Hilary Putnam embraces H. P. Grice's Anti-Ryleism

In order to avoid "category mistakes," it is necessary to re- 
strict this notion, "explain human behavior," very carefully. 
Suppose a man says "I feel bad." His behavior, described in one 
set of categories, is: "stating that he feels bad." And the ex- 
planation may be "He said that he felt bad because he was 
hungry and had a headache." I do not wish to suggest that the 
event "Jones stating that he feels bad" can be explained in terms 
of the laws of physics. But there is another event which is very 
relevant, namely "Jones' body producing such-and-such sound 
waves." From one point of view this is a "different event" from 
Jones* stating that he feels bad. But (to adapt a remark of 
Hanson's) there would be no point in remarking that these are 
different events if there were not a sense in which they were the 
same event. And it is the sense in which these are the "same 
event" and not the sense in which these are "different events" 
that is relevant here. 

In fine, all I mean when I speak of "causally explaining hu- 
man behavior" is: causally explaining certain physical events 
(notions of bodies, productions of sound waves, etc.) which are 
in the sense just referred to the "same" as the events which 
make up human behavior. And no amount of "Ryle-ism" can 
succeed in arguing away 24 what is obviously a possibility: that 
physical science might succeed in doing this much.