranslatable in most cases. Often paired with:
δε: connective or adversative conjunction used with sentences instead of individual phrases, often progressive. Often paired with men, to give the meaning "Men X, de Y."
"On the one hand X, on the other hand Y".
αρα: marking a consequent thought. progressive. Also, a confirmative.
γε: Either intensive or restrictive, "indeed", "at least".
Grice was taught at Clifton that "ge" is best translated by raising one eyebrow.
γαρ: confirmatory adverb and causative conjunction. Often used after a question as a confirmatory adverb.
δη: postpositive, marks an immediate thought or present statement, often obvious or naturally progressing.
η: adversative conjunction (disjunction). paired "e X, e Y", "Either X, or Y".
η: (with circumflex) asseverative. "In truth, verily".
νυν: "now", either with a causal or progressive sense, often inferential; rarely temporal.
μην: asseverative, emphasizing a whole statement or single word.
ουν: postpositive, confirmatory or inferential
τε: correlative conjunction; enclitic
cf. Cicero on 'sed' or 'set'
sĕd or sĕt ,
I.conj. [cf. Freund, Cic. Mil. p. 8 sq.; old and orig. form sedum, acc. to Charis. p. 87 P., and Mar. Vict. p. 2458 P.; but more prob. an ablative from root of the reflexive pron. so- for suo-, and orig. the same with the insep. prep. 2. sēd; prop., by itself, apart; hence, but, only, etc.; cf. Corss. Ausspr. 1, p. 200 sq.], a particle of limitation, exception, or correction (cf. at and autem init.).
I. In gen., but, yet: “ipsum regale genus civitatis reliquis simplicibus longe anteponendum: sed ita, quoad statum suum retinet, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 2, 23, 43: “Neoptolemus apud Ennium Philosophari sibi ait necesse esse, sed paucis: nam omnino haud placere,” id. Tusc. 2, 1, 1; cf. id. Rep. 1, 18, 33: “C. Memmius perfectus litteris, sed Graecis,” id. Brut. 70, 247: “nactus es (me otiosum), sed mehercule otiosiorem operā quam animo,” id. Rep. 1, 9, 14: “quae observanda essent, multa constituit (Numa), sed ea sine impensa,” id. ib. 2, 14, 27; cf. id. ib. 1, 31, 47: “miser homo est, qui, etc....sed ille miserior qui, etc.,” Plaut. Capt. 3, 1, 2: “vera dico, sed nequicquam, quoniam non vis credere,” id. Am. 2, 2, 205: “video te testimoniis satis instructum: sed apud me argumenta plus quam testes valent,” Cic. Rep. 1, 38, 59: “(Platonis civitatem) praeclaram illam quidem fortasse, sed a vitā hominum abhorrentem et moribus,” id. ib. 2, 11, 21; cf. id. ib. 1, 40, 63: “sed id ubi jam penes sese habent, ex bonis pessumi sunt,” Plaut. Capt. 2, 1, 37: “nostri casus plus honoris habuerunt quam laboris, etc....Sed si aliter ut dixi accidisset: qui possem queri? etc.,” Cic. Rep. 1, 4, 7: “istos captivos sinito ambulare, si foris, si intus volent. Sed uti asserventur magnā diligentiā,” Plaut. Capt. 1, 2, 6: “non possum dicere...sed neque his contentus sum,” Cic. Rep. 1, 22, 36: nec sum in ullā re molestus civitatibus; “sed fortasse tibi, qui haec praedicem de me,” id. Att. 5, 21, 7: “non sum tantopere admiratus, sed posteaquam coepit rationem exponere,” id. Rep. 1, 14, 22: “non perfectum illud quidem, sed tolerabile est,” id. ib. 1, 26, 42: “sane bonum rei publicae genus, sed tamen inclinatum et quasi pronum ad perniciosissimum statum,” id. ib. 2, 26, 48: “scio tibi ita placere: sed tamen velim scire, etc.,” id. ib. 1, 30, 46; cf. Plaut. As. 2, 2, 72: “difficile factu est, sed conabor tamen,” Cic. Rep. 1, 43, 66: “in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa natura saepe rationem,” id. ib. 2, 33, 57: illa quidem tristis, nec adhuc interrita vultu: Sed regina tamen, sed opaci maxima mundi; “Sed tamen inferni pollens matrona tyranni,” Ov. M. 5, 507 sq.; cf. id. ib. 7, 718: “plerique patriae, sed omnes famā atque fortunis expertes,” Sall. C. 33, 1: “ipsum quidem regem assecutus non est, sed magnam partem agminis oppresserunt,” Liv. 36, 19: “plus aegri ex abitu viri quam ex adventu voluptatis cepi. Sed hoc me beat saltem, quod perduelles vicit,” Plaut. Am. 2, 2, 15: “apponam urnam jam ego hanc in mediā viā. Sed autem, quid si hanc hinc abstulerit quispiam?” but then, id. Rud. 2, 5, 15 (cf. in the foll. II. A. 2.): “statim Luculli ... eum domum suam receperunt. Sed enim hoc non solum ingenii ac litterarum, verum etiam naturae, etc.,” but indeed, Cic. Arch. 3, 5: “progeniem sed enim Trojano a sanguine duci Audierat,” Verg. A. 1, 19; 2, 164; 5, 395; “6, 28 et saep. (cf. also infra, II. A. 2.): sed enimvero, cum detestabilis altera res sit, quid ad deliberationem dubii superesse?” Liv. 45, 19, 14.—Very rarely with non (for nec tamen), introducing a qualification of a previous word: “Academici veteres beatum quidem esse etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum,” Sen. Ep. 71, 18.
II. In partic.
A. Interrupting the discourse by transition to another subject or by ending the speech.
1. In a transition to another subject: “tristis sit (servus), si eri sint tristes: hilarus sit, si gaudeant. Set age, responde: jam vos redistis in gratiam?” Plaut. Am. 3, 3, 7; cf. id. ib. 5, 1, 20; “5, 1, 26: non impedio, praesertim quoniam feriati sumus. Sed possumus audire aliquid, an serius venimus?” Cic. Rep. 1, 13, 20: “nunc reliquorum oratorum aetates et gradus persequamur. Curio fuit igitur ejusdem aetatis fere, etc. ... Scripsit etiam alia nonnulla, etc.... Sed ecce in manibus vir praestantissimo ingenio... C. Gracchus,” id. Brut. 33, 125; cf.: “sed eccum Amphitruonem, etc.,” Plaut. Am. 3, 4, 22; id. Aul. 2, 1, 55; 3, 5, 62; id. Capt. 5, 3, 20; 5, 4, 8 al.: “sed quid ego cesso?” id. As. 1, 1, 112: sed ista mox; “nunc audiamus Philum, quem, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 1, 13, 20 fin. et saep.—In recurring to a previous subject: “sed ad instituta redeamus,” Cic. Brut. 61, 220: “sed redeamus rursus ad Hortensium,” id. ib. 84, 291: “sed jam ad id, unde degressi sumus, revertamur,” id. ib. 88, 300: “sed perge de Caesare et redde quae restant,” id. ib. 74, 258 et saep.—Hence, after parenthetic clauses, but, now, I say, etc.: “equidem cum audio socrum meam Laeliam (facilius enim mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant, quod multorum sermonis expertes ea tenent semper quae prima didicerunt) sed eam sic audio, ut Plautum mihi aut Naevium videar audire,” Cic. de Or. 3, 12, 45: “qui (Pompeius) ut peroravit (nam in eo sane fortis fuit: non est deterritus: dixit omnia, atque interdum etiam silentio, cum auctoritate semper), sed ut peroravit, surrexit Clodius,” id. Q. Fr. 2, 3, 2.—
2. In breaking off, discontinuing speech: “sed satis verborum est: cura quae jussi atque abi,” Plaut. Capt. 1, 2, 16: “sed, si placet, in hunc diem hactenus,” Cic. Rep. 2, 44, 71: “sed haec hactenus,” id. Off. 1, 39, 140 al.: sed quid ego haec memoro? Enn. ap. Prisc. p. 724 P. (Ann. v. 318 Vahl.): “nec requievit enim, donec Calchante ministro—Sed quid ego haec autem nequicquam ingrata revolvo? Quidve moror?” Verg. A. 2, 101: sed enim, οἰκονομία (epistulae) si perturbatior est, tibi assignato: te enim sequor, σχεδιάζοντα, but indeed, Cic. Att. 6, 1, 11; so, “sed enim,” Verg. A. 1, 19.—
B. After negative clauses, to limit the negative statement, i. e. to indicate either that the assertion does not hold good at all, but something else does instead; or else that it is not exclusively true, but something else holds good in addition, but, on the contrary; and in an ascending signif., but also, but even, but in fact, etc.
1. In a simple opposition: non cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes, Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrique, Enn. ap. Cic. Off. 1, 12, 38 (Ann. v. 201 Vahl.); cf.: haud doctis dictis certantes, sed maledictis ...Non ex jure manu consertum sed magi' ferro Rem repetunt, id. ap. Gell. 20, 10 (Ann. v. 274 sq. Vahl.): “non ego erus tibi, sed servus sum,” Plaut. Capt. 2, 1, 44: “quae (hominum vestigia) ille (Aristippus) non ex agri consiturā, sed ex doctrinae indiciis interpretabatur,” Cic. Rep. 1, 17, 29: “nec leges imponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam, ut legem, praefert suis civibus,” id. ib. 1, 34, 52; “1, 13, 19: neque hac nos patria lege genuit, ut...sed ut, etc.,” id. ib. 1, 4, 8: “non quod...sed quod, etc.,” id. ib. 1, 18, 30.—With contra: “non liberis servitutem, sed contra servientibus libertatem afferre,” Liv. 4, 18 init.— “Several times repeated: non sibi se soli natum, sed patriae, sed suis,” Cic. Fin. 2, 14, 45 Madv. ad loc.: “quod non naturā exoriatur, sed judicio, sed opinione,” id. Tusc. 3, 34, 82: “sed publicam, sed ob frumentum decretam, sed a publicanis faenore acceptam,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 72, § 169; id. Planc. 10, 24: “non eros nec dominos appellat eos ...sed patriae custodes, sed patres et deos,” id. Rep. 1, 41, 64; Tib. 1, 7, 44 sq.: quam tibi non Perseus, verum si quaeris, ademit; “Sed grave Nereïdum numen, sed corniger Hammon, Sed quae visceribus veniebat belua ponti Exsaturanda meis,” Ov. M. 5, 17 sq.: “sed Pompeium, sed Lepidum,” Tac. A. 1, 10; Sen. Const. 13, 4; id. Ben. 1, 1, 6; 1, 7, 3: “non praefectum ab iis, sed Germanicum ducem, sed Tiberium imperatorem violari,” Tac. A. 1, 38 et saep.—
2. In a climax.
a.Non modo (solum, tantum, etc.)...sed or sed etiam (et, quoque), not only, not merely ...but, but also, but even, but indeed (sed, standing alone, isolates the ascending idea, while an appended etiam, et, or quoque places it in closer connection with the first statement, and thus permits them to be viewed together): “non modo falsum illud esse, sed hoc verissimum,” Cic. Rep. 2, 44, 71: “quod non modo singulis hominibus, sed potentissimis populis saepe contingit,” id. ib. 5, 8, 11; “3, 10, 17: id ei perpetuā oratione contigit, non modo ut acclamatione, sed ut convitio et maledictis impediretur,” id. Q. Fr. 2, 3, 2: “unius viri consilio non solum ortum novum populum, sed adultum jam et paene puberem,” id. Rep. 2, 11, 21; cf.: “nec vero corpori soli subveniendum est, sed menti atque animo multo magis,” id. Sen. 11, 36: “volo ut in scaenā, sic in foro non eos modo laudari, qui celeri motu utantur, sed eos etiam, quos statarios appellant,” id. Brut. 30, 116; id. Rep. 1, 8, 13: “omnia ejus non facta solum, sed etiam dicta meminisset,” id. ib. 6, 10, 10: “neque solum fictum, sed etiam imperite absurdeque fictum,” id. ib. 2, 15, 28; 1, 3, 4; “1, 34, 51: neque vero se populo solum, sed etiam senatui commisit, neque senatui modo, sed etiam publicis praesidiis et armis, neque his tantum, verum ejus potestati, cui, etc.,” id. Mil. 23, 61: “haec non delata solum, sed paene credita,” id. ib. 24, 64: “nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis,” id. Lael. 27, 102: “illum non modo favisse sed et tantam illi pecuniam dedisse honoris mei causā,” id. Att. 11, 9, 2: “omnes civiles dissensiones, neque solum eas, quas audistis, sed et has, quas vosmet ipsi meministis et vidistis,” id. Cat. 3, 10, 24: “multiplicatusque terror non infimis solum, sed primoribus patrum,” Liv. 3, 36, 5: “non responsum solum benigne legatis est, sed Philippi quoque filius Demetrius ad patrem reducendus legatis datus est,” id. 36, 35 fin.: “conciti per haec non modo Cherusci, sed conterminae gentes,” Tac. A. 1, 60; 3, 44: “via non angusta modo, sed plerumque praerupta,” Curt. 3, 4, 12; 5, 1, 20 Mützell ad loc.—
(β). Esp., in passing from the part to the whole, from the particular to the universal (usually followed by omnino, or by omnis, cunctus, totus, universus, etc.): “timebat non ea solum quae timenda erant, sed omnia,” Cic. Mil. 24, 66: “neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti,” id. Off. 1, 28, 99: “nec sibi tantum, sed universis singulisque consulere,” Sen. Ben. 2, 5, 4: “non consuli modo, sed omnibus civibus enitendum,” Plin. Pan. 2, 1: “non initio tantum, sed continuo totius temporis successu,” Just. 1, 8, 14: “non modo Italiā, sed toto orbe terrarum,” Flor. 1, 16, 3.—Etiam is rarely added: “quotiens non modo ductores nostri, sed universi etiam exercitus ad mortem concurrerunt,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 37, 89; Curt. 5, 1, 24.—
b. Non modo (solum) non...sed, sed etiam; sed ne... quidem, not only not...but, but even, but indeed, but not even, etc.: “ut non modo a mente non deserar, sed id ipsum doleam, me, etc.,” Cic. Att. 3, 15, 2; id. Rep. 2, 23, 43: “judicetur non verbo, sed re non modo non consul, sed etiam hostis Antonius,” id. Phil. 3, 6, 14: “hoc non modo non laudari, sed ne concedi quidem potest,” id. Mur. 3, 8: “iis non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto,” id. Off. 1, 21, 71: “non modo non oppugnator, sed etiam defensor,” id. Planc. 31, 76: “ego contra ostendo, non modo nihil eorum fecisse Sex. Roscium, sed ne potuisse quidem facere,” id. Rosc. Am. 29, 79.—Also, without the second non in the first clause, and with ne quidem, doubly negative (only when both clauses have the same verb; “v. Zumpt, Gram. § 724 b): quod mihi non modo irasci, sed ne dolere quidem impune licet,” Cic. Att. 11, 24, 1: “ea est ratio instructarum navium, ut non modo plures, sed ne singuli quidem possint accedere,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 51, § 133: “non modo aeternam, sed ne diuturnam quidem gloriam assequi possumus,” id. Rep. 6, 21, 23: “ea sunt demum non ferenda in mendacio, quae non solum facta esse, sed ne fieri quidem potuisse cernimus,” id. ib. 2, 15, 28: “quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est,” id. Lael. 24, 89: non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam audebit, id. Off. 2, 19, 77; cf. with vix: “verum haec genera virtutum non solum in moribus nostris, sed vix jam in libris reperiuntur,” id. Cael. 17, 40: “non modo ad expeditiones, sed vix ad quietas stationes viribus sufficiebant,” Liv. 3, 6.—After quisquam with ellipsis of non: “ut non modo praedandi causā quisquam ex agro Romano exiret, sed ultro Fidenates descenderent, etc.,” Liv. 4, 21, 6 (where Weissenb. supplies non in brackets before exiret); cf.: “antiqui non solum erant urbes contenti cingere muris, verum etiam loca aspera et confragosa saxis eligebant,” Hyg. Grom. Limit. p. 197.—
C. As sed, after non modo, acquires an idea of ascent or climax, from the fact that non modo represents a thing as existing (only not existing alone), and thus includes an affirmation, so, too, after purely affirmative clauses, sed sometimes serves as an ascending adjunct, but, but in fact, but also: “ego te hodie reddam madidum, sed vino, probe,” Plaut. Aul. 3, 6, 37: “odore canibus anum, sed multo, replent,” Phaedr. 4, 17, 19: Dae. Curriculo affer Duas clavas. La. Clavas? Dae. Sed probas: “propera cito,” Plaut. Rud. 3, 5, 19.—In good prose usually joined with etiam (or et): “hic mihi primum meum consilium defuit, sed etiam obfuit,” Cic. Att. 3, 15, 5; cf. id. ib. 4, 16, c, 10; “10, 16, 6: Q. Volusium, certum hominem, sed mirifice etiam abstinentem, misi in Cyprum,” id. ib. 5, 21, 6: “hoc in genere si eum adjuveris, apud ipsum praeclarissime posueris, sed mihi etiam gratissimum feceris,” id. Fam. 13, 64, 2: “ex testamento Tiberii, sed et Liviae Augustae,” Suet. Calig. 16; 20.
So far as "Smith hasn't left off beating his wife" is concerned, I should have at least some inclination to say that the presence of the implication IS a matter of the MEANING of SOME of the words in the sentence, but we should be in some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this word, or words are, of which this is true."
I would suggest, as a first shot, "leave off,' which seems otiose.
Also it's trickier in the affirmative:
"Smith has stopped beating his wife."
"Stop"?
The verb Occcam used was "cessare," to cease:
As in
Smith hasn't ceased from beating his wife.
TU NON CESSAS COMEDERE FERRUM
cesso , āvi, ātum, 1,
I.v. freq. n. and a. [1. cedo]; lit., to stand back very much; hence, to be remiss in any thing, to delay, loiter, or, in gen., to cease from, stop, give over (indicating a blamable remissness; while desinere, intermittere, requiescere do not include that idea: cessat desidiosus, requiescit fessus, Don. ad Ter. Eun. 3, 1, 15. Diff. from cunctari in this, that the latter designates inaction arising from want of resolution, but cessare that which is the result of slothfulness; cf. Doed. Syn. 3, p. 300 sq.; “class. in prose and poetry): paulum si cessassem,” Ter. Eun. 4, 4, 5; 4, 6, 16; id. Ad. 4, 2, 49: “si tabellarii non cessarint,” Cic. Prov. Cons. 7, 15: “in suo studio atque opere,” id. Sen. 5, 13: “ne quis in eo, quod me viderit facientem, cesset,” Liv. 35, 35, 16; cf. id. 35, 18, 8: “ab apparatu operum ac munitionum nihil cessatum,” id. 21, 8, 1; 34, 16, 3; 31, 12, 2; Tac. A. 3, 28: “quidquid apud durae cessatum est moenia Trojae,” whatever delay there was, Verg. A. 11, 288: “audaciā,” to be deficient in spirit, Liv. 1, 46, 6; cf.: “nullo umquam officio,” id. 42, 6, 8: “ad arma cessantes Concitet,” Hor. C. 1, 35, 15 et saep.—So in admonitions: “quid cessas?” Ter. And. 5, 6, 15; Tib. 2, 2, 10: “quid cessatis?” Curt. 4, 16, 5: “quor cessas?” Ter. Ad. 4, 5, 69; cf.: cessas in vota precesque (poet. for cessas facere vota), Tros, ait, Aenea? cessas? Verg. A. 6, 51 sq.; Tib. 3, 6, 57.— With dat. incommodi: it dies; “ego mihi cesso,” i. e. to my own injury, Plaut. Ps. 1, 3, 12 Lorenz ad loc.; id. Ep. 3, 2, 8: “sed ego nunc mihi cesso, qui non umerum hunc onero pallio,” Ter. Phorm. 5, 6, 4.—
b. With inf.: “ego hinc migrare cesso,” Plaut. Ep. 3, 2, 6 sq.: “numquid principio cessavit verbum docte dicere?” id. Pers. 4, 4, 3; so, “alloqui,” Ter. And. 2, 2, 6; 5, 2, 4: “adoriri,” id. Heaut. 4, 5, 9: “pultare ostium,” id. ib. 3, 1, 1; id. Phorm. 2, 3, 30: “introrumpere,” id. Eun. 5, 5, 26: “detrahere de nobis,” Cic. Att. 11, 11, 2: “mori,” Hor. C. 3, 27, 58 et saep.—
II. In gen.
A. To be inactive, idle, at leisure, to do nothing: “cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos praeficit?” Cic. N. D. 3, 39, 93; cf. id. ib. 1, 9, 22; id. Off. 3, 1, 1: nisi forte ego vobis cessare nunc videor; “cum bella non gero,” id. de Sen. 6, 18: “et si quid cessare potes, requiesce sub umbrā,” Verg. E. 7, 10: “cessabimus una,” Prop. 3 (4), 23, 15. Ov. M. 4, 37: “cur alter fratrum cessare et ludere et ungi praeferat, etc.,” Hor. Ep. 2, 2, 183 (cessare otiari et jucunde vivere, Schol. Crucq.); so id. ib. 1, 7, 57: “per hibernorum tempus,” Liv. 36, 5, 1: “cessatum usque adhuc est: nunc porro expergiscere,” Ter. Ad. 4, 4, 23: “cessatum ducere curam,” put to rest, Hor. Ep. 1, 2, 31: “non timido, non ignavo cessare tum licuit,” Curt. 3, 11, 5.—
b. Of things, to be at rest, to rest, be still, inactive, unemployed, or unused, etc.: “si cessare putas rerum primordia posse, Cessandoque novos rerum progignere motus,” Lucr. 2, 80 sq.: “quid ita cessarunt pedes?” Phaedr. 1, 9, 5: “et grave suspenso vomere cesset opus,” Tib. 2, 1, 6; Ov. F. 6, 348: “Achilles cessare in Teucros pertulit arma sua,” Prop. 2, 8, 30: “cur Berecyntiae Cessant flamina tibiae,” Hor. C. 3, 19, 19: “cessat voluntas?” id. ib. 1, 27, 13: “cessat ira deae,” Liv. 29, 18, 10: “solas sine ture relictas Praeteritae cessasse ferunt Letoïdos aras,” i. e. remained unsought, unapproached, Ov. M. 8, 278; cf.: “at nunc desertis cessant sacraria lucis,” Prop. 3 (4), 13, 47. and: “cessaturae casae,” Ov. F. 4, 804: “cessans honor,” a vacant office, Suet. Caes. 76.—
(β). Of land, to lie uncultivated, fallow (cf. cessatio): “alternis idem tonsas cessare novales,” Verg. G. 1, 71; Plin. 18, 23, 52, § 191; cf. Suet. Aug. 42.—Pass.: “cessata arva,” Ov. F. 4, 617.—Trop., of a barren woman, Paul. Nol. Carm. 6, 48.—
c. Sometimes cessare alicui rei, like vacare alicui rei, to have leisure for something, i.e. to attend to, apply one's self to: “amori,” Prop. 1, 6, 21.—
B. Rarely (prob. not ante-Aug.), not to be at hand or present, to be wanting: “cessat voluntas? non aliā bibam Mercede,” Hor. C. 1, 27, 13: “augendum addendumque quod cessat,” Quint. 2, 8, 10.—Hence,
2. Judic. t. t.
a. Of persons, not to appear before a tribunal, to make default: “culpāne quis an aliquā necessitate cessasset,” Suet. Claud. 15 (where, just before, absentibus; cf. “absum, 8.): quoties delator adesse jussus cessat,” Dig. 49, 14, 2, § 4; so ib. 47, 10, 17, § 20.—
b. Of things (a process, verdict), to be invalid, null, void: “cessat injuriarum actio,” Dig. 47, 10, 17, § 1: “revocatio,” ib. 42, 8, 10, § 1: “edictum,” ib. 39, 1, 1: “senatus consultum,” ib. 14, 6, 12 et saep.—
C. Also rare, in a moral view, to depart from a right way, i.e. to mistake, err: “ut scriptor si peccat... Sic qui multum cessat,” Hor. A. P. 357: “oratoris perfecti illius, ex nullā parte cessantis,” Quint. 1, 10, 4.
I may now deal more briefly with my remaining two examples.
The first in this group is one of a PARTICULARISED conversational implicatum relying on something like a principle of conversational appositeness.
The second in this group is a generalisatio of the former, i.e. a GENERALISED (if there are such things -- Witters denies it!) conversational implicatum.
(3)
A don is reporting on his tutee at Collections.
All the don utters is
Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical.
We might perhaps agree that there is here [hic], i.e. under the Collections scenario only, a strong, even overwhelming, implication that Smith is no good at philosophy.
It is plain that there is no case at all for even regarding the truth (1) of what is implied here as a necessary pre-condition of the truth (1) or falsity (0) of what I have asserted.
A denial of the truth of what is implied would have no bearing at all on whether what I have asserted is true (1) or false (0).
So "Smith has beautiful handwriting" is much closer to "She was poor but she was honest" than "Smith has not ceased from beating his wife" in this respect.
Next, the human agent, the don, the utterer (and NONE but the utterer) SHOULD (must, ought to) certainly be said to have implied that Smith is hopeless or no good at philosophy (provided that this is what the don intends to "get across," as Lady Welby would put it).
The UTTERER's explicitly conveying that (at any rate my saying JUST that and no more) is also certainly a vehicle of implication.
On the other hand, or but, neither the don's expression, i.e. his words, NOR what the don says (asserts) is HERE [hic], I think, a vehicles of implication.
"Smith has beautiful handwriting" (uttered by a don at Collections) thus differs from both "Smith hasn't ceased beating off his wife" and "She was poor but she was honest."
The implication IS surely cancellable by the don, but it is alas not detachable.
If the don adds or expands his so far terse conversational move, realising he was thought of as rude -- 'damn by faint praise' -- with
"I do NOT, of course, mean to imply that Smith is no good at philosophy."
the don's whole utterance is intelligible and linguistically impeccable, even though it may be extraordinary tutorial behaviour; and the don can no longer be said to have implied that Smith is no good at philosophy, even though perhaps that is what my colleagues might conclude to be the case if I had nothing else to say.
At Oxford, a Collection may be one of two things, and Grice knew this! (He was lecturing at Cambridge, though!)
A collection can be an examination taken at the beginning of term by either a undergraduate or a graduate, testing the work done in the previous term, and often based on past paper questions (typically a three-hour exam).
An undergraduates usually sits one or two Collections per term, but this can vary by tutor and by college.
Collections are College (or sometimes departmental), rather than University examinations, and assist in predicting a student's final degree result rather than constituting a part of it.
A Penal Collection might be set if an undergraduate has failed to work hard enough.
Failure to achieve a minimum mark set in advance may result in the student's being rusticated for a set period, or even being “sent down” — that is, permanently expelled from the College.
But a collection, and this is how Grice means the "Smith has beautiful handwriting" HIC is a meeting at the end of term, usually with a SET of tutors or - very occasionally - with the Head of House of the College, at which reports of the term's work are read, or (especially, but not necessarily) for a postgraduate) the tutee's or pupil's or student's progress is discussed.
These are sometimes known as “hand-shaking”, or “Principal's (Dean's/Master's/Warden's/President's/
Provost's/Rector's, etc.) Collections”.
So now you don't know.
The implication (i.e. the proposition that Smith is no good at philosophy) is NOT however, detachable.
Any other way of making, in the same context of utterance, just the assertion I have made would involve the same implication.
Let's revise. What was the assertion that the don makes:
i. Smith has beautiful handwriting
and
ii. His English is grammatical
Substitutes:
ib. Smith's handwriting is admirable
and
iib. His prose is legible.
"Smith's handwriting is a _marvel_, and his prose style never incurs in an error of usage."
Finally, the fact that the implication holds is not a matter of any particular word or phrase within the sentence which I have uttered.
So in this respect (3) is certainly different from (2) and, possibly different from (1).
One obvious fact should be mentioned before I pass to the last example of 'disjunction' qua generalised conversational implicature.
This "beautiful handwriting" case of implication is unlike the others in that the utterance of the sentence "Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical" does not STANDARDLY (i.e. if we are craving for generalities as Witters said we shouldn't) involve the implication here attributed to it.
It requires a special context (that it should be uttered by a PHILOSOPHY don, or tutorial fellow in philosophy, if you must at Collections) to attach the implication (Smith is no good at philosophy) to its utterance.
Since OTHER NON-PHILOSOPHICAL agents may be part of the Collection, they have to take the don's word for it.
GRICE: Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical.
CO-COLLECTIONIST: And on what basis are you conveying to us that he is no good at philosophy?
Surely:
GRICE: He is an idealist, and I'm a verificationist.
won't do.
(4) If someone, an utterer qua human agent, says
"My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom."
it would normally be implied that he, the utterer qua human agent, did not know in which of the two rooms she was.
Of course, let me give you a diagramme. At Smith's villa, actually, there is a passageway, not a very long one, in fact, a pretety narrow one, connecting the kitchen with the bedroom.
Smith's wife likes to LIE there in the summer ('there's a nice breeze coming from both the bedroom's and the kitchen's windows).
In which case
"Smith's wife is IN THE KITCHEN *and* IN THE BEDROOM."
This example might well be held to be very similar to this or that case under dispute in what we may call the neo-Wittgensteiniann philosophy of perception attending such a statements as
"That pillar box seems red to me."
So, I must be careful NOT to prejudge any issues to my objector's disadvantage.
It will be similar in that RATIONALITY is involved in a special way -- but the "Smith's handwriting" example also fits here -- (and is used by Grice in "Logic and Conversation," and he is very precise as to what conversational maxim, within the principle of conversational helpfulness, (aiming at the goal of giving/receiving information and influencing/being influenced by others) is being flouted)
Grice states the 'beautiful handwriting' example as a member of GROUP C,
i.e. an example that involves 'exploitation,' that is, a procedure by which conversational maxim (aimed at the goals the principle of conversational helpfulness is supposed to comply, i.e. giving/receiving information, influencing/being influenced by others) is 'flouted' for the intentional purpose of 'getting in' or 'generating' an conversational implicature extra to what the utterer has EXPLICITLY conveyed, by means of something 'of the nature' of a rhetorical figure, a figure of speech, such as 'damn by faint praise.'
In such an example, though SOME maxim IS 'violated' at the GROUND-level of what is explicitly conveyed (via assertion, say), the ADDRESSEE is entitled to assume that even THAT particular maxim, or desideratum or SURELY (even NECESSARILY, in terms of something like a Kantian weak transcendental justification) at least the over-all, over-arching categoric (in the sense of 'universalisable) Principle of Conversational Helpfulness, is observed at the HIGHER-level of what is implicated -- where what is implicated may not trump what is EXPLICITED, but where the HIGHER-LEVEL goal certainly trumps, in terms of concerted human agency of conversation as rational co-operation, the now GROUND-level of what is explicitly conveyed or of the utterer's EXPLICITLY conveying this or that.
We can have a 'flouting' of a conversational maxim enjoining a conversationalist to be as informative as is required. In the imperative mode:
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
A don is giving a testimonial about his tutee at Collections.
All the don says is
Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical.
Gloss of what the don is 'getting at':
The don cannot be opting out of the principle of conversational helpfulness, since if he wished to be UN-co-operative (to the institution of Collections), why open his mouth at all?
cf.
"My lips are sealed."
On top, there might be disciplinary measures if the don refuses to testify.
The don cannot be unable, through ignorance, to say more, since the man is his tutee.
(And while some dons are unattentive of their tutee's progress, many aren't --)
(Grice was referred to as 'Godot' at St. John's, and by his tutees, but they surely loved him.)
("Perhaps slightly eccentric in a charming way, BUT he has a great reputation as a don!")
Moreover, the don knows that more information than this is wanted.
At Collections, the reporting can be pretty specific. Various tutors are 'collected,' sometimes even the master of St. John's.
Specific information as to the tutee's progress is needed, in order to see if what the tutee proposes for the NEXT term 'makes sense.'
Say, he has studied only Plato and now wants to read Hegel. That makes sense.
He has only studied Aristotle and now wants to read Hegel. Makes less sense.
The don must, therefore, be wishing, willing, intending, deciding, to impart, or convey, information that he is reluctant to express, convey in a more explicit, ground-floor-level, central, primary, fashion.
This supposition or assumption or EXPECTATION is reasonable, indeed, rational, or tenable only if the don thinks or believes that Smith is no good at philosophy.
Therefore, this, ceteris paribus, is what the don is implicating, meaning, hinting, suggesting -- in a cancellable way.
"Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical; I don't, of course, mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy."
Such pronouncement is impeccable. The figure of rhetoric is 'over-praise by over-convolutedness.'
Grice thinks, however, that in the case of "My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom" I can produce a strong argument (or reasoning or abduction) in favour of holding that the fulfillment of the implication of the utterer's ignorance ('not say' -- 'not know') is NOT a precaution of the truth (1) or falsity (2) of the disjunctive statement.
So we are dealing with "or" -- vide "The genealogy of disjunction."
Suppose
that the utterer, Mr. Smith, KNOWS that his wife is in the kitchen,
that Smith's small 'villa' has only two rooms (and no mid-way passage, etc. -- but surely there must be a DOOR between them -- what if Mrs. Smith is lying THERE?)
Let me diagram:
Smith's villa
PLAN
KITCHEN DOOR BEDROOM
Surely it is possible that
Smith's villa
PLAN B:
KITCHEN ----- BEDROOM
(with own door to garden)
with
door
to
garden
Even though (a) is the casc, the utterer, Mr. Smith, can certainly assert, truly and truthfully,
"My wife is in the villa."
He is merely not being as informative as he could be if need arose.
Cf.
"Oh, I conclude that someone is in the villa."
But the conjunction of the true proposition that his wife is in the VILLA together AND the true proposition that the villa, alas, consists entirely of a kitchen and a bedroom (no garden, and two separate doors straight to the street, and thus no way to go from one room to the other, or to lie in between), seems to ENTAIL the proposition that his wife is in the kitchen OR in the bedroom.
But if to express the proposition "p" in certain circumstances would be to speak truly and truthfully, and "p," together with another true proposition, seems to entail "q," surely to express now the disjunction, "My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom" in the same circumstances seems also to speak truly and truthfully.
So Grice takes it that the disjunctive statement "My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom" does not FAIL to be true (1) or false (0) if the implied ignorance is in fact not realised, and the proposition expressing it is therefore false (0).
Secondly, Grice thinks it is fairly clear that in this case, as in the case of "Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical," we could say that the human agent, the utterer implies that he did not know, and also that his saying that (or his saying THAT rather than something else, viz., in which room his wife is) implies that the utterer does not know.
Thirdly, the implication ("I don't know in which room") is in a way non-detachable, in that if, in a given context, the utterance of the disjunctive sentence would involve the implication that the utterer does not know in which room his his wife is, this implication would also be involved in the utterance of any other expression or form of words which would make the same assertion --
e.g., "The alternatives are:
(1) p
(2) q.
"
or
"One of the following things is the case:
(a) p.
(b) q."
In another possible way, however, the implication could perhaps be said to be detachable.
For there will be this or that context of utterance (unless I'm sounding too much like Firth) in which the normal implication will not hold.
E. g., the spokesman who announces,
"The next conference will be in Geneva or New York."
perhaps does NOT imply that he does not know which; for he may well be just not saying which.
But cf.
"The next conference will be at Oxford, or not."
This points to the fact that the implication is cancellable.
Mr. Smith could say,
"My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom."
in circumstances in which the implication would normally (cf. 'norms of conversation,' conversational norm), standardly, ceteris paribus, be present, and then go on,
"Mind you, I'm not saying that I don't know which."
This conversational move might be unfriendly (unco-operative?) (and perhaps ungrammatical) but would be perfectly intelligible.
He's playing a game! Surely games are co-operative!
Cf. "I don't really care where your wife is, Mr. Smith, so never do mind."
Finally,
AND THIS IS GRICE AT HIS RATIONALIST, DISSENTING, IRREVERENT best:
the fact that the utterance of the disjunctive sentence normally (cfr. 'norm of conversation,' 'conversational norm'), standardly, ceteris paribus, involves the implication of the utterer's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be EXPLAINED (and surely not just DESCRIBED) by reference or appeal to a general rational principle governing conversation, a principle of conversational helpfulness, as I may want to call it.
Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, or rather, exactly the way I feel like FORMULATING it is.
But a first shot would be the following:
"One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing."
Actually, I will go as far as following R. M. Hare's advice and use the imperative for what imperatives are for: commands -- and if I have to speak of a table of conversational commandments, I will:
Thou shalt not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing.
VARIANTS, since that's not the imperative strictly, but I like the archaicness of 'shalt':
Thou shalt not make a weaker (poorer) rather than a stronger (richer) explicit point, unless there is a good reason, trumping this commandment, for thou so doing.
-- e.g. thou seest that thou hast no evidence or ground for it.
This is perhaps not an adequate formulation but will perhaps be good enough for our present purposes of refuting Witters.
And it doesn't seem adequate because I don't think another philosopher ever used 'weak' like that.
Cfr.
Thou shalt not make a poorly informative utterance unless thou thinkest there is a good reason for thou so doing.
Or
Thou shalt not make a scarcely informative move in the conversation in which thou art engaged unless thou thinkest there is a good reason for thou so deviating from this very commandment.
On the assumption that such a principle of conversation as this is of general, and thus universalisable, application, one can draw the conclusion that the utterance of a disjunctive sentence would imply the utterer's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts, given that
(a) the obvious reason for not making a statemcnt which there is some call (by whom? who asked Mr. Smith) on one to make is that one is not in a position to make it,
--- cfr.
"Thou shalt make the utterance which there is a call on thee to make."
and
"Thou shalt not make an utterance that thou art not in a position to make."
and given
(b) the logical (in terms of Moore's entailment) fact that each disjunct ENTAILS the disjunctive -- i.e. the disjunction or the 'molecular disjunctive proposition' --, but not vice versa; which being so, each disjunct is, in this way, 'stronger' than the disjunctive.
This is crucial. It's easy to speak 'entailment' with this or that 'formal device' and this or that 'vernacular counterpart' to it.
p
--Therefore, p or q
q
--Therefore, p or q
Formulation of the maxim in terms of 'shalt' and entailment, rather than 'strength':
Thou shalt not make an utterance which entails LESS if thou art in a position to make an utterance which entails MORE.
If the outline of an rational explanation just given is on the right lines, I would wish to say, we have a strong reason for refusing in the case of "My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom" to regard the implication of the utterer's ignorance (cancellable as it is) as being at all part of the meaning of the expression -- the word 'or,' say, or variants thereof, 'the alternatives are...', 'one of this is true').
Anyone who knows about the logical relation between a disjunction (or strictly, a molecular disjunctive utterance or proposition) and its disjuncts, and who also expects one's conversational partner to abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness, should work out or calculate for himself that the utterance of a disjunctive utterance would involve the implication which it does in fact, ceteris paribus, involve.
I must insist, however, that my aim in discussing this last point about the principle of conversational helfpulness and its ability to 'generate' this or that conversational implicatum (i.e. the proposition of the form: the human agent, the utterer conversationally IMPLIES that p) has been merely to indicate the position I would wish to take up, and not to argue too seriously in favour of it.
We may want to refine the terminology and start using 'implicature,' after Sidonius.
Grice's main purpose in his exploration of 'implying' or the ways in which we can say that a human agent, an utterer conversationally implies that p or that q, is to introduce four ideas or tests of which he intends, having seen that neo-Wittgensteinians have detected a conversational nuance ("That pillar box seems red to me" -- baffling) -- to make some use; and to provide some conception of the ways in which these four tests or catalysts apply or fail to apply to various types of implication, or scenarios in which we can say that a human agent, the utterer conversationally implies that p or q.
Grice surely does not claim to have presented a systematic theory of implication.
For he might not care for one!
"That would be a very large undertaking and one for another occasion," if there is one, the implicatum being, or, rather, Grice implies.
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