H. P. Grice on his reductive analysis alleged to be "too strong"

EXAMPLES DIRECTED TOWARD SIIOWING THE THREE-PRONG ANALYSANS Too STRONG Let us (for simplicity) revert to the original analysans of "U means something by uttering x," and abbreviate "U utters x intending A: (I) to produce r (2) to think U intends A to produce r (3) to think U intends the fulfillment of (I) to be based on the fulfillment of (2)" to "U utters x M-intending that A produce r." In my original article, I supposed that the identification of what U meant by x would turn on the identification of the M-intended response or effect. In particular I supposed that generic differences in type of response would be connected with generic differences within what is meant. To take two central examples, I supposed (a) "U meant by x that so-and-so is the case" would (roughly speaking) be explicated by " U uttered x M-intending to produce in A the belief that so-and-so"; (b) " U meant by x that A should do such-and-such" would be explicated by "U uttered x Mintending to produce in A the doing of such-and-such." Indicative i65 H. P. GRICE or quasi-indicative utterances are connected with the generation of beliefs, imperative or quasi-imperative utterances are connected with the generation of actions. I wish to direct our consideration to the emendation of this idea: to substitute in the account of imperative or quasi-imperative utterances, as the direct, M-intended response, "intention on the part of A to do such-and-such" (vice "A's doing such-and-such"). This has the advantages (i) that symmetry is achieved, in that the M-intended response will be a propositional attitude in both cases (indicative and imperative); (2) that it accommodates the fact that agreement ("yes," "all right") in the case of "The engine has stopped" signifies belief, and in the case of "Stop the engine" signifies intention. Of course action is the ultimate objective of the speaker. Cases of immediate response by acting are treatable, however, as special cases of forming an intention-namely, the intention with which the agent acts. Imperatives always call for intentional action. Alleged counterexamples are best seen as attempts to raise trouble, not for the suggested analysis for "U means something by uttering x," but for this analysis when supplemented by the kind of detail just mentioned, so as to offer an outline of an account of "By uttering x, U means (meant) that . . .." In particular, it is suggested that to explicate "By uttering x, U meant that so-and-so is the case" by "U uttered x M-intending to produce in A the belief that so-and-so" is to select as explicans a condition that is too strong. We need to be able to say on occasion that U meant that so-and-so, without committing ourselves to the proposition that U M-intended to produce a belief that so-and-so. The following examples seem to present difficulties: Examinee: Q: "When was the Battle of Waterloo"? A: "I8 5" ("18I6") Here the examinee meant that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in i8I5 (i8i6) but hardly M-intended to induce a belief to that effect in his examiner. The examiner's beliefs (whatever they may be) are naturally tobe thought of by the examinee as independent of candidates' answers. The M-intended effect is (perhaps) that the examiner knows or thinks that the examinee thinks the Battle i66 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS of Waterloo was fought in I815 (i8I6); or (perhaps) that the examiner knows whether the examinee knows the correct answer to the question. (Perhaps the former is the direct, and the latter the indirect, intended effect). Confession (some cases): Mother: "It's no good denying it: you broke the window, didn't you ?" Child: "Yes, I did." Here the child knows his mother already thinks he broke the window; what she wants is that he should say that he did. Perhaps the M-intended effect, then, is that the mother should think the child willing to say that he did (what does "say" mean here-how should it be explicated?); or that the mother should think the child willing not to pretend that he did not break the window (not to say things or perform acts intended to induce the belief that the child did not break the window). (Confession is perhaps a sophisticated and ritual case.) Reminding: Q: "Let me see, what was that girl's name?" A: "Rose" (or produces a rose). The questioner is here to be presumed already to believe that the girl's name is Rose (at least in a dispositional sense); it has just slipped his mind. The intended effect seems to be that A should have it in mind that her name is Rose. Review offacts: Both speaker and hearer are to be supposed already to believe that p (q, and so forth). The intended effect again seems to be that A (and perhaps U also) should have "the facts" in mind (altogether). Conclusion of argument: p, q, therefore r (from already stated premises). While U intends that A should think that r, he does not expect (and so intend) A to reach a belief that r on the basis of U's intention that he should reach it. The premises, not trust in U, are supposed to do the work. The countersuggestible man: A regards U as being, in certain areas, almost invariably mistaken, or as being someone with whom he i67 H. P. GRICE cannot bear to be in agreement. U knows this. U says "My mother thinks very highly of you" with the intention that A should (on the strength of what U says) think that U's mother has a low opinion of him. Here there is some inclination to say that, despite U's intention that A should think U's mother thinks ill of him, what U meant was that U's mother thinks well of A. These examples raise two related difficulties. (i) There is some difficulty in supposing that the indicative form is conventionally tied to indicating that the speaker is Mintending to induce a certain belief in his audience, if there are quite normal occurrences of the indicative mood for which the speaker's intentions are different, in which he is not M-intending (nor would be taken to be M-intending) to induce a belief (for example, in reminding). Yet, on the other side, it seems difficult to suppose that the function of the indicative mood has nothing to do with the inducement of belief. The indication of the speaker's intention that his audience should act (or form an intention to act) is plausibly, if not unavoidably, to be regarded as by convention the function of the imperative mood; surely the function of the indicative ought to be analogous. What is the alternative to the suggested connection with an intention to induce a belief? The difficulty here might be met by distinguishing questions about what an indicative sentence means and questions about what a speaker means. One might suggest that a full specification of sentence meaning (for indicative sentences) involves reference to the fact that the indicative form conventionally signifies an intention on the part of the utterer to induce a belief; but that it may well be the case that the speaker's meaning does not coincide with the meaning of the sentence he utters. It may be clear that, though he uses a device which conventionally indicates an intention on his part to induce a belief, in this case he has not this but some other intention. This is perhaps reinforceable by pointing out that any device the primary (standard) function of which is to indicate the speaker's intention to induce a belief that p could in appropriate circumstances be easily and intelligibly employed for related purposes, for example (as in the "examinee" example), to indicate that the speaker believes that p. The problem then would be to exhibit the alleged counterexamples as natural adaptations of a i68 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS device or form primarily connected with the indication of an intention to induce a belief. I think we would want if possible to avoid treating the counterexamples as extended uses of the indicative form, and to find a more generally applicable function for that form. In any case, the second difficulty is more serious. (2) Even if we can preserve the idea that the indicative form is tied by convention to the indication of a speaker's intention to induce a belief, we should have to allow that the speaker's meaning will be different for different occurrences of the same indicative sentence. (Indeed, this is required by the suggested solution for difficulty [i]). We shall have to allow this if differences in intended response involve differences in speaker's meaning. But it is not very plausible to say that if U says, "The Battle of Waterloo was fought in I8I 5": (i) as a schoolmaster (intending to induce a belief) (2) as an examinee (3) as a schoolmaster in revision class, U would mean something different by uttering this sentence on the three occasions. Even if the examinee M-intends to induce a belief that he (the examinee) thinks the Battle of Waterloo was fought in i8I5, it does not seem attractive to say that when he said "Waterloo was fought in I8I5" he meant that he thought that Waterloo was fought in i8I5 (unlike the schoolmaster teaching the period for the first time). We might attempt to deal with some of the examples (for example, reminding, fact-reviewing) by supposing the standard M-intended effect to be not just a belief but an "activated belief" (that A should be in a state of believing that p and having it in mind that p). One may fall short of this in three ways: one may (i) neither believe that p nor have it in mind that p (2) believe that p but not have it in mind that p (3) not believe that p, but have it in mind that p. So one who reminds intends the same final response as one who informs, but is intending to remedy a different deficiency. This (even for the examples for which it seems promising) runs I69 H. P. GRICE into a new difficulty. If U says (remindingly) "Waterloo was fought in i8I5," two of my conditions are fulfilled: (i) U intends to induce in A the activated belief that Waterloo was fought in I 8 I 5 (2) U intends A to recognize that (i). But if the date of Waterloo was "on the tip of A's tongue" (as it might be), U cannot expect (and so cannot intend) that A's activated belief will be produced via A's recognition that U intends to produce it. If A already believes (though has momentarily forgotten) that Waterloo was fought in i8I5, then the mention of this date will induce the activated belief, regardless of U's intention to produce it. This suggests dropping the requirement (for speaker's meaning) that U should intend A's production of response to be based on A's recognition of U's intention that A should produce the response; it suggests the retention merely of conditions (i) and (2) above. But this will not do: there are examples which require this condition. (a) Herod, showing Salome the head of St. John the Baptist, cannot, I think, be said to have meant that St. John the Baptist was dead. (b) Displaying a bandaged leg (in response to a squash invitation). In (b) the displayer could mean (i) that he cannot play squash or (dubiously) (2) that he has a bad leg (the bandages might be fake) but not (3) that his leg is bandaged. The third condition seems to be required in order to protect us from counter-intuitive results in these cases. Possible remedies (i) We might retain the idea that the intended effect or response (for cases of meaning that it is the case that p-indicative type) is activated belief, retaining in view the distinction between reaching 170 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS this state (i) from assurance-deficiency (2) from attentiondeficiency; and stipulate that the third condition (that U intends the response to be elicited on the basis of a recognition of his intention to elicit that response) is operative only when U intends to elicit activated belief by eliminating assurance-deficiency, not when he intends to do so by eliminating attention-deficiency. This idea might perhaps be extended to apply to imperative types of cases, too, provided that we can find cases of reminding someone to do something (restoring him to activated intention) in which U's intention that A should reach the state is similarly otiose, in which it is not to be expected that A's reaching the activated intention will be dependent on his recognition that U intends him to reach it. So the definition might read roughly as follows: (*b is a mood marker, an auxiliary correlated with the propositional attitude b from a given range of propositional attitudes) "U means by uttering x that *ap" = "U utters x intending (i) that A should actively b that p (2) that A should recognize that U intends (i) and (unless U intends the utterance of x merely to remedy attention-deficiency) (3) that the fulfillment of (i) should be based on the fulfillment of (2)." This remedy does not, however, cope with (i) the "examinee" example, (2) the "confession" cases, or (3) the countersuggestible man. (ii) Since, when U does intend, by uttering x, to promote in A the belief that p, it is standardly requisite that A should (and should be intended to) think that U thinks that p (otherwise A will not think that p), why not make the direct intended effect not that A should think that p, but that A should think that U thinks that p? In many but not all cases, U will intend A to pass, from thinking that U thinks that p, to thinking that p himself ("informing" cases). But such an effect is to be thought of as indirect (even though often of prime interest). '7' H. P. GRICE We can now retain the third condition, since even in reminding cases A may be expected to think U's intention that A should think that U thinks that p to be relevant to the question whether A is to think that U thinks that p. We have coped, not only with the reminding example, but also with the examinee example and with the countersuggestible man (who is intended to think that U thinks that p, though not to think that p himself). And though the fact-review example is not yet provided for (since A may be thought of as already knowing that U thinks that p), if we are understanding " U believes that p" as " U has the activated belief thatp," this example can be accommodated, too.A, though he is to be supposed to know that U believes that p, does not until U speaks know that U has it in mind that p. But while a solution along these lines may be acceptable for indicative-type cases, it cannot be generalized to all non-indicative cases. Contrast: (a) "You shall not cross the barrier." (b) "Do not cross the barrier." When uttering (a), U would characteristically intend A to think that U intends that A shall not cross the barrier; but it seems that a specification of U's meaning, for a normal utterance of (b), would be incompletely explicated unless it is stated that U intends A not merely to think that U intends that A shall not cross the barrier, but also himself to form the intention not to cross. Let us then draw a distinction between what I might call "purely exhibitive" utterances (utterances by which the utterer U intends to impart a belief that he [ U] has a certain propositional attitude), and utterances which are not only exhibitive but also what I might call "protreptic" (that is, utterances by which U intends, via imparting the belief that he [U] has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer). We reach, then, Redefinition IV, Version A: "By uttering x U meant that */ip" is true iff (3A) (3f) (3c): 172 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS U uttered x intending (i) (2) (3) (4) [as for III(A), with "4-ing that p" (5) substituted for "r"] (6) (7) and (for some cases) (8) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), himself to /b that p. Whether a substitution-instancc of subclause (8) is to appear in the expansion of a statement of the form represented in the dcfinicndum will depend on the nature of the substitution for "*s" which that statement incorporates. We can also reach Rcdcfinition IV, Vcrsion B, by adding what appears above as subclause (8) to the dcfinicns of III(B) as subclausc (a) (5), together with a modification of clause (b) of III(B) to take into account that the intended response r is now specified in terms of the idea of b-ing that p. Whether either version of Rcdcfinition IV is correct as it stands depends crucially on the view to be taken of an imperatival version of the "countcrsuggestiblc man" cxamplc. Mr. A, wishing to be relieved of the immediate presence of Mrs. A, but regarding her as being, so far as he is concerned, countcrsuggestiblc, says to her, "Now, dear, keep me company for a little." Would it be correct to say that Mr. A, who clearly did not mean Mrs. A to keep him company, meant by his remark that she was to (should) keep him company? If the answer is "yes," the Rcdcfinition IV is inadequate, since according to it to have meant that Mrs. A was to keep him company, Mr. A would have had to intend that she form the intention to keep him company, an intention which he certainly did not have. Emcndation, however, would not be difficult; we alter the new subclause from "A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), himself to p to that p" to "A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), to think Uto intend A top/ thatp." If, however, the answer is "no," then Rcdcfinition IV is left intact. '73 H. P. GRICE V. UTTERER'S OCCASION-MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AUDIENCE There are various examples of utterances by which the utterer could correctly be said to have meant something (to have meant that so-and-so), such that there is no actual person or set of persons whom the utterer is addressing and in whom he intends to induce a response. The range of these examples includes, or might be thought to include, such items as the posting of notices, like "Keep out" or "This bridge is dangerous," entries in diaries, the writing of notes to clarify one's thoughts when working on some problem, soliloquizing, rehearsing a part in a projected conversation, and silent thinking. At least some of these examples are unprovided for in the definitions so far proposed. The examples which my account should cover fall into three groups: (a) Utterances for which the utterer thinks there may (now or later) be an audience. U may think that some particular person, for example, himself at a future date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U's utterance; or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who is or will be an auditor of his utterance. (b) Utterances which the utterer knows not to be addressed to any actual audience, but which the utterer pretends to address to some particular person or type of person, or which he thinks of as being addressed to some imagined audience or type of audience (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of his part in a projected conversation). (c) Utterances (including "internal" utterances) with respect to which the utterer neither thinks it possible that there may be an actual audience nor imagines himself as addressing an audience, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly indefinite kind of audience were it the case that such an audience was present. In the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of an audience will have to be interpreted liberally, as being the idea of there being an audience for a public counterpart of the '74 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS utterer's internal speech. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking fall outside the scope of my account. When verbal thoughts merely pass through my head as distinct from being "framed" by me, it is inappropriate to talk of me as having meant something by them; I am, perhaps, in such cases more like a listener than a speaker. I shall propose a final redefinition which I hope will account for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow as special cases the range of examples in which there is, and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual audience. This redefinition will be relatively informal; I could present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension. Let "p" (and k') range over properties of persons (possible audiences); appropriate substituends for "O" (and i') will include such diverse expressions as "is a passer-by," "is a passer-by who sees this notice," "is a native English speaker," "is identical with Jones." As will be seen, for U to mean something it will have to be possible to identify the value of "/" (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U has in mind; but we do not have to determine the range from which U makes a selection. Redefinition V "U meant by uttering x that *iP" is true iff (30) (3f (3c): I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has q would think that (i) x hasf (2) f is correlated in way c with M-ing that p (3) (3 0'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has b' would think, via thinking (i) and (2), that U4's that p (4) in view of (3), U O's that p; and II. (operative only for certain substituends for "*4") U uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has 0, he would via thinking (4), himself a that p; '75 H. P. GRICE and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has 0 will both (i') rely on E in coming to O+ that p and (2') think that (3k'): Uintends x to be such that anyone who has O' will come to /+ that p without relying on E. Notes: (X) "i+" is to be read as "p" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that UO's" if Clause II is non-operative. (2) We need to use both "i" and "i'," since we do not wish to require that U should intend his possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description as U does himself. Explanatory comments: (i) It is essential that the intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as U's intention "that should there be anyone who has 0, he would (will) . . ." rather than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as U's intention "that x should be such that, should anyone be 0, he would ... ." If we adopt the latter specification, we shall be open to an objection raised by Schiffer, as can be shown with the aid of an example of the same kind as his. Suppose that, infuriated by an afternoon with my mother-inlaw, when I am alone after her departure I relieve my feelings by saying, aloud and passionately, "Don't you ever come near me again." It will no doubt be essential to my momentary well-being that I should speak with the intention that my remark be such that were my mother-in-law present, she would form the intention not to come near me again. It would, however, be unacceptable if it were represented as following from my having this intention that I meant that she was never to come near me again; for it is false that, in the circumstances, I meant this by my remark. The redefinition as formulated avoids this difficulty. (2) Suppose that in accordance with the definiens of the latest redefinition, (30): U intends x to be such that anyone who is f will think ... , and suppose that the value of "O" which U has in mind is the property of being identical with a particular person A. Then it will follow that U intends A to think . . . ; and given the further 176 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS condition, fulfilled in any normal case, that U intends A to think that he (A) is the intended audience, we are assured of the truth of a statement from which the definiens of IV(B) is inferrible by the rule of existential generalization (assuming the legitimacy of this application of E. G. to a statement the expression of which contains such "intensional" verbs as "intend" and "think"). I think it can also be shown that, for any case in which there is an actual audience who knows that he is the intended audience, if the definiens IV(B) is true then the definiens of V will be true. If that is so, given that redefinition V is correct, for any normal case in which there is an actual audience the fulfillment of the definiens of IV(B) will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for U's having meant that *1p. VI. CONCLUSION I see some grounds for hoping that, by paying serious attention to the relation between nonnatural and natural meaning, one might be able not only to reach a simplified account of utterer's occasion-meaning, but also to show that any human institution, the function of which is to provide artificial substitutes for natural signs, must embody, as its key-concept, a concept possessing approximately the features which I ascribe to the concept of utterer's occasion-meaning. But such an endeavor lies beyond the scope of this paper.