The Grice Is Right

Further to Grice's apt remarks about 'shall' vs. 'will' as "misused by most English speakers":

In _Aspects of Reason_ (p.51), Grice writes:

"I will avail myself of one
species of acceptance, namely V-acceptance which I shall call 'willing'.
The proper interpretation of 'will' would be determined by its role in a
psychological theory [Grice refers at this point -- p.77 -- to his 'Method
in Philosophical Psychology, in _The Conception of Value_]. So, for Grice,
there are two volitive sub-modes (actually he notes that the same
distinction applies to the judicative), and one volitive super-mode, as it
were. Consider:

(1) I shall go to London.
(2) I predict that I go to London.
(3) I will go to London.
You will go to London.
*He will-s go to London.
(4) I will that I go to London.
You will that you go to London.
He wills that he go to London.

This supermode, Grice notes, "relates to willing that p" (p.53). The
intentional submode would be the 'exhibitive' variety (U wills that A
judges that U wills that p); the imperative submode would be the
'protreptic' variety (U wills that A judges that U wills that _A_ wills
that p). In 'Intention and Uncertainty', Grice is concerned with the
distinction above between (5) and (6):

(5) John wills that he flies to the moon
(6) John will fly to the moon.

Grice is attempting to analyse (7), and he sees this as involving an
ascription of belief (8):

(7) John _intends_ that he will fly to the moon.
(8) John believes that he will fly to the moon.

Now. What kind of a belief is (8)?

Grice is opposing here the theory put
forward in Oxford by H. L. A. Hart and S. N. Hampshire, 'Intention and
Certainty' (_Mind_) that sees the belief as a sort of incorrigibly totally
certain belief that one _will_ do some action. Grice thinks it may be
called a 'hunch' more than a belief. "The general direction of this attack
[on the belief-based theory of intention] is, I hope, clear; it is that the
less able we are to find parallels in the nonpractical sphere for the
so-called beliefs about OUR OWN FUTURE ACTIONS which the theory invites,
the more special these so-called beliefs become and the more unjustified is
the application of the term 'belief'" (p.7) (Note above the reference to
the 'future' actions (and the agent's belief about them). We're getting
closer to this use of "will" to mark, thus, the future).

Grice introduces talk of "shall" here -- a modal he considers in _Aspects
of Reason_ -- vis a vis 'should'.

The belief involved in intention does not
seem to behave like a 'memory-belief' ("I believe that I remember that I
bit my nurse'). There is an asymmetry here: "If we ask why I hold a believe
such that, say, I shall go abroad, one possible answer is that I believe
this because it is something that I should particularly like to the the
case". I.e. we do not look for confirmatory evidence, as seems to be the
rule with _other_ sorts of beliefs. A different test is that it is
unnatural to qualify the belief with 'truly' (or 'rightly') or 'falsely'
(or 'mistakenly):

(9) *John believes mistakenly that he will go abroad.

Grice writes:

"We cannot employ here the ordinary terminology for
appraising beliefs

(cf. Aristotle on the difference between _proairesis_
[typo in the original, reading 'proaioesis'. JLS] and _doxa_)" (p.8).

Is the belief about a 'factual statement' then? 'A factual statement that the
agent will do A' then? Grice deals with this in the section he entitles,
'The possibility of denying the presence of the factual commitment', as a
preamble to yet another thesis, viz. that one who intends to do A _does
have and rely on some evidential basis for the statement that he _will_ do
A.

Here Grice recounts this anecdote from Brecht's _Refugee Conversations_:

"Denmark was plagued by a succession of corrupt finance ministers. To deal
with this situation, a law is passed requiring periodical inspection of the
books of the Finance Minister. A certain finance minister, when visited by
the inspectors, said to them:

(10) If you inspect my books,
I shall not continue to be your finance minister.

"They retired in confusion, and only 18 months later it ws discovered that
the Finance Minister had spoken nothing other than the literal truth".
Grice writes: "This anecdote exploits a MODAL ambiguity in the FUTURE
TENSE, bewteen (a) the future 'indicated' or factual, and (b) the future
intentional."

And then Grice goes 'prescriptive':


"Sensitive English speakers (WHICH MOST OF US ARE NOT)
mark this distinction by discriminating between 'will'
and 'shall'".

"Just as NO ONE ELSE can say 'Oh for rain tomorrow' so NO ONE ELSE can say
_just_ what I say when I say:

(1) I shall go to London.

"If someone else says

(11) Grice will go to London.

he will be expressing _his_, not my, intention that I shall go." What about
(12), though?

(12) Grice shall go to London.

"One who intends to do A cannot _honestly_ use the Future Indicated (or
Factual). Only the Future Intentional." Or rather, "if he uses the Future
Indicated, he will _giving it to be understood that doing A is something
with regard to which he has no intentions (it is something outside his
control)". There is a symmetry here, Grice notes, with (13) and (14):

(13) I wish for rain tomorrow
(14) Oh for rain tomorrow.

Here Grice introduces a sub-script: "f" for "factual" and "i" for
"intentional". So we have two possible readings of (1), "I shall go to
London", viz. (15) and (16):

(15) I shall-f go to London.
(16) I shall-i go to London.

"If one intends to go to London, either (i) one says DISHONESTLY (15) -- in
which case a request for an evidential basis is perfectly legitimate (and
to maintain one's pretence in response to such a request one may have in
supply, and perhaps EVEN INVENT, an evidential basis for (15); or; (ii) one
says (16) in which case a reqeuest for an evidential basis is
_syntactically_ even no more appropriate than it would be in response to
'Oh for rain tomorrow' (rather than 'I wish for rain tomorrow').

Contra Hampshire and Hart, Grice finds all this 'heroic'.

Surely if one
intends to do A one can discuss the possibility that one will be prevented,
and so that one will-f NOT do A." "Even if use of the Future Intentional
were to be restricted to expressions of an intention to ATTEMPT to do A,
rather than TO DO A, it is still time" [odd use of 'time' here? JLS] that
an attempt to do A may be prevented by such contingencies as SUDDEN DEATH".
A second consideration is the embedding of "I shall go to London" in, e.g.
the antencedent of a conditional. Here it must be read only as:

(17) If I shall-f go to London, Jones will be pleased.

rather than

(18) If I shall-i go to London, Jones will be pleased.

for this is what 'planning' is all about -- but cfr. Brecht's example above
--: "one who expresses an intention says something which justifies OTHERS
in planning on the assumption that he will in fact do A".

A third point is
that this thesis offers "no reason why it should be impossible to operate
SIMULTANEOUSLY with BOTH MOODS of the Future Tense". Here it seems clear
that it's a distinction of 'mood'. The presence of "will" is misleading
here. The presence of 'will' does not _mark_ the operation of the
_volitional_ mode. It can still be _judicative_.

Grice goes back to the
distinction between the judicative (13) (I wish for rain tomorrow) and the
volitive (14) (Oh for rain tomorrow). "There is certainly no principle of
mutual exclusiveness of different moods. I can combine (19) with either
(20) or (21):

(19) Oh that it may rain tomorrow
(20) It will rain tomorrow
(21) It will _not_ rain tomorrow.

Grice considers at this point a modified form of the original thesis: "An
intender _may_ use both moods, but he can only reasonably use the Future
Indicated or Factual in so far as he has evidential backing." Grice notes
that this modified version runs into the difficulty that it licenses "such
illegitimate locutions" as

(22) *I shall-i go to London, but I cannot
say (have no reason to think) that I
shall-f go.

(* indicates 'illegitimate thing to say'). The other possibility is that
one _always_ has evidential backing anyway for the Future Indicated. The
evidence happens to be one's very intention, as it happens. At this point,
Grice introduces:

(23) Jones accepts that he will go to London.

"It seems that a degree of analogy between [willing] and believing has to
be admitted. ... He who intends to do A and he who believes that he will do
A can both be said to accept that he will do A." (p.13). Grice proposes as
an analysis of (24) in terms of a _two_ prong analysans -- (25) and (26):

(24) Jones intends that he will go to London.
(25) Jones accepts that he will go to London.
(26) Jones accepts that his going to London
will result from his accepting that he
will go to London.

"The idea is that when a case of acceptance is _also_ a case of _belief_,
the accepter does not regard his acceptance as contributing towards the
realisation of the state of affairs the FUTURE EXISTENCE OF WHICH HE
ACCEPTS. When a case of acceptance is a case of intention he does regard
the acceptance as so contributing". "If my going to Lodnon is to DEPEND
CAUSALLY on my accepting that I shall-f go, the possession of satisfactory
evidence that I shall-f go will involve possession of the information that
I accept that I shall-f go. Obviously, in such a case, I (unlike others)
can _not_ come to accept that I shall-f go on the basis of satisfactory
evidence; for to have such evidence I should have ALREADY to have
_accepted_ that I shall-f go. I cannot DECIDE whether or not to _accept_
that I shall-f go on the strenght of evidence which includes as a datum
that I _do_ accept that I shall-f go.". Grice is aware that he has yet not
provided _one_ sort of reply: "One must not expect the intender to rely on
evidence for his statement that he will in fct go to London", and that's a
fact, "but we have not [yet] provided any account of the nature of the
_non-evidential_ considerations [backing] which may be adduced to justify
such a statement".

Grice is careful here that the sceptic should not rely on 'an argument from
usage', viz. the inappropriateness of the dialogue:

(27) A: I shall-f go to London.
B. i. How do you know?
ii. What reason have you for
thinking that you will go?

Grice notes that to reply

(28) I intend to go.

is perfectly in order there and provides a 'partial answer' to the
questions in (27). Grice relies here on the Cooperative Principle. One
would not be making the questions he makes in (27) if one knew the answer
already: "It is only when, as is normally the case, one assumes that if a
man says that he will go to London he says so because this is his
intention, that such questions are _odd_. And they are _then_ odd because
they ask a question the answer to which the asker already knows, or thinks
he knows" (p.15). "The sceptic's best resource at this point seems to be:
if an intender relies on evidence that he will go to London, this evidence
either (i) is _independent_ of his intention that he shall-f to London, or
(b) includes the fact that he intends that he shall-f go to London. If (i),
it will be impossible (or very difficult) to avoid the admission that it
makes no difference whether the intention is present or not. If so, his
going to London is something which the agent cannot regard as within the
scope of a possible intention on his part (it's something he cannot avoid).
If (ii) then, since the fact that one intends that he shall-f go to London
cannot be a conclusive reason for supposing that one will go, it must be
possible for a situation to arise in which _this_ piece of evidence
favouriable to the idea that one will go to London is outweighed by
counter-evidence." "One ought to be able to say:

(29) *I intend to go to London, though
_other_ evidence makes it virtually
certain that I shall not in fact go.

At this point Grice brings the parallel 'judicative' case: Similarly, it
_is_ legitimate to say:

(30) It looks to me as if there were a red object
before me, but other evidence makes it
virtually certain that there is in fact
no such object before me.

One problem here is that (29) _is_ illegitimate. "(29) is something that I
cannot legitimately say; and this fact blocks the suggestion that my
intention to go to London can properly be regarded as being (for me)
evidence that I shall-f go." We seem to be just where we started...

It is here that Grice thinks that Prichard will save him! Here Grice brings
an asymmetry. Consider (31) versus (32):

(31) My arm goes up.
(32) My hair stands on end.

(31), unlike (32) can be the object of one's intention in a situation "in
which an inention to do something may be expected to be _causally_
effective". Grice asks: "How do we learn to separate the two sort of
cases". Answer: "By experience". Grice finds this slightly unconvincing: "I
cannot find _by experience_ that an _intention_ that my hair shall-f stand
on end is _ineffective_". And this because one cannot even _form_ (let
alone have) an intention "unless I think that my hair's standing on end is
a matter within my direct control". "To think of this as being so is to
suppose myself as being already provided with the answer which experience
is supposed to give me." It is _here_ that Grice introduces "to will".

To will, for Grice, is to intend when such causal requirement is not
operative.

"These difficulties can be avoidable if we can replace
'intending that' by some concept -- call it "Z-ing that" -- which satisfies
the following condition: that it shouldbe closely related to, indeed
involved in, 'intending that' _except that_ 'Z-ing that so-and-so should
occur' does _not_ entail that the occurrence is thought of as being within
one's control." "Prichard, for reasons not unlike those here mentioned,
introduced such a concept, which he called 'willing'". (p.16). "He deserves
great credit for ... [further] looking for a concept which applies both in
cases of one's own actions and in cases which are not cases of one's own
actions:

(33) Jones wills that the footballer runs faster.

and for "seeing that the accurate specification of 'willing'" should take,
as it were, a "phastic", or "the form 'willing that...', not 'willing
to...' (p.16). Grice thinks that his _functionalist_ approach to 'willing'
supersedes some 'dubious or misleading' things Prichards says about it,
"for example, that willing is 'an activity' and that it is _sui generis_".
Grice says, like believing, "willing is not a process or activity, but,
rather, perhaps a 'state'" (caveat: "the precise significance of any such
classificatory term would emerge only within the context of a developed
theory"). Grice closes his lecture with the analysis of four cases:

(34) I scratch my head.
(35) I intend to scratch my head
(36) I wish that I could scratch my head.
(37) I wish that I _had_ scratched my head.

Grice notes five symmetries here:

(i) In all four cases, there is a good
case for saying that it is a _good thing_ if I scratch my head. (ii) There
is no rival occurrence the case for which is in serious competition with
that for head-scratching. (iii) Not only do I recognise the superiority of
the case for head-scratching but I do not shrink from the idea of this
taking place. (iv) The considerations for the merits or the case for
head-scratching are (apart from time differences) the same in the four
cases: the head scratching relieves an itch. (v) If, when tied up, I say
(36), and my gaoler immediately releases me, it will be very odd if I do
not then scratch my head. I _can_ refrain, and say:

(38) The itch is gone.

thereby implicating that there is no longer a case for head-scratching, or

(39) I've changed my mind.

But "I cannot say:

(40) I only said, when tied up, that I
wished that I could scratch my head;
but now that I'm untied I am faced with
a quite different question, namely
whether or not to sratch my head.

Grice concludes by proposing that (41) be then analysed in terms of "will
that": i.e. "'Jones scratched his head' may be regarded as roughly
anlysable as (42) + (43) + (44):

(41) Jones's hand scratched his head.
(42) Jones willed that his hand should scratch his head.
(43) The circumstance specified in (42) resulted,
relatively directly (without an intervening overt link)
from the circumstance specified in (2).

"Normally (44) and (45) will _also_ be fulfilled":

(44) Jones expected that it would be the case that (42).
(45) X willed that it would be the case that (42).

"But I do not regard (44) or (45) as a necessary condition for the truth of
(31)". "What then, are we to say of Future Intentional?" How are we to
analyse, say, (46)?

(46) Jones intends now to scratch his head
in 1 minute's time.

Grice proposes (46) as being "roughly analysable" as (47) + (48):

(47) Jones wills now that his hand should scratch
his head in 1 minute's time.
(48) Jones judges that his present willing (or will) that
his hand should scratch his head in 1 minute's time
will result at the time in question in Jones's
hand scratching his head.

"To deal with the sceptic, we must show with what justification Jones may
have the 'judging' mentioned in (48)". Grice notes: "Jones is in a position
to say that his will _now_ is. This is clearly _not_, for Jones, an
evidential matter". He adds, that as a matter of fact, "its [real] status
is by no means easy to determine" (p.18). Second, "Jones is (or may be) in
a position to say taht, if 1 minute hence his will is still the same, his
head will be scratched". "This _will_ be for Jones an evidential matter",
and rests on: (i) "Jones's knowing, from experience, that head-scratching
is a matter within his control", i.e. "is the sort of occurrence which will
result from willing that it occur..." [Note the use of the subjunctive mode
following "will that...".] "... provided that there are no
interference-factors. (ii) Jones's having reason to suppose that, on this
occasion, there will be no interference factor. Grice's final paragraph in
the lecture is of special interest for the reference to work by his
colleague D. F. Pears: "The justifiability of Jones's factual commitment,
if he expresses an intention by saying

(49) I shall-i scratch my head in 1 minute's time.

to its being the case that he _will_, in fact, scratch his head in 1
minute's time reduces, then, to the question of the justifiability of an
assumption, on his part, given that he _now_ wills that his head _be
scratched_..." [Note again the subjunctive mood] "...in 1 minute time, that
he _will_ (still) in 1 minute hence _will_ that this be so." Note that
Grice is having here the iterated occurrence

(50) Jones will will.

Odd, but not impossible:

"This question, shich is fairly closely related to
questions about the PREDICTABILITY of one's own decisions (which have been
worked on by D. F. Pears and others), is not one which I shall attempt to
resolve in this lecture". Well, he did a pretty good job towards the
elucidation, though, setting the scene for things like G. Harman's
contributory essay in PGRICE, 'Willing & intending'...

----

Notes from the OED:

shall
[A Com. Teut. preterite-present strong verb: OE. sceal, sculon, sc(e)olde =
OFris. skil (skel, scol), skilun (skalun, etc.), skolde (sculde, etc.), OS.
skal, skulun, skolda, OLow Frankish sal, sulum, solde (MDutch sal, sullen,
solde, mod.Dutch zal, zullen, zou), OHG. scal, sculun, scolta, also sal
(sol), sulun, solta (MHG. schal and schol, schulen, scholte, also sal and
sol, sulen, solte; mod.G. soll, sollen, sollte), ONor. skal, skulu, skylda
(Sw. skall, pa. t. skulle; Da. skal, pa. t. skulde), Goth. skal, skulum,
skulda. The Teut. root (*skel-:) *skal-: *skul- to owe (:-pre-Teut. *skel-:
*skol-: *sk'l) is represented by Goth. skula, OHG., OS. scolo, OE.
&asg.escola wk. masc., debtor, OHG. sculd, sculda (mod.G. schuld), OS.
sculd, OE. scyld fem., debt, guilt. Outside Teut. the only certain cognates
are Lith. skele&hacek.ti to be guilty, skì.lti to get into debt,
skolà debt, guilt, OPrussian skallisnan (acc.) duty, skellânts guilty,
po-skulit to admonish. The northern English dialects (including Sc.) have a
form "sal", pa. t. "suld", with initial s instead of sh. This does not
occur in the remains of ONorthumbrian, but first appears in the 13th c. It
is remarkable that a similar form, with s irregularly representing OTeut.
sk, existed as a dialectal variant in OHG. (sal, sol, sulun) and OFris.
(sal, sel), and has ousted the regular form in Ger. (soll, sollen) and
Dutch (zal, zou). Some scholars regard the s form as representing an OTeut.
variant, originating from the euphonic dropping of k in inflexional forms
like the subjunctive *skli¯-. It seems more probable that it was
independently developed in the different dialects at an early period, while
the sk- retained its original pronunciation; in stressless position the k
might naturally be dropped, and the simplified initial afterwards extended
by analogy to the stressed use. In Eng. the vb. has no inf. or pples. (the
evidence of an OE. inf. sculan, sceolan, is doubtful). Some of the other
Teut. langs. have an infinitive: OHG. scolan, solan (MHG., mod.G. sollen),
MDutch sullen (Dutch zullen), ONor. skulu (pa. t. inf. skyldu); Goth. has
the pres. pple. skuland-s and the pa. pple. skuld-s; OHG. has the pres.
pple. scolanti (mod.G. sollend), and early mod.G. the pa. pple. gesollt;
ONor. has a ppl. adj. skyld-r bound by duty.]
Signification and uses.
I 1 to owe (money).
1425 Hoccleve Min. Poems xxiii. 695 The leeste ferthyng þat y men shal.
To owe (allegiance).
1649 And by that feyth I shal to god and yow.
II Followed by an infinitive (without "to"). Except for a few instances of
"shall will", "shall may" (mowe), "shall conne" in the 15th c., the
infinitive after "shall" is always either that of a principal verb or of
have or be.
1 The present tense shall.
2 In general statements of "what is right" or "becoming": = `ought'.
(Superseded by the pa. subjunctive "should". In OE. the subjunctive present
sometimes occurs in this use (e.g. c 888 in A. 4).
1460 Fortescue Abs. & Lim. Mon.
The king shall often times send his judges to punish rioters and risers.
1562 Legh Armory 149
Whether are Roundells of all suche coloures, as ye haue spoken of here
before? or shall they be named Roundelles of those coloures?
3 a In OE. and occas. in ME. used to express "necessity" (of various kinds)
(for the many shades of meaning in OE. see Bosworth-Toller): = "must",
"must needs", "have to", "am compelled to", etc.
b In stating a necessary condition: = `will have to', `must' (if something
else is to happen).
1596 Shaks. Merch. V. i. i. 116 You shall seeke all day ere you finde them,
& when you haue them they are not worth the search.
1605 Shaks. Lear v. iii. 22 He that parts vs, shall bring a Brand from
Heauen.
c In hypothetical clause, accompanying the statement of a necessary
condition: = `is to'.
1612 Bacon Ess., Greatn. Kingd. (Arb.) 482 Neither must they be too much
broken of it, if they shall be preserued in vigor.
4 Indicating what is appointed or settled to take place = the mod. `is to',
`am to', etc.
1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. ii. iv. 89 What is he that shall buy his flocke and
pasture?
1625 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser. i. III. 199 Tomorrow His Majesty will be
present..to begin the Parliament which is thought shall be removed to Oxford.
5 In commands or instructions. a (a) In the second person, EQUIVALENT TO AN
IMPERATIVE. Chiefly in Biblical language, of Divine commandments, rendering
the jussive future of the Heb. and Vulgate. (In OE. the imperative is used
in the ten commandments.)
1382 Wyclif Exod. xx. 7 Thow shalt not tak the name of the Lord thi God in
veyn. [So Coverdale, etc.]
(b) In expositions: you shall understand, etc. (that).
(c) In the formula you shall excuse (pardon) me. (now "must").
1595 Shaks. John v. ii. 78 Your Grace shall pardon me, I will not backe.
1630 R. Johnson's Kingd. & Commw. 191 You shall excuse me, for I eat no
flesh on Fridayes.
b In the third person.
1744 in Atkyns Chanc. Cases (1782) III. 166 The words "shall" and "may" in
general acts of parliament, or in private constitutions, ARE TO BE
CONSTRUED IMPERATIVELY, they must remove them.
6 In the second and third persons, expressing the speaker's determination
to bring about some action, event, or state of things in the future, or
(occasionally) to refrain from hindering what is otherwise certain to take
place, or is intended by another person.
a In the second person.
1891 'J. S. Winter' Lumley xi, If you would rather not stay then, you shall
go down to South Kensington Square then.
b In third person.
1591 Shaks. Two Gent. v. iv. 129 Verona shall not hold thee.
1604 Shaks. Oth. v. ii. 334 If there be any cunning Crueltie, That can
torment him much,..It shall be his.
1891 'J. S. Winter' Lumley xiv, `Oh, yes, sir, she shall come back,' said
the nurse. `I'll take care of that.' `I will come back,' said Vere.
7 In special interrogative uses.
a In the first person, used in questions to which the expected answer is a
command, direction, or counsel, or a resolve on the speaker's own part.
(a) in questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun (in oblique case),
adverb, or adverbial phrase.
1600 Fairfax Tasso viii. lxix, What shall we doe? shall we be gouern'd
still, By this false hand?
1865 Kingsley Herew. xxxiii, Where shall we stow the mare?
(b) in categorical questions.Often expressing indignant reprobation of a
suggested course of action, the implication being that only a negative (or,
with negative question an affirmative) answer is conceivable.
1611 Shaks. Wint. T. v. iii. 83 Shall I draw the Curtaine?
1802 Wordsw. To the Cuckoo i, O Cuckoo! shall I call thee Bird, Or but a
wandering Voice?
1891 'J. S. Winter' Lumley xiii, `Are you driving, or shall I call you a
cab?' `Oh, no; I'm driving, thanks'.
(c) In ironical affirmative in exclamatory sentence, equivalent to the
above interrogative use. (Cf. Ger. "soll".)
1741 Richardson Pamela (1742) III. 89 A pretty thing truly! Here I, a poor
helpless Girl, raised from Poverty and Distress,..shall put on Lady-airs to
a Gentlewoman born.
(d) to stand shall I, shall I (later shill I, shall I: see shilly-shally),
to be at shall I, shall I (not): to be vacillating, to shilly-shally.
1674 R. Godfrey Inj. & Ab. Physic 85 Such Medicines..that will not stand
shall I? shall I? but will fall to work on the Disease presently.
b Similarly in the third person, where the subject represents or includes
the speaker, or when the speaker is placing himself at another's point of
view.
1610 Shaks. Temp. v. i. 22 Hast thou (which art but aire) a touch, a
feeling Of their afflictions, and shall not my selfe, One of their
kinde,..be kindlier mou'd then thou art?
c In the second and third person, where the expected answer is a decision
on the part of the speaker or of some person other than the subject. The
question often serves as an impassioned repudiation of a suggestion that
something shall be permitted.
1450 Merlin i. 14 `What shalbe his name?' `I will', quod she, `that it haue
name after my fader.'
1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. iv. ii. 11 What shall he haue that kild the Deare?
1737 Pope Hor. Epist. i. i. 97 And say, to which shall our applause belong,
This new Court jargon, or the good old song?
1812 Crabbe Tales xviii, Shall a wife complain?
d In indirect question.
1865 Kingsley Herew. x, Let her say what shall be done with it.
8 As A MERE AUXILIARY, forming (with present infinitive) the FUTURE, and
(with perfect infinitive) the future perfect tense. In OE. the notion of
the future tense was ordinarily expressed by the present tense. To prevent
ambiguity, "wile" ("will") was not unfrequently used as a future auxiliary,
sometimes retaining
NO TRACE OF ITS ORIGINAL SENSE [connected with the faculty of volition.
JLS]. On the other hand, "sceal" ("shall") even when rendering a Latin
future, can hardly be said to have been ever a mere tense-sign in OE.;
IT ALWAYS EXPRESSED SOMETHING OF ITS ORIGINAL NOTION OF OBLIGATION OR
NECESSITY. In ME the present early ceased to be commonly employed in
futural sense, and the future was expressed by either "shall" or "will",
the former being much more common. The usage as to THE CHOICE between the
two auxiliaries has varied from time to time. Since the middle of the 17th
c. the general rule (subject to various exceptions) has been that
MERE FUTURITY is expressed in the first person by "shall", in the second
and third by "will". In indirectly reported speech, usage permits either
the retention of the auxiliary used by the original speaker or the
substitution of that which is appropriate to the point of view of the
person reporting.

a In OE. "sceal", while retaining its primary sense, served as a tense-sign
in announcing a future event as fated or divinely decreed. Hence "shall"
has always been the auxiliary used, in all persons, for prophetic or
oracular announcements of the future, and for solemn ASSERTIONS OF THE
CERTAINTY OF A FUTURE EVENT.
1577 in Allen Martyrdom Campion (1908) 110 The queene neither ever was, nor
is, nor ever shall be the head of the Church of England.
1601 Shaks. Jul. C. iii. i. 262 Now do I Prophesie..A Curse shall light
vpon the limbes of men.
b In the first person, "shall" has, from the early ME. period, been the
normal auxiliary for expressing MERE FUTURITY, without any adventitious
notion. (a) Of events conceived as INDEPENDENT OF THE SPEAKER'S VOLITION
(To use "will" in these cases is now a mark of Scottish, Irish, provincial,
or extra-British idiom.)
1595 in Cath. Rec. Soc. Publ. V. 357 My frend, yow and I shall play no more
at Tables now.
1605 Shaks. Macb. i. i. 1 When shall we three meet againe? 1613 Shaks. Hen.
VIII, i. iv. 44 Then wee shall haue 'em, Talke vs to silence.
1852 Mrs. Stowe Uncle Tom's C. xvii, `But what if you don't hit?' `I shall
hit', said George coolly.
(b) Of voluntary action or its intended result. Here "I shall" or "we
shall" is always admissible exc. where the notion of a present (as
distinguished from a previous) DECISION OR CONSENT is to be expressed (IN
WHICH CASE "will" MUST BE USED). Further, "I shall" often expresses a
determination insisted on in spite of opposition. In the 16th c. and
earlier, "I shall" often occurs where "I will" would now be used.
1559 W. Cunningham Cosmogr. Glasse 91 This now shall I alway kepe surely in
memorye.
1601 Shaks. All's Well v. iii. 27 Informe him So 'tis our will he should.-I
shall my liege.
1885 Ruskin On Old Road II. 57 note, Henceforward..I shall continue to
spell `Ryme' without our wrongly added h.
c In the second person, "shall" as a MERE FUTURE AUXILIARY appears never to
have been usual; but in categorical questions it is normal: e.g. `Shall you
miss your train? I am afraid you will.'
d In the third person. (superseded by "will") exc. when another's statement
or expectation respecting himself is reported in the third person, e.g. `He
says he shall not have time to write.' (Even in this case "will" is still
not uncommon, but in some contexts LEADS TO AMBIGUITY. IT IS THEREFORE
PREFERABLE TO USE "HE SHALL" AS THE INDIRECT RENDERING OF "I SHALL").
1489 Caxton Sonnes of Aymon ii. 64 Yf your fader come agayn from the
courte, he shall wyll yelde you to the kynge Charlemayne.
1799 J. Robertson Agric. Perth 361 The effect of the statute labour..has
always been, now is, and probably shall continue to be, less productive
than it might.
¶e Down to the 18th c., "shall", the auxiliary appropriate to the first
person, was sometimes used when a person wrote of himself in the third
person. Cf. the formula: `And your petitioner shall ever pray.'
1798 Kemble Let. in Pearson's Catal. (1900) 45 Mr. Kemble presents his
respectful compliments to the Proprietors of the `Monthly Mirror', and
shall have great pleasure at being at all able to aid them.
f In negative (or virtually negative) and interrogative use, shall often =
"will be able to".
1600 Shaks. Sonn. lxv, How with this rage shall beautie hold a plea.
g Used (after a hypothetical clause or an imperative sentence) in
statements of a result to be expected from some action or occurrence. Now
(exc. in the first person) usually replaced by "will"; but "shall" survives
in literary use.
1851 Dasent Jest & Earnest (1873) II. 140 Visit Rome and you shall find him
[the Pope] mere carrion.
h In clause expressing the object of a promise, or of an expectation
accompanied by hope or fear. Now only where "shall" is the ordinary future
auxiliary; but down to the 19th c. "shall" was often preferred to "will" in
the second and third persons.
1628 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser. i. III. 266 He is confident that the blood
of Christ shall wash away..his..sins.
1654 E. Nicholas in N. Papers (Camden) II. 142, I hope neither your Cosen
Wat. Montagu nor..Walsingham shall be permitted to discourse..with..the D.
of Gloucester.
i In impersonal phrases, "it shall be well, needful", etc. (to do so and
so). (now "will").
j "shall be", added to a future date in clauses measuring time.
1617 Sir T. Wentworth in Fortescue Papers 25 To which purpose my late Lord
Chancelour gave his direction about the 3. of Decembre shallbe-two-yeares.
9 In the idiomatic use of the future to denote what ordinarily or
occasionally occurs under specified conditions, "shall" was formerly the
usual auxiliary. In the second and third persons, this is now somewhat
formal or rhetorical; ordinary language substitutes "will" or "may". Often
in antithetic statements coupled by an adversative conjunction or by "and"
with adversative force.
a in the first person.
1712 Steele Spect. No. 326 p.2 In spite of all my Care, I shall every now
and then have a saucy Rascal ride by reconnoitring..under my Windows.
b in the second person.
1852 Spencer Ess. (1858) 414 After knowing him for years, you shall
suddenly discover that your friend's nose is slightly awry.
c in the third person.
1793 W. Roberts Looker-On (1794) III. 179 One man shall approve..the same
thing that another man shall condemn.
1870 M. Arnold St. Paul & Prot. 2 It may well happen that a man who lives
and thrives under a monarchy shall yet theoretically disapprove the
principle of monarchy.
10 In hypothetical, relative, and temporal clauses denoting a future
contingency, the future auxiliary is "shall" for all persons alike. (Where
no ambiguity results, however, the present tense is commonly used for the
future, and the perfect for the future-perfect; the use of "shall", when
not required for clearness, is apt to sound pedantic.) Formerly sometimes
used to express the sense of a present subjunctive.
a In hypothetical clauses.("shall I" = `if I shall')
1680 New Hampsh. Prov. Papers (1867) I. 388 If any Christian..shall speak
contempteously of the Holy Scriptures,..such person..shall be punished.
b In relative clauses (where the antecedent denotes an as yet undetermined
person or thing).
1811 Southey Let. to G. C. Bedford 16 Feb. The minister who shall first
become a believer in that book..will obtain a higher reputation than ever
statesman did before him. 1874 R. Congreve Ess. 417 We extend our
sympathies..to the unborn generations which..shall follow us on this earth.
c In temporal clauses.
1830 Laws of Cricket in Nyren Yng. Cricketer's Tutor (1902) 20 If in
striking, or at any other time, while the ball shall be in play, both his
feet be over the popping-crease.
11 In clauses expressing the purposed result of some action, or the object
of a desire, intention, command, or request. (Often admitting of being
replaced by "may"; in OE., and occas. as late as the 17th c., the pres.
subj. was used as in Latin.)
a in final clause usually introduced by that.In this use mod. idiom prefers
should (22 a): see quot. 1611 below, and the appended remarks.
1879 M. Pattison Milton xiii. 167 At the age of nine and twenty, Milton has
already determined that this lifework shall be..an epic poem.
b in relative clause.
1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. iv. 40 As Gardeners doe with Ordure hide those
Roots That shall first spring.
The choice between "should" and "would" follows the same rules as that
between "shall" and "will" as future auxiliaries, except that "should" must
sometimes be avoided on account of liability to be misinterpreted as =
`ought to'. In present Eng. "should" occurs mainly in the first person; in
the other persons it follows the rule for "shall".
III Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses.
24 With ellipsis of verb of motion: = `shall go'. Now arch.[The use is
common in OHG. and OS., and in later HG., LG., and Du. In the mod.
Scandinavian langs. it is also common, and instances occur in MSw.]
1596 Shaks. 1 Hen. IV, iv. i. 37 That with our small coniunction we should
on.
1598 Shaks. Merry W. iii. v. 14 If the bottome were as deepe as hell, I
shold down.
25 In questions, what shall = `what shall (it) profit', `what good shall
(I) do'.
26 With the sense `is due', `is proper', `is to be given or applied'. [Cf.
G. soll.]
27 a With ellipsis of active infinitive to be supplied from the context.
1892 Mrs. H. Ward David Grieve iv. ii, `No, indeed, I havn't got all I
want', said Lucy... `I never shall, neither'.
b Phrase, if I shall. Now dial.
1390 Gower Conf. II. 96 Doun knelende on mi kne I take leve, and if I
schal, I kisse hire.
1390 Gower Conf., II. 96 I wolde kisse hire eftsones if I scholde.
1871 Earle Philol. Engl. Tongue 203 The familiar proposal to carry a
basket,..I will if I shall, that is, I am willing if you will command me; I
will if so required.
1886 W. Somerset Word-bk. s.v., I'll warn our Tom'll do it vor ee, nif he
shall-i.e. if you wish.
c With generalized ellipsis in proverbial phrase: needs must that needs
shall = `he must whom fate compels'.
28 a With ellipsis of do (not occurring in the context).
1477 Norton Ord. Alch. in Ashm. (1652) 5 O King that shall These Workes!
b The place of the inf. is sometimes supplied by that or so placed at the
beginning of the sentence.The construction may be regarded as an ellipsis
of "do". It is distinct from the use (belonging to 27) in which so has the
sense of `thus', `likewise', or `also'; in the latter there is usually
inversion, as so shall I.
1888 'J. S. Winter' Bootle's Childr. iv, `I should like to see her now
she's grown up'. `So you shall'.
29 With ellipsis of be or passive inf., or with so in place of this (where
the preceding context has is, was, etc.).
1615 J. Chamberlain in Crt. & Times Jas. I (1848) I. 362 He is not yet
executed, nor I hear not when he shall.

will, would. [OE. willan, pres.t. wille, willaþ, pa. t. wolde, Anglian
walde, = OFris. willa, wille, wilde, wolde, OS. willian, williu, williad,
wolda, (M)LG. willen, (M)Dutch willen, wilde, ONor. vilja, vil, vilda,
viljat (Sw. vilja, ville, Da. ville, vilde), Goth. wiljan, wiljau,
wilda:-OTeut. *wel(l)jan, parallel with OTeut. *wal(l)jan, whence OFris.
wella, welde, OS. wellian, welda, MLG. wellen, OHG. wellen, well, wellemes,
etc., welta, wolta (MHG. wellen, wollen, wöllen, welte, wolte, gewellt, G.
wollen, will, wollen, wollte, gewollt), ONor. velja, vel, valði, valiðr
(Sw. välja, Da. vælge) to choose, (see wele v.), Goth. waljan to choose;
for other Teut. derivatives see will sb.1, will v.2, wale sb.2 choice, well
adv.: f. Indo-Eur. wel-: wol-: wl-, represented by L. velle, volo, (velim,
volui¯), Lith. ve~lyju, ve~lyti to wish, pa-velmi to allow, viltis hope,
OSl. veleti to command, voliti to will, choose, volja will, W. gwell
better, Skr. várati chooses, wishes, prefers, vára- wish, choice, váram
better, vr&dotbl.n&dotbl.ati wishes, prefers.
The most remarkable feature of this vb., besides its many idiomatic and
phrasal uses, is its employment as a regular auxiliary of the future tense,
which goes back to the OE. period, and may be paralleled in other Germanic
languages, e.g. MHG. In some uses it is not always possible to distinguish
this vb. from will v.2]
Signification and uses.
I The present tense will.
1 Transitive uses, with simple obj. or obj. clause; occas. intr.
1 trans. with simple obj.: Desire, wish for, have a mind to, `want'
(something); sometimes implying also `intend, purpose'.
1601 Shaks. (title) Twelfe Night, Or what you will. 1654 Whitlock Zootomia
44 Will what befalleth, and befall what will.
1734 tr. Rollin's Anc. Hist. V. 31 He that can do what ever he will is in
great danger of willing what he ought not.
b intr. with well or ill, or trans. with sbs. of similar meaning (e.g.
good, health), usually with dat. of person: Wish (or intend) well or ill
(to some one), feel or cherish good-will or ill-will. Obs. (cf. will v.2 1
b). See also well-willing a.
d to will well that: to be willing that.
1483 Caxton Gold. Leg. 166/1, I wyl wel that thou say, and yf thou say ony
good, thou shalt be pesybly herde.
2 trans. with obj. clause (with vb. in pres. subj., or in periphrastic form
with should), or acc. and inf.: Desire, wish; sometimes implying also
`intend, purpose' (that something be done or happen).
1548 Hutten Sum of Diuinitie K viij, God wylle all men to be saued.
3 Denoting expression (usually authoritative) of a wish or intention:
Determine, decree, ordain, enjoin, give order (that something be done).
1528 Cromwell in Merriman Life & Lett. (1902) I. 320 His grace then wille
that thellection of a new Dean shalbe emonges them of the colledge.
b spec. in a direction or instruction in one's will or testament; hence, to
direct by will (that something be done).
1820 Gifford's Compl. Engl. Lawyer 672, I..do hereby will and direct that
my executrix..do excuse and release the said sum of 100l. to him.
c fig. of an abstract thing (e.g. reason, law): Demands, requires.
1597 Shaks. 2 Hen. IV, iv. i. 157 Our Battaile is more full of Names then
yours... Then Reason will, our hearts should be as good.
4 transf. (from 2). Intends to express, means; affirms, maintains.
1602 Dolman La Primaud. Fr. Acad. (1618) III. 662 Hee will that this
authority should be for a principle of demonstration.
2 With dependent infinitive (normally without "to").
5 Desire to, wish to, have a mind to (do something); often also implying
intention.
1697 C'tess D'Aunoy's Trav. (1706) 149, I will not write to you often,
because I will always have a stock of News to tell you, which..is pretty
long in picking up.
1704 Locke Hum. Und. i. iv. §8 The great Encomiasts of the Chineses, do all
to a man agree and will convince us that the Sect of the
Literati..are..Atheists.
6 In relation to another's desire or requirement, or to an obligation of
some kind: Am (is, are) disposed or willing to, consent to; †in early use
sometimes = deign or condescend to.With the (rare and obs.) imper. use, as
in quot. 1490, cf. b and the corresponding negative use in 12 b.
1921 Times Lit. Suppl. 10 Feb. 88/3 Literature thrives where people will
read what they do not agree with, if it is good.
b In 2nd person, interrog., or in a dependent clause after beg or the like,
expressing a request (usually courteous; with emphasis, impatient).
1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. i. 47 Will you shogge off? 1605
1878 Hardy Ret. Native v. iii, O, O, O,..O, will you have done!
7 Expressing voluntary action, or conscious intention directed to the doing
of what is expressed by the principal verb (without temporal reference as
in 11, and without emphasis as in 10): = choose to (choose v. B. 3 a).The
proper word for this idea, which cannot be so precisely expressed by any
other.
1685 Baxter Paraphr. N.T. Matt. ix. 25 When God will tell us we shall know.
8 Expressing natural disposition to do something, and hence habitual
action: Has the habit, or `a way', of --ing; is addicted or accustomed to
--ing; habitually does; sometimes connoting `may be expected to' (cf. 15).
1865 Ruskin Sesame ii. §91 Men, by their nature, are prone to fight; they
will fight for any cause, or for none.
9 Expressing potentiality, capacity, or sufficiency: Can, may, is able to,
is capable of --ing; is (large) enough or sufficient to.†it will not be: it
cannot be done or brought to pass; it is all in vain. So, †will it not be?
1833 N. Arnott Physics (ed. 5) I. 597 The heart will beat after removal
from the body.
10 As a strengthening of sense 7, expressing determination, persistence,
and the like (without temporal reference as in 11).
a Purposes to, is determined to. 1539 Bible (Great) Isa. lxvi. 6, I heare
ye voyce of the Lorde, that wyll rewarde, & recompence his enemyes.
b emphatically. Is fully determined to; insists on or persists in --ing:
sometimes with mixture of sense 8. (In 1st pers. with implication of
futurity, as a strengthening of sense 11 a.) Also fig. = must inevitably,
is sure to.
1892 E. Reeves Homeward Bound viii. 239, I have spent 6,000 francs to come
here..and I will see it!
c In phr. of ironical or critical force referring to another's assertion or
opinion. Now arch. exc. in will have it (see have v. B. 13 b).
1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI, ii. iii. 58 This is a Riddling Merchant for the
nonce, He will be here, and yet he is not here.
1728 Chambers Cycl. s.v. Honey, Some naturalists will have honey to be of a
different quality, according to the difference of the flowers..the bees
suck it from.
11 As AUXILIARY OF THE FUTURE TENSE WITH IMPLICATION OF INTENTION (THUS
DISTINGUISHED FROM "SHALL" v. B. 8, where see note).
a In 1st person: sometimes in slightly stronger sense = intend to, mean to.
1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. v. iii. 2 To morrow will we be married.
1607 Shaks. Cor. v. iii. 127 Ile run away Till I am bigger, but then Ile
fight.
1777 Clara Reeve Champion of Virtue 55 Never fear it..I will speak to
Joseph about it.
b In 2nd and 3rd pers., in questions or indirect statements.
1839 Lane Arab. Nts. I. ii. 85, I will cure thee without giving thee to
drink any potion... When King Yoonán heard his words, he..said.., How wilt
thou do this?
c will do (with omission of "I"): an expression of willingness to carry out
a request. Cf. wilco. colloq.
1967 L. White Crimshaw Memorandum v. 91 `And find out where the bastard
was.'.. `Will do,' Jim said.
13 In 1st pers., expressing immediate intention: "I will" = `I am now going
to', `I proceed at once to'.
1885 'Mrs. Alexander' At Bay iii, Very well; I will wish you good-evening.
b In 1st pers. pl., expressing a proposal: we will (†wule we) = `let us'.
1798 Coleridge Nightingale 4 Come, we will rest on this old mossy bridge!
c FIGURATIVE (in 3rd pers.) of a thing: Is ready to, is on the point of
--ing.
1225 Ancr. R. 254 A treou þet wule uallen, me underset hit mid on oðer treou.
14 In 2nd and 3rd pers., as auxiliary EXPESSING MERE FUTURITY, forming
(with pres. inf.) the future, and (with pf. inf.) the future pf. tense:
corresponding to "shall" in the 1st pers. (see note s.v. shall v. B. 8).
1847 Tennyson Princess iii. 12 Rest, rest, on mother's breast, Father will
come to thee soon.
b As auxiliary of future substituted for the imper. in mild injunctions or
requests.
1876 Ruskin St. Mark's Rest. i. §7 That they should use their own balances,
weights, and measures; (not by any means false ones, you will please to
observe).
15 As auxiliary of future expressing a contingent event, or a result to be
expected, in a supposed case or under particular conditions (with the
condition expressed by a conditional, temporal, or imper. clause, or
otherwise implied).
1861 M. Pattison Ess. (1889) I. 46 The lover of the Elizabethan drama will
readily recal many such allusions.
b With pers. subject (usually 1st pers. sing.), expressing a voluntary act
or choice in a supposed case, or a conditional promise or undertaking: esp.
in asseverations (e.g. I will die sooner than..., I'll be hanged if..., etc.).
1898 'H. S. Merriman' Roden's Corner xiii. 138 But I will be hanged if I
see what it all means, now.
c Expressing a determinate or necessary consequence (without the notion of
futurity).
1887 Fowler Deductive Logic (ed. 9) 47 From what has been said it will be
seen that I do not agree with Mr. Mill. Mod. If, in a syllogism, the middle
term be not distributed in either premiss, there will be no conclusion.
d With the notion of futurity obscured or lost: = will prove or turn out
to, will be found on inquiry to; may be supposed to, presumably does. Hence
(chiefly Sc. and north. dial.) in estimates of amount, or in uncertain or
approximate statements, the future becoming equivalent to a present with
qualification: e.g. it will be... = `I think it is...' or `it is about...';
what will that be? = `what do you think that is?'
1584 Hornby Priory in Craven Gloss. (1828), Where on 40 Acres there will be
xiij.s. iv.d. per acre yerely for rent.
1791 Grose Olio (1792) 106, I believe he will be an Irishman.
1791 Grose Olio 107 C. How far is it to Dumfries? W. It will be twenty miles.
1812 Brackenridge Views Louisiana (1814) 156 The agriculture of this
territory will be very similar to that of Kentucky.
1876 Whitby Gloss. s.v. Biddels, This word we have only once heard, and
that will be twenty years ago.
16 Used where "shall" is now the normal auxiliary, chiefly in expressing
mere futurity: since 17th c. almost exclusively in Scottish, Irish,
provincial, or extra-British use (see shall v. B. 7, 8, 10).
1602 Shaks. Ham. v. ii. 184, I will win for him if I can: if not, Ile gaine
nothing but my shame, and the odde hits.
1825 Scott in Lockhart Ballantyne-humbug (1839) 99, I expect we will have
some good singing.
1875 E. H. Dering Sherborne xxxix, `Will I start, sir?' asked the Irish
groom.
3 Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses.
17 In absol. use, or with ellipsis of obj. clause as in 2: in meaning
corresponding to senses 5-7.if you will is sometimes used parenthetically
to qualify a word or phrase: = `if you wish it to be so called', `if you
choose or prefer to call it so'.
1696 Whiston The. Earth iv. i. §2. 218 Gravity..depends entirely on the
constant and efficacious, and, if you will, the supernatural and miraculous
Influence of Almighty God.
1876 Ruskin St. Mark's Rest vii. §78 Very savage! monstrous! if you will.
b In parenthetic phr. if God will (†also will God, rarely God will), God
willing: if it be the will of God, `D.V.'In OE. Gode willi&asg.ende (will
v.2) = L. Deo volente.
1716 Strype in Thoresby's Lett. (1832) II. 368 Next week, God willing, I
take my journey to my Rectory in Sussex.
c fig. Demands, requires (absol. or ellipt. use of 3 c).
1511 Reg. Privy Seal Scot. I. 345/1 That na seculare personis have
intrometting with thaim uther wais than law will.
d Phr. I will well: I assent, `I should think so indeed'. (Cf. F. je veux
bien.)
18 With ellipsis of a vb. of motion.
1885 Bridges Eros & Psyche Aug. xviii, I will to thee o'er the stream afloat.
19 With ellipsis of active inf. to be supplied from the context.
1836 Dickens Sk. Boz, Steam Excurs., `Will you go on deck?' `No, I will
not.' This was said with a most determined air.
1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. lii, I can't believe it. It's not that I don't or I
won't. I can't!
1885 'Mrs. Alexander' Valerie's Fate vi, `Do you know that all the people
in the house will think it very shocking of me to walk with you?'.. `The
deuce they will!'
b With generalized ellipsis, esp. in proverbial saying (now usually as in
quot. 1562, with will for would).
1639 J. Clarke Paroem. 237 He that may and will not, when he would he shall
not.
c With so or that substituted for the omitted inf. phr.: now usually placed
at the beginning of the sentence.
1596 Shaks. Tam. Shr. i. ii. 215 Hor. I promist we would..beare his charge
of wooing... Gremio. And so we wil.
d Idiomatically used in a qualifying phr. with relative, equivalent to a
phr. with indef. relative in -ever; often with a thing as subj., becoming a
mere synonym of may: e.g. shout as loud as you will = `however loud you
(choose to) shout'; come what will = `whatever may come'; be that as it
will = `however that may be'.
1732 Pope Mor. Ess. iii. 153 The ruling Passion, be it what it will, The
ruling Passion conquers Reason still.
20 With ellipsis of pass. inf.
A. 1774 Goldsm. Surv. Exp. Philos. (1776) II. 145 The air's force is
compounded of its swiftness and density, and as these are encreased, so
will the force of the wind.
21 In const. where the ellipsis may be either of an obj. clause (as in 17)
or of an inf. (as in 19).
a In a disjunctive qualifying clause or phr. (usually parenthetic), as
whether he will or no, will he or not, †(with pron. omitted) will or no,
(with or omitted) will he will he not, will he nill he (see VI. below and
willy-nilly), etc.In quot. 1592 vaguely = `one way or another', `in any
case'.
For the distinction between should and would see note s.v. shall v. B . 19 b.
46 In a noun-clause expressing the object of desire, advice, or
request.Usually with a person as subj., implying voluntary action as the
desired end: thus distinguished from should, which may be used when the
person's will is not in view. Also (almost always after wish) with a thing
as subject, in which case should can never be substituted because it would
suggest the idea of command or compulsion instead of mere desire.
Cf. shall v. B. 22 a.

will. v.2 Pres. t. 2 sing. willest, 3 sing. willeth (arch.), wills; pa. t.
and pple. willed (wIld). Forms: 1 willian, 3-4 willi, 3-6 wyll, 5-6 wille,
5-7 wil, 5- will. Pa. t. 1 willode, -ade, 3 will-, wyllede, 3-6 wylled, 4
willyd, 5 -ied, Sc. -it, 5-6 -id, 3- willed; 4 wijld, 4-6 wilde, 6 wild.
Pa. pple. 5 willid, -yd, 5-6 wylled, 6 willet, 6- willed; 6 willd(e, 6-7
wild. [OE. willian wk. vb. = OHG. willôn (MHG., G. willen, pa. pple.
gewillt): f. will sb.1]
1 trans. To wish, desire; sometimes with implication of intention: = will
v.1 1, 2, 5.
1400 Lat. & Eng. Prov. (MS. Douce 52) lf. 13 He þt a lytul me 3euyth to me
wyllyth [optat] longe lyffe.
1548 Udall, etc. Erasm. Par. Matt. v. 21-24 Who so euer hath gotten to
hymselfe the charitie of the gospell, whyche wylleth wel to them that
wylleth yll.
1581 A. Hall Iliad v. 87 By Mineruas helpe, who willes you all the ill she
may. A.
1875 Tennyson Q. Mary i. iv, A great party in the state Wills me to wed her.
b To assert, affirm: = will v.1 B. 4.
1614 Selden Titles Hon. 134 None of this excludes Vnction before, but only
wils him the first annointed by the Pope.
2 a To direct by one's will or testament (that something be done, or
something to be done).
b To dispose of by will; to bequeath or devise.
3 To determine by the will; to attempt to cause, aim at effecting by
exercise of will; to set the mind with conscious intention to the
performance or occurrence of something; to choose or decide to do
something, or that something shall be done or happen.Const. with simple
obj., acc. and inf., simple inf. (now always with to), or obj. clause; also
absol. or intr. (with as or so). Nearly coinciding in meaning with will v.1
7, but with more explicit reference to the mental process of volition.
1630 Prynne Anti-Armin. 119 He had onely a power, not to fall into sinne
vnlesse he willed it.
1667 Milton P.L. viii. 549 So absolute she seems..that what she wills to do
or say, Seems wisest.
1710 J. Clarke tr. Rohault's Nat. Philos. (1729) I. 11
If I will to move my Arm, it is presently moved.
1712 Berkeley Pass. Obed. §11 He that willeth the end, doth will the
necessary means conducive to that end. 1837 Carlyle Fr. Rev. i. v. v, All
shall be as God wills.
1880 Meredith Tragic Com. vi, So great,..heroical, giant-like, that what he
wills must be.
1896 Housman Shropsh. Lad xxx, Others, I am not the first, Have willed more
mischief than they durst.
b intr. To exercise the will; to perform the mental act of volition.
1594 Hooker Eccl. Pol. i. vii. §2 To will, is to bend our soules to the
hauing or doing of that which they see to be good.
1830 Mackintosh Eth. Philos. Wks. 1846 I. 85 But what could induce such a
being to will or to act?
1867 A. P. Forbes Explan. 39 Art. i. 12 Is this infinitely powerful and
intelligent Being free? wills He? loves He?
c trans. To bring or get (into, out of, etc.) by exercise of will.
1850 L. Hunt Table-t. (1882) 184 Victims of opium have been known to be
unable to will themselves out of the chair in which they were sitting.
d To control (another person), or induce (another) to do something, by the
mere exercise of one's will, as in hypnotism.
1882 Proc. Soc. Psych. Research I. 57 note, The one to be `willed' would go
to the other end of the house, if desired, whilst we agreed upon the thing
to be done. 1886 19th Cent. Dec. 883 They are what is called `willed' to do
certain things desired by the ladies or gentlemen who have hold of them.
1897 A. Lang Dreams & Ghosts iii. 59 A young lady, who believed that she
could play the `willing game' successfully without touching the person
`willed'.
4 To express or communicate one's will or wish with regard to something:
with various shades of meaning. (Cf. will v.1 3.)
a To enjoin, ORDER; to decree, ordain.
(a) with personal obj., usually with inf. or clause.
1481 Cov. Leet Bk. 496 We desire and also will you that vnto oure seid
seruaunt..ye yeue your aid.
1547 Edw. VI in Rymer Foedera (1719) XV. 192 We Wyll and Commaunde yowe to
Procede in the seid Matters.
1568 Grafton Chron. II. 659 Their sute was smally regarded, and shortly
after they were willed to silence. 1588 Lambarde Eiren. ii. vii. 272 If a
man do lie in awaite to rob me, and (drawing his sword upon me) he willeth
me to deliver my money.
1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI, i. iii. 10 We doe no otherwise then wee are will'd.
1596 Nashe Saffron Walden P 4, Vp he was had and..willed to deliuer vp his
weapon.
1656 Hales Gold. Rem. (1673) i. 31
The King in the Gospel, that made a Feast, and..willed his servants to go
out to the high-ways side.
1799 Nelson in Nicolas Disp. (1845) III. 397
Willing and requiring all Officers and men to obey you.
(b) with thing as obj., either sb. (alone or with inf. pass.) or obj.
clause; also absol. in clause with as. (See also 2 a.)
1565 Cooper Thesaurus s.v. Classicum, By sounde of trumpet to will scilence.
1612 Bacon Ess., Of Empire (Arb.) 300 It is common with Princes (saith
Tacitus) to will contradictories. 1697 Dryden Æneis i. 112 'Tis yours, O
Queen! to will The Work, which Duty binds me to fulfil.
1877 Tennyson Harold vi. i, Get thou into thy cloister as the king Will'd it.
b To pray, request, entreat; = desire v. 6.
1454 Paston Lett. Suppl. (1901) 54 As for the questyon that ye wylled me to
aske my lord, I fond hym yet at no good leyser.
1564 Haward tr. Eutropius iii. 26 b, The Romaines sent ambassadoures to
him, to wyll him to cease from battayle.
1581 A. Hall Iliad ii. 19 His errand done, as he was willde, he toke his
flight from thence.
1631 [Mabbe] Celestina xiii. 150 Did I not will you I should not be wakened?
1690 Dryden Amphitryon i. i, He has sent me to will and require you to make
a swinging long Night for him.
c fig. of a thing: To require, demand (cf. will v.1 B. 3 c); also, to
induce, persuade (a person to do something).
1445 in Anglia XXVIII. 267
==================================================================
Constaunce willeth also That thou doo noughte with weyke corage.
===================================================================

S. Webb quotes from Cable & Baugh:

*A History of the English Language*, 4th ed., pp. 274-5: "One important
series of prescriptions that now form part of all our grammars -- that
governing the use of "shall" and "will" -- had its origin in this period.
Previous to 1622 no English grammar recognized any distinction between
these words. In 1653 Wallis in his _Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae_ stated
for the benefit of foreigners that simple futurity is expressed by "shall"
in the _first_ person, by "will" in the second and third. It was not until
the second half of the eighteenth century, however, that the use in
questions and subordinate clauses was explicitly defined. In 1755 Johnson,
in his _Dictionary_, stated the rule for questions, and in 1765 William
Ward, in his _Grammar of the English Language_, drew up for the first time
the full set of prescriptions that underlies, with individual variations,
the rules found in modern books. His pronouncements were not followed
generally by other grammarians until Lindley Murray gave them greater
currency in 1795. Since about 1825 they have often been repeated in English
grammars (v. C Fries, The Periphrastic Future with "shall" and "will"" PMLA
40)".

B. Need points out that 'will' qua modal auxiliary _never_ had an 's'. The
absence of conjugation being a very old phenomenon (common Germanic): "OE
3rd person present indicative of _willan_ (and of the preterite-present
verbs) was not distinct from the 1st person present indicative -- That
dates back at least to CGmc (further if you look just as the forms and
ignore tense and/or mood). Re: "Jones wills that he go to London" "Is this
your example, Grice's or Prichard's?" It was the lifelong native speaker's.

The -s is "introduced to indicate a difference between the modal and main
verb uses of _will_." "in fact, _will_ [qua 'modal'] has never been used
with a to-infinitive). OE used present tense forms to refer to future
events as well as _willan_ and, I think, _sculan_. _willan_ would give a
volitional nuance; _sculan_, an obligational nuance. I can't think of an
example of _weorthan_ used to express the future in OE, but that doesn't
mean it didn't happen. I would say, however, that Modern English _will_ has
very little of volition about it (unless you follow the arcane rules for
"shall" and "will"). [Referred to by S. Webb]. "But to be honest, most
Modern English speakers probably use "'ll" (or "be going to") for the future".

Refs.
Davidson D. Intending.
Grandy R/Warner R. Philsophical grounds of rationality: intentions,
categories, ends. Clarendon.
Grice HP. Intention & uncertainty. Oxford: The University Press.
. Aspects of Reason.
. The conception of value.
. Davidson on intending.
. Lectures on intending and trying. Brandeis.
. Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the
bizarre. Repr. in Conception of Value.
. Studies in the way of words.
Hampshire SN & HLA Hart. Decision, intention, and certainty. _Mind_ 67.
Harman GH. Willing and intending. In Grandy/Warner.
. Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics 29.
. Thought. Princeton U.P. (A functionalist approach ala Grice's
'Method').
. Principes of reasoning.
. Rational action & the extent of intention. Social Theory &
Practice 9.
Jeffrey RC. Probability kinematics. In The Logic of Decision. Cited by
Harman in PGRICE.
Kahneman D & A. Tversky. Judgement under uncertainty. Science 185. Cited by
Harman in PGRICE.
Nisbet R & L Ross, Human inference. Prentice Hall. Cited by Harman in PGRICE.
Pears DF. Predicting and deciding.
Prichard HA. Acting, willing, and desiring. In Moral Obligations, OUP. Ed.
by J. O. Urmson.
Speranza JL. The Grice Circle Wants You. [log in to unmask]
Stout GF. Voluntary action. Mind 5. Repr in _Studies in Philosophy and
Psychology_, Macmillan. Cited by Grice, 'Intention & Uncertainty'.
Urmson JO. Introduction to Prichard's Moral Obligations.