Gricean Perversions

Re: 'objectification', etc., there is an interesting application of H. P.
Grice's theories of meaning to sex/sexuality by T. Nagel and R. C. Scruton. The
Nagel reference is 'Sexual Perversions' (JP 1969, repr. in Soble,
_Philosophy of Sex_). Scruton takes up Nagel's proposal in _Sexual Desire: a
philosophical examination_ (Weidenfeld and Nicolson). The idea being that
'non-perverted' sex blocks objectification, in a sort of Gricean mechanism that secures
enhancement via feed back in sexual arousal. Scruton writes:

"If Nagel's suggestion were right, then, following the
theory of meaning put forward by Grice, we should
expect the glance of [sexual] desire to involve, first,
an intention to arouse sexual interest; secondly,
the intention that this first intention be recognised;
thirdly, the intention that, though being recognised,
it play a part in precipitating what is intended."

Scruton thinks, rightly, that desire (rather than the more epistemic notion
of 'intention') is sufficient here, and Nagel has agreed (personal
communication). Scruton goes on to discusses the apparent paradox of self-reference --
or regressus ad infinitum -- that the chain of interconnected desire may
bring, and concludes, rightly, that it's more apparent than real (and sexual
desire _is_ fulfilled, if platonically -- _contra_ Sartre).

Good luck with your syllabus, and keep us posted.

Cheers,

JL

J. L. Speranza
_jlsperanza@aol.com_ (mailto:jlsperanza@aol.com)
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Refs.:

Grice, H. P. ‘Meaning’. (1948), reimpr. en Studies in the Way of Words.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.
---. ‘Intention and Uncertainty’. Proceedings of the British Academy, 1971.
Cited by Scruton in Sexual Desire.

---. ‘ Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre’.
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1975. repr. in Grice,
The Conception of Value, Oxford: Clarendon. Cited by Scruton en Sexual
Desire.
Hamilton, Christopher. Living philosophy: reflections on life, meaning, and
morality. Edinburgh University Press, 2001.
Nagel, T. ‘Sexual Perversion,’ (1969), repr. in Alan Soble, ed., The
Philosophy of Sex, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
Scruton, Roger. ‘Sexual Arousal’, en Practical Philosophy, Royal Institute
of Philosophy, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths, 1985, repr. as chapter 2, ‘Arousal’
, en Sexual Desire.
--- Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1986. Editado en USA: Sexual desire: a moral philosophy of the
erotic. New York: Free Press, 1986.
Speranza, J. L. "Gricean Love", MS. Available from The Grice Club.