Disimplicature

Speranza

On a wide variety of presently live realist interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of 'value definiteness', according to which the properties---a.k.a. 'observables'---of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. 

The indeterminacy in such cases is moreover typically taken to be metaphysical, not merely epistemological or semantic. Here we consider whether two recent approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy---a metaphysical supervaluationist account, on the one hand, and a determinable-based account, on the other---can provide an intelligible basis for quantum value indeterminacy (QMI). 

Grice argues that previous arguments (Darby 2010, Skow 2010) according to which supervaluationism cannot accommodate QMI are unsuccessful; then provide more comprehensive arguments for the same conclusion. 

Grice goes on to argue, in ways touching base with Bokulich 2014 and Wolff 2015, that a determinable-based approach can accommodate the full range of sources of quantum MI.