Balashov Sums Up Neale for us

The Gricean-Russellian Analysis of the Referential Use of DDs

(From Stephen Neale, Descriptions (MIT Press, 1990), Ch. 3

Consider the utterance of

The Φ is Ψ

by speaker S, where ‘the Φ’ (e.g., ‘Smith’s murderer’) is used referentially to refer to a (e.g., Jones).

1. S has expressed the proposition that [the x: Φx] Ψx
(i.e., the proposition expressed by the purely general “Russellian” sentence ‘(∃x) (Φx & ((∀y) (Φy ⊃ x=y) & Ψx))’ )

2. There is no reason to suppose that S is not observing the CP and maxims.

3. S could not be doing this unless he thought that Ψa (where ‘a’ is a name).
Gloss: on the assumption that S is observing the Maxim of Relation, he must be attempting to convey something beyond the general proposition that whoever is uniquely Φ is Ψ. On the assumption that S is adhering to the Maxim of Quality, he must have adequate evidence for thinking that the Φ is Ψ. I know S knows that a is the Φ, therefore S thinks that Ψa.

4. S knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I know that a is the Φ, that I know that S knows that a is the Φ, and that I can see that S thinks the supposition that he thinks that Ψa is required.

5. S has done nothing to stop me thinking that Ψa.

6. S intends me to think, or at least willing to allow me to think, that Ψa.

7. And so, S has implicated that Ψa.